'The Paradox Of U.S. Security In The 1990s Trans-Border Challenges From Mexico In The Context Of Nafta'

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‘THE PARADOX OF U.S. SECURITY IN THE 1990s: TRANS-BORDER CHALLENGES FROM MEXICO IN THE CONTEXT OF NAFTA’

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Declaration

The work submitted in this dissertation is the result of my own investigation, except where otherwise stated.

It has not already been accepted for any degree, and is also not being concurrently submitted for any other degree.

Agustin Macfel-Padilla

August 4, 2011, El Paso, Texas

The U.S.-Mexico Border

Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), *U.S.-Mexico Border Program*, [online] available: http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/wastewater/mexican/index.cfm (27/06/11).

ABSTRACT

In comparison to security relationships characterised by the centrality of the state and the use of force, better explained by the 'traditional' security perspective, the U.S.-Mexico security relationship in the 1990s is defined by non-state actors and trans-border concerns from the U.S. point of view. U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico are the result of growing interdependence between the two countries, and the paradox of the bilateral security relationship is that these concerns only intensified in the context of NAFTA.

The kind of concerns Mexico indirectly generates for the United States requires for their explanation a non-traditional conception of security. This thesis relies thus on the combination of the 'Copenhagen School' and Risk Society theory perspectives to explaining security issues.

While drug trafficking from Mexico has been seen as detrimental to the social fabric of the United States because of its impact on the U.S. society, Mexican undocumented immigration has been perceived as a U.S. concern because of the possibility for this flow to weaken the U.S. cultural identity.

This thesis also includes the analysis of border environmental challenges, in particular the potential for an epidemic from contaminated water in the region, in order to emphasise that not all pressing border issues are security concerns, as well as the value of non-traditional perspectives to explain those issues that are addressed with far better results through cooperation.

To my mother, Elizabeth

To my daughters, Astrid and Mirel

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I travelled a long journey to complete this thesis, and not only in a metaphorical sense: it literally took me from Mexico City to London, from London to San Luis Potosí, and back to London again. It was sometimes a frustrating process but most of the time a very, very rewarding experience, and I learned a lot both about the subject under study and about life itself.

Whether at this point in my life I have done well or not, this is just a matter of perspective. What really matters to me is that along the way I have always come across with people who have believed in me and have been there to support me. For this, I consider myself a fortunate person and I owe them all a lot. I am obliged to help those that follow me as I have been helped by those who preceded me.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

As President Felipe Calderón's term is coming to an end on the last day of November 2012, Mexico is facing a complex and dire security situation as drug trafficking organisations (DTOs)[1] continue their violent competition for dominance of the lucrative corridors to the United States. According to the most recent *National Drug Control Assessment 2011*, Mexican DTOs are preeminent in the drug trade in the United States because of 'their control of smuggling routes across the U.S. Southwest border and their capacity to produce, transport, and/or distribute cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine'.[2] In fact, it has been established that 'Mexican DTOs represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States'.[3]

Notwithstanding the fact that President Calderón intensified the fight against drug trafficking in Mexico since assuming power on 1 December 2006,[4] the security context in the country began to deteriorate long before, as the trend of violent deaths in the country -which at the time already numbered in excess of thousand a year- had been gradually increasing in the 2000s as shown in Graph 1.

[1] As most academic analyses on this subject do, this thesis adopts the more accurate term 'drug trafficking organisation' instead of 'drug cartel', recognising that Mexican drug groups do not quite operate either to 'regulate output' or to 'fix prices' for drugs, which are key aspects of the definition of the term 'cartel'. See 'cartel', *Oxford English Dictionary*, [online] available: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/28279?rskey=sBrhxh&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (08/06/12).
[2] U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), *National Drug Threat Assessment 2011*, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), August 2011, [online] available: http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf (08/06/12), p.2.
[3] U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), *National Drug Threat Assessment 2009*, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), December 2008, [online] available: http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf (11/06/12), p.iii.
[4] Since the start of his administration, President Calderón deployed 40,000 troops for counter-narcotics operations, beginning with 'Joint Operation Michoacán' on 11 December 2006 that included 4,200 troops. See Notimex, 'Anuncia gabinete de seguridad operativo conjunto Michoacán', *Cronica.com.mx*, [online] available: http://www.cronica.com.mx/nota.php?id_nota=275855 (08/06/12).

Graph 1. Drug-related killings in Mexico (2001-2009)



The number of drug-related deaths was 1,080 (2001), 1,230 (2002), 1,290 (2003), 1,304 (2004), 1,776 (2005), 2,120 (2006), 2,280 (2007), 5,153 (2008), and 6,587 (2009). Source: L. Astorga and D. A. Shirk, *Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context*. Mexico and the United States: Confronting the Twenty-First Century, USMEX WP 10-0, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (USMEX), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (Tijuana), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, El Colegio de México, available [online]: http://usmex.ucsd.edu/assets/024/11632.pdf (11/06/12), p.41.

An interesting argument locates the origin of current drug violence in Mexico in 2001, as a result of the Mexican government's offensive against the brutal Arellano-Felix organisation (AFO/Tijuana DTO), which in turn ended up strengthening the Sinaloa faction, whetting thus its appetite for a greater share of the drug market.[5] Violence in Mexico, however, is a multifaceted phenomenon and there are four general factors that help explain the current context. First, recurrent economic crises in Mexico between the 1970s and 1990s, and consequent economic neo-liberal reforms since the mid-1980s, significantly contributed to erode standards of living in the country. Besides increasing unemployment, the situation also contributed to the growth of the underground economy, which by some estimates provides income for 28.4 million people or 64.01% of Mexico's economically-active population.[6] Second, the shift of South American cocaine routes from the Caribbean to continental Mexico in the mid-1980s after U.S. authorities

[5] V. Felbab-Brown, *The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia*, Policy Paper Number 12, March 2009, Foreign Policy at Brookings, The Brookings Institution, [online] available: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/3/mexico%20drug%20market%20felbabbrown/03_mexico_drug_market_felbabbrown.pdf (08/06/12), p.5.

[6] M. Monroy, 'Empleo informal, un lastre para México', *CNNExpansion.com*, 2 February 2011, [online] available: http://www.cnnexpansion.com/mi-carrera/2011/02/02/empleo-informal-mexico-seguro-social-cnn (28/06/12).

closed the basin's aerial and maritime corridors, resulted in a more prominent role for Mexican DTOs by eventually increasing both their profits and power, as Colombia's cartels (i.e Medellín and Cali) became also gradually weakened by joint U.S.-Colombia law enforcement action.[7] It is estimated that drug trafficking generates around $30 billion dollars a year for Mexican DTOs -equivalent to between 3% and 4% of Mexico's annual gross domestic product (GDP) ($1.5 trillion)-, in the process providing means of subsistence for close to half a million people.[8] Third, while these law enforcement and economic changes were taking place, political transformation in Mexico eroded the traditional social control mechanisms of the single-party political system, weakening thus the official containment orientation that allowed drug cartels to grow with the connivance and protection of authorities that also prevented violent confrontations among these groups. In 1997, for instance, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) lost for the first time the majority in the lower house of Congress, and in 2000 it lost the Presidency to the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) candidate, Vicente Fox, and this reallocation of power contributed to political fragmentation in the country. Eventually, state and local governments found it increasingly difficult to incorporate the federal government's centrally-designed security initiatives because of their different 'political interests', and within this vacuum criminal groups attained more autonomy from government structures.[9] The fact that the government's response to drug trafficking in Mexico became fragmented because of the shift described above, -that is, that either the level of response to crime or the level of complicity with crime varies for authorities in different areas of the country, in part explains why President Calderón's security efforts have not been successful in dealing with both drug flows and violent incidents.[10] The lesson from this, therefore, is that in the long run a comprehensive political agreement in Mexico is required in order to effectively contain violence in the country. Fourth, as a result of political change and transformations in law enforcement agencies in Mexico, especially the abolition of the political police (the DTOs arbitrator), the Federal Directorate of Security (DFS) in response to U.S.

[7] J. S. Beittel, *Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of Rising Violence*, January 7, 2011, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), [online] available: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155587.pdf (08/06/12), p.5.
[8] D. A. Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico. Confronting a Shared Threat*, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 60, March 2011, [online] available: www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/**Mexico**_CSR60.pdf (01/06/12), p.7.
[9] A. Cerda-Ardura, 'Los Matazetas, apuesta por mayor violencia', Entrevista a Luis Astorga Almanza/Investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM, *Siempre!*,11 de Octubre de 2011, [online] available: http://www.siempre.com.mx/2011/10/los-matazetas-apuesta-por-mayor-violencia/ (01/06/12).
[10] *Idem*.

pressure after the assassination in Mexico of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Enrique 'Kiki' Camarena Salazár on 19 February 1985 (along with a Mexican pilot, Alfredo Zavala Avelar),[11] the bipolar structure of DTOs in Mexico began to crumble (at that time the two main DTOs were Sinaloa and Golfo), leading to the accession of new leaders within the fractionalised groups and also to a more intense competition among them. By the 1990s there were four major DTOs in Mexico, in comparison to recent years when it has been possible to identify at least seven groups.[12] The country found itself thus with the worst of the two worlds: less official control over these criminal groups because of political fragmentation, and less respect for the traditional rules of the game on the part of the new leaders of those organisations. According to one perspective, the 'self-destructive' process that contributes to the breakup of these groups, that is, the violent methods used to settle disputes among them, at the same time compels them to incorporate new members from marginalised sectors of society whose inexperience and, sometimes, greed, in turn lead to more violence,[13] and this is an argument that helps explain why the current organisations are less respectful than the old ones of what used to be the 'non-spoken' rules of the game (i.e. no dead bodies on the streets).

By the 1990s, moreover, Osiel Cárdenas-Guillén, leader of the Gulf DTO, co-opted members of the Mexican Army Air/Amphibious Special Forces Unit (GAFES/GANFES) who became known as 'Zetas', and this development resulted in the introduction, for the first time, of paramilitary tactics in the confrontation among DTOs; crime paramilitary tactics implied not only the presence but also control of criminal activities within a given territorial demarcation by criminal groups, and this eventually led to confrontation with the government after these groups were seen as taking over exclusive functions of the state,[14] such as challenging the official monopoly of the use of force. In this context, and in comparison with previous periods of violence, DTOs' behaviour has been characterised by their aggression against the upper echelons of security forces; the brazenness of their brutal acts; and the use of high-power weapons (i.e.

[11] Political control mechanisms, through police forces, started to erode since at least the 1980s with the assassination of Camarena and the dissolution of the DFS. Political power used to establish the rules of the game and drug organisations lacked the capacity to challenge the state. Erosion of those instruments led to an increase of violence among drug traffickers. See A. Cerda-Ardura, 'Inoperante el actual esquema antidrogas', Entrevista a Luis Astorga Almanza/Investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM, *Siempre!*,9 de Febrero de 2004.
[12] These are the Beltran-Leyva, *Los Zetas*, the Gulf, the Juárez, *La Familia*, the Sinaloa, and the Tijuana DTOs.
[13] J. Villalobos, 'Doce mitos de la guerra contra el narco', *Nexos* en línea, (01/01/2010), [online] available: http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=72941 (08/06/12).
[14] Cerda-Ardura, 'Los Matazetas'.

AK-47s, MP-5s, AR-15s, P90s, submachine guns, grenade launchers, and .50 calibre machine guns).[15]

President Calderón responded to this situation escalating the fight against DTOs, by increasingly involving the military in regional operations around the country to contain violence generated by competition among these organisations; that is, by further militarising the response to organised crime activities. This course of action, however, has not been new in Mexico as a measure of last resort in response to widespread corruption among its police forces, notwithstanding that the military has not proved to be above and beyond drug-related corruption. The centrepiece of the Calderón administration's strategy has focused on the idea of turning a 'national security' problem into a 'public safety' challenge by breaking down the big DTOs into smaller groups, under the logic that smaller factions are more amenable to be contained.[16] This strategy has put a premium on neutralising high-value targets (HVTs), and this orientation has contributed to intra-cartel conflict.[17] In fact, decapitating DTOs has created more chaos and uncertainty in the short-term without necessarily dealing with either drug distribution or internal violence. This strategy has also been criticised in terms of an offensive that was launched without previously having the required tools to get the job done, evident, for instance, in the fact that not only Mexico's police forces are characterised by their lack of professionalism and ingrained corruption,[18] but also, according to an estimation, by the fact that only 1 or 2 per 100 crimes actually end up in conviction, which provides the picture of the serious level of impunity in the country and the long way Mexico still has to go to achieve an effective judicial reform.[19]

It is important to note that even though violence in Mexico has so far been localised, it has spread internally in the last years. According to a study, 2/3 of drug-related deaths have occurred in just 5 of the 32 states, and around 80% of them have occurred in 168 of the country's 2,456 municipalities, even though the density of violence in some locations such as Ciudad Juárez has

[15] A. Gereben Schaefer, B. Bahney, K. J. Riley, *Security in Mexico. Implications for U.S. Policy Options*, RAND, Monograph Series, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, c2009), [online] available: http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/security_in_mexico.pdf (08/06/12), p.xiv.
[16] Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico*, p.9.
[17] I. Salmerón, 'A muerte, la lucha de los capos por dominar el narcotráfico', Entrevista a Luis Astorga Almanza y Jorge Chabat/Investigadores sociales, *Siempre!*,13 de Febrero de 2006. By mid-2010, more than 35 HVTs had already been arrested or killed. See A. Rawlins, *Mexico's Drug War*, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), December 13, 2011, [online] available: http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689 (08/06/12), p.4.
[18] S. O'Neil, 'Mexico-U.S. Relations: What's Next?', *Americas Quarterly*, Spring 2010, p.70.
[19] Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico*, p.11.

been significant,[20] which is reflected in the 3,096 murders that occurred there just in 2010.[21] This is the reason why Ciudad Juárez became synonymous of drug-related violence in Mexico in recent years, and also why the stakes there have been high for the Calderón administration in terms of justifying its offensive against drug trafficking.[22] Regionally, violence has also extended as the proportion of the 95% of cocaine entering the United States from Mexico has increasingly travelled through Central America (it went from less than 1% in 2007 to 60% in 2010), having an impact on the growth of violent deaths in the region.[23]

The Mexican government may well be correct in believing that the atomisation of DTOs and disorder in the drug market indicate that anti-narcotics operations have been effective, but the other side of this coin is that authorities are finding it difficult to contain crime.[24] One reason for this unsatisfactory outcome is that unlike Colombia in the 1980s and early 1990s, the greater number of DTOs in Mexico makes it difficult for law enforcement agencies to identify with accuracy the perpetrators of crime.[25] It is important to note that, according to a contrasting perspective, if it is true that DTOs' fragmentation brings with it negative consequences (i.e. an increase of violence), these effects are temporary and are part of an inevitable step to improve security in the long-term. The argument goes that it is less difficult to deal with small, local groups, than fighting organisations with a national structure comprising regional influence, support from the population, resources, and a large group of enforcers.[26] Whether atomising DTOs is a sensible course of action or not, it is important to note that dealing with common

[20] *Ibid*., p.8. In the most recent assessment 2011, violence concentrated on key trafficking areas with 70% homicides occurring in just 8 states, and 24% in just five cities. Between 2010 and 2011 violence also moved south from border states with a decrease in the proportion of deaths from 50% to 44%, and 29.5% to 17% for border cities, displacing violence to states such as Veracrúz and Guerrero. C. Molzahn, V. Rios, and D. A. Shirk, *Drug Violence in Mexico. Data and Analysis Through 2011*, Special Report, Trans-Border Institute, Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, University of San Diego, March 2012, [online] available: http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/2012-tbi-drugviolence.pdf (11/06/12), (Executive summary).

[21] V. Felbab-Brown, *Calderon's Caldron. Lessons from Mexico's Battle Against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Michoacán*, Latin America Initiative, Brookings Institution, September 2011, [online] available: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/9/calderon%20felbab%20brown/09_calderon_felbab_brown.pdf (11/06/12), p.8.

[22] *Idem*.

[23] U.S. Senate, *Responding to Violence in Central America*, A Report by the United States Senate Caucus on international Narcotics Control, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, September 2011, Washington, DC, [online] available: http://www.grassley.senate.gov/judiciary/upload/Drug-Caucus-09-22-11-Responding-to-Violence-in-Central-America-2011.pdf (08/06/12), p.12.

[24] Felbab-Brown, *Calderon's Caldron*, p.11.

[25] *Ibid*., p.40.

[26] J. Villalobos, 'Nuevos mitos de la guerra contra el narco', *Nexos*, a. 35, v. XXXIV, n. 409, Enero, 2012, [online] available: http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=2102505 (11/06/12), p.5.

crime in the country requires to deal first with organised crime because of the fact that illegal activities such as kidnapping and extortion –apparently unrelated to drugs-, are in fact elements of the DTOs' strategy to maintain management of crime in the *plaza*. Moreover, the need for consolidating regional influence has been a direct consequence of the growth of *narco-menudeo* (retail drug sales on the streets) in the country since the mid-1990s.[27]

The United States has been part of the problem by its unrelenting demand for drugs and its permissive arms market that has fuelled arms trafficking and, consequently, violence in Mexico. According to U.S. Bureau of Arms Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) data, 90-95% of guns used in drug violence in Mexico enter illegally from the United States; it is estimated that the several hundred arms entering Mexico per day add to the estimated 40 million illicit guns already in the country.[28] The persistence of arms trafficking into Mexico is explained not only by the lack of political support in the United States for extending the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB) in 2004 after ten years of observation,[29] but also by the fact that 10% of U.S. gun dealers are located on the Mexican border.[30] However, the United States has not only contributed to violence in Mexico but it has also been affected because of its own vulnerability to criminal activity both of Mexican organisations operating within its own territory and south of the border. Even though violence has for the most part occurred on the Mexican side of the dividing line, there have been isolated incidents related to Mexican organised crime within the United States that have added to the perception that violence has spilled-over into the country, and this is the reason that has helped to justify, for instance, the $3 billion annually the Border Patrol spends on protecting the border.[31] So far, the effects of border violence on the U.S. side have been manifested in terms of, for instance, the movement of people from Mexico. Given the level of violence and extortion by DTOs in Ciudad Juárez, people from different occupations with access to economic means have increasingly moved to El Paso, Texas, while keeping their everyday activities on the Mexican

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[27] F. Calderón Hinojosa, *La Lucha por la Seguridad Pública*, Presidencia de la República, Presidente Felipe Calderón, [online] available: http://portal.sre.gob.mx/chicago/pdf/061810SeguridadPublica.pdf (11/06/12), p.2.
[28] H. Brands, *Mexico's Narco-insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy*, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College (USAWAC), [online] available: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=918 (11/06/12), p.20.
[29] C. S. Koper, with D. J. Woods and J. A. Roth, Shirk, *An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban: Impacts on Gun Markets and Gun Violence, 1994-2003*, Report to the National Institute of Justice with funds from the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), Document No. 204431, June 2004, Jerry Lee Center of Criminology, University of Pennsylvania, [online] available: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204431.pdf (29/06/12).
[30] Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico*, p.13.
[31] *Ibid*., p.vii.

side.[32] It is important to note that while this phenomenon can be seen with concern on the U.S. side of the border, it has also had a positive effect in the form of small-business being brought to the United States.[33] More alarming, although still limited, there have been cases of spill-over related to, for instance, the number of kidnappings in Phoenix, Arizona, which tripled from 48 in 2004 to 241 in 2008.[34] U.S. border cities, however, have been consistently considered some of the safest in the United States,[35] and the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS), Janet Napolitano, has even argued that the border is 'safest than ever'.[36]

In 2008, the United States and Mexico entered into an agreement called the 'Merida Initiative' that was a three-year $1.4 billion U.S. aid package to provide equipment and training, on top of an estimated $4 billion annually devoted by Mexico to the fight against drugs.[37] This agreement was explained not only because of the strategic importance of Mexico in terms of the 2,000-mile common border and the variety of issues that are part of the complex bilateral relationship -such as U.S. foreign direct investment, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico being a potential source of asylum seekers-,[38] but also because of concerns emanating from south of the border such as organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and insurgency.[39] It is important to note that U.S. counternarcotics aid to Mexico had previously amounted to around $55-60 million annually in the 7 years since 2000.[40] In this context, if significant in comparison to previous periods, the Merida Initiative was relevant mainly because of its symbolism, in particular because of the U.S. government's acceptance of the principle of

[32] Felbab-Brown, *Calderon's Caldron*, p.9.
[33] R. Alvarado, J. Martínez, N. Chávez, 'Mexodus –Unrelenting violence and lawlessness forces thousands of middle-class Mexicans to relocate seeking safety in the U.S. and in more peaceful regions in Mexico', *Borderzine*, August 4, 2001, [online] available: http://borderzine.com/2011/08/mexodus-%E2%80%93-unrelenting-violence-and-lawlessness-forces-thousands-of-middle-class-mexicans-to-relocate-seeking-safety-in-the-u-s-and-in-more-peaceful-regions-in-mexico (29/06/12).
[34] R. C. Archibold, 'Wave of Drug Violence is Creeping Into Arizona From Mexico, Officials Say', *The New York Times*, February 23, 2009, [online] available: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/us/24border.html (29/06/12).
[35] The top four big U.S. cities with the lowest rates of violent crime are all in border states: San Diego, Phoenix and El Paso and Austin in Texas, according to a new FBI report. And an in-house Customs and Border Protection report shows that Border Patrol agents face far less danger than street cops in most U.S. cities. See Associated Press, 'U.S.-Mexico Border Safety: Area is One of the Safest in America', *Huffington Post*, 06/03/10, [online] available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/03/us-mexico-border-safety-a_n_598825.html (11/06/12).
[36] J. Epstein, "Janet Napolitano: Border security better than ever", *Politico*, 3/25/11, [online] available: http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51925.html (08/06/12).
[37] Astorga and Shirk, *Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context* p.25.
[38] Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico*, pp.4-5.
[39] Gereben Schaefer, Bahney, Riley, *Security in Mexico*, p. xv.
[40] Brands, *Mexico's Narco-insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy*, p.xv.

'co-responsibility' in reference to Mexico's challenges, which represented a departure from the previous 'finger-pointing' practice on the part of each other in the bilateral relationship. As a matter of fact, in one of her official visits to Mexico City, U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, conceded the United States was in part responsible for violence in Mexico, and her statement had no precedent in the history of bilateral relations.[41]

The fact that the initial stages of the programme focused on providing coercive instruments,[42] and because the increasing involvement of the Mexican military in counter-narcotics operations led to human rights abuses,[43] both governments found themselves under pressure from the U.S. Congress and public opinion in both countries to address this issue. Their demand consisted in making sure the extension of the programme, called 'Beyond Merida', would focus on strengthening Mexico's judicial system and other non-coercive initiatives for dealing with the country's security challenges, more in line with institutional reform. In 2008, for instance, the U.S. Congress released the first instalment of $400 million to Mexico, and though U.S. legislators initially delayed the second instalment in 2009 due to human rights violations, the Obama administration continued its support for the initiative.[44] One alternative explanation of the U.S. emphasis on equipment and training in its support of Mexico refers to Mexican resistance to accept foreign intromission in institution-building matters because of sovereignty concerns.[45] An additional problem regarding the Merida Initiative is that it has focused on federal to federal collaboration, neglecting thus 95% of the 325,000 police officers at the state and local level that are not only the first-responders to crime but also the weakest security link and the most vulnerable to corruption.[46]

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[41] K. Ellingwood, 'U.S. shares blame for Mexico drug violence, Clinton says', *Los Angeles Times*, March 26, 2009, [online] available: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-clinton26-2009mar26,0,2128382.story (11/06/12).

[42] The Merida Initiative rested on three pillars: (1) counter-narcotics/counter-terrorism/border security; (2) public security and law enforcement; and (3) institution building/rule of law. The largest chunk of the $400 million first installment ($327 million or 82%) was devoted to the first and second pillars. Brands, *Mexico's Narco-insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy*, p.22.

[43] Human Rights Watch Report, *Neither Rights Nor Security. Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico's 'War' on Drugs*, Executive Summary, 9 November 2011, [online] available: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf (14/06/12), pp.4-16.

[44] Astorga and Shirk, *Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context*, p.25.

[45] Gereben Schaefer, Bahney, Riley, *Security in Mexico*, p.52.

[46] S. O'Neill, 'The Real War in Mexico. How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 4, July/August 2009, p.73.

Mexico's own efforts at addressing the non-coercive part of its security strategy were highlighted by the murder of 15 middle and high school students attending a birthday party in the neighbourhood Villas de Salvárcar, Ciudad Juárez, on 30 January 2010, as a result of being mistakenly taken by DTO enforcers as members of an opposing gang. At first, President Calderón strongly condemned the atrocious act, but also declared the deceased teenagers were victims of a 'fight between gangs' without validating this information.[47] Even though the president eventually apologised for his characterisation, this generated uproar in Ciudad Juárez. In order to keep the situation under control, twelve days after the massacre President Calderón launched the '*Todos Somos Juárez*' programme that included $282.1 million dollars to finance 160 different social reconstruction projects, to be disbursed in one year.[48] Notwithstanding the programme faced problems such as insufficient connectivity between officials in charge of planning and the needs of local stake-holders,[49] '*Todos Somos Juárez*' has often been presented as proof of the non-coercive elements of the federal government's comprehensive security strategy. It can be argued, however, that no social project stands a chance to succeed if there is not a previous security stabilisation effort to set the conditions for that programme to work out. One cannot conceive, for instance, how the building and the materials of a public library constructed in the middle of a marginalised neighbourhood can survive if there are no security guarantees for that facility to operate.

Militarisation of anti-narcotics operations has continued to lead to an increase in human rights violations, as mentioned above, and it has contributed to corruption, to desertion within the rank and file of the Mexican military, and to more violence, in general.[50] The most ominous sign of President Calderón's strategy, nevertheless, has been the 50,000 deaths[51] produced by the three-pronged confrontation (i.e. intra-DTO, DTO *vs.* DTO, and DTOs *vs.* government) that is directly attributed to the federal government's policy, even though the President has repeatedly

[47] *CNN México*, 'Calderón ofrece disculpas a juarenses si ofendió la memoria de sus hijos', 11 de Febrero de 2010, [online] available: http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2010/02/11/calderon-disculpas-a-juarenses-si-ofendio-la-memoria-de-sus-hijos (18/07/12).
[48] L. Cárdenas, '"Todos Somos Juárez", the reality speaks for itself', Mexico in Focus, *El Paso Times*, 1/25/2011, [online] available: http://elpasotimes.typepad.com/mexico/2011/01/todos-somos-ju%C3%A1rez-the-reality-speaks-by-itself.html (17/07/12).
[49] Felbab-Brown, *Calderon's Caldron*, p.19.
[50] Astorga and Shirk, *Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context*, p.3.
[51] There are over 50,000 organised crime murders in Mexico from 2006 through 2011. The Mexican government recorded 47,515 and the *Reforma* newspaper 2,624. They represented 31.9% of the total in 2007, 63.4% in 2010, and 53.8% in 2011. See Molzahn, Ríos, and Shirk, *Drug Violence in Mexico*, Executive Summary.

argued that far from initiating violence, the government only responded to what already was a violent situation, a point which seems to have some merit.[52] For instance, from the total death toll since 2006, 90% of homicides are estimated to be part of intra-criminal conflict, without the authority being involved in any manner.[53] It is important to note that even though violence has involved innocent civilians, such as in the case of grenades being thrown into a crowd in Morelia on Independence Day in 2008,[54] criminal activity has not pre-eminently targeted civilians.[55] Massacres and homicides are occurring precisely where there are disputes for *plazas* and corridors among criminal organisations, and those conflicts started before the presence of authorities was required.[56] In this context, it can be argued that what produces and explains violence has not been the intervention of the federal government *per se* but the intrinsic dynamic of crime as expressed in a high level of 'criminal density'.[57] Violence is evidence of growing criminal activities because of the government's long-time practice of managing, rather than solving, the problem in order to avoid conflict,[58] and it is only in this sense that violence is an outcome created by a failed official strategy.

In previous years, the situation has been so dire in Mexico that both official and private estimates have pointed to the country's supposedly 'failed state' status. For instance, the private consulting company *Stratfor* made reference to Mexico's potential to become a 'failed state' due to an imbalance between the declining power of the state *vis-a-vis* the DTOs,[59] and *The Joint Operational Environment* (JOE) 2008 established that, 'in terms of worst case scenarios…two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and

[52] *Europa Press*, 'Calderón justifica el despliegue de militares en regiones con violencia "inmanejable"', 16 de Febrero de 2012, [online] available: http://www.europapress.es/latam/mexico/noticia-mexico-calderon-justifica-despliegue-militares-regiones-donde-violencia-inmanejable-20120216215447.html (16/07/12).
[53] Villalobos, 'Nuevos mitos de la guerra contra el narco', p.7.
[54] M. García, 'Grenade attacks kill 8 on Mexico's National Day', *Reuters*, September 16, 2008, [online] available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/16/us-mexico-blasts-idUSN1634595120080916 (15/06/12).
[55] P. Williams, 'Drug Trafficking, Violence, and the State in Mexico', *Op-Ed*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (USAWC), April, 2009, [online] available: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub913.pdf (15/06/12), p.2.
[56] Villalobos, 'Nuevos mitos de la guerra contra el narco', p.9.
[57] Criminal density is the sum of organisations with regional and national presence, growth of armed branches, expansion of information systems and availability of weapons, co-optation and intimidation of key sectors of criminal activity. *Ibid*., pp.1 and 7.
[58] *Ibid*., p.1.
[59] G. Friedman, 'Mexico: On the Road to Failed State?', *Stratfor*, Free Podcast, May 13, 2008, [online] available: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexico_road_failed_state (15/06/12).

Mexico'.[60] A more nuanced and accurate characterisation of Mexico's predicament, nevertheless, makes reference not to a 'state failure' but to a 'security failure', meaning the Mexican government has been ineffective only in the security sphere but not as a state as a whole, which is different.[61]

To these perspectives it is possible to add alarmist statements such as the one by former DHS Secretary, Michael Chertoff, who pointed out that his department had devised a contingency plan based on a 'surge' capability to confront spill-over violence from Mexico;[62] the former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, Michael Hayden, declared that 'Mexico could rank alongside Iran as a challenge for Obama, perhaps a greater problem than Iraq';[63] and General Barry McCaffrey recommended the incoming administration (Obama) to do more to support Mexico because the 'risk from drug-fueled [sic] crime which is so powerful that it could threaten the viability of the state'.[64] These statements, nevertheless, have ignored the realities of the situation in the country, on the one hand, and have also reflected the complexity of Mexico's predicament, on the other. For instance, the conflict in Mexico has been classified as 'narco-insurgency' and 'narco-terrorism'[65] ignoring that the principal motivation of drug traffickers has not been political but economic gain, and also the fact that the problem sprang from the erosion of a previous arrangement devised to avoid open conflict, in the first place. Incidents such as the 2010 car bombing in Ciudad Juárez, nevertheless, have arguably contributed to focus México's challenges from the perspective above.[66] According to an analyst, 'strikingly, this is a conflict defined as much by what it lacks as by which it includes, and what it lacks is a clear political

[60] See, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *The Joint Operational Environment 2008*, United States Joint Forces Command, Center for Joint Futures (J59), [online] available: http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf (15/06/12), p.36.
[61] P. Kenny and M. Serrano (eds.), with A. Sotomayor, *Mexico's Security Failure. Collapse into Criminal Violence*, (New York, NY: Routledge, c2012), pp.2-3.
[62] R. C. Archibold, 'U.S. Plans Border "Surge" Against Any Drug Wars', *The New York Times*, January 7, 2009, [online] available: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/us/08chertoff.html (15/06/12).
[63] T. Carl, 'Mexico On Path To Becoming Bigger Security Threat than Iraq', *The Huffington Post*, January 18, 2009, [online] available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/18/mexico-on-path-to-becomin_n_158879.html (15/06/12).
[64] B. Mc Caffrey, 'Visit Mexico: 5-7 December 2008', After-action report based on the December 5-7 International Forum of Intelligence and Security Specialists in Mexico, [online] available: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0103/comm/mccaffery_mexico.html (15/06/12), p.8.
[65] See Brands, *Mexico's Narco-insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy*, p.4, and Mc Caffrey, 'Visit Mexico: 5-7 December 2008', p.11, respectively.
[66] R. Bracamontes, 'Experts: Car bomb in Juárez mimics Middle East terrorist tactics', *El Paso Times*, July 17, 2010, [online] available: http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_15537113 (16/07/12).

agenda on the part of almost all combatants'.[67] Only *La Familia* DTO has developed a sort of 'narco-administration' imposing its rules in its home territory.[68] Even though the situation in Mexico is far from stable, violence elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere is far worse than in the country. Whereas there were 45,000 violent deaths in Mexico between 2007 and 2011 (14 per 100,000), Brazil and Colombia saw more than 80,000 (20 per 100,000) and 50,000 (30 per 100,000) in the same period, respectively.[69]

Most analysts agree that the U.S. war on drugs is a failure that requires a new approach,[70] evident in the fact that drugs are more accessible, more widely utilised and more potent than ever before.[71] Given that the U.S. demand for drugs will continue and no possible modification of the U.S. Constitution Second Amendment[72] is in sight regarding the easy access to weapons in the United States, the option for the Mexican government is to continue fighting drug trafficking, perhaps through a more focused strategy targeting not HVTs but the mid-level members of DTOs in order to erode their operational capacity.[73] It can be argued that the state cannot afford to have the state institutions challenged, and this is the reason why the offensive will continue beyond the 2012 presidential election, and also why advancing on the institution-building process is needed. In contrast, the possibility for accommodation between the incoming government and DTOs is very narrow because it is not clear who to negotiate with within the DTOs, and also because there are no guarantees of stability. Moreover, the idea about the

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[67] J. Parakilas, 'The Complexities of *Narcoviolencia*: Understanding the Mexican Drug Conflict as a Market of Violence', *Interdisciplinary Political Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Special Issue, March 2012, [online] available: http://www.idps.unisi.it/issue1-vol2/47/the-complexities-of-narcoviolencia-understanding-the-mexican-drug-conflict-as-a-market-of-violence (15/06/12), p.36.

[68] *La Familia's* activities include generating drug-related employment for people, limiting the operation of other DTOs within its area of operations, contributing to the church by repairing its buildings, providing 'protection' to businesses (extortion), and monitoring newcomers to its territory. See G. Grayson, *La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security*, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College (USAWAC), December 2010, [online] available: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1033.pdf (15/06/12), p.viii.

[69] Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico*, p.3.

[70] The Latin American Commission on Drugs, for instance, with Cardoso, Gaviria, Zedillo expressing their opinion that prohibition and criminalization of consumption has not worked and alternative approaches are needed. See Global Commission on Drug Policy, *War on Drugs. Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy*, June 2011, [online] available: http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/themes/gcdp_v1/pdf/Global_Commission_Report_English.pdf (15/06/12).

[71] Astorga and Shirk, *Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context*, p.4.

[72] 'A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed'. See Legal Information Institute, 'Second Amendment', *U.S. Constitution*, Cornell University Law School, [online] available: http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/second_amendment (02/07/12).

[73] Felbab-Brown, *Calderon's Caldron*, p.44.

government helping out to consolidate one leading DTO may seem attractive, but the establishment of such dominance of the criminal market by one group also has consequences. Most obviously, it strengthens the group *vis-a-vis* both the state and the society.[74] Such 'narco-peace' is vulnerable to changes in balances of power in the criminal market.[75] Power in Mexico today is more fractured and devolved to various layers of the government. Equally, the DTOs are too fractured and unstable to be able to commit to a bargain.[76]

Notwithstanding that the Calderón administration is key to understanding Mexico's current security context and therefore its impact on U.S. security, this thesis focuses on an earlier period: U.S. security in the 1990s. Given that the research question of this thesis is why Mexico, a valuable U.S. trade partner, became a U.S. security concern in the context of a closer economic relationship as reflected by the NAFTA agreement, the study of security issues in U.S.-Mexican relations during the 1990s is fundamental to explain, first, the increase of undocumented immigration to the United States and, second, the strengthening of Mexican DTOs with the potential to affect U.S. security.

On the one hand, from the beginning of the 1990s through approximately 1995, it is estimated that around 1.1 million immigrants entered the United States on average every year; the peak years were 1999 and 2000 with annual flows 35% higher than average to reach 1.5 million. Migration from Mexico comprised 1/3 of the overall flow.[77] On the other hand, it is important to note that growing criminality is function not only of the economic crises of the 1980s and the consequent efforts to restructure the Mexican economy, but also of the fact that it was precisely in the 1990s when Mexican DTOs gained sufficient power and influence to challenge the structure of the Mexican state through corruption and direct confrontation. During the 1990s, Mexican DTOs became stronger and increased their potential to generate risks beyond Mexico's borders. For instance, the Carrillo Fuentes organisation became the most influential player in drug trafficking to the United States by controlling the El Paso-Juárez area of operations.[78] By the late 1990s, however, there were four major DTOs fighting for dominance of

[74] *Ibid*., p.4.
[75] *Idem*.
[76] *Ibid*., pp.4-5.
[77] See J. S. Passel and R. Suro, *Rise, Peak, and Decline: Trends in U.S. Immigration 1992-2004*, Report, September 27, 2005, Pew Hispanic Center, [online] available: http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/53.pdf (25/08/12), pp.i-iii.
[78] Astorga and Shirk, *Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context*, p.14.

the drug market, unleashing therefore a wave of violence without precedent at the time.[79] This explains why the 1990s witnessed an increasing deterioration of public safety in Mexico, and this is also the background of the U.S. current security concern regarding Mexico.

At the basis of this thesis, therefore, there is the explanation of the paradox that is related to the fact that precisely at a time of a closer economic relationship between the United States and Mexico (and Canada) in the context of NAFTA, the United States became more concerned about challenges emanating from Mexico, a neighbour that at that time had also become a more integrated and thus a more valuable partner. U.S. concerns, nevertheless, contrast with ideas that acknowledge, for instance, that 'only the reciprocal exchange and division of labor' in the international economy promotes peaceful relations among states.[80] Moreover, from a neo-realist perspective, in principle, it does not make sense that the weaker side in the U.S.-Mexico relationship represents a significant concern for the United States, given the fact that all indicators clearly establish the United States as the superior power in the bilateral equation, as shown in Table 1.

[79] *Ibid*, p.16.
[80] R. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State. Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., c1986), p.25.

Table 1-1. **Differences in Military and Economic Capacity between the United States and Mexico (selected years)**

	1990		1995		2000		2005	
	US	MEXICO	US	MEXICO	US	MEXICO	US	MEXICO
Total Active Armed Forces	2,117,900 A	148,500 C	1,547,300 A	175,000 C	1,371,500 A	178,770 C	1,433,600 F	192,770
GDP (US Dollars)	$5.1 trillion B	$192.38 billion B	$6.7 trillion D	$243 billion D	$8.5 trillion E	$400 billion E	$10.9 trillion G	$625 billion G
GDP *per Capita* (US Dollars)	n.a.	n.a.	$25,400	$8,100	$31,100 E	$7,900 E	$37,750 G	$6,115 G
Total Population	248,855,000	88,928,000	263,119,000	90,464,000	273,133,000	97,122,000	291,044,000	102,291,000
Average Annual Population Growth Rate	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.80% H	1.40% H

A. Excluding the U.S. Coast Guard.
B. 1989.
C. 60,000 conscripts.
D. 1994.
E. 1998.
F. Excluding the U.S. Coast Guard plus 158,156 National Guard and Reserve troops.
G. 2003.
H. Projection for the 2002-2015 period.

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, (Oxford: Published by Brassey's for the IISS, c1990); The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1995-1996*, (Oxford: Published by Oxford University Press for the IISS, c1995); The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1999-2000*, (Oxford: Published by Oxford University Press for the IISS, c1999); The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, (London: Published by Oxford University Press for the IISS, c2004). Sections on the United States and Mexico.

The selection of the research topic was the product of my personal interest in the field of security studies, on the one hand, and, on the other in the United States as a relevant area of study because of its impact on the history of Mexican foreign policy.[81] In this context, this thesis is located within the general framework of U.S.-Mexican studies, and it focuses on the security aspect of the bilateral relationship. In particular, it explores the security dimension of U.S.-Mexican relations in the 1990s from the U.S. point of view.

[81] For instance, in reference to what being the neighbour of the United States has traditionally meant to Mexico, in a classical text of Mexico's foreign policy Mario Ojeda establishes: 'As a matter of fact, only in a few countries such as in Mexico one can clearly observe that geographic location has actually operated both as a conditioning factor of its foreign policy, and as a constraining aspect of its sovereignty'. M. Ojeda, *Alcances y Límites de la Política Exterior de México*, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, c1976), p.87. (Translation by the author).

The objective of this study is to explain the paradox that is at the centre of the thesis' argument; that is, that precisely at a time of increasing economic integration as expressed in the NAFTA agreement -when common sense would indicate that the more economically integrated two countries the less the risk they pose to each other-, the United States became increasingly concerned about security issues regarding Mexico because of NAFTA's potential to intensify illegal flows across the Southwest border in the form of drugs and undocumented immigration. What I am basically asking is why Mexico, a valuable U.S. trade partner, also became a U.S. security concern in the context of a closer economic relationship as reflected by the NAFTA agreement.

I am trying to respond to this question utilising a combination of complementary perspectives from the non-traditional literature on security. On the one hand, I resorted to the so-called 'Copenhagen School'[82] which was born at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI), and it has been identified with efforts at broadening the concept of security. Its best known exponents are Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. This research adopted the broader security perspective developed by B. Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (Buzan et.al) in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*[83] –which is itself a critique of the traditional security perspective- because it represents a comprehensive and holistic approach that recognises that security became more complex even before the end of the Cold War, to the extent that different actors in the international system have become increasingly affected by other issues besides the use of force, which is the basis for thinking about both 'referent objects' beyond the state, and 'issue-sectors' beyond the military one.

On the other hand, I compared the analytical framework above with the insights of the Risk Society theory, which is a perspective also from the non-traditional literature on security that focuses on the kind of non-military concerns that replaced state-centred threats after the Cold War. The justification to combine and to contrast the two approaches above is: (1) both are

[82] According to Steve Smith, the main strands of the 'non-traditional literature' are 'Alternative Defence and Common Security'; the 'Third World Security School'; 'Buzan and the "Copenhagen School"'; 'Constructivist Security Studies'; 'Critical Security Studies'; 'Feminist Security Studies'; and 'Poststructural Security Studies'. See S. Smith, 'The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years', in S. Croft and T. Terriff (eds.), *Critical Reflections on Security and Change*, (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., c2000), pp.72-101.

[83] See B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

Western European perspectives that became well-known in the 1990s to explain post-Cold War, trans-national, security challenges; (2) both are useful to explain U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico such as drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, in particular because these are not related to the state or military capabilities but to global forces embodied in an integrated illegal market between the two countries; and (3) because, as far as Risk Society theory is concerned, 'risk management' and 'preventive action' have gradually become the guiding principle of the U.S. security orientation after the 9/11 events.

More importantly, the justification to combine them is that the Buzan et.al analytical framework has been criticised on the grounds that if it is true it contributes to understanding the scope of security, it lacks and in-depth perspective on security,[84] which is precisely what is provided by Risk Society theory by explaining not the consequences but the causes of security concerns. Both approaches together, therefore, provide a more comprehensive understanding of U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico at a time of a closer economic relationship. Utilising both frameworks to explain the U.S.-Mexican security relationship is an exercise nowhere to be found in the literature on security in the bilateral relationship.

The study of U.S. security in the context of NAFTA is relevant because the prospect of the agreement made clear to the United States that a trade partnership with Mexico would bring with it not only more beneficial economic opportunities, but also a greater exposure to a variety of trans-border challenges (i.e. drug trafficking and undocumented immigration) that were already present in the bilateral agenda before the formal NAFTA agreement. The basic explanation for this was the potential for illegal flows to grow in parallel to increasing legitimate exchange opportunities.[85] The hypothesis developed in this thesis, therefore, establishes that the paradox at the basis of this thesis is explained by the increasing U.S. concern about non-military, non-state risks on its Southwest border that were related to the intensification of interdependence with Mexico, such as drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, which were likely to be intensified by NAFTA because the expansion in the flow of goods, services and people in both directions presented more opportunities for Mexican criminal organisations to take greater

[84] In criticizing the Buzan et.al analytical framework, for instance, Booth suggests that thinking of security in broader terms also requires 'deepening' the concept, which means assessing the repercussions of using a more complex security idea. M. Sheehan, *International Security. An Analytical Survey*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, c2005), p.58.

[85] See, for instance, M. L. Cottam and O. Marenin, 'The Management of Border Security in NAFTA: Imagery, Nationalism and the War on Drugs', *International Criminal Justice Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1, May 2005, [online] available: http://www.sagepub.com/criminologystudy/articles/chapter13_article01cottam.pdf (26/04/11).

advantage of an already integrated illegal drug and labour market between the two countries. These problematic flows are not necessarily the outcome of the process of globalisation *per se* but the result of structural demand and supply conditions between the two countries that were likely to intensify in the context of NAFTA. An additional issue considered in this study was the border physical environment. In contrast to drugs and undocumented immigrants, the analysis of bilateral environmental issues demonstrates that potentially disruptive challenges do not need to become securitised, and can be actually dealt with through preventive actions.

The prospect for drugs and undocumented immigration to remain problematic issues in the future is explained by the fact that NAFTA is not a political and economic union but only a trade agreement between two industrialised countries, the United States and Canada, and a less developed country, Mexico, with potential political, social and even military consequences as well. In contrast to the comprehensive integration process that has characterised the European Union (EU), the narrower NAFTA integration framework, while it deals with regional trade matters, is ill equipped to confront political and security issues because of its lack of adequate institutions. In contrast to the EU, intra-regional NAFTA borders are not open to the free flow of people, and the NAFTA countries lack the high level of foreign and defence policy co-ordination and the intensity of police co-operation across national boundaries that characterises the EU.[86]

My already-mentioned interest in security and U.S. studies eventually led me to the analysis of the security dimension in U.S.-Mexican relations, and I became aware of a dearth of relevant scholarship both in the United States and in Mexico. According to some specialists, the reason that explains this lack of attention to security was in part that Latin America, in general, has been basically a low-level foreign policy priority for the United States. In their opinion,

> Up to now, neither the supposedly sophisticated debates about the concept [security]in the United States, nor more recent discussions in Mexico, have systematically reviewed the importance of each other in the definition and defense of national security. In the case of the United States the reason resides in the fact that, as a hegemonic power, it has basically taken Mexico (and the rest of Latin America) for granted.[87]

[86] F. Trauner, *The Internal-External Security Nexus: More Coherence Under Lisboa?*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Occasional Paper 89, March 2011, [online] available: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op89_The_internal-external_security_nexus.pdf (26/04/11).

[87] S. Aguayo, B. M. Bagley and J. Stark, 'Introducción. México y Estados Unidos: En Busca de la Seguridad', in S. Aguayo y B. M. Bagley (eds.), *En Busca de la Seguridad Perdida. Aproximaciones a la Seguridad Nacional Mexicana*, (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores, 1990), p.30.

At the time I started studying this topic, I found that while the literature on the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico contained a wide variety of studies on economic, political and social aspects (trade, foreign debt, oil, drugs, immigration, environment), there was very little explicit literature on security, certainly not any systematic study on the subject, notwithstanding the growing importance of the issue in the bilateral agenda.

It can be argued that the citation above was basically correct in describing the prevalent situation up to the mid-1970s, because in the years that followed the intensification of interdependence between the two countries demanded more attention to bilateral issues, including those related to security, as more developments in each country had an increasing impact on the other. That is, a growing number of domestic issues in each country began to affect the other, and for this reason items in the bilateral agenda became known as 'intermestic'.[88] According to Bayless Manning's discussion regarding the impingement of international on local matters, and vice versa, he pointed out,

> These new issues are thus simultaneously, profoundly and inseparably both domestic and international. If I may be permitted a coinage whose very cacophony may help provide emphasis –these issues are 'intermestic'.[89]

For instance, Mexico's foreign debt, the effects of the oil crisis on the United States in the 1970s, and disagreement between the two countries regarding the Central American armed conflicts in the 1980s, had the potential to affect each other's security. That is, increasing interdependence between the United States and Mexico since the 1970s led to greater attention to security matters as an increasing number of issues in each country had the potential to affect the other.[90] Additionally, growing interdependence between the two countries also set the stage for the negotiation of NAFTA at the beginning of the 1990s. This agreement, as a matter of fact,

[88] B. Manning, 'The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals', in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, p.309.
[89] *Idem.*
[90] In addition to an already complex asymmetric economic relationship, from 1977 on Mexico also became more politically relevant for the United States given a series of issues such as Mexico's 1976 economic crisis; the world's oil crisis; the two countries' different postures toward the Central American armed conflicts; the impact of the Mexican economic crisis on undocumented immigration to the United States; drug trafficking; and the foreign debt. See M. Ojeda, 'México-Estados Unidos: Su Singular Vecindad', in Colegio Nacional de Ciencias Políticas y Administración Pública, A.C., *MEXICO-EUA: Cooperación y Conflicto*, Memoria del Foro Efectuado en México, D.F., del 15 al 18 de Diciembre de 1986. pp.34-37.

meant that security in Mexico would have eventually to be defined not in national but in 'regional' terms.[91]

Reviewing the literature on the security dimension of U.S.-Mexican relations, which is what this thesis is strictly about, is in principle a straightforward task because there are only few analyses providing a general and explicit perspective on this subject. Nevertheless, since security is such a multifaceted concept, it is possible to observe that studies addressing issues such as North American integration, the common border, and drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, among other aspects, cannot escape reference to the U.S.-Mexico security relationship, thus making the review of scholarly works on the subject a more complicated task because of the wide array of issues involved and the scope of the bilateral relations literature itself.

This literature review, however, focuses on the most representative sample of analyses on the subject in chronological order and from a deductive approach; that is, it addresses first those at the general perspective level, and then reviews those at the regional, bilateral and border level, to end up addressing works focusing on individual issues and those regarding official views and empirical accounts of the subject.

Within the category of general perspectives on the subject, there is a collective book titled *Mexico. In Search of Security* that was edited in 1990 by a Mexican and a U.S. scholar, which represents a conceptual analysis of Mexican security with the United States as the point of reference. The opening of the Mexican economy was advanced as the justification for studying the United States, in particular its impact on Mexican security. It was a valuable initial effort to understand how U.S. national security factors affect Mexico, and how Mexican security issues have an impact on the United States.[92] There is a second book by the title *Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations beyond the Cold War* edited in 1996 also written by both a Mexican and a U.S. scholar in order to advance mutual understanding of security issues in a post-Cold War environment. This project was 'unique' not only because it explicitly involved both scholars and officials from the two countries, but also because it dealt with more practical issues absent in the already mentioned previous work, such as law enforcement and intelligence cooperation

[91] J. F. Rochlin, *Redefining Mexican 'Security': Society, State & Region under NAFTA*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p.180.
[92] B. M. Bagley and S. Aguayo (eds.), *Mexico. In Search of Security*, North-South Center, University of Miami, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993 by the University of Miami).

between the two countries.[93] This category also includes a historical analysis of wartime cooperation between Mexico and the United States that provides an account of U.S. concerns during World War II, in particular those related the possibility of Mexico becoming a platform for the Axis powers' operations in the Western Hemisphere. Even though it discusses U.S.-Mexican relations in this light, it also represents an analysis of Mexican political evolution during this period in terms of the need to maintaining a balance between nationalism and an adequate relationship with the United States.[94] A fourth book, *Organized Crime & Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands* edited by John Bailey and Roy Godson, appeared in 2000 as a collective effort to explain the fact that the increasing complexity of criminal activity at the U.S.-Mexico border had already surpassed the ability of local governments and the law enforcement approach to deal with those challenges (i.e. not only drug trafficking but also smuggling of arms, people and vehicles). By examining Mexico's political system and its security-relevant actors, this book provides a 'continuum of governability' to guide the analysis of possible solutions to the shared U.S.-Mexico organised crime problem.[95] A more modest effort is *National Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations* edited by the author of this thesis in 2003. This book was the outcome of a bi-national seminar organised in 2000 in order to analyse U.S. and Mexican security matters in the context of globalisation and trans-nationalisation. It reflected the idea that in spite of increased bilateral co-operation at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the United States and Mexico were still holding different conceptions of security. These two countries have usually agreed on what they want to prevent, but this has not necessarily translated into compatibility of interests. Therefore, instead of becoming 'allies' in the foreseeable future, the collective analysis established they were likely to remain just 'partners' in terms of security concerns.[96]

There is a series of books in the 2000s -mainly by Mexican specialists- that offer a critical perspective on Mexican security in the context of a closer relationship with the United

[93] J. Bailey and S. Aguayo (eds.), *Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations beyond the Cold War*, (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1996), p.4.
[94] M. E. Paz, *Strategy, Security, and Spies. Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II*, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, c1997).
[95] J. Bailey and R. Godson (eds.), *Organized Crime & Democratic Governability. Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands*, Pitt Latin American Series, Billie R. DeWalt, General Editor, (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, c2000).
[96] A. Maciel (coord.), *La Seguridad Nacional en las Relaciones México-Estados Unidos*, (San Luis Potosí, S.L.P.: El Colegio de San Luis, A.C., 2003).

States as reflected by NAFTA. First, a collective and multidisciplinary work published in 2004 was devoted to Mexican security from an integrated perspective and going beyond purely military factors. For example, it discussed Mexico's traditionally pacifist posture regarding international security, as well as the U.S. war on terror and its effects on Mexico in terms of unilateralism and in limiting options for Mexican foreign policy.[97] Second, an analysis published in 2007 by Leonardo Curzio argues that Mexico lacks a clear national project supported by its people, and this situation is in turn considered to complicate the design of a meaningful national security policy. This lack of a vision for the future originates not only from the erosion of the import substitution model in 1982, but also from the imposition of economic integration with the United States. There is a contradiction therefore between searching for Mexican security, and at the same time maintaining a disadvantageous relationship with the United States.[98] From a different perspective, the history of authoritarian Mexico explains why the country lacks a national project and therefore a clear concept of security, in particular in reference to its relationship with the United States. It is argued, therefore, that in an increasingly complex 21st century the country requires to develop its notion of security within a democratic framework, because this is an important step to achieve an integral security perspective.[99] Another analysis addresses the concept of Mexico's 'security failure' rather than Mexico's 'state failure', and assesses its impact beyond its borders. The key idea of the book -security failure-focuses on an *intermestic* level of analysis (i.e. the country's institutional weakness *vis-à-vis* the challenge posed by drug trafficking) as opposed to the emphasis on the external, trans-national character of threats (i.e. U.S. drug demand), in order to explain Mexico's current security crisis.[100]

The second category of scholarly works refers to analyses dealing with the regional perspective. A book titled *Drawing lines in sand and snow. Border security and North American economic integration* addresses the major issues facing the North American region: security, economic integration (i.e. globalisation), border management, corruption, and undocumented migration. It represents an analysis of the economic, business, and security implications of cross-border flows of people, goods, and capital in North America, and provides a road map for

[97] J. L. Piñeiro (coord.), *La seguridad nacional en México: Debate Actual*, Serie Sociología, División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (México, D.F.: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Azcapotzalco, 2004).
[98] L. Curzio, *La seguridad nacional de México y la relación con los Estados Unidos*, Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte (CISAN), (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2007).
[99] A. Rodriguez, *La urgente seguridad democrática. La relación de México con Estados Unidos*, (México, D.F.: Taurus, c2008).
[100] Kenny and Serrano with Sotomayor, *Mexico's Security Failure.*

addressing these concerns recognising the need for a balance between promoting legitimate exchanges and the imperative of border control to contain terrorism.[101] A better known collective work, *The Rebordering of North America. Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*, deals with the implications for North America of the 9/11 events and the U.S. war on terror in terms of both a hardening of border controls and political discourse. For instance, it explains the trade-offs between border security and facilitation of legitimate flows across borders, in a context where security and economic integration influence policy in opposite directions.[102] Another analysis deals with Mexico's foreign and security policy after the PRI lost the Presidency in 2000 and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It argues that within that context, Mexico started not only breaking its isolationist past but also began balancing its bilateral and multilateral agendas in order to strengthen its transition to democracy and to position the country within the Hemisphere in the post-9/11 security debate.[103] A trilateral report published in 2005 by the Council on Foreign Relations that assessed North America's security and economic vulnerabilities, developed a series of recommendations that at the time went beyond the so-called 'Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America' by proposing an ambitious vision for the region by 2010. In the area of security, for instance, it proposed establishing a common security perimeter, a regional border pass, developing a unified North American border plan, and strengthening border infrastructure.[104]

There is another collective work that analyses the wide variety of non-state actors (i.e. companies, private institutions, social movements and networks that expanded with NAFTA) in the region from a multidisciplinary point of view, covering individual issues such as energy, security and the environment.[105] The central argument of the book is that these new regional actors interact with governments to generate new dynamics that affect politics in the North

[101] B. J. Condon and T. Sinha, *Drawing lines in sand and snow. Border security and North American economic integration*, (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, c2003).
[102] P. Andreas and T. J. Biersteker (eds.), *The Rebordering of North America. Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*, (New York, NY: Routledge, c2003).
[103] L. Bondi, *Beyond the Border and Across the Atlantic. Mexico's Foreign and Security Policy post-September 11th*, Center for Transatlantic Relations, EU Center, Washington, DC, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, c2004).
[104] J. P. Manley, P. Aspe, W. F. Weld, *Building a North American Community*. Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, Independent Task Force Report No. 53, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, c2005).
[105] E. Antal (ed.), *Nuevos Actores en América del Norte*, Volumen I: Seguridad, Energía, Economía y Medio Ambiente, Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte (CISAN), (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2005).

American area. Regional analyses also include comparative studies, such as the one on public security policy in the Americas focusing not on institutions but on the notion of reform. The central argument is that criminal challenges in the region can only be confronted through the overhaul of judicial systems and the consolidation of democracy, which means an effective government response involves respect for human rights in a context where, as in several parts of Latin America, the military has assumed responsibilities that otherwise belong to civilian police forces, with implications for the agenda of U.S.-Latin American relations.[106]

Canadian and Mexican Security in the New North America: Challenges and Prospects describes the transformation of regional relations from its focus on trade after NAFTA to security as consequence of the 9/11 events. It argues that North American security integration is a gradual process that has already started and will continue to be central to the region's agenda. Even though the process has been dominated by the United States, it points out that integration offers opportunities for both Mexico and Canada in terms of the former's consolidation of democracy and the opportunity for the latter to become an alternative security model for Mexico in contrast to the U.S. option.[107] In an opposite argument, another book rejects the notion of a North American community based on the fact that NAFTA is seen as an instrument of social exclusion that was conceived by the elites more than being the product of a bottom-up process, making thus both Canada and Mexico more dependent on their common neighbour.[108] In the area of security, it criticises U.S. unilateralism -especially after 9/11- as evidence of the lack of shared interests that are characteristic of the idea of 'community'. A further collective analysis argues that the 2008 change of administration in the United States did not bring with it a substantial transformation of its strategic policy. In this context, the current North American security framework and its focus on international terrorism has not only continued but has also intensified regarding border control and intelligence sharing; this situation, nevertheless, has been reflected

[106] L. Dammert y J. Bailey (coords.), *Seguridad y reforma policial en las Américas. Experiencias y desafíos*, ILANUD-Naciones Unidas, FLACSO, Chile, (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores, c2005).
[107] J. Diez (ed.), *Canadian and Mexican Security in the New North America: Challenges and Prospects*, Defence Management Series, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, c2007, published for the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University).
[108] D. Drache, *La ilusión continental. Seguridad fronteriza y búsqueda de una identidad norteamericana. La desilusión de la unión en América del Norte*, (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores, c2007).

so far neither in the transformation of U.S. defence relations with Mexico and Central America, nor with Canada for that matter.[109]

The third category of analyses refers to those devoted to the bilateral context. *Transnational Crime and Public Security. Challenges to Mexico and the United States* was a collective volume published 2002 that focused on law enforcement, the judicial system and organised crime issues in Mexico, as well as on drug trafficking, military activities and intelligence challenges on the U.S. side of the border. It was a study on how local crime, violence, corruption, and law enforcement interact with trans-national crime, and how they affect domestic politics in particular and U.S.-Mexican relations more in general. The work is a relevant contribution because of its emphasis in the possibility for public security matters, especially in Mexico, to become national security issues affecting both the United States and bilateral relations.[110] There are two books by the same Mexican author dealing with the subject of security in the bilateral context, from a local perspective. The first one addresses the role of local border governments in confronting security challenges in the Tijuana-San Diego region. It underlines the complexities of promoting cooperation between local governments with different capacities and resources, and it emphasises therefore the need to professionalise Mexican border administrations as a condition for trans-border strategic management of intricate problems.[111] The second book provides a citizen's perspective in reference to tensions created by the Mexican government's inability to deal with border challenges as a result of an inadequate decision-making process regarding public policy.[112]

Within this category, there are also three analysis published in 2009 that reflect increasing attention for the intensification of both, drug violence in Mexico and U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. The first volume analyses policy options for the United States in the context of both security deterioration in Mexico and the change of administration in the United States. It is a RAND Corporation book that explored alternatives for the then incoming Obama

[109] R. Benítez (coord.), *Seguridad y Defensa en América del Norte. Nuevos Dilemas Geopolíticos*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo, San Salvador, El Salvador, Abril de 2010.
[110] J. Bailey and J. Chabat (eds.), *Transnational Crime and Public Security. Challenges to Mexico and the United States*, (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 2002).
[111] J. M. Ramos, *La gestión de la cooperación transfronteriza México-Estados Unidos en un marco de inseguridad global: Problemas y desafíos*, Conocer para decidir, H. Cámara de Diputados, LIX Legislatura, México, Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, (México, D.F.: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, c2004).
[112] J. M. Ramos, *Relaciones México-Estados Unidos. Seguridad Nacional e Impactos en la frontera norte*, Selección Anual para el libro universitario, (Mexicali, BC: Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, c2005).

administration in reference to U.S. security support for Mexico. From the U.S. point of view, it provides arguments for developing a strategic partnership with Mexico, instead of opting for the *status quo*, let alone considering 'retrenchment'.[113] The second volume is a collective effort that analyses the Merida Initiative from the point of view of both Mexico and the United States. It characterises the programme as a new cooperation paradigm based on the acceptance of co-responsibility in the challenge posed by drug trafficking to Mexico, notwithstanding Mexican corruption and continued U.S. unilateralism as obstacles to the success of the initiative.[114] In contrast to the work cited above, the third volume is a monograph that criticises the Merida Initiative as representative of the failed supply-side approach to drugs that has characterised U.S. drug control policy. It argues the initiative is unlikely to achieve the desired results in Mexico because of marginal attention paid to structural problems in both Mexico and the United States, such as official corruption and large-scale drug consumption, respectively.[115]

The fourth category of the literature in this area deals with security in the context of the common border. The book *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992. Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home*, argues that during the period of reference, U.S. immigration and drug enforcement policies and practices in the U.S.-Mexico border region became increasingly militarised based on a 'low-intensity conflict' perspective, which entails social control over specific civilian populations and human rights violations. In this context, it calls for a critical study of official accounts of U.S. policy on the border with Mexico.[116] A widely-known book titled *Border Games. Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide*, focuses on the contradiction created by NAFTA liberalisation, on the one hand, and, on the other, increasing U.S. surveillance of the border with Mexico. The author argues that this contradiction reflects the fact that bilateral cooperation, far from preventing smuggling, served to provide a stage for both United States and Mexico to create the image about their ability to protect borders in an

[113] A. G. Schaefer, B. Bahney, and K. J. Riley, *Security in Mexico: Implications for U.S. Policy Options*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, c2009).
[114] R. Velázquez and J. P. Prado (coords.), *La Iniciativa Mérida ¿nuevo paradigma de cooperación entre México y Estados Unidos en seguridad?*, (México, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, c2009).
[115] Brands, *Mexico's Narco-insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy*.
[116] T. J. Dunn, *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992. Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home*, CMAS Border & Migration Studies Series, Editor Victor J. Guerra, The Center for Mexican American Studies, The University of Texas at Austin, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997).

increasingly open world, which is a far cry from actually dealing with the demand for drugs and the movement of undocumented immigrants across the common border.[117]

In a similar line of argument, *Operation Gatekeeper. The Rise of the 'Illegal Alien' and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary*, explores the U.S. effort to prevent illegal border crossings in the context of the mid-1990s U.S. economic boom and the presence of a sizeable Mexican immigration presence in the United States. It argues that the aforementioned border operation was in fact a political measure by the U.S. federal government to counter California efforts (i.e. Proposition 187) in the mid-1990s to prevent undocumented immigration. Instead of achieving the supposed goal, it only increased the dangers for immigrants attempting to enter illegally the United States and contributed to the further politicisation of the issue.[118]

An additional analysis addresses U.S.-Mexico security cooperation in the border region within the framework of the U.S.-induced security agenda. It analyses bilateral collaboration in terms of the new security paradigm introduced by the 9/11 events, and concludes that U.S. hegemony over the security discourse, while fostering security agreements, has not been adequate to achieve understanding in other pressing issues affecting the border such as immigration.[119] Another volume critical of the U.S. border strategy contends that, notwithstanding the optimistic talk of the 1990s regarding bilateral trade, the preeminent role of security at the border (embodied in three simultaneous wars, on drugs, on undocumented immigration and on terror), has not only restricted the autonomy of local communities but also disturbed traditional border practices based on more open economic, social, and cultural interactions. This situation leaves at odds the government and the public because of the inevitable contradiction between seeking border security and maintaining the flow of legitimate cross border exchanges, respectively.[120] In terms of a wider perspective, the book by the title *The U.S.-Mexican Border into the Twenty-First Century* examines the security context brought about by the September 11 terrorist attacks, against the background of the history, politics, economy

[117] P. Andreas, *Border Games. Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy, Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, c2000).
[118] J. Nevins, *Operation Gatekeeper. The Rise of the 'Illegal Alien' and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary*, (New York, NY: Routledge, c2002).
[119] J. M. Ramos and O. Woo (coords.), *Seguridad nacional y fronteriza en la relación México-Estados Unidos y Canadá*, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (CUCSH), (Guadalajara, Jal.: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2004).
[120] T. Payan, *The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars. Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, c2006).

and society that has characterised the border region. Using globalisation as the framework, this study emphasises the continued importance of borders and the conflict this priority creates in a context of economic opening.[121] Another critical volume based on a feminist and human rights perspective argues that, notwithstanding the effort to safeguarding the U.S. border with Mexico, policies that militarise the region and criminalise immigrants are also responsible for obscuring violence against women, immigrant deaths, and poverty prevalent in the region. In this context, a link is established between this analysis and proposed solutions to the identified challenges in the form of institutional change, policy reform, and protection of human rights as a valuable input to transform security perspectives in a more constructive way.[122]

Focusing on a more specific issue, one of the volumes within this category makes reference to the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps as a case study to explore both the emergence and proliferation of vigilantism at the U.S.-Mexico border. It argues that groups such as the one mentioned above are not only related to the increasing criminalisation and securitisation of immigration, but also to a new form of activism brought about by globalisation that is tolerated and even encouraged by official structures.[123] In reference to issues and bureaucracies, the collective work *United States Border Issues. Defense, Security and Strategies*, is an analysis of U.S. border security after 9/11 dealing with specific aspects of the U.S.-Mexico border such as commercial trucking from Mexico and arms trafficking flowing south. It addresses the expansion of border barriers, and the challenge posed by the need to devise methods to measure drug violence spilling over from south of the dividing line.[124] *Border Wars* is a book that discusses the appeal of the Southwest border hard-line rhetoric on immigration-enforcement within conservative circles in the rest of the United States, notwithstanding the outcome of this discourse so far in terms of lost lives, family disintegration and wasted financial resources. The authors argue that the lack of a coherent federal policy regarding border challenges has only contributed to politicisation of issues and to justifying significant law enforcement budgets

[121] P. Gangster and D. E. Lorey, *The U.S.-Mexican Border into the Twenty-First Century*, Latin American Silhouettes, Second Edition, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007).
[122] K. Staudt, T. Payan, Z. A. Kruszewsky, (eds.), *Human Rights Along the U.S.-Mexico Border.Gendered Violence and Insecurity*, (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, c2009).
[123] K. S. Arfsten, *The Minuteman Civil Defense Corps: Border Vigilantism, Immigration Control and Security on the US-Mexican Border*, Hamburger Studien zur Kriminologie und Kriminalpolitik, Band 48, LIT Verlag, July 21, 2010.
[124] V. M. Clancy (ed.), *United States Border Issues. Defense, Security and Strategies*, (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers Inc., c2011).

without achieving meaningful solutions. This analysis, however, does not offer alternatives to the problem described.[125] *The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective* analyses the U.S. Army's traditional role regarding the border with Mexico, and argues there are important lessons to be learnt from history that are relevant for the current post-9/11 security context, in particular the contribution of the National Guard to border enforcement.[126]

The fifth category of relevant literature is composed of analyses on individual trans-border issues such as drug trafficking and undocumented immigration. *Bad Neighbor Policy. Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America*, for instance, includes chapter 7 titled 'Mexico: The Next Colombia?', which argues that even if Mexico is different to Colombia in many political and security aspects, the failed U.S. drug policy could actually push Mexico to resemble Colombia at the height of drug violence as in the 1990s. The rest of the book, in general, provides an account of the damage the drug war has inflicted on Latin America.[127] A monograph dealing with the 'Zetas' argues that the way Mexico can reverse the challenge posed by violent non-state actors to the state is the employment of political-psychological measures more in tune with the origin of the current Mexican predicament that is related to the decomposition of its socio-political system, which in turn explains why law enforcement measures, by themselves, will not be able to solve a problem with ramifications beyond Mexico's borders.[128] The book *Drug War Zone. Frontline Dispatches from the Streets of El Paso and Juárez*, is an anthropological study of drug trafficking and counter-narcotics efforts in the region that resorts to an ethnographic perspective to analyse drug violence in Mexico through the eyes of both drug traffickers and law enforcement officials. It underlines corruption as one of the issues defining drug trafficking on both sides of the boundary.[129] A book that also addresses drug violence is *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* It explores both the origin and the prospects for containing violence in Mexico, as well as its implications for the relationship with the United States. The author concludes that even if it is undisputable that the Mexican state has

[125] T. Barry, *Border Wars*, Boston Review Books, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, c2011).
[126] M. M. Matthews, *The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective*, The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 22, (Forth Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2012).
[127] T. G. Carpenter, *Bad Neighbor Policy. Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America*, A CATO Institute Book, (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, c2003).
[128] M. G. Manwaring, *A 'New' Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and other Private Armies*, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009).
[129] H. Campbell, *Drug War Zone. Frontline Dispatches from the Streets of El Paso and Juárez*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, c2009).

territorial presence and the resources required for its determined offensive against drugs, the country may become a failed state because of its inability so far to gain ascendance on the problem in a context where its power is constantly challenged.[130] A monograph by a Mexican and a U.S. specialist analyses the concerns created in the United States by potential spill-over violence from south of the border, and considers the consequences of alternative scenarios whether Mexico deals with the challenge in the form of complicity, confrontation, or drug use regulation, all of which it concludes have inevitable undesirable effects.[131] A monograph dealing with 'La Familia' analyses the ideological evolution of the drug organisation, in particular its opposition to drug consumption at the same time it continues with production of methamphetamines and practises such as extortion of local businesses. Its ideological overtones are related to the help the organisation offers to marginalised people in a sort of social service, in exchange for their loyalty in the drug trade. The fact that 'La Familia' has aligned itself with the Gulf and Sinaloa organisations against 'Los Zetas' in Tamaulipas, in particular in Nuevo Laredo, has relevant implications for U.S. security.[132]

Another relevant monograph is *Mexico's 'Narco-Refugees': The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security*, which addresses the security concern created by a potential spill-over of violence from Mexico into the U.S. side of the border. It analyses the growing number of Mexicans moving north escaping insecurity and argues that, if sustained, this phenomenon will not only force U.S. policymakers to rethink the strategic environment, but it will also have an impact on political debates over immigration, public safety, and border security.[133] It is important to note that the reason for including U.S. Army War College monographs in this category and not in that of 'official analyses', is because scholars writing these documents enjoy academic freedom and therefore they do not convey U.S. government official policy or position. *The Drug War in Mexico. Confronting a Shared Threat*, is a relatively recent analysis of the exaggerated 'failed state' argument regarding Mexico that explores the country's capacities and limitations, and examines factors that have undermined effective state performance. It assesses the prospects for U.S. support to strengthen critical state institutions, and offers

[130] G. W. Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, c2009).
[131] Astorga and Shirk, *Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context.*
[132] Grason, *La Familia Drug Cartel*.
[133] P. R. Kan, *Mexico's "Narco-Refugees": The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security*, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), October 1, 2011, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College).

recommendations for reducing the potential of state failure based on stronger political and economic structures, and a more vibrant civil society.[134] In reference to undocumented immigration, an analysis discusses the convenience of turning chaotic Mexican undocumented immigration flows into a more ordered process in a context of heightened security. It is considered that for such a system to work, nevertheless, Mexico would have to supervise its borders and to extend the security perimeter by strengthening the rule of law within its own territory. It is suggested this should be a central U.S. policy goal.[135]

The sixth category of literature relevant to this thesis refers to the variety of official analyses on the subject. At the beginning of 2011, for instance, the U.S. House of Representatives published a report that established that, for the first time in 25 years, Mexican drug trafficking organisations are targeting U.S. law enforcement agents. This is considered an act of terrorism as well as a 'game-changer' in terms of the U.S. involvement in Mexico's drug war.[136] Another official organisation that has regularly devoted attention to Mexico has been the Congressional Research Service (CRS) through a wide variety of special reports on specific issues for Members of Congress. An interesting CRS analysis focuses on the definition of 'border violence spill-over' and distinguishes between two different meanings of this phrase. One entails targeting civilians and government officials, while the other restricts the definition only to disputes among organisations. This study points out there is no conclusive evidence to prove there has actually been a violence spill-over from Mexico into the United States, and this argument is in line with U.S. official statements on the issue.[137] An additional report also deals with drug violence in Mexico and points out that, even though the Mexican government's strategy has been fairly successful in hitting the upper echelons of drug organisations, these efforts have only led so far to an intensification of violence that has no precedent in terms of its scope and brutality, thus leading analysts to debate whether these organisations can be classified as terrorists or as criminal groups using terrorist tactics, or even so as insurgents attempting to

[134] Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico*.
[135] R. S. Leiken, *Enchilada Lite: A Post-9/11 Mexican Migration Agreement*, Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), Washington, DC, 2002.
[136] U.S. House of Representatives, *The U.S. Homeland Security Role in the Mexican War Against Drug Cartels*, March 31, 2011, Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC.
[137] M. R. Rosenblum, W. J. Krouse, K. M. Finklea, *Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence*, CRS Report for Congress, August 25, 201, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS).

penetrate the Mexican state.[138] The report compares current violence in Mexico with Colombia in the 1990s, and addresses the prospects for containing violence in the country.

The seventh category of literature reviewed here is represented by investigative reports that even though they provide valuable information, they lack in general the rigorous analysis that characterises academic works. The first book is about U.S. options in reference to securing the border with Mexico, which involved a series of interviews by the author as well as on-site visits to the region.[139] The author describes the border as one of the most complex issues in the context of terrorism and economic uncertainty, and concludes that even though the divide is substantial, so are the opportunities for both countries. For all practical purposes, this book represents the U.S. side of the story. The second book deals with the recurrent issue about the U.S. need to maintaining the balance between building defences and remaining open to the flows of people and ideas after the 9/11 events. According to interviews carried out for this work, the new U.S. security regulations have not only affected people's lives but also the U.S. economy by discouraging trade, the arrival of tourists into the United States, and the attraction of valuable human resources fostered by opportunities offered by both the U.S. economy and the U.S. society. It makes a relevant point in terms of the need to distinguish between border enforcement and counter-terrorism because of the fact that, to be effective, each needs to be separated from the other (it questions the effectiveness of anti-terrorist resources being poured to the border with Mexico).[140] A third book is an account of the migrants' trek across the Arizona border, and portrays the dynamic between the Border Patrol and smugglers along the 2,000-mile border with Mexico. Although descriptively interesting, this work is uncritical of any position in the border or immigration debate, and excessive attention is paid to border police corruption and possible links between the border and terrorism.[141]

A fourth book is the work of an analyst that has followed Mexico's drug trafficking organisations, more than that of an on-the-ground observer. It explains their tactics and methods to smuggle drugs into the United States and high-powered weapons into Mexico, and argues these organisations pose a threat not only to the border but also to areas deep inside the United

[138] Beittel, *Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations*.
[139] J. Danelo, *The Border. Exploring the U.S.-Mexican Divide*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, c2008).
[140] E. Alden, *The Closing of the American Border. Terrorism, Immigration, and Security since 9/11*, (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers**,** c2008, published in cooperation with the Council on Foreign Relations).
[141] T. Gaynor, *Midnight on the line. The secret life of the U.S.-Mexico border*, (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books, c2009).

States. It offers alternatives for dealing with the drug trafficking problem in the form of reconstructing Mexico's social fabric and addressing U.S. drug demand through legislation.[142] A fifth book offers an analysis of the border fence and the variety of forms it assumes at different stretches along the U.S.-Mexico border. Through a series of personal interviews with relevant actors and on-site visits, the author concludes that, far from achieving its intended purpose -to stop undocumented immigration and drugs-, the border 'fence' is a waste of resources that is counterproductive regarding the issues it is supposed to address, as reflected in the number of border deaths and the increasing profits of criminal organisations. A more sensible approach is thus suggested for the formulation of public policies that recognise the complexity of the issues at hand.[143]

At the time I started my graduate programme at Kings College London back in 1997, the security aspect of the U.S-Mexico bilateral relationship was poorly developed, and in this context I structured my research question by drawing on the limited security themes that were in the literature; these themes were implicit rather than explicit. Even though the literature on the security aspect in U.S.-Mexican relations has grown ever since, as shown in the seven categories of material reviewed above, security remains an underdeveloped subject as much as was the case when I started this thesis, especially if compared to the growing importance of security in the bilateral relationship, especially after the 9/11 events and the current security context in Mexico. For instance, none of the works above explicitly explains, in the first place, why Mexico can be a potential security concern for the United States in the context of a closer economic relationship, and certainly not even one has attempted to tackle this type of elemental question by resorting to the insights provided by a specific analytical security perspective. Most of these works are empirical descriptions of a particular aspect of the subject, and the analysis offered is not based on any analytical framework. Therefore, because of the gaps in the literature at the time a started studying this subject, which basically remain to this day, I decided to embark on the study of U.S. security regarding Mexico in the 1990s to start addressing important aspects of the subject that were absent in the body of scholarly work on the subject.

[142] S. Longmire, *Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico's Drug Wars*, (New York, NY: Palgrave, Macmillan, c2011).
[143] R. L. Maril, *The Fence: National Security, Public Safety, and Illegal Immigration along the U.S.-Mexico Border*, (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, c2011).

During the review of the literature above, I did not find either a fundamental debate or a series of debates. However, I identified an implicit discussion about what should or should not be considered security issues in the U.S.-Mexican relationship. On the one hand, one perspective points out to the inconvenience of identifying drug trafficking as a security matter in the bilateral relationship, basically because this is a trans-national issue that as such requires a bilateral (or a multi-lateral) approach. In this context, confronting drug trafficking involves a more comprehensive response that is in contrast to the narrow military focus provided by the traditional concept of security.[144] On the other hand, the argument in favour of broadening the concept of national security, as advanced by one of the first studies on the U.S.-Mexican security relationship, *México. En Busca de la Seguridad*, edited by Bagley and Aguayo, consists in creating the possibility of transcending the traditional concept of security in order to be able to incorporate Mexico's security concerns, as a developing country (i.e. democracy, economic development, social progress), in the analysis of U.S.-Mexico security issues.[145] From my perspective, transcending the traditional concept of security represents an essential analytical tool to understand, and to be able to explain, the kind of non-state, non-military, security concerns Mexico poses to the United States. This aspect is nowhere to be found in the seven literature categories discussed earlier.

The course of action I followed to answer the research question above was to focus analysis on the 1990s, in particular on how the Clinton administration saw the security relationship with Mexico in the context of a closer economic relationship. At the time, the prospect was that with the agreement there would be an intensification of trans-border risks given the opportunities created by NAFTA. If it is true the agreement would expand opportunities for U.S. investment in Mexico, it would also make legitimate bilateral trade channels more vulnerable to exploitation by criminal organisations. For instance, drugs were expected to become more difficult to detect within the growing volume of legitimate goods entering the United States from Mexico.[146]

In this context, the current importance of security issues in the bilateral relationship is not only explained by the 9/11 events and Mexico's present security predicament, but also by pre-

[144] D. R. Mares, 'Strategic Interests in the U.S.-Mexican Relationship', in Bailey and Aguayo (eds.), *Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations Beyond the Cold War*, p.30.
[145] Aguayo, Bagley and Stark, 'Introducción. México y Estados Unidos: En Busca de la Seguridad', in Aguayo y Bagley (eds.), *En Busca de la Seguridad Perdida*, p.23.
[146] T. Weiner, 'Border Customs agents are Pushed to the Limit', *The New York Times*, July 25, 2002.

existing illegal flows whose relevance increased in the context of NAFTA. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, a closer economic relationship also offered the United States the possibility of increasing its influence on Mexican military and strategic matters because Mexican security would have eventually to incorporate a regional perspective.

In order to identify Mexico-related issues that are of a security significance for the United States, I started by looking first at U.S. official documents to establish, from the U.S. point of view, the issues that were actually defined as threats. In this context, issues were not selected randomly but according to what the U.S. government itself established as important. First of all I analysed the U.S. defence strategy to determine what kind of threat, if any, Mexico posed at the military-strategic level based on the May 1997 *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), which was the first four-year strategic revision that the U.S. Congress instructed the Clinton administration to complete.[147] It was based on the broader May 1997 *A New National Security Strategy for A New Century*.[148] This latter document was the fundamental reference for this thesis because of two reasons: (1) it was the first of the series 'A New National Security Strategy for A New Century', and therefore the one that set the parameter for the two Clinton administrations' years that is the period covered by this thesis; (2) as such, it became the foundation for the first QDR report mentioned above.

After reviewing the QDR report, I found that Mexico's military significance for the United States was only tangential, and basically related to the support the U.S. military must provide to civilian agencies confronting trans-border threats.[149] The first QDR, nevertheless, was criticised by not really affecting the fundamental U.S. Cold War military structure by being based on domestic economic and political considerations rather than on the new strategic realities of the international system.[150] Moreover, the QDR retained old Cold War assumptions

[147] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, May 1997, [online] available: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/index.html (03/10/98).
[148] The White House, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, May 1997, Federation of American Scientists, [online] available: http://www.fas.org/man/docs/strategy97/.htm (17/03/00).
[149] Within Section III, Defense Strategy; Shaping the International Environment; Preventing or Reducing Conflicts and Threats. See W. S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), May 1997, [online] available: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/sec2.html (03/10/98), p.4.
[150] Vice Admiral J. J. Shanahan, USN (Ret), Director, *Statement before the National Defense Panel Public Hearing April 29, 1997*, Center for Defense Information (CDI), [online] available: http://www.cdi.org/issues/qdr/shanpan.html (13/03/00), p.1.

instead of reflecting the 'emerging threats of asymmetric warfare'.[151] In this context, either because of domestic political considerations or because of a disconnection between threats and strategy, it is possible to conclude that the QDR did not devote –at least not formally- sufficient attention to the kind of non-state, non-military concerns the United States was confronting in relation to Mexico.

When I turned my attention to the broader 1997 *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, nevertheless, it was possible to better appreciate Mexico's impact on the security of its northern neighbour mainly in terms of trans-border, non-state, threats such as drug trafficking and undocumented immigration. In retrospect, the 9/11 events actually validated the focus on drugs and undocumented immigrants, given the U.S. border agencies' concern for the possibility of terrorists exploiting the routes and means of organised crime (human smugglers and drug traffickers) in order to introduce themselves or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) into U.S. territory.[152]

Besides drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, this thesis also addresses the border physical environment not because it is defined as a security issue but precisely because of the opposite reason. While drugs and undocumented immigration have involved law enforcement and legislative responses in the United States by being recognised as border security concerns, environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexico border, in contrast, has so far not encouraged the same kind of emergency-mode measures and instead it has been dealt with through the creation of bilateral institutions and within the normal process of political dialogue between the two countries. That is, the border environment is addressed within the context of the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory to explain an important border issue that has not fallen yet within the security realm, to show not only the complexity of security at the border but also the utility of both non-traditional perspectives to explain issues that notwithstanding they

[151] J. B. Tucker, 'Asymmetric Warfare: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Security', *Commentary on the QDR*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, [online] available: http://www.comw.org/qdr/tucker.html (13/03/00), p.3.

[152] U.S. House of Representatives, *A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border*, Prepared by the Majority Staff of House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Investigations, Michael T. McCaul, Chairman, 2006, [online] available: http://www.house.gov/sites/members/tx10_mccaul/pdf/Investigaions-Border-Report.pdf (24/03/11); and B. Nuñez-Neto, A. Siskin and S. Viña, *Border Security: Apprehensions of 'Other Than Mexican' Aliens*, Congressional Research Service (CRS), The Library of Congress, September 22, 2005, [online] available: http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1.pdf (24/03/11).

represent a risk, they are addressed outside the security context, which is an analytically interesting point.

During the course of this study I was often asked why I decided to concentrate on addressing only the U.S. perspective, especially when I could have embarked on a more comprehensive analysis by including Mexico's point of view.

The main reason I opted for emphasising the U.S. perspective, as opposed to the Mexican one, was the fact that, in the context of the scarce literature on security in U.S.-Mexican relations, I identified a gap in the efforts to understand the impact of NAFTA on U.S. security, in contrast to the interest NAFTA created for the analysis of Mexican security. For instance, in 1997 James Rochlin published a book on how NAFTA would redefine Mexican security,[153] but there was no equivalent analysis regarding the U.S. side of the equation. My research, in this context, represents an attempt to fill this gap in the literature in order to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of security in U.S.-Mexican relations, using a combination of security perspectives.

In terms of methodology, I basically relied on two elements. Firstly, after determining that U.S. security was affected by non-state, non-military, challenges coming from Mexico, I turned to a non-traditional security perspective based on the insights provided by Buzan et.al in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* and Risk Society Theory, as mentioned above. Their insights were then applied to the analysis of the impact of trans-border concerns to U.S. security coming from Mexico. The justification for combining these two perspectives has been discussed above.

I opted for the analytical framework developed by Buzan et.al and Risk Society theory because of their potential to explain non-state, non-military, security issues which are central in the U.S.-Mexico security relationship. I made this decision, nevertheless, after considering the potential of some IR theories within both the 'traditional' and 'non-traditional' literature to explain security issues in the U.S.-Mexican relationship. For instance, realism and its focus on the state and military threats did not seem to provide a useful framework for a bilateral relationship where military factors have not been dominant, in general, except for the 1846-1848 'Mexican War' and a brief period during World War II (WWII) when the two countries became

[153] Rochlin, *Redefining Mexican 'Security': Society, State & Region under NAFTA*.

allies to confront the Axis powers' potential inroads into the Western Hemisphere.[154] Regarding interdependence, the main reason that led me to initially consider this theory as an adequate analytical tool for my study was the fact that this framework has been widely used to explain U.S.-Mexican relations.[155] The use of this theory in the analysis of the bilateral relationship, nevertheless, has proven to be useful mainly to explaining economic factors. Moreover, the idea that the more density of interaction between societies the less the incentives to resort to military means to solve their differences, as advanced by this theoretical framework, was very attractive in terms of explaining part of the bilateral security dynamic.[156] From my perspective, however, interdependence did not offer either an adequate explanation of the bilateral security relationship because it does not contribute to clarify, for instance, why security –sometimes with military connotations such as in the case of sending the National Guard to the border- is in fact currently at the top of the U.S.-Mexico security agenda.

The Buzan et.al analytical framework, in contrast, represents a synthesis of these and other theories by explaining not only non-military challenges to security but also how threats in one security sector have an impact on the others, which is a phenomenon reflected in the U.S.-Mexico security relationship. Moreover, after searching for *Internet* sources, I discovered the Buzan et.al framework has been used by a significant number of analysts to explain a wide variety of theoretical and empirical security issues. For instance, the aforementioned framework has been used to explain the need for a broader security approach to promote stability in

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[154] See H. J. Morgenthau, Revised by K. W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Brief Edition, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, c1993); and K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, First Edition, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., c1979).

[155] See Report of the Bilateral Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, *The Challenge of Interdependence*, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., c1989), p.30; G. F. Erb and C. Thorup, *U.S.-Mexican Relations: The Issues Ahead*, Overseas Development Council Paper 35, Prepared for the U.S.-Mexico Policy Committee, U.S.-Mexico Project, Overseas Development Council, Nov. 1984, p.2; J. Chabat, 'Mexico's Foreign Policy After NAFTA: The Tools of Interdependence', in R. O. de la Garza and J. Velasco (eds.), *Bridging the Border. Transforming Mexico-U.S. Relations*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., c1997), p.35; M. Ojeda, 'Mexico and United States Relations: Interdependence or Mexico's Dependence?', in C. Vasquez and M. García y Griego (eds.), *Mexican-U.S. Relations: Conflict and Convergence*, UCLA Chicano Studies Research Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1983, p.112; C. W. Reynolds, *Lessons from the United States-Mexico Experience for North-South Relations*, Working Paper, U.S.-Mexico Series No. 6, Overseas Development Council, July 1982, p.1; C. L. Thorup, 'Managing Extreme Interdependence: Alternative Institutional Arrangements of U.S. Policymaking toward Mexico, 1976-1988', Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1992, quoted by Bailey and Aguayo, 'Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations', in Bailey and Aguayo (eds.), *Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations Beyond the Cold War*, p.2.

[156] R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Second Edition, Written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, (New York, NY: *HarperCollins* Publishers, c1989).

Afghanistan,[157] or to justify the EU enlargement process.[158] It has also been used to understand the politicisation and securitisation of trans-boundary waters, [159] how the concept of human security has become embedded in the EU security perspective,[160] the need to delimit the concept of human security in the South Asian context,[161] the convenience of utilising the securitisation process to conceptualise computer security,[162] and how Japan has securitised itself in non-traditional ways.[163] The more theoretical analysis of the framework includes discussions on how securitisation transforms practices and discourses,[164] how to understand security in terms of non-state actors,[165] and the assessment of traditional *versus* non-traditional explanations of security.[166]

Whereas the Buzan et.al analytical framework helps to understand the scope of security, I also utilised Risk Society theory to explore the depth (i.e the formation) of the U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico in order to complement the Copenhagen School approach. Risk

[157] A. Wagemaker, 'Rescuing Afghanistan? Small Western Liberal Democracies and Multinational Intervention', W. Feichtinger/M. Gauster (Hrsg.), *Zivil-Militarische Zusammenarbeit am Beispel Afghanistan*, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, (Wien, Marz, 2008), [online] available: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/civ_mil_coop_bsp_afgha_004_rescuin_afghanistan_a_wagemaker_42.pdf (26/04/11).

[158] A. Higashino, 'The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 39, No. 4, December 2004.

[159] J. Warner, 'Plugging the Gap. Working with Buzan: The Ilisu Dam as a Security Issue', Occasional Paper No. 67, *SOAS Water Issues Study Group*, School of Oriental and African Studies/King's College London, University of London, January 2004, [online] available: http://www.soas.ac.uk/water/publications/papers/file38410.pdf (26/04/11).

[160] M. Davi, 'Human Security as the One Size Fits All Policy Approach?', Paper presented at the European Security and Defense Forum (ESDF) organised by Chatam House, *European and Defense Forum Workshop 2: New Transnational Security Challenges and Responses*, November 11, 2009, [online] available: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16718_1109esdf_davi.pdf (26/04/11).

[161] S. Gupta, 'Delimiting Human Security: A South Asian Perspective', Draft paper for the ISYP Conference *Advancing Human Security*, Halifax, Nova Scotia, July 15-17, 2003, [online] available: http://www.hegoa.ehu.es/dossierra/seguridad/Delimiting_human_security_a_South_Asian_perspective.pdf (26/04/11).

[162] H. Nissenbaum, 'Where Computer Security Meets National Security', *Ethics and Information Technology*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, [online] available: http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/ETINsecurity.pdf (26/04/11).

[163] K. Cooney, 'Alternative Visions of Japanese Security: The Role of Absolute and Relative Gains in the Making of Japanese Security Policy, *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2005, [online] available: http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v29n3-f.pdf (26/04/11).

[164] M. J. Trombetta, 'The Securitization of the Environment and the Transformation of Security', Draft, Delft University of Technology, [online] available: http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Trombetta-the_securitization_of_the_environment_and_the_transformation_of_security.pdf (26/04/11).

[165] W. Rees, 'Organised Crime, Security and the European Union', Draft paper for ESRC Workshop, Grenoble, France, [online] available: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/grenoble/ws8/rees.pdf (26/04/11).

[166] V. Sulovic, 'Meaning of Security and the Theory of Securitisation', Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), October 5, 2010, [online] available: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/Occasional+Papers+and+Analysis/3855/Meaning+of+Security+and+the+Theory+of+Securitization.shtml (26/04/11).

Society theory provides valuable elements to understand the non-military, trans-national, concerns that characterise the post-Cold War, post-9/11 period, and in this context it is useful to reach a more comprehensive understanding of U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico.

I do not claim that identifying the trans-border and trans-national nature of the threats posed by Mexico to the United States is the original contribution of the thesis because this argument has already been presented by other authors. [167] What I claim to be the contribution of my thesis is the effort to go beyond descriptive explanations of the problem by applying a combination of non-traditional security perspectives, and this is something not found in the literature of the subject, neither for the threats Mexico perceives from the United States, nor for the threats the United States perceives from Mexico, which is the subject of this analysis.

Secondly, in terms of information, this thesis relies on a blend of secondary and primary sources. The former included academic books and book chapters, policy briefs and working papers such as those available in Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO) –to which I have access by virtue of being alumni from the Center for Hemispheric and Defense Studies (CHDS) in Washington, DC- and also academic journal articles as well as articles from newspapers. The bibliography of the thesis is organised in two main parts: the first one lists all secondary sources and the second one all the official documents used in the course of this research. At the very end of the bibliography I provide a list of specialists, mainly officials from the U.S. Government who served under one or the two Clinton administrations, who I interviewed during the research for this thesis. In terms of the balance between the two types of sources, approximately 40% of this research relied on primary sources and 60% on secondary sources. Interviews were particularly relevant within the former category as all of them allowed me to confront data found on written sources as well as to find new pieces of information not available in published documents.

Primary sources included government documents ranging from Public Laws and Acts of Congress, to reports by Executive Branch agencies such as the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) annual strategic assessments and background notes from the U.S. Department of State (DoS), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) *Factbook*, in addition to those ordered by the U.S. Congress to be prepared by organisations such as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the then-General Accounting Office (GAO). I also used statistical data from the *Greenbook* in

[167] See for instance Bailey and Chabat (eds.), *Transnational Crime and Public Security. Challenges to Mexico and the United States*.

order to analyse the evolution of U.S. economic and military assistance to Mexico in the period under study, as well as opinion polls on trans-border issues and data on the presence of Mexico as a subject in U.S. Congress proceedings in those years.

Official U.S. documents also consisted of testimony provided by Clinton administration officials before members of the U.S. Congress at legislative hearings, as well as reports prepared by boards such as the Good Neighbor Policy Board (GNPB), commissions such as the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) and the Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR), panels such as the National Defense Panel (NDP), and task forces such as the Interagency Task Force on Economic Development for the Southwest Border.

The White House turned out to be a valuable source of information, as I was able to obtain from its website press releases, the yearly *National Security Strategy of the United States*, as well as a variety of assessments and statistics from the Office of National Drug Control (ONDCP). I was able to have access to some *National Security Decision Directives* (NSDD) through the National Security Archives at The George Washington University (GWU), whose office I actually visited during a short stay in Washington, D.C.

This study also resorted to sources of information from government academic centres such as the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, D.C., and from the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. This author visited the USAWC library during the first stage of this research project, and frequently followed articles on Mexico and Latin America published in the USAWC quarterly *Parameters*, which is a journal that can be accessed for free through the Internet. It is important to note that whenever I had the opportunity to have access to electronic sources of information, I extensively used database systems such as *ProQuest*, and *JSTOR* (Journal Storage) in particular, in order to find articles on the topics of interest of this thesis using key words such as 'U.S. security', 'Mexican security', 'trans-border issues', 'U.S.-Mexico border', 'drug trafficking', 'undocumented immigration' and 'NAFTA', among others.

Primary sources for this thesis also consisted of reports from international organisations such as The World Bank (WB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the United Nations (UN). UN documents utilised in this research project included papers from the UN University and the UN Research Institute for Social Development, and also those from other UN bodies covering specific topics such as conflict, climate change, development and drugs.

I also used grey literature from think tanks that included the RAND Corporation, the Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, the Democratic Leadership Council/Progressive Policy Institute (DLC/PPI), the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), COPRI, the Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), the Center for Defense Information (CDI), the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, the Project on Defense Alternatives, the Commonwealth Institute, the Inter-American Dialogue, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the conservative The Heritage Foundation, and a variety of papers from academic institutions such as the Association of Borderland Studies and Western Social Science Association, the Political Science Association (PSA), the Center for Mexican-American Studies (CMAS) at the University of Texas (UT) at Austin, CUSM at UCSD, the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (GSIRPS) at UCSD, the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at UCSD, the Project on Advocacy of U.S. Interests Abroad, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Centre for the Study of Globalisation at the University of Warwick, and the Mexico City-based Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) and Colegio Nacional de Ciencia Política y Administración Pública, A.C. Finally, I obtained information from the Drug Library.org,

I also carried some quantitative work in the form of searching for and presenting statistical data to support specific arguments of this thesis. For instance, the chapters devoted to drug trafficking and undocumented immigration included a variety of tables showing amounts of drug seizures, U.S. drug assistance and U.S. drug consumption, as well as figures on deportations, immigration enforcement and immigrant population in the United States, respectively, in order to illustrate and to put into perspective both the trends and the dimension of each issue. For this purpose, I utilised statistics from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DoHHS), in particular from the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), among others. It is important to note that besides the use of non-traditional security perspectives for the study of the non-military, non-state, threats Mexico poses to the United States, interviews with officials who worked in the two Clinton administrations were primary sources as well as an additional source of originality for the thesis. Thanks to my

frequent participation in academic events in the United States, such as in the Summer Seminar on U.S. Studies at the CUSMS at UCSD in 2001, as well as in the variety of events organised by the CHDS from 2000 on, I was able to have access to scholars as well as to practitioners who worked for the two Clinton administrations who directly dealt with the issues under consideration in this thesis. I conducted these interviews according to qualitative methodology; that is, they were based on a flexible question-and-answer framework and were carried out person to person.[168] None of them was conducted over the phone, although two of them were based on a questionnaire that was sent, and responded to, through e-mail. Except for the latter two, all of them were conducted face to face, recorded, and later transcribed. I interviewed Juan Pablo Cárdenas, Policy Analyst in charge of Mexico, Central America & Caribbean at The White House ONDCP; David Fege, Assistant Director, San Diego Border Liaison Office, EPA; Manuel Figueroa, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent at El Centro Sector Headquarters, one of the busiest undocumented immigrant corridors in California at the time; Edward Logan, Special Agent in Charge at the U.S. Customs Service in San Diego, California; Michael Pérez, Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General (former) Office of the Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ): David Randolph, Coordinator of U.S.-Mexico Border Affairs at the DoS; Ana María Salazar, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support who later went into journalism in Mexico City; Marico Sayoc when she held the position of U.S.-Mexico Program Coordinator at EPA; Mark Spalding, GSIRPS Professor at UCSD, who is a re-known specialist on border environmental issues; Thomas Umberg, Attorney at Law, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Irvine, California, who was the former Deputy Director for Supply Reduction at the ONDCP; and Patrick Whelan, who was in charge of the Office of International Activities at the EPA. Two additional interviews I conducted were those with Arturo Valenzuela, then-Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Georgetown University and former Assistant Secretary for Hemispheric Affairs at the DoS; and with Errol Chávez, Special Agent in Charge of the DEA Division in San Diego, California. The transcription of these two last interviews was problematic because of technical problems I unexpectedly experienced with the tape recorder, so they are incomplete. As an appendix to this thesis, nevertheless, I have included the schedule of interviews, and a transcript of all of them is available for examiners to consult if

[168] J. L. Simon and P. Burnstein, *Basic Research Methods in Social Science*, Third Edition, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc.), pp. 255-256.

they wish. In general, information elicited through interviews converged with or did not contradict the ideas expressed in official documents, but sometimes disagreed with, or complemented, information found in secondary sources.

This research concludes that the answer to the research question -which consists in explaining the paradox as to why Mexico, a valuable U.S. trade partner, became a U.S. security concern in the context of NAFTA- is that U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico are the product of the intensification of interdependence between the two countries, in particular of the existence of an integrated illegal drug and labour market that was likely to expand in the context of the trade agreement.

The NAFTA process began by President George H. W. Bush in 1990 and concluded by President Clinton in 1994, created important economic opportunities for both the United States and Mexico (and Canada), reflected in the fact that trade among its members increased in the first years of operation of the agreement.[169] Concerns in the United States about the negative impacts of the accord with Mexico, nevertheless, have been expressed outside the official U.S. rhetoric, and they have been reflected in arguments that point out that NAFTA facilitated the movement of drugs across the border[170] and trade integration, far from deterring undocumented immigration, actually increased it,[171] to the point that the 1990s were characterised by more restrictive U.S. immigration policies at the federal level. In this context, drugs and undocumented immigrants became more securitised after 9/11 given the potential scenario of drug trafficking organisations helping terrorists to illegally enter the United States, possibility that contributed to establish a direct link between immigration and terrorism in the United States. In contrast, border environmental issues between the United States and Mexico have been for the most part not actual but potential security concerns, and they have remained the same way in part due to the bilateral institutional infrastructure to deal with these matters. The prospect for drugs and undocumented immigration to remain as U.S. security concerns in the bilateral relationship depend on whether drugs are eventually legalised, and the United States and Mexico arrive at a

[169] For instance, while U.S. exports to Mexico increased 89.4% between 1993 and 1998, after four years of NAFTA's operation Mexico occupied Japan's place as the second U.S. import-export market. See Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch, 'NAFTA's First Five Years', (Part I), *El Paso Business Frontier*, Issue 2, 1999, [online] available: http://dallasfed.org/research/busfront/bus9902.pdf (28/04/11).
[170] R. Grim, 'NAFTA and the Drug Cartels: "A Deal Made in Heaven"', *Huffington Post*, July 1, 2009, [online] available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-grim/nafta-and-the-drug-cartel_b_223705.html (28/04/11).
[171] J. Wayne, 'The Secret Aspects of NAFTA', *Council on Hemispheric Affairs* (COHA), April 8, 2008, [online] available: http://www.coha.org/the-secret-aspects-of-nafta/ (28/04/11).

more comprehensive integration framework that would allow for the free movement of people -especially of Mexicans into the United States-, even though it is important to note that this scenario is unlikely as long as deep economic differences remain between the two countries. In academic terms, this thesis demonstrates the reasons why drugs and undocumented immigration are security issues from the U.S. point of view. In policy terms, the conclusion of this study is that if both countries had non-coercive institutional structures, such as bilateral mechanisms to regulate the flow of Mexican workers to the United States and a bi-national agency to deal with the demand of drugs in both countries through the development of a joint strategy and programmes to reduce consumption, both issues could be pushed out of the security realm and back into the political sphere. The presence of bilateral institutions has proven valuable to solve common security concerns.

After this introduction, chapter 2 is devoted to discussing both the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society Theory. It starts by briefly addressing post-positivist strands in order to locate the Buzan et.al and the Risk Society perspectives within this school of thought, and compares the Buzan et.al approach with the traditional conception of security to identify the latter perspective's limitations in terms of explaining non-military threats to security. After addressing the securitisation process, the chapter goes on to discuss each of Buzan et.al's five security issue-sectors. It assesses the broader security perspective's advantages and disadvantages, and explains the utility of the Buzan et.al analytical framework to study the two securitised issues under consideration in this thesis, drugs and undocumented immigration, and the non-securitised environmental concern. It addresses Risk Society Theory and compares it to the Buzan et.al analytical framework to test its strengths. Chapter 3 begins by establishing the nature of the U.S.-Mexico security relationship, and then addresses NAFTA's security implications for the United States establishing the 1990s as the focus of this study. It continues with the empirical analysis of Mexico's importance for the United States within both the U.S. defence and the national security strategies. This section adopts an inductive perspective by first studying Mexico's particular military irrelevance within the U.S. defence strategy, and then moving on to its broader significance in terms of the more general U.S. national security strategy. It is here where Mexico's security impact on its northern neighbour becomes clearer, both in terms of opportunities and risks. Chapter 4 deals with the analysis of drug trafficking as the only U.S. security issue directly linked to Mexico within the U.S. national security strategy in

its character of a trans-national concern in relation to the Western Hemisphere. It addresses the background of the issue, its evolution and explains it from both security perspectives. Chapter 5 focuses on Mexican undocumented immigration to the United States. Even though Mexico was not directly addressed at all within the U.S. security strategy in relation to undocumented immigration, the document identified this as one of the issues of a trans-national nature. In this context, including undocumented immigration in the analysis of U.S. trans-border threats was only logical given both the impact and dimension of Mexican legal and unauthorised immigration in the United States. At no point the U.S. security strategy document mentioned the erosion of identity either as a security concern in relation to migration, and for this reason it became interesting to find out what the U.S. concern is in this regard. This chapter addresses undocumented immigration from the two security perspectives. Chapter 6 focuses on the border environment, in particular on the issue of water pollution and its potential to create an epidemic on both sides of the boundary. In analytical terms, the purpose of addressing the border environment consisted in demonstrating that the Buzan et.al analytical framework is equally useful to understand potentially threatening issues that are kept outside the security realm – besides the fact that the existence of a bi-national institutional infrastructure is part of the explanation about the non-securitisation of the border environment. This argument was complemented with insights from Risk Society theory in order to arrive at a more comprehensive explanation about this issue, and the measures that have prevented it from becoming a security concern. Therefore, the sequence followed by the analysis consisted in addressing an explicit securitised issue, an implicit security issue, and a potential security concern in order to reflect not only the complexity of the U.S.-Mexican security relationship but also the utility of both security perspectives to understand U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico in the context of NAFTA.

CHAPTER 2. A NON-TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter consists in describing, analysing and comparing the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory in order to reach a more comprehensive understanding the non-state, non-military, threats Mexico poses to the United States.

In contrast to security relationships determined by the pre-eminence of the state and the threat or the actual use of force (such as the one that characterised bipolar confrontation during the Cold War), which are better explained by the realist perspective and its focus on military factors, the U.S.-Mexico security relationship is defined, from the U.S. point of view, by non-state, non-military, trans-border, threats (mainly drug trafficking, undocumented immigration) that Mexico indirectly poses to its neighbour to the north. Understanding the U.S.-Mexico security relationship, therefore, requires a non-traditional conception of security.

It is not the intention of this chapter to make an exhaustive review of the 'non-traditional' (post-positivist) perspectives on security; instead, the objective is to discuss two interesting post-positivist strands in security studies such as Critical Security Studies and Feminism in order to situate the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory within the 'non-traditional' literature, and in subsequent sections to compare them in order to test the strengths of the former in relation to the analysis of U.S. security and trans-border threats from Mexico.

First, Critical Security Studies (CSS) derives from critical IR theory, and is an orientation that criticises the *status quo* in international relations based on the idea that the behaviour of states and individuals can be transformed. An important book within this school has been *Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases* edited in 1996 by Keith Krause and Michael Williams, which focuses criticism on the neo-realist's emphasis on states as the main object of security, which for all practical purposes translates a human being's security into 'citizenship'; in other words, the security of the individual is relevant only to the extent that he/she is a citizen of a state; otherwise the individual is not significant as an object of security *per se*.[172] In this context, CSS proposes an approach based on the security of the individual -or on that of his/her society- instead of concentrating on the state. This orientation widens the agenda for security

[172] K. Krause and M. C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases*, (London: UCL Press 1997), p.43.

studies, in particular because it opens the possibility of identifying who is accountable for the security of the individual in absence of an authority that can provide protection, or whether a structure of authority is a threat to its own population.[173] An important point implicit in this CSS argument is that to the extent that the focus of analysis is the individual and/or the community, it is important to consider the principles, customs and standards that shape the community, which in turn requires the analyst not to be objectively detached from the object under study but to interpret the situation according to the object's perception. In the case of Risk Society theory, because of the process of 'reflexive modernisation', the individual is a central actor in the definition of risk, as discussed below.

It is important to note that even though CSS criticises the state as the central referent object of security by pointing out that security involves more than military aspects, the state itself is analysed under a new light because this object, as the community, is also constituted by ideas, and this argument is characteristic of the post-positivist theoretical strands. Critical Security Studies also refers to a strand developed by Ken Booth based on the ideas of the Frankfurt School that links critical security and criticism of Marxist assumptions. Booth distances himself from Krause and Williams by being in favour of a unitary rather than a broader critical security strand. According to his view, critical theory has to uncover the political forces that shape knowledge, as well as to expose the interests behind the apparently 'neutral' traditional security theory, because this is important to foster social change and thus the possibility of progress; as a matter of fact, 'the test of social theory is emancipation'[174] from structures that impede social progress such as an authoritarian state, for instance.

It can be argued that Krause and Williams CSS is a reaction to the Buzan et.al. analytical framework more than to the traditional notions of security. Comparing the two perspectives, it is important to note that the Buzan et.al analytical framework represents a wider perspective than CSS by including security issue-sectors as part of its analysis while CSS focuses primarily on the process of securitisation. CSS criticises the Buzan et.al analytical framework in reference to its lack of clarity, by failing to adequately address questions such as who can really securitise; under what conditions successful securitisation is achieved; and what the consequences of successful

[173] D. Mutimer, 'Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History', Chapter Four, in A. Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Online Resource Centre, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, c2007), p. 57.
[174] K. Booth (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, c2005), p.268.

securitisation are. While CSS shares with the Buzan et.al analytical framework recognition of constructivism as a useful analytical tool, CSS criticises the issue-sector aspect of the Buzan et.al's perspective by considering it part of a different epistemological orientation (positivist) in comparison to securitisation which is post-positivist. Booth also criticises the Buzan et.al analytical framework for the same reason, in particular because it retains a positivist orientation in detriment of a constructivist analysis. Buzan et.al argues that even though their framework shares with CSS the value of a constructivist approach, 'we, in contrast, believe even the socially constituted is often sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do analysis on the basis that it continues'.[175] In their view, therefore, the security field is highly constant as not to approach it also from an objective perspective. Finally, CSS shares with constructivism the relevance of promoting social change, and both reject the separation of the analyst from the social world in contrast to the Buzan et.al analytical framework,[176] as discussed above. Risk Society Theory rejects the centrality of the state and this is a characteristic it shares with both the Buzan et.al analytical framework and CSS, even though it has also found it difficult to isolate itself from constructivism by recognising that the designation of a risk may be function of perception, that is of a social construction as discussed in more detail below.

Second, Feminism is a theoretical approach originating from the idea that the national security discourse, which has emphasised the security of the state, has been influenced by the male-dominated world of 'high politics' that has resulted in neglecting women and issues that also affect the security of the individual. Ann Tickner, for instance, makes reference to this exclusion by pointing out to the 'extent to which international politics is such a thoroughly masculinised sphere of activity that women's voices are considered inauthentic'.[177] As in the case of other critical theoretical strands, feminism is an orientation interested in finding out who has really been favoured by national security policy,[178] and its main arguments can be grouped into four different categories. First, it criticises women's lack of relevance within international security policies. In this context, feminism strives to demonstrate that women and gender are

[175] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.34.
[176] *Idem*.
[177] J. A. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving International Security*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, c1992), p.4.
[178] E. M. Blanchard, 'Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, Vol.28 No. 4, 2003, p.1290.

empirically and conceptually relevant aspects of the structure of international relations.[179] Women were, for instance, victims in war-ravaged Europe during WW II, while they represented a valuable human resource on the home front in the war effort, in places such as in the United States. Second, feminism analyses the extent to which women have really been protected in times of war, taking into account that security is a multi-factorial concept related to different forms of violence that include physical and psychological forms. In this context, feminists broaden the security analysis by dealing not only with war as a threat, but also other types of issues such as lack of economic opportunities, subjugation to male authority and vulnerability to environmental challenges. According to one interesting perspective, 'feminists not only broaden what is meant by security but also who the concept of security applies to'.[180] Cynthia Enloe, for instance, addresses the issue of global politics by placing women as the central aspect for analysis, arguing about women's positive contribution in areas such as diplomacy, military, tourism and agriculture.[181] Third, feminism establishes that without women, security studies are incomplete because it is neither scientifically correct nor ethically acceptable to neglect gender in their analysis. Understanding 'immunity' in times of war, for instance, required a feminist approach to reveal the fact that because of immunity has often been associated with civilian populations, meaning women and children, non-combatant male populations were faced with a significant vulnerability.[182] In synthesis, feminism has contributed to reconceptualise ideas such as security, violence and war, and has provided new knowledge in areas such as sexual violence, the participation of women in the armed forces, militarisation, and the *a priori* link between women and peace, contributing therefore to a more comprehensive understanding of security issues.

The Buzan et.al analytical framework is part of the 'non-traditional' literature on security that includes the post-positivist strands discussed above, among others. Even though the Buzan et.al analytical framework shares with CSS the value of social construction as a key element of analysis –which is present in one of its main components, the process of securitisation-, the

[179] L. Sjoberg and J. Martin, *Feminist Security Studies: Conversations and Introductions*, Draft, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, The George Washington University, Draft, [online] available: http://florida.academia.edu/LauraSjoberg/Papers/242700/Feminist_Security_Studies_Conversations_and_Introductions (20/07/11), p.6.
[180] *Ibid*., p.9.
[181] C. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, c1989).
[182] Sjoberg and Martin, *Feminist Security Studies*, pp.15-16.

framework of reference also includes a structural explanation in terms of security issue-sectors that allow for a more comprehensive understanding of security than either constructivism or CSS. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, therefore, not only explains how issues are securitised and by whom, but also the implications of securitisation on different contexts, providing thus a 'holistic' understanding of security. CSS criticises the Buzan et.al analytical framework for retaining a positivist orientation by acknowledging the dominance of the state in security analysis. From this author's view, however, recognising the significance of the state is an advantage rather than a disadvantage because of the fact that a more eclectic perspective allows the analyst to reach a more comprehensive understanding of security. In this context, it can be argued that *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* represents a *sui generis* explanation by being critical of the traditional notion of security, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by retaining some important positivist elements such as the objective continuation and permanence of the state as a key factor in the study of security.

Feminism provides valuable insights on important international issues such as war, diplomacy and economic relations, and this perspective is useful to the analysis of certain gender-related aspects of U.S. security in relation to Mexico. For instance, Kathleen Staudt points out that the analysis of violence at the U.S.-Mexico border invariably includes 'gender-based variables' such as different sorts of aggression against women.[183] She contends, nevertheless, that even though the activist community has called the attention of authorities to these problems, the paradox is that by doing so the activists have only reinforced the official coercive orientation to deal with border challenges that is characterised by the lack of genuine concern for women's issues. To break this cycle, therefore, she argues it is important to understand violence against women from the perspective of those who suffer it, and to accomplish this objective requires expanding (i.e. focusing the issue from a more general Feminist and human rights perspective) the narrower conceptions that characterise the government's response to border challenges.[184]

The arguments above do not intend to portray the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory as exceptional and ideal models for understanding security in U.S.-Mexican

[183] K. Staudt, 'Violence at the Border: Broadening the Discourse to Include Feminism, Human Security, and Deeper Democracy', in K. Staudt, T. Payan, and Z. A. Kruszewski (eds.), *Human Rights Along the U.S.-Mexico Border. Gendered Violence and Insecurity*, (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, c2009), p.3.
[184] *Ibid*, pp.3-4.

relations; they are just the perspectives that provide more elements to understanding security in the context of a very complex bilateral relationship, in comparison to CSS and Feminism. This was the justification to adopt both complementary perspectives instead of others within the 'non-traditional' literature on security.

This chapter has four sections besides this introduction. The first part outlines the main characteristics of the notion of security in order to reflect its complexity. The second part focuses on describing the traditional conception of security and its emphasis on the state and military factors. It deals with the principles of realism and neo-realism and their influence on security, and discusses some of the criticisms made to this perspective. It addresses the reasons why the realist/neo-realist security notion does not sufficiently explain the U.S.-Mexico security relationship. The third part addresses both the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk society Theory. It examines the framework's securitisation process and each of the security-issue sectors as well as its overall advantages and disadvantages. It discusses the framework's utility for this thesis. The fourth part addresses Risk Society Theory and compares it to the Buzan et.al analytical framework to test this latter strength. The fifth part provides the conclusions of the chapter.

2.2. The Complexity of the Security Idea

Even though there are references to the 'theory of national security' within academic discussions on the subject, the ambiguity and relativity that has characterised the concept of 'security' makes it difficult to conceive of security in terms of a theory. For this reason, it is easier to think of security in terms of doctrines, approaches, notions and analytical frameworks rather than in terms of a theory *per se*.[185] While most characterisations of security/national security deal with basic elements such as goals, obstacles and the state, trying to define a concept is problematic precisely because security is contextual and dependent on a wide variety of circumstances.[186] For Colombia, for instance, having U.S. military advisors within its territory as part of 'Plan Colombia' is not a security concern, in comparison to having U.S. military personnel stationed in

[185] See, for instance, a couple of works that are in fact more conceptual and empirical than theoretical: N. A. Graebner (ed.), *The National Security. Its Theory and Practice 1945-1960*, A Galaxy Book, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, c1986); F. N. Trager and P. S. Kronenberg (eds.), *National Security and American Society. Theory, Process and Policy*, Published for the National Security Education Program, (Wichita, KS: The University Press of Kansas, c1973).

[186] B. Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, (Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.18.

Mexico as part of the 'Merida Initiative', which Mexico made it clear was out of question, because of the historic distrust of U.S. intentions.[187]

Notwithstanding the argument above, it is important to note that theories have been developed in relation to specific aspects of security. For instance, 'balance of power' and 'deterrence' are two security-related concepts that have produced theoretical thinking.[188] Moreover, even though scholars, in general, do not make reference to any 'Buzan theory', some of them have actually theorised about specific aspects of the Buzan et.al analytical framework when they mention, for instance, 'securitization theory'.[189] Two of the authors of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* themselves, Buzan and Waever, have contributed to the development of '"classical security complex theory"'.[190] Yet, they conceive their work of reference in terms of a 'framework for analysis' rather than in terms of a theory.

Therefore, although this study underlines the difficulties involved in thinking in terms of a 'security theory', it does recognise that there is a series of basic elements that underpin the idea of security. First, notwithstanding labels such as 'human', 'public', 'domestic', 'internal', 'national' or 'international', security involves 'values' and as such they do require to be protected from threats.[191] In other words, once a goal has been identified, one has to be prepared to overcome the obstacles to its achievement. According to Donald Nuechterlein, 'the *national*

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[187] See J. Petras, 'Geopolitics of Plan Colombia', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 35, No. 52/53, Dec. 30, 2000-Jan. 5, 2001.

[188] For the theory of deterrence see, among others, B. Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon*, (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1946); H. A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, (New York, NY: Harper, 1957); A. Wohlstetter, 'The Delicate Balance of Terror', *Foreign Affairs*, 37, 211 (1958); B. Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959); T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); H. Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, 2nd ed., (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961); T. C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); F. M. Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon*, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983); L. Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 2nd ed., (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989); R. Jervis (ed.), *Psychology and Deterrence*, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Reprint Edition, April 1, 1989); J. Baylis and J. Garnett, *Makers of Nuclear Strategy*, (London: Pinter, 1991); R. Smoke, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma*, 3rd ed., (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1993); G. Allison and P. Zelikow, (1999). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2ed*., (New York, NY: Longman, 1999). For the theory of balance of power see H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*, Third Edition, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002); J. J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001); H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Brief Edition, Revised by K. W. Thompson, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., c1993); M. Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 2000); S. M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

[189] Trombetta, 'The Securitization of the Environment and the Transformation of Security'.

[190] See Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.10.

[191] A. Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 61, No. 4, December, 1952, p.484.

interest is the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising its external environment'.[192] In this context, interests are the concrete expression of values and aspirations. Second, security is basically the 'pursuit of freedom from threat'.[193] Security is defined mainly by a 'negative value' in the sense that it is characterised by the absence of a threat. It resembles the debates about 'positive' and 'negative' freedom in political philosophy.[194] Third, security represents a cost, which means that resources assigned to security do so at the expense of satisfying other needs in a context of 'scarce resources'.[195] In fact, devoting resources to security implies not only sacrificing other goals but also the possibility of producing an undesirable effect: the greater the investment in security, the grater the possibility that it could bring about precisely the consequence it seeks to prevent in the first place, which is to diminish one's own security creating a 'security dilemma' by making others feel less secure because of one's own actions.[196] Fourth, in relation to the previous argument, security is relative because more often than not it is necessary to accept a minimum threshold of insecurity. Security is relative also because the threat perception is different for different entities or actors. According to Arnold Wolfers' classic 1950s essay,

> Some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.[197]

Security, therefore, is an issue related to perception and this fact lays at the foundation of the constructivist view on the subject that establishes that the concept is inter-subjective, socially constructed.[198] For instance, walking alone on an empty street late at night can be objectively safe because of the absence of any material threat. From a different perspective, this situation is

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[192] D. E. Nuechterlein, *National Interest and Presidential Leadership*, Westview Special Studies in International Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. C1978), p.3. (Emphasis original).
[193] Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.18.
[194] See for instance, I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), in H. Hardy (ed.), *Liberty*, New Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, *Positive and Negative Liberty*, October 8, 2007, [online] available: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ (22/07/11).
[195] D. A. Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 1997, p.14 and 15.
[196] J. H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, c1951).
[197] Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol', pp.485-486.
[198] An important collective work in this regard is P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New Directions in World Politics, John Gerard Ruggie, General Editor, Sponsored by the Committee on International Peace and Security of the Social Research Council, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, c1996).

only subjectively safe precisely because of the same reason, because an empty street late at night is supposed to increase the vulnerability for an individual walking in the area due to the absence of other people who to resort to in case of an emergency.

Because of its ambiguity, the purpose of this section has been to introduce some of the characteristics that make security a notion difficult to define. This is in line with the argument about its complexity and changing character, and with the fact that it cannot be defined in absolute terms but only in reference to a specific context.

2.3. 'Traditional' Notion of Security

The traditional notion of security and its focus on the state and military factors has its roots in 'classical realism' and 'neo-realism' within IR theory.

Realism has been a dominant and well established IR perspective whose antecedents can be traced back to Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli, which in modern times represented a criticism of the 'utopianism' that characterised the interwar period.[199] For instance, in his book *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939* published in 1939, E. H. Carr rejected the idea of a 'natural harmony of interests' in the international system, and he actually considered it the source of 'so much confusion in international thinking'.[200] Hans Morgenthau, the most influential proponent of this view after WWII, in his *Politics Among Nations* criticised 'the "legalistic-moralistic approach" to international politics'.[201] He established that the world 'is the result of forces inherent in the human nature', one of 'opposing interests and of conflict' where there is no place for morality especially if it is defined in isolation from reality.[202]

His perspective on international politics is based on six principles: 1) politics mirrors human nature; 2) international politics translates into 'interest defined in terms of power'; 3) the meaning of the national interest, as 'an objective category', is changeable; 4) the permanence of the state is the crucial 'moral principle'; 5) 'morality' is nothing but pursuing the interest of the state; 6) 'moral standards' must adjust to politics.[203] Based on these principles, states are rational and unitary actors operating in an anarchic international system, seeking to maximise their power

[199] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Translated by John H. Finley, Jr., (New York, NY: Modern Library, 1951); T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Edited by Michael Oakeshott, (New York, NY: Collier Macmillan, 1974); N. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Translated with an introduction by George Bull, Penguin Classics, (London: Penguin Books, c1981).
[200] E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, (London: Papermac, 1995), p.50.
[201] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p.14.
[202] *Ibid*., p.3.
[203] *Ibid*., pp.4-14.

as the means to promote their national interests often through use of the force. This is why power, meaning military power, equals security within this perspective. Moreover, in a competitive international context of sovereign states, balance of power represents 'a particular manifestation of a general social principle' that is fundamental to preserve states' freedom of action.[204]

In contrast to classical realism, for neo-realism or structural realism,[205] understanding international politics requires focusing not on the human nature but on the nature of the international system.[206] According to this perspective, a system is formed by a 'structure' and 'interactive units'.[207] While the structure is defined by the way each unit is related to all others, units are states that are differentiated not by the objectives they have to accomplish but by the array of instruments at their disposal to achieve those goals.[208] One relevant aspect of this theory is that its most important variables are located at the system level, not at the level of the unit, and this is actually a source of criticism made of realism and neo-realism as well.[209] The criticism focuses on the fact that neither of the two theories take into consideration the internal characteristics of individual units, which otherwise would provide valuable elements of analysis. According to Richard Ashley, for instance,

> The proposition that the state might be essentially problematic or contested is excluded from neorealist theory. Indeed, neorealist theory is prepared to acknowledge problems of the state only to the extent that the state itself, within the framework of its own legitimations, might be prepared to recognize problems and mobilize resources toward their solution. [210]

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[204] *Ibid*., p.183.
[205] Within IR theory, the terms neo-realist and structural realist are used indistinctively to refer to analysts that focus on the structure of the international system. See, for instance, J. J. Mearsheimer, 'Structural Realism', Chapter Four, pp.71-88, in T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith, *International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity*, Online Resource Centre, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., c2007). It is important, nevertheless, not to confuse this with the broad school of thought of 'structural realism' that is considered 'the most defensible form of scientific realism'. It posits that theories are in fact 'approximately true descriptions of the world', in spite of 'scepticism about theories of unobservable entities'. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, *Structural Realism*, May 22, 2009, [online] available: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/ (22/07/11).
[206] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p.79.
[207] *Idem*.
[208] *Ibid*., p.80 and 97.
[209] *Ibid*., p.79.
[210] R. K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', in R. O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New Directions in World Politics, Helen Milner and John Gerard Ruggie, General Editors, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, c1986), p.269.

In comparison to the hierarchical nature of domestic politics, where there is a vertical line of authority that establishes relations of super-ordination and subordination, the defining principle of international politics is anarchy, which is created by each unit looking for its own self-serving interest.[211] As a result of this 'self-help' principle, the primary goal of states is 'survival'.[212] As in classical realism, balance of power is a relevant concept, even though within neo-realism it is a circumstance defined by both the anarchic structure and the units' search for their survival.[213]

One significant criticism of realism comes from pluralism, in particular from the neo-liberal institutionalist strand and its concept of 'complex interdependence'. This idea establishes that in the international context societies are inter-connected by a wide variety of links; that military issues are not necessarily the main concern of all states; and also that military power is increasingly difficult to translate into other forms of influence.[214] Even though this perspective does not reject the relevance of the state and military factors, it challenges the claim about them being the determining aspects of international politics. One interdependence line of argument found in Buzan et.al is, for instance, that 'in the post-Cold War world, a case can be made that military threats are ceasing to matter in relations among the advanced industrial democracies'.[215] Consider, for instance, the Franco-German brigade established in 1987, which is evidence of the evolution of a non-threatening military relationship between France and Germany after centuries of rivalry.[216]

It is important to mention that realism, neo-realism and neo-liberalism are all positivist perspectives, which means they describe phenomena that are observable and measurable, also known as practical empiricism.[217] From the post-positivist side -that rejects the principles of

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[211] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p.88. According to one interesting perspective, states in informal hierarchical relationships devote significantly less resources to defence in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). In this context, 'hierarchy matters and subordination pays'. See D. A. Lake, 'Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics', *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer 2007, pp.47-79.
[212] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p.91.
[213] *Ibid*., p.121.
[214] Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, pp.21-22.
[215] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.62.
[216] Bundesregierung, 'Franco-German Brigade to Be Stationed in France', 07/02/09, [online] available: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2009/02/2009-02-07-merkel-sarkozy-muenchen__en,layoutVariant=Druckansicht.html (31/07/11).
[217] See GubaLincolnChart. pdf [online] available: http://www.wordsinspace.net/course_material/mrm/mrmreadings/GubaLincolnChart.pdf (22/07/11).

positivism by establishing that observation is fallible and theory susceptible to correction-, nevertheless, the realist/neo-realist perspective is also criticised by the 'English School' which, contrary to realism, holds that states can actually abide by rules that contribute to sustain 'common interests', and by doing so they create a 'society of states' meaning that anarchy does not necessarily turns into conflict.[218] Additional theoretical views that are critical of positivist/rational choice theory approaches are Feminism, Critical Theory, Post-structuralism and Postmodernism that basically share a 'rejection of a "foundationalist" account of the world, in which knowledge can be grounded by the correspondence of theory to a knowable reality'.[219] For post-positivist positions, therefore, knowledge is based on 'nonfalsified hypotheses that are probable facts or laws'.[220] Nevertheless, one of the outstanding criticisms of realism/neo-realism is its failure to satisfactorily explain the causes of war. According to Robert Jervis, making reference to the international context after the end of the Cold War,

> Whatever its explanation, the very existence of a security community among the leading powers refutes many theories of the causes of war or, at least, indicates they are not universally valid.[221]

States, therefore, are not all and certainly not all the time worried about military threats from other states, nor about their survival as realism and neo-realism claim.

2.3.1. *The Partial Utility of the 'Traditional' Notion to Explain the U.S.-Mexico Security Relationship*

Notwithstanding the critique above, it is important to note that the realist and neo-realist perspectives are useful if the objective is to analyse power relationships and to compare national power factors regarding the United States and Mexico. In terms of neo-realist principles, for instance, 'the distribution of capabilities' in the system favours the United States in comparison to Mexico as shown in Table 1 above.

Taken from E. G. Guba and Y. S. Lincoln, 'Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences', in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 3rd. Edition, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), pp.195-6; and K. Keifer-Boyd, Penn State University, "The Heart of Research": http://sva74.sva.psu.edu/%7ecyberfem/aed502_f02/basics/intro.htmlBuzan

[218] Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p.13.

[219] C. Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, Second Edition, Revised and Updated, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, c2001), p.63.

[220] GubaLincolnChart. pdf

[221] R. Jervis, 'Theories of War and Peace in an Era of Leading-Power Peace, "Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001"', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 1, March 2002, p.11.

The asymmetry of power between the two countries has been historically evident, and in fact the United States expanded in the first half of the 19th century to the detriment of Mexico, which explains why the latter has been traditionally wary and cautious of the former. Nevertheless, their security relationship has not been determined, at least not since the 1846-1848 'Mexican War', by military factors. This is the reason why realism and neo-realism represent a necessary but not sufficient explanation for the security dynamic between the two countries that is determined by the non-state, trans-border, character of challenges in the bilateral relationship.

Even though it is possible to recognise the state as a significant element in the U.S.-Mexico relationship that is present in the high intensity of inter-governmental interaction -especially in a context where security has made it to the top of the bilateral agenda-, this situation does not necessarily mean the use of force is a preponderant aspect of the relations between the two countries. Arguing about the United States and Mexico being part of a 'pluralist security community', one scholar establishes that after WWII 'military means of resolving the threats posed by each country to the other have been "subrationally unthinkable"',[222] meaning the use of force to resolve disputes is out of the mind of political leaders in the two countries. Looking for negotiated solutions to disputes in the bilateral relationship is function not only of the high intensity of interdependence between the United States and Mexico, but also of the increasing institutionalisation of co-operation and dialogue brought about by NAFTA. For all practical purposes, military threats are absent in their relationship, and bilateral co-operation in the area of security has been defined by the need to confront non-military challenges affecting both countries.

On the one hand, even though Mexico perceives a threat from the United States because of its potential to influence Mexican domestic affairs, this perception does not necessarily envisage the use of force. On the other hand, in a recent document defining U.S. military strategy, only a marginal reference was made in relation to Mexico, and it was in the context of disaster relief support the Mexican armed forces provided the United States in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in August of 2005.[223] The key argument advanced here is that the logic of realism and neo-realism does not provide a complete explanation of the security relationship

[222] Mares, 'Strategic Interests in the U.S.-Mexican Relationship', p.24.
[223] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2007, [online] available: http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf (31/05/07), p.87.

between the two countries, and this is why it is necessary to search for more comprehensive orientations in order to understand their security interaction.

The real militarisation of shared-security issues takes place in the form of a more intense participation of the Mexican armed forces in anti-narcotics operations within Mexican territory -encouraged by the United States-, which could have serious consequences for both countries in the long term. This subject will be addressed in more detail below in the chapter devoted to drug trafficking.

Therefore, according to the discussion above, neither realism nor neo-realism offers a satisfactory explanation of the U.S.-Mexico security relationship.

2.4. Non-traditional Security Perspectives

This section addresses the non-traditional security perspectives developed by Buzan et.al and Risk society Theory. It deals with the elements Buzan et.al framework and proceeds to explaining the securitisation process (i.e. the course followed by a given issue when constructed as a security issue), as well as with the criticisms made of this process. The section turns to explaining each of the five issue-sectors outlined by the framework, and assesses its overall advantages and disadvantages. It deals with the main characteristics of Risk Society Theory. Finally, it compares both perspectives and addresses the utility of both for the study of the U.S.-Mexico security relationship.

2.4.1. *The Copenhagen School*

The idea about broadening the concept of security represents a criticism of the so-called 'traditionalist' (realist/neo-realist) view. Whereas the traditional perspective has emphasised the state and the pre-eminence of military factors, the broader view of security proposes a re-definition of both its notion and its agenda in order to provide for a more comprehensive understanding of the subject.[224]

[224] The non-traditional security perspective is not the direct result of the end of the Cold War. The traditional concept had already been criticised in the 1980s, at least a decade before the fall of the Berlin Wall. See Sheehan, *International Security*, p.43.

As discussed above, Buzan is one of the scholars who have contributed to the development of a broader conception of security.[225] He is associated with the so-called 'Copenhagen School', which 'has played an important role in broadening the conception of security and in providing a framework to analyse how an issue becomes securitized or desecuritized'.[226] Even though in Buzan's early writings on security he describes himself as a neo-realist, in a further refinement of his ideas he developed a holistic framework for security analysis (Buzan et.al) that incorporates the constructivist perspective. This aspect is significant because even though Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde are advocates of a broader perspective, none of them describes himself as a constructivist.[227] In fact, they acknowledge that security analysis cannot be completely separated from realist principles. In their opinion,

> The main purpose of [*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*] is to present a framework based on the wider agenda that will incorporate the traditionalist position. Our solution comes down to the side of the wideners in terms of keeping the security agenda open to many different types of threats.[228]

The Buzan et.al analytical framework broadens the notion of security, first of all, by defining five different issue-sectors besides the one related to the military/use of force (i.e. environmental, economic, societal/cultural, and political), each one with its own dynamic (meaning the logic of securitisation is different in each of them in terms of actors and processes) but interconnected to produce a comprehensive understanding of security. These sectors are discussed in more detail below.

One of the main criticisms of the wider perspective, from the traditionalist point of view, is that opening security to issues other than military ones erodes the 'intellectual coherence' of the field because then everything and nothing could be considered a security concern.[229] Buzan et.al, nevertheless, maintain they 'want to construct a more radical view of security studies by

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[225] See W. Brandt, *North-South: A Programme for Survival: Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980); R. Ullman, 'Redefining Security', *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983; J. T. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 68, No. 2, Spring 1989.; J. J. Romm, *Defining National Security* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); J. A. Tickner, "Re-visioning Security", in K. Booth and S. Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[226] R. Emmers, 'Securitization', in A. Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Chapter 7, Online Resource Centre, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.110.

[227] While Buzan is a combination of the neo-realist/interdependence analyst, de Wilde and Waever describe themselves as 'liberal-pluralist' and 'post-modern realist', respectively. See Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.2.

[228] *Ibid*., p.4.

[229] S. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 1991, p.213.

exploring threats to referent objects [levels of analysis], and the securitization of those threats, that are nonmilitary [sic] as well as military', and they add,

> We take seriously the traditionalists' complaint about the intellectual incoherence but disagree that the retreat into a military core is the only or the best way to deal with such incoherence. We seek to find coherence not by confining security to the military sector but by exploring the logic of security itself to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitization from that which is merely political. This solution offers the possibility of breaking free from the existing dispute between the two approaches.[230]

From Buzan et.al's perspective, coherence in security studies is not achieved by maintaining a military logic. They claim to preserve the field's congruence by looking at the logic of the process of securitisation to identify why and how a certain issue becomes securitised. Describing security issues in terms of 'survival' and 'existential threats' is also a source of intellectual coherence within the analytical framework. According to Ralph Emmers, these elements allow the broadly defined security framework to maintain 'the reasoning found within a traditional approach to security studies'.[231]

In his previous work on the subject, Buzan abstained from defining security because he considered the notion to '[defy] pursuit of an agreed general definition'.[232] His purpose, instead, was 'to map the terrain of the concept, identifying both its general features and its conspicuous hazards'.[233] This posture, however, came under criticism as well. For instance, in the opinion of David Baldwin, dealing with the problem of security requires first of all defining its concept. In his opinion,

> [Buzan's] approach, however, risks conflating conceptual analysis with empirical observation. Understanding the concept of security is a fundamentally different kind of intellectual exercise from specifying the conditions under which security may be attained. Indeed, conceptual clarification logically precedes the search for the necessary conditions of security, because the identification of such conditions presupposes a concept of security.[234]

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[230] Buzan et.al, *Security*, pp.4-5.
[231] Emmers, 'Securitization', p.113.
[232] Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.16.
[233] *Ibid.*, p.20.
[234] Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security', p.14.

Baldwin's point concurs with Booth's words with reference to Buzan's lack of a definition by asking: 'If we cannot name it, can we ever hope to achieve it?'[235] The Buzan et.al analytical framework, nevertheless, provides a definition of security but does it in terms of a process, a logical sequence. According to the analytical framework, in the context of international security,

> Security is about *survival*. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats.[236]

In synthesis, the analytical framework holds that the content of security is determined by how the concept is used. Discussion now focuses on the securitisation process and its elements.

2.4.1.1. Securitisation Process

This aspect of the analytical framework, in particular, reflects a departure from Buzan's earlier neo-realist analysis by incorporating Waever's constructivist approach, as discussed above.

The securitisation process emerges from the assumption about a spectrum along three different realms, from non-political, to political, to security, where potentially threatening issues not adequately addressed within the first two arenas are thus dealt with through extreme measures in the third. In this sense, security is seen as 'the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization'.[237] The securitisation of a given issue, therefore, reflects the inadequacy of the political arena to neutralise problems with potential to escalate. To securitise something is a measure of last resort that means shifting into emergency mode in order to justify the use of extreme instruments to deal with a challenge. It entails, for instance, the distraction of efforts and scarce resources from the satisfaction of other important needs. For this reason, Buzan et.al establish that 'national security should not be idealized'; instead, 'desecuritization is the optimal range option...'[238] Consider, for instance, a small community facing an upward trend in drug consumption among

[235] K. Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1991, p.317.
[236] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.21. (Emphasis by the author).
[237] *Ibid*., p.23.
[238] *Ibid*., p.29.

young people. Without help from any government agency, the first option open for this community is to organising itself in order to establish prevention and treatment programmes to be managed through non-profit organisations. At this stage, the issue remains non-political. If it turns out that anti-drug programmes are ineffective in spite of the community's efforts, civil leaders could resort to the government asking for support to deal with drug demand, effectively placing thus the problem within the political agenda. If at this stage the problem persists largely because of the corrupting power and the intimidation tactics of a drug trafficking organisation, both the community and the government can turn into securitising actors by designating drugs, and their multiple manifestations, a security issue. This is the course an issue not dealt with within the non-political and political arenas would follow to enter into the security realm.

One important aspect of the securitisation process is that it is based on a sequence that involves a series of specific steps. Usually, a 'securitizing actor' makes a 'securitizing move' by presenting before an 'audience' a development as an 'existential threat'; if the audience accepts this designation the securitising move becomes successful and legitimises thus the 'breaking of rules' and the adoption of 'extreme measures'; if it does not, the securitising move results only in the politicisation of the issue.[239] That is, 'securitization is intersubjective and socially constructed'; it is a matter defined by the interaction between the 'securitizing actor (s)' and the 'audience' approving the securitising move, as explained above.[240] Therefore, in contrast to the traditional security perspective that 'focuses on the material nature of the threat',[241] the Buzan et.al securitising process is eminently subjective.

There are several relevant criticisms of this particular aspect of the analytical framework, but the most important is that it can also be misused to complicate responses to a challenge such as drug consumption, which in principle is a health rather than a law enforcement matter, by failing to appreciate the relevance of non-security responses to social problems. Securitising an issue is often not the best option. Making echo of other scholars, for instance, Michael Sheehan points out that,

[239] *Ibid*., p.25. 'Securitizing actors' are those 'who securitize issues by declaring something –a referent object- existentially threatened'. *Ibid*., p.28. According to the framework, '[existential threats] can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question… The essential quality of existence will vary greatly across different sectors and levels of analysis…'. *Ibid*., pp.21-22.
[240] *Ibid*., p.31.
[241] Emmers, 'Securitization', p.114.

> securitizing certain issues such as the environment and migration is likely to be counterproductive, because they will end up being colonized by a military mind-set rather than being addressed in a holistic and politically progressive manner.[242]

An additional aspect of the securitisation process is what the authors refer to as the 'speech act', which transfers issues from the realm of normal politics into the security context by framing them as something extremely urgent and of the highest priority to be dealt with. In their view, '[the speech act] is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)'.[243] The most important implication of this aspect of the analytical framework is that securitising actors are different in terms of their ability to successfully perform the speech act. The most successful ones are those in positions of authority who are therefore the 'accepted voices of security'.[244] Governments, as representatives of the state, have been usually better placed than other securitising actors in terms of identifying threats. Furthermore, they have been supposed to promote the general interest of society, and this is a claim that other social sectors would find difficult to sustain.

The analytical framework also expands the range of 'referent objects of security' (levels of analysis) beyond the state. They are defined as 'things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival'.[245] Even the state is deconstructed to consider each one of its components as an object of security. According to Buzan, the three basic components of the state are its idea, its physical base and its institutions, and each one of these elements is an object of security.[246] The Buzan et.al analytical framework establishes three important conditions regarding the legitimacy of referent objects of security. First, legitimacy is established by a community's sense of identity that justifies its right to continue to exist in reference to other community (for this reason, it is difficult for the individual and system level to articulate their security needs).[247]

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[242] See D. Deudney, 'The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, No. 19, 1990, pp.461-476; J. Huysmans, 'Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of Securitizing Societal Issues', in R. Miles and D. Thranhardt (eds.), *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, (London: Pinter, c1995), cited by Sheehan, *International Security*, p.53.
[243] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.26.
[244] *Ibid*., p.31.
[245] *Ibid*., p.36.
[246] B. Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.65.
[247] Buzan et.al, *Security*, pp.36-37.

The possibility of securitising a wide variety of referent objects besides the state, such as alliances in the military sector, strategic industries in the economic sector, minorities in the societal sector, ecosystems in the environmental sector, and international regimes in the political sector, depends on the ability of each referent object to legitimise its claim to survival. This is the basis for analysing security beyond the parameters established by the traditional military sector. In the opinion of Buzan et.al,

> If we place the survival of collective units and principles –the politics of existential threat- as the defining core of security studies, we have the basis for applying security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the concept.[248]

It is important to note, however, that 'size or scale seems to be one crucial variable in determining what constitutes a successful referent object of security', and this has to do with the possibility for entities or actors 'to establish a wider security legitimacy in their own right'.[249] This explains why the individual cannot be the basis for security analysis. The analytical framework, nevertheless, takes the state as the *primus inter pares* unit without necessarily designating it as the only referent object that matters.[250]

While the process of securitisation can be potentially manipulated to promote a specific agenda, de-securitising issues allows for the implementation of collaborative measures to solve those issues by removing them from the confrontation-like security arena. For instance, the 'Murmansk Initiative' proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1987, created not only a 'zone of peace' in what used to be a military theatre of operations, but also fostered more co-operative relations among countries with interests in the Arctic region.[251] Discussion now turns to the description of the five security issue-sectors.

2.4.1.2. Security-issue Sectors

Sectors represent the essence of thinking about security in terms of a broader perspective beyond traditional military concerns. According Buzan et.al, 'one way of looking at sectors is to see them as identifying specific types of interaction'.[252] That is, sectors are areas characterised

[248] *Ibid*.,p.27.
[249] *Ibid*., p.36.
[250] *Ibid*., p.37.
[251] K. Atland, 'Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Relations in the Arctic', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 43, No. 3, September 2008.
[252] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.7.

basically by a distinctive security dynamic, which does not necessarily mean they are disconnected. In fact, sectors are linked in two important ways. First, even though the analytical framework analyses sectors separately, this course of action is followed only for the sake of clarity of explanation. They are conceptually linked to each other because of the impact of security issues across sectors. According to the authors of the analytical framework,

> Although we maintain that the disaggregated world of sectors makes analytical sense because of different agenda, values, discourses, and the like can be reasonably clustered in these five sectors, it should be remembered that sectors are lenses focusing on the same world. Not surprisingly, the sector chapters are full of cross-references.[253]

This argument is related to the existence of interconnections among the five security issue-sectors proposed by Buzan et.al. An environmental health risk, which is a challenge that originates in the environmental-security sector, could have serious potential consequences if an epidemic leads people to abandon their country of origin and to cross an international border in order to get the help they need. For instance, people from the Mexican side could attempt crossing into the United States in the context of a health emergency if medical services are more available to people on the U.S. side. In such a context, an epidemic could affect the societal security of the receiving country if its population perceives immigration as a threat to its identity, demanding thus the government to address the flow of unwanted people and placing the challenge within the political security sector by testing the government's commitment regarding its country's people. If the government decides to resort to the use of military means to address the trans-border flow, an epidemic as a security challenge would have impacted several issue sectors besides the one it originated from.

The combination of the logic of securitisation (process) and security issue-sectors (structure) represents the foundation for thinking about security from a broader perspective. Far from eroding the conceptual coherence of security as a field of study, as one of the criticisms establishes, the analytical framework is considered by its authors as 'the answer to those who hold that security studies cannot expand its agenda beyond the traditional military-political one without debasing the concept of security itself'.[254]

It is important to note that sectors were at the centre of the development of *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, which emerged from the question about whether classical security

[253] *Ibid.*, pp.166-167.
[254] *Ibid.*, p.27.

complex theory (CSCT) could be addressed in terms other than political-military ones, which the framework responded affirmatively.[255]

Table 2-1 is intended to sum up the main elements in each sector.

[255] *Ibid*., p.11. For the subsequent analysis on security complexes see B. Buzan and O. Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Table 2-1. **Security-issue Sectors**

	Sectors				
	Military	**Environmental**	**Economic**	**Societal**	**Political**
Agenda	use of force	the environment from the scientific and political perspectives	controversial in the context of liberalism	Identity	legitimacy, sovereignty, international society, international principles
Objects	state, non-state units, alliances, regimes, principles	environment, relationship between environment and achieved levels of civilisation	system, states and corporations only under very specific circumstances	tribes, clans, nations, minorities, civilisations, religions, race	state, emerging quasi-super states, tribes, minorities, clans, trans-national movements, religions
Actors	State representatives, Inter-governmental organisations' (IGOs) officials, intelligence services, arms industry, armed services	states, scientific community, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), corporations, Trans-national Corporations (TNCs), state firms, industries, IGOs	state representatives, IGOs' officials	state officials, opposition leaders, social movements, media, religious leaders	state leaders, authoritative leaders, persons in official positions, states in relation to systemic-referent objects, UN Security Council
Vulnerabilities/Threats	war, military conquest or occupation	human manipulation of the environment that threatens civilisation	lack of access to outside sources of supply in the case of non-self reliant states, state's failure at economic reform, IGOs' collapse, systemic crises	depending on how identity is constructed, migration	attacks on ideas, institutions, intervention, non-acceptance, violation and challenges to international principles
Dynamics	Regional and local	global concerns, local securitisation	global, with regional dynamics as response to the global one	increasing importance of this sector *vis-à-vis* other sectors in both global and regional terms	bilateral and regional

a) Military

This sector deals with the subject matter of the traditional perspective that is the state and the use of force. One important aspect is that notwithstanding that the state remains a central referent object within this sector, this area of security is not only about military conflict between states because armed forces can also be employed to deal with non-state and non-military issues. Buzan et.al argue that,

> the military security agenda revolves largely around the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and external military threats, but it can also involve the use of military power to defend states or governments against non-military threats to their existence, such as migrants or rival ideologies.[256]

Military force, in this context, is used not only to confront other states but also threats to the state located at the 'substate level' such as criminal, subversive or terrorist organisations.[257] This is also a sector highly organised and rule bound given the importance accorded to the use of force, and this is the reason why securitising actors are in general well-identified.[258] For instance, given that the traditional object of security has been the state, official representatives have usually been the accepted securitising actors who designate a development as a security threat.

During the Cold War, geopolitical and geo-strategic competition among the superpowers helps explain the relevance of the military sector of security in the context of the bipolar confrontation. The demise of the former-Soviet Union and the consequent transformation of the international system, however, contributed to radically reducing the relevance of global in contrast to regional dynamics (by removing the threat of nuclear confrontation as well as restrictions that kept inter-state and intrastate rivalries in check),[259] but also to move competition among states from the military sector to other arenas as political and economic factors became more salient than those related to the use of force.[260] In Europe, one of the military issues that remained as a concern was the European Union's common foreign policy's failure to intervene in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, precisely because of political competition and

[256] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.50.
[257] *Ibid*., pp.53-54.
[258] *Ibid*., p.55.
[259] *Ibid*., p.61.
[260] *Ibid*., p.62.

the contending character of the interests of individual member states,[261] and also because the EU has consistently underplayed military power and investments in it.

b) Environmental

This sector is about the interaction between two different agendas. The political one that is about environmental politics; and the scientific one whose objective is to portray environmental issues in terms of threats in order to press the government into action.[262] This connection is important because notwithstanding the activism of certain sectors within the scientific community to securitise some issues, most of the interplay between the two agendas results only in the politicisation of the issues (by placing them in the public debate).[263] For instance, in 1949 a Scientific Committee was created within the International Whaling Commission (IWC), established in 1946, in order to carry out independent assessments of whale populations to revert the influence of previously government-funded research programmes. A declining number of whales at the beginning of the 1960s, however, consolidated a closer relationship between scientists from the committee and activists, which eventually resulted in blurring the lines between the interests of the two groups: knowledge became central to the activists' efforts, and activism cemented the influence of scientists.[264]

Sectors within the scientific community address a wide variety of problems and interpret them in terms of an environmental perspective. However, according to the analytical framework, '"disruption of ecosystems" is the most purely environmental issue area'.[265] Besides this issue that represents an environmental threat in its own right, additional issues in this sector are those ecological problems with manifestations in other sectors.[266] The environmental agenda is influential, nevertheless. In Buzan et.al's view, 'the extent to which scientific argument structures environmental security debates strikes us as exceptional'.[267]

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[261] T. Risse and G. Walter-Drop, 'After the Fall of Wall. A Report Card on Post-Cold War European Integration', *Spiegel Online International*, 03/18/2009, [online] available: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,613866,00.html (23/07/11).
[262] Buzan et.al, *Security*, pp.71-72.
[263] *Ibid*., p.74.
[264] C. Epstein, 'Knowledge and Power in Global Environmental Activism', *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2005, [online] available: http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol10_1/Epstein_101IJPS.pdf (23/07/11).
[265] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.75.
[266] *Idem.*
[267] *Ibid*., p.72.

Within this issue-sector, the central challenge is not natural disasters such as earthquakes (although it can be argued that other natural disasters such as hurricanes and floods are due to global warming that is the product of human activity) for which security refers mainly to the implementation of emergency measures to deal with their consequences. The key challenge for this sector is related to 'threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when the changes made *do* seem to pose existential threats to (parts of) civilization'.[268] That is, the central concerns of this sector are man-made threats that involve identifying those responsible for them and also establishing preventive measures.

According to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, while the securitising efforts of the scientific agenda often results only in the politicisation of environmental issues,[269] the official agenda deals with the consequences of environmental challenges, which lead to securitisation in other sectors. In this context, the environmental sector resembles the dynamics of the economic sector in terms of generating threats whose effects are experienced in other sectors.

Even though securitisation is more successful at the local level, this is a sector dominated by a global logic where is difficult to promote a co-ordinated response to environmental issues given the disparity of interests in the international context. This results therefore in the politicisation of issues at this level.[270]

The main criticism of the environmental security sector, as discussed above, is that framing environmental issues in security terms could actually end up obstructing more than promoting co-operative solutions to common problems. In the opinion of some scholars, 'critics suggest that linking the environment to security runs the risk of militarizing the environment instead of greening security'.[271] Regarding this last point, it is ironic that the Buzan et.al analytical framework represents such a complex and a detailed explanation of security, nonetheless useful, only to lead the analyst to conclude at the end that de-securitising an issue is a superior form of solution *vis-à-vis* its securitisation.

[268] *Ibid*., p.80. (Emphasis original).
[269] *Ibid*., p.74.
[270] *Ibid*., p.91.
[271] T. Terriff, S. Croft, L. James and P. M. Morgan, *Security Studies Today*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, c1999), p.132.

c) Economic

This is a *sui generis* sector to the extent that vulnerabilities from competition are built-in in the post-Cold War neo-liberal economic system.[272] That is, the triumph of liberalism over communism -as expressed by the demise of the former Soviet Union- resulted in the international economic system being dominated by market principles. Even though there are examples of countries that do not participate efficiently in the dominant capitalist system, or which have not adopted entirely its principles, such as Russia and China, respectively, they cannot remain isolated from the global economic system and therefore they have to adapt to the liberal rules of the game. This set of rules, in turn, fosters an intensified economic competition that rewards those units (i.e. states and companies) that are better at adapting themselves to the system, while punishing those that are unable to strive within this competitive environment. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to securitise economic issues when failure, as a result of poor economic performance, is part of the accepted and socialised rules of the game.[273] Such as in the case of environmental issues, attempts to securitise economic matters often results only in their politicisation.

In this sense, it is argued 'the particular characteristics of the liberal ascendance mean the contemporary discourse on economic security centres on concerns about instability and inequality'.[274] Firstly, inequality is related to the fact that even though advanced and developing countries are both exposed to the same international economic forces, the latter are more vulnerable to experience the system's negative effects and less able to exploit its advantages.[275] In the context of the liberal international economy, developing states face structural challenges such as foreign debt and institutional weaknesses in areas related to justice, health, finance and trade, which are issues for the most part absent in advanced societies.[276] Secondly, although developing countries are less able to exploit the liberal economic system in their favour, they are still dependent on it due to the impossibility of operating in complete isolation from the world economy, and for this reason they are as interested as developed countries in the stability of the system. A global economic crisis has the potential to affect advanced and developing countries

[272] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.95.
[273] *Ibid*., p.99.
[274] *Ibid*., p.97.
[275] *Ibid*., pp.97-98.
[276] C. Thomas, *In Search of Security. The Third World in International Relations*, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, c1987).

alike, even though the impact of economic turbulence is greater on the latter. The Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO), therefore, is actually the most important referent object in this sector according to the Buzan et.al analytical framework; furthermore, it is suggested that the clearest candidate to be considered an economic security issue in this sector is actually a global catastrophe.[277] For instance, a large-scale international financial crisis could affect stock exchanges around the world, creating thus a generalised economic breakdown with the potential to affect, albeit with different intensity, developing and developed countries alike.

Besides the issues mentioned above, economic security relates to the ability of the economy to provide the means for national defence; abuse of dependency; unequal benefits for countries notwithstanding abiding by the rules of the international economic system; 'the dark side of capitalism' as expressed in the form of illegal flows of drugs, weapons and technology, as well as degradation of the environment; and exposure to a worldwide economic disaster.[278] In this context, states and companies do not qualify as referent objects of security because both units have no other choice but to operate within the global economic system according to its rules with all the consequences this entails. In the economic sector, the only exception for a state to become a referent object of security is if its economic system suffers a breakdown to the point of risking survival.[279] Resembling the dynamics within the environmental sector, economic issues turn into security concerns mainly because of their impact on other sectors, such as in the case of an economic crisis eroding the legitimacy of the state because of insufficient crisis management skills and consequent inability to provide for the well-being of the population. [280] In fact, illegal flows generated by the operation of the market represent the kind of political, societal, environmental and military consequences originated in this sector. Similar to the environmental security sector, the economic sector is characterised by a globalising dynamic that explains why the main concern is the system's instability. The connection between global and regional in the economic sector, nevertheless, consists in the fact that regional frameworks are a reaction to global trends, in particular because regional arrangements provide advantages to countries in case of either the continuation or the breakdown of the LIEO.[281]

[277] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.109.
[278] *Ibid*., p.98.
[279] *Ibid*., p.102.
[280] *Ibid*., p.105.
[281] *Ibid*., pp.112-113.

d) Societal

According to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, 'the organizing concept in the societal sector is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as community'.[282] In this context, the identity of communities can be at risk by political or economic processes that involve exposure to foreign influence. This condition, in turn, threatens to dilute or to transform indigenous values, customs and traditions. Consider, for instance, the negative perceptions of the U.S. population on immigration brought about by the changing composition of the flows, from European to Hispanic and Asian, in both the 1960s and the 1980s.[283] The most common issues construed as threats to societal security are processes that pit one identity against another, and the most conspicuous of them is migration.[284] One useful distinction within the analytical framework is between 'threats *in* society' and societal threats. For instance, while drug consumption is an issue that affects life *in* society, if drug use grows out of control it can turn into a societal security issue by threatening the survival of the society, by directly threatening its members.[285]

The referent objects in the societal sector are large groups that are characterised by Buzan et.al as 'tribes, clans, nations (and minorities aspiring to autonomy and nationhood), civilizations, religions and race'.[286] A paradigmatic case in this sector, for instance, is a nation striving for autonomy within a state that does not share its identity. The Kurds, for instance, is a 'Sunni' Muslim people concentrated in an area called 'Kurdistan' that straddles the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia. Notwithstanding their long-sought goal of statehood, oppression by neighbours and internal dissent has prevented them from becoming an autonomous entity.[287] In this context, threats and vulnerabilities in this sector are related to the construction of identity.[288]

In contrast to the military sector where securitising actors are well-established, in the societal sector they are less identifiable because their authority can often be disputed.[289] Finally,

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[282] *Ibid*., p.119.
[283] This particular issue is discussed in more detail in the chapter on undocumented immigration.
[284] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.121.
[285] *Idem*.
[286] *Ibid*., p.123.
[287] See, for instance, A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., c1986), and also The Washington Post Background Information, 'Who are the Kurds?', *The Washington Post*, February 1999, [online] available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/kurdprofile.htm (23/07/11).
[288] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.124.
[289] *Ibid*., p.123.

the dynamic in this sector is neither global or regional, nor global versus regional; it is rather characterised by the fact that the salience of societal security *per se* has increased *vis-à-vis* the other sectors, and this phenomenon is likely to be present both at the regional and global levels.[290]

e) Political

Security issues are political by definition, and in this sense the political sector is connected to all other sectors. According to the analytical framework, 'political security is about the organizational stability of social order(s)'.[291] It is about acceptance and recognition of authority. In the case of the state, which is the main referent object in this sector, it is about 'internal legitimacy', on the one hand, and 'external recognition', on the other.[292] Besides this central concern, the political sector is about political threats to non-state referent objects, as well as about the protection of global political principles (institutions, regimes, and International Law) that contribute to keep the stability of the international system.[293]

If it is true that the state is a fundamental actor in this sector, additional referent objects emerge according to how a political unit is defined. That is, Buzan et.al argue that,

> a political unit is a collectivity that has gained a separate existence distinct from its subjects. It can be a firm or a church, not in their basic capacities as economic or religious units but only to the extent that they act according to the political logic of *governing large groups of people*.[294]

A referent object of security in the political sector, for instance, is a hierarchically-organised group such as the Sikh, which is an ethnic minority that has established its own legitimacy and right to exist by having an identity that differentiates it from other groups.[295] This is the 'middle scale' referent object of security referred to by the Buzan et.al analytical framework, which is characterised by operating within a context of competition that reinforces the need to assure its continuity.[296] *Minority Rights Group International* (MRGI), for instance, is a London-based non-

[290] *Ibid*., p.139.
[291] *Ibid*., p.141.
[292] *Ibid*., p.144.
[293] *Idem*.
[294] *Ibid*., p.143. (Emphasis by the author).
[295] See J. S. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab*, Revised Edition, The New Cambridge History of India, II.3, General Editor Gordon Johnson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, First paperback edition 1998).
[296] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.36.

governmental organisation (NGO) devoted to promote the rights of minorities around the world through education, information and lobbying strategies, guided by the idea that 'exclusion can result in instability, conflict, and in the most extreme cases, genocide'.[297] This is an interesting illustration of a sub-national group being portrayed by a securitising actor as an object of security, establishing its legitimate right to survival. In synthesis, the political sector is about collectivities and relationships of authority based on legitimacy. As in the military sector, securitising actors here are in general well defined -in contrast to other sectors- because of the positions of authority they hold.

One important distinction within the political sector is that between strong and weak states. While securitising actors, typically the government, in weak states are more susceptible to securitise challenges from within due to institutional deficiencies and insufficient political consensus, securitising actors in strong states are less prone to securitise domestic issues because of its higher internal cohesion.[298] It can be argued that the repressive regime in Iraq in the 1990s, and its refusal to comply with the November 1990 UN Resolution 678 to leave Kuwait after its August 1990 invasion, is an example of a weak state with vulnerability on both internal and external fronts that has represented a significant international security concern in the last decades.[299] Finally, this sector is characterised not by a regional dynamic but by the interplay between units and by the issues concerning system-level referent objects.[300]

2.4.1.3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Copenhagen School Perspective

When reflecting on the advantages and disadvantages of the Buzan et.al analytical framework, its main utility lies in the following points. It explains the logic underpinning officials' confronting threats through mobilisation of the resources of the state. In addition, by taking into consideration the impact of a variety of issues on the well-being of the individual it expands the focus of security to include areas other than the military one. Thirdly, it provides the basis for thinking about security from a comprehensive perspective that, in contrast to the traditional

[297] Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), 'Our work', [online] available: http://www.minorityrights.org/548/our-work/our-work.html (23/07/11).
[298] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.146.
[299] J. T. Richelson (ed.),'Operation Desert Storm: Ten Years After. New Documents Shed Light on Role of Intelligence, Stealth Technology and Space Systems', Electronic Briefing Book , *The National Security Archive*, The George Washington University, January 17, 2001, [online] available: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/
[300] Buzan et.al, *Security*, pp.152-153.

approach, includes internal as well as external aspects of security.[301] The obvious advantage of the broader security perspective is its utility to understand the variety of challenges that affect modern societies, most of which confront pressing threats other than the use of force.[302] This re-conceptualisation of security allows for thinking of security not necessarily in adversarial terms between states but in more collaborative forms of dealing with common challenges.[303]

One of the most important disadvantages of the framework, which mirrors its most salient criticisms, is the fact that the analytical framework is criticised for broadening the security issue-sectors without previously developing the concept of security. Sheehan, for instance warns about one of the dangers of broadening security by stating that,

> it can still be done in pursuit of a conservative agenda. Much depends upon whether the objective of a particular securitization is to capture the concept for a radical, emancipator policy agenda, or whether the purpose is to militarize new areas of governmental action, to colonize wider areas of social policy with an essentially militaristic mind-set.[304]

Sheehan's argument above is important insofar as it is generally recognised that attaching the 'security' label to issues does not necessarily facilitate the resolution of the problem, and it can actually complicate it.

This thesis is critical of the Buzan et.al analytical framework in terms of its lacunae and one of them refers to its lack of explanation about how securitisation occurs in practice. The securitisation process describes a very broad inner sequence that moves an issue into the security realm without offering more insights on the complications faced by the securitising actor in every step of the cycle, and this is the reason why one is left speculating only on the details of the process. The Buzan et.al analytical framework clearly establishes that its main focus of analysis are successful cases of securitisation, even though it recognises that the use of extreme measures to deal with an existential threat is not an automatic consequence of successfully moving an issue into the security realm. In this context, there is no way to tell the difference between securitisation and extreme forms of politicisation. The argument of this thesis in reference to this point in particular, is that establishing that successful securitisation will not lead to the adoption of extreme measures makes no sense at all, especially because securitisation of an issue is a serious matter that often requires political capital and a significant effort (i.e. working

[301] Sheehan, *International Security*, p.56.
[302] *Ibid*., p.57.
[303] *Ibid*., p.62.
[304] *Ibid*., p.44.

towards UN Resolutions 678 and 1441 in reference to Iraq), just to end up effecting no action at all. There is no sense in talking security and not to produce any solution to an identified problem. The utility of the Buzan et.al analytical framework for the study of trans-border threats to U.S. national security in reference to Mexico, in particular, is discussed in the following section.

2.4.1.4. The Utility of the Copenhagen School Perspective to Explain the U.S.-Mexico Security Relationship

The process of securitisation helps to identify who is the securitising actor, what is the nature of the threat, and therefore what the interests and intentions involved in the process are. This aspect is useful for this thesis in terms of understanding the reasons why drugs and undocumented immigrants became threats to U.S. national security. This point is also relevant because the reality is that government officials are not the only ones performing the 'speech act' in the context of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, given the multiple channels of communication between the two countries affecting different sectors of their respective societies.

Issue-sectors, in particular, contribute to a comprehensive explanation of security in the U.S.-Mexico context. As it has been pointed out, 'the purpose of broadening beyond traditional military threats is to be able to address issues without necessarily triggering a traditional military-type response',[305] and this is also an important factor in terms of the U.S.-Mexico security relationship. This proposition is related to the fact that notwithstanding the United States and Mexico hold different security interests regarding undocumented immigration from Mexico, for instance, their contrasting views have not led so far the United States to mount a massive-scale military operation on the border with Mexico in order to stop the unauthorised flow of people. Unilaterally, the United States has opted for more restrictive immigration legislation to stem the flow of Mexico and to deal with Mexican undocumented nationals already in the country, and for the circumscribed use of military assets on the border in order to support its LEAs. Accordingly, the U.S. response to undocumented immigration from Mexico has not involved a formal military-type of response, even though it is important to underline the fine line between the increasing involvement of the military in law enforcement activities, and the increasing incorporation of military tactics by LEAs.

[305] R. Wyn Jones, 'Travel Without Maps: Thinking About Security After the Cold War', in M. Jane Davis (ed.), *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp.196-218, cited by Sheehan, *International Security*, p.62.

Drug trafficking has been construed by both governments as a 'national security' issue. The United States has traditionally adopted a coercive view of the problem by considering drugs as a law enforcement matter rather than a health issue. From this perspective, the problem is one of supply rather than one of demand, and the solution has been based on interdicting drugs abroad more than emphasising treatment programmes at home. Attacking the problem beyond its shores also spares de United States the high level of violence present in drug producing and transit countries. The United States –mainly its government- has constructed drug trafficking as a societal security threat because of its harmful effect on its people (the social costs of addiction), as a political security threat because of the impact of corruption on its institutions, and to a lesser extent as an economic security matter originating from global illicit market. The policy which has been informed by these views, nevertheless, has been inefficient, as shown by the failure of the 'war on drugs' so far.

Immigration, in general, is seen by conservative sectors of the U.S. society (such as nativist groups, unions concerned about unemployment, right-wing politicians who exploit the voter's fear of immigrants, federal and state legislators, state governments and federal agencies such as the Border Patrol), as a matter of concern mainly because of its effect on weakening the society's sense of cohesion and identity (societal security). Even though this issue has for long been mostly politicised and not widely discussed in general security terms, undocumented immigration has been regarded as a security risk by those who favour more restrictive immigration policies and tighter security at the border, such as the Arizona government. It can be argued that undocumented immigration has affected sovereignty because of people entering the country without having been officially admitted (political security) and because of its perceived effect on identity (societal security). In contrast to the past, it is important to note that the phenomenon acquired an explicit security connotation in the United States after the 9/11 events. Ever since, a direct link was established by the federal and several state governments (i.e. Texas and Arizona) between immigration and security because of the terrorist threat, mainly due to the possibility of Islamic terrorists entering U.S. territory through the border with Mexico. For instance, U.S. security agencies focus their anti-terrorist efforts on people from 'special-interest

countries' (Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen), and on those based on the DoS list of 'countries sponsors of terrorism' (Cuba, Iran, Syria and Sudan).[306]

This thesis concurs with this argument by establishing that security issues in U.S.-Mexican relations are located in sectors other than the military one. The analysis of the U.S. defence strategy below confirms that Mexico is not a significant concern for the United States in military terms. The worst scenario for the U.S. military regarding Mexico would be the need to seal the Southwest border in case of deep instability south of the dividing line, and because of the potential for massive immigration from Mexico. An additional valuable idea advanced by the analytical framework refers to the employment of military assets to confront non-military threats, and this is reflected in the support the U.S. military provides LEAs in charge of security at the border with Mexico.

Second, in terms of environmental issues, Buzan et.al establishes that 'a useful starting point for tracing security complexes in the environmental sector is disaster scenarios'.[307] In this context, this thesis recognises that environmental challenges between the United States and Mexico have to do mainly with the common border, in particular with the scenario of a potential epidemic deriving from factors such as insufficient infrastructure to deal with water pollution in the area. The effects of this potential situation could appear in the political, societal, and to an extreme in the military sector. For instance, an epidemic could affect the U.S. societal sector by directly threatening the U.S. population in the area, and it could also affect the military sector if the U.S. military were called in to prevent a massive influx of people from the Mexican side of the border seeking help on the U.S. side. Environmental issues in U.S.-Mexican relations, nevertheless, are mostly politicised rather than securitised, and this aspect will be dealt with in more detail in the environment chapter as an example of the non-securitisation of a bilateral issue.

Third, in reference to the economic sector, Buzan et.al note that in the particular case of North America, the region is 'lightly institutionalized and reflects liberal values'.[308] In contrast to the EU, NAFTA does not represent more than a trade pact, albeit one with profound political consequences for its three members. NAFTA, nevertheless, has contributed to further

[306] E. Mora, 'Border Patrol Chief: Canadian Border Bigger Terror Threat than Mexican Border', CNSNEWS.COM, May 18, 2011, [online] available: http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/us-canada-border-bigger-terror-threat-sa (23/07/11).
[307] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.85.
[308] *Ibid*., p.114.

institutionalise the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship to the extent that increasing trade has facilitated co-operation in other areas of the relationship, most notably in the security arena. It can also be argued that NAFTA is in fact a response to globalisation from the U.S. and the Mexican point of view, in particular because of the need to form a regional trade bloc in order to remain competitive in the context of the economic challenge posed by similar arrangements in other regions of the world. One of the relevant issues in the economic security sector is that liberal economics has facilitated not only beneficial flows but also illegal exchanges, and this fact is important to understand the negative implications of the integrated illicit drug and labour markets between the United States and Mexico.[309]

Fourth, the societal security sector is useful to understand both problems originating in this sector and the effects of challenges originating in other sectors. Regarding undocumented immigration, the Buzan et.al framework underlines that 'migration operates more intensely as intraregional and neighbouring region dynamics, as in the flow of Hispanics into the United States…'[310] From all the areas addressed by the analytical framework within this sector, North America receives the most extensive review among other reasons because the framework considers it an interesting, yet little explored, region in societal security terms. In its view, 'military security and even political security are rather insignificant in North America, where the main agenda is constituted by the global role(s) of the United States'.[311] In terms of the regional setting, immigration is actually the most important factor. In their view,

> At present, migration is securitized mainly at the state level for these areas -especially California- in which the population balance has already shifted the most significantly because of the immediate adjacency to the mainland [sic] of origin for immigrants – Mexico. Two issues (changing self-definition and the physical change in the composition of the population) interact in several ways but perhaps most importantly in the reactions of white European Americans, who see immigration as a threat –not so much because the United States could become Spanish speaking (whites could become a minority) but rather because the increasing self-assuredness of different minorities threatens to produce a less unified, more multicultural, and thereby less universalistic United States.[312]

[309] See M. Naim, *Illicit. How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy,*(New York, NY: Anchor Books, October, 2006).
[310] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.125.
[311] *Ibid*., p.129.
[312] *Ibid*., pp.130-131.

The main U.S. security concern regarding immigration from Mexico is precisely its effect on U.S. identity. This was the case before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, before the establishment of the aforementioned explicit link between immigration and security. More recently, the risks associated to immigration are explained because of both the identity issue and the terrorist threat. Mexican immigration to the United States, therefore, is a security issue whose explanation can be found in the societal security sector. As noted above, this flow is also related to the economic security sector because of the existence of an integrated illicit labour market between the two countries.

Fifth, potential threats in the political sector come mainly from the challenge to U.S. institutions because of corruption of U.S. officials deriving from drug trafficking and human smuggling, as well as from unmet demands for action placed on the federal government by states located at the border with Mexico seeking to confront these two threats. That is, political threats in the United States arise from challenges originating in other sectors, even though it has already been established that all security is political by definition.

2.4.2. *Risk Society Theory*

2.5.1. Definition

'Risk society' refers to a theory developed in the mid-1980s by the German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, to reflect an increasingly individualised society's concern about the consequences of modernisation and its process of industrialisation, which in turn leads the individual to question the foundation of society itself.[313] The term became popular during the 1990s because of its potential to make sense of public environmental concerns during the period, such as the Iraqi's army decision to set ablaze Kuwait's oil wells in its retreat, in the context of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.[314] Besides Beck, one of its most important exponents has been British sociologist, Anthony Giddens. While the latter defined the concept as 'a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk',[315] the former defines it as a 'systematic way of dealing with the hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by

[313] U. Beck, *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, (London: SAGE Publishers, 1992).
[314] H. Khordagui and D. Al-Ajmi, 'Environmental impact of the Gulf War: An integrated preliminary assessment', *Environmental Management*, Vol. 17, Issue 4, 1993.
[315] A. Giddens, 'Risk and Responsibility', *Modern Law Review*, Vol. 62, No.1, January 1999, p.3.

modernization itself'.[316] At the heart of risk society theory, therefore, is an uneasiness about the prospect of a chaotic future that induces the observer to question the wisdom of modern society's progress. In fact, it has been argued that risk 'is the definitive theme of our age'.[317]

There are relevant distinctions to be made, nevertheless, between the concept of risk and two of its often related ideas such as 'uncertainty' and 'threat'. On the one hand, while risk is related to calculations based on possible outcomes, uncertainty in contrast is characterised by lack of information required to make assessments,[318] which means it is not possible to determine with precision whether an event will happen or not, such as the date of the next earthquake in the Pacific basin.[319] On the other hand, whereas risks entail possibilities, as mentioned above, threats involve capabilities and intentions.[320] In other words, while the basis to understand risk is possibilities, threat refers to danger that can objectively be measured in terms of goals and means to achieve those goals. For instance, this kind of 'instrumental' or 'linear' rationality was behind the formulation of the NSC-68 (National Security Council) directive that represented the U.S. master plan for the Cold War.[321] In this context, 'threats generate fears; risks fuel anxiety';[322] while the former are based on objective elements, the latter originate from subjective views.

2.4.2.2. Background

To a different intensity and extent, human beings have always been exposed to a certain level of hazard or peril which traditionally involved the forces of nature. With the development of 'modernity'[323] and its associated process of industrialisation, however, the main concern for the

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[316] Beck, *Risk Society*, p.21.
[317] C. Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, c2009), p.viii.
[318] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management. Strategy and conflict in an age of globalised risks*, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, c2006), pp.44-45.
[319] Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), 'Can Earthquakes be Predicted?', Global Seismology Research Group, 'Earthquake Questions & Answers (FAQs)', revised August 18, 1997, [online] available: http://www.pdc.org/iweb/earthquakes-prediction.jsp?subg=1 (10/07/12).
[320] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.50.
[321] President's Secretary Files, 'A Report to the National Security Council – NSC 68', April 12, 1950, *Truman Papers*, [online] available: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf (18/07/12).
[322] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.50.
[323] Giddens describes modernity as 'a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial civilization. Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to transformation, by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production and a market economy; (3) a certain range of political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy. Largely as a result of these characteristics, modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of social order. It is a society—more technically, a complex of institutions -which, unlike any preceding culture, lives in the future,

individual has become not unpredictable natural disasters but man-made issues such as crime, for instance, brought about by modernisation itself.[324] It is in this context that, according to Beck, 'society becomes a theme and a problem for itself'.[325] Disasters and accidents created by human activity represent 'manufactured risks'[326] that are characterised by human agency, which means society is responsible for both producing and preventing those challenges. This aspect of risk society theory, in particular, resembles the environmental security sector within the Buzan et.al. analytical framework in the sense that threats within this sector are defined by 'human manipulation of environment that threatens civilization',[327] more than by natural phenomena. Both approaches denote, therefore, an increased sense of human involvement in defining the conditions of the current age.

Given the fact that manufactured risks are the result of human intervention, the individual is in principle able to calculate the risk being produced and therefore to contribute to change disruptive behaviour. This implies that risk is a matter of deciding among different alternatives based on knowledge about possible outcomes, and this characteristic differentiates risk from uncertainty, as discussed above. The increased awareness of risk as a result of industrial development is referred to as 'reflexive modernisation'.[328] This is a central feature of risk society theory that means the individual questions the wisdom of progress from a self-critical point of view. Because of the fateful character of the challenges that define modernity, the individual becomes thus more aware of the limitations of official policies and scientific knowledge, and in consequence relies instead on ideas such as sustainability[329] and preventive action[330] in order to minimise and, more specifically, to manage risk.

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rather than the past'. See A. Giddens, *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1998), p.94; and A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, c1990).

[324] See, for instance, L. I. Shelley, *Crime and Modernization: The Impact of Industrialization and Urbanization on Crime*, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, c1981).

[325] Beck, *Risk Society*, p.21.

[326] 'Manufactured risk is risk created by the very progression of human development, especially by the progression of science and technology'. See Giddens, 'Risk and Responsibility', p.4.

[327] See Table 2-2 above.

[328] According to Beck, '"Reflexive modernization" means the possibility of a creative (self-) destruction for an entire epoch: that of the industrial society. The "subject" of this creative destruction is not the revolution, not the crisis, but the victory of western modernization'. U. Beck, 'The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization', in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash, *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, c1994), p.2.

[329] See, for instance, W. M. Adams and S. J. Jeanrenaud, *Transition to Sustainability: Towards a Humane and Diverse World*, Future of Sustainability Initiative 2008, International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural

A relevant characteristic of risk society is its built-in avoidance of risk, even though there is no clear connection between 'perceived' and 'objective' risks.[331] In this sense, it can be argued that risk is a socially-constructed concept that induces society to deal with its self-created challenges in the context of an increasingly complex and disordered modern world. In the opinion of Christopher Coker, 'for it is no longer possible to externalize risks; we now internalize them as never before. This is what makes our societies so self-critical'.[332] Societies, in this context, become more aware and self-conscious of the risks they confront. Reflexive rationality, however, can be approached either as a reaction to risk society or from both a constructivist and a realist perspective.[333]

A relevant argument of risk society theory is that manufactured risks have an impact on social relations as risk, like a concept such as wealth, is not distributed uniformly within society.[334] Nevertheless, risk is also an equaliser in the sense that not even the one 'manufacturing' the risk is safe from its effects.[335] Regarding man-made risks, such as in the case of the depletion of the ozone layer and its effect on human health and ecosystems,[336] for instance, the distinction between the one polluting the stratosphere and the one suffering its consequences becomes blurred, and this represents the 'democratisation of risk'.[337] In theory, it can be argued that being wealthy would allow the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a trans-national company using chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) in its production process[338] to purchase the necessary protection

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Resources (IUCN), [online] available: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/transition_to_sustainability__en__pdf_1.pdf (08/07/12).

[330] Consider, for instance, the existence of a *Center for Preventive Action* (CPA) that is part of the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR), which 'seeks to help prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly conflicts around the world and to expand the body of knowledge on conflict prevention'; [online] available: http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/cpa/ (08/07/12).

[331] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.ix.

[332] *Ibid*., p.7.

[333] U. Beck, *World Risk Society*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, c1998), pp.133-152.

[334] Beck, *Risk Society*, p.23.

[335] According to Beck, traditional social structure (based on wealth) is transformed in a modern-risk society because people occupy social risk positions that are achieved through risk-aversion. 'In some of their dimensions these follow the inequalities of class and strata positions, but they bring a fundamentally different distributional logic into play'. See *Idem*.

[336] United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Environmental Effects of Ozone Depletion and its Interactions with Climate Change: 2010 Assessment*, Published December 2010 by the Secretariat for The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, [online] available: http://ozone.unep.org/Assessment_Panels/EEAP/eeap-report2010.pdf (09/07/12).

[337] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.34.

[338] An example of such a company would be DuPont. See J. Ball, 'New Market Shows Industry Moving on Global Warming. Even as Bush Opposes Kyoto, Companies Trade Rights to Emit Greenhouse Gases', *The Wall Street*

from exposition to ultraviolet (UV) radiation. Nevertheless, the distribution of risk is a function of knowledge rather than means because, in the example above, Beck would argue that the CEO may not know whether, or at what level of intensity, the risk of UV radiation existed in the first place.[339] From Giddens' perspective, in contrast, class structure plays a more determinant role 'in terms of differential access to forms of self-actualization and empowerment'.[340] His view of risk society, nevertheless, is more optimistic than Beck's by establishing that 'active risk-taking is a core element of a dynamic economic and an innovative society'.[341] Additionally, a significant aspect of risk society theory is that risk entails a 'boomerang effect' not in the sense that actors producing risks will also be exposed to them but, more properly, in the sense that any effort to deal with the original risk will often result in the configuration of an unintended risk, and so on. In this context, far from achieving absolute security, the more feasible goal is 'to manage or pre-empt a risk'.[342] Within risk society there is no perfect and no definitive solution to a given problem, and therefore no sense of conclusion. Partial knowledge in reference to probabilistic scenarios, nevertheless, does not impede decision-making, and this is what Beck refers to as the 'risk trap'.[343] Lack of knowledge is no justification not to respond to a risk situation, and this in turn strengthens anticipatory action.

2.4.2.3. International Security through the Lenses of Risk Society Theory

Even though risk society theory was conceived within the discipline of sociology, its principles provide considerable potential explanatory power for understanding international relations and, more specifically, the post-Cold War globalised security environment. Risk society, as a tool for international security analysis has been developed not by internationalist scholars but by sociologists who have applied the theory to the study of international affairs, suggesting that 'the international system itself has become a globalised risk society'.[344] A particular contribution in

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Journal, January 16, 2003, [online] available: http://www.fordham.edu/economics/mcleod/NewMarket_WSJ.pdf (10/07/12).

[339] Beck, *Risk Society*, p.53.

[340] A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, (Cambridge: Polity, c1991), p.6.

[341] A. Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives*, (London: Profile, c1999), p.29.

[342] M. V. Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, c2006), p.2.

[343] Beck, *World Risk Society*, pp.139-141.

[344] Besides Beck and Giddens, consider, for instance, N. Luhmann, *Risk: A Sociological Theory*, Translated by Rhodes Barrett, (New York, NY: Adline de Gruyter, 1993). See Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.11.

this regard are Beck's two books *World Society at Risk* (1998) and, one year later, *What is Globalisation?* (1999). Both texts reflect the fact that international security was increasingly focusing on probabilistic risks scenarios away from clearly identified threats.[345]

Risk society theory, as applied to international security analysis, rests on the idea that both the end of the Cold War and the process of globalisation have created a new security paradigm.[346] On the one hand, with the end of the Cold War, state-centred concerns were replaced by preoccupation with non-military threats, which meant the survival of states at the centre of the international system was not threatened anymore by each other, and instead they were freed to focus on risk management regarding transnational challenges[347] such as such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and drug trafficking, among others. As a matter of fact, according to Martin Van Creveld, the future of conflict will not be defined by the clear lines that used to distinguish 'Trinitarian warfare' (i.e. government, army and people), but by confrontation resembling 'low intensity conflict among different organizations' not necessarily entailing the state and its monopoly on the use of force.[348] It is argued that, in this context, risk management 'involves managing disorder at levels of insecurity that are more acceptable to the international community',[349] rather than conclusively confronting a challenge in order to achieving a sense of security. This is the type of outcome that actually defines 'wicked problems',[350] which are characterised by elusive solutions and by leaving those in charge of managing risk in a persistent state of vigilance. Nevertheless, the mere fact of looking at current security challenges through the prism of probable scenarios in the context of globalisation -as established by Beck's *World Risk Society*-, is considered to be 'a crucial step forward' from the simplistic post-Cold War analysis that was unable to better contextualise and explain non-military threats.[351]

On the other hand, the transformation of security thinking deals with the fact that globalisation has had security consequences in the form of trans-`national challenges that do not

[345] U. Beck, *World at Risk*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, c2007) and U. Beck, *What is Globalization?*, Translated by Patrick Camillier, (Cambridge: Polity Press, c2000), see *Ibid*., p.30.
[346] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.21.
[347] *Ibid*., p.6.
[348] M. Van Creveld, *On Future War. The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz*, (London: Brassey's, c1991), p.224.
[349] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.151.
[350] *Ibid*., p.155.
[351] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.12.

respect political boundaries. For instance, the 1999 U.S. national security strategy, in its section on 'Opportunities and Challenges', establishes that,

> Globalization, however, also bring risks. Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability and progress in many important areas of the world. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime are global concerns that transcend national borders. Other problems originating overseas –such as resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, new infectious diseases, pervasive corruption, and uncontrolled refugee migration- have increasingly important implications for American security. Our workers and businesses will suffer if the global economy is unstable or foreign markets collapse or lock us out, and the highest domestic environmental standards will not protect us adequately if we cannot get others to achieve similar standards. In short, our citizens have a direct and increasing stake in the prosperity and stability of other nations, in their support for international norms and human rights, in their ability to combat international crime, in their open markets, and in their efforts to protect the environment.[352]

It is important to note that risk management is mainly a Western perspective that deals with the way advanced countries deal with probabilistic risk scenarios. In other areas of the world, some states still face existential threats rather than risks, such as in the case of Somalia which has occupied for the fifth straight year the top position of the 'Failed States Index', displaying aspects such as 'demographic pressures', 'delegitimization of the state' and 'external intervention', among other serious challenges.[353] In this context, it is suggested that 'risk is the condition that dominates late modernity in the North Atlantic area'.[354] However, there are two important points to be made in this regard. First, the fact that risk management originated in the West does not mean other states do not practice risk management as well. China, for instance, is 'just as interested in managing America's decline as the US is in managing [its] rise'.[355] Second, the ingrained risk-avoidance trait of the West seems to be paradoxical in the sense that daring and audacious actors in other parts of the world (i.e. a rogue state such as North Korea or a

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[352] The White House, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, December 1999, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), available [online]: http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nssr-1299.pdf (11/07/12), p.1.
[353] 'The 2012 Failed States Index', An eight annual collaboration between *Foreign Policy* and Fund for Peace, *Foreign Policy*, July 12, 2012, available [online]: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive (12/07/12).
[354] M. J. Williams, *The Good War. NATO and the Liberal Conscience in Afghanistan*, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, c2011), p.22.
[355] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.147.

terrorist group) may end up forcing the West to discard its proclivity for a protective (defensive) stance by being confronted with the need to respond (offensively) to dreadful situations.[356]

The central characteristic of risk society, 'reflexive rationality', is reflected in the 'risk' security paradigm in the relevance accorded to avoiding consequences in the context of probabilistic scenarios. For instance, whereas the Cold War security environment privileged the state's 'computable' rationality' regarding the assessment of the enemy's strategic plans and order of battle, in the risk age the more subtle character of risks leads the state to focus on possible outcomes of events that, even if they do not threaten its survival, they constitute challenges that require to be managed.[357] It is precisely the ambivalence of these issues what is in stark contrast with the 'clarity and decidability'[358] of traditional security concerns.[359]

Risk assessment is an increasingly individualised activity as survival is seen in more personal terms, and this is explained 'precisely because what we fear most is other people'.[360] Consider, for instance, the case of the 77 lives claimed by Anders Behring Breivik in his 22 July 2011 Oslo rampage, and the fear instilled in a society by the potential harm that can be inflicted not by an organisation or a state but by a single individual.[361] Therefore, what makes people more concerned about risks is a function both of increasing access to information through the media and the individual's own reflexive rationality. This growing role of the individual in defining risks may actually explain why sociology was the ground-breaking discipline in relation to risk society theory. It is important to note that just as the 'speech act' has the potential to securitise an issue within the Buzan et.al. analytical framework,[362] risk discourse represents an instrument to either validate or reject the existence of a risk.[363] That is, risks exist because people are made aware of them -paraphrasing the Buzan et.al. framework-, by a 'securitising actor'. Beyond the debate about risk being a rational response or a social construction, an interesting argument in reference to risk language points to the need of transcending the traditional

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[356] *Ibid*., p.x.
[357] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.13.
[358] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.10.
[359] See for instance, T. Edmunds, 'British civil-military relations and the problem of risk', *International Affairs*, March 2012.
[360] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.16.
[361] V. Criscione, 'Oslo police refute Breivik's claim of terrorist network, saying he acted alone', *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 30, 2012, [online] available: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0530/Oslo-police-refute-Breivik-s-claim-of-terrorist-network-saying-he-acted-alone (18/07/12).
[362] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.26.
[363] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.22.

conception of risk in terms of calculations, and instead focusing risk from a 'meditative' perspective that takes into consideration the transformation of technology and the essence of the non-apparent danger emanating from it,[364] such as understanding the danger posed to 'human species' by developments in biotechnology.[365]

In the context of risk management, security strategy is characterised by its proactive nature, and this constitutes a significant difference regarding the traditional security orientation that was mainly defined by both reactive and defensive postures.[366] During the Cold War, the U.S. strategic posture was intended 'primarily to deter a nuclear attack, rather than to defeat one or otherwise prevail in the event of a conflict'.[367] However, given the fact that more often the origin of risk, as opposed to threat, is rather diffused, pre-emption is therefore a more amenable course of action for managing risk.[368] The risk age actually rewards the anticipation of possible events, notwithstanding that dealing with the consequences of an incident is usually more cost-effective as long as its effects remain localised.[369] This is exactly the way risk management has influenced thinking about war, which for all practical purposes consists in the use of force to prevent probable consequences deriving from a risk situation.[370] There is a contradiction, nevertheless, in the fact that if it is true traditional strategic analysis recognises probabilistic scenarios, it has been slow in adapting to the new risk environment, and in this context strategic studies have neglected a central Clausewitzean tenet establishing that 'every age has its own kind of war', because of their continued use of Cold War perspectives to explain new transnational challenges.[371] The logical conclusion is that in the context of risk society theory, risk management, and war for that matter, is proactive, and the nature of global risks means they can only be managed because of their resistance to un-ambivalent solutions.

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[364] B. Adam, U. Beck, and J. Loon (eds.), 'Introduction', *The Risk Society and Beyond. Critical Issues for Social Theory*, (London: SAGE Publications, Ltd., 2005), pp.6-8.
[365] H. Caygill, 'Liturgies of Fear: Biotechnology and Culture', in Adam, Beck, and Loon, *The Risk Society and Beyond*, p.155.
[366] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.25.
[367] D. Goure, Vice President, 'Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture', A Paper Presented to the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, *The Lexington Institute*, September 10, 2008, [online] available: http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/rethinking-the-us-strategic.pdf (18/07/12), p.1.
[368] *Idem*.
[369] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.2.
[370] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.19.
[371] Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War*, p.41.

For instance, risk management has gradually become the guiding principle of the U.S. security orientation, with pre-emption as a key element to confront the challenges of the post-9/11 era. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. strategy documents have visibly incorporated risk management concepts, notwithstanding that in the Clinton administration years there were already some elements related to this line of thinking, such as mitigating conditions abroad that could potentially harm the United States. In its 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) proposed to 'shaping the international environment' in order to create the conditions to avoid risk. According to the document,

> In addition to other instruments of national power, such as diplomacy and economic trade and investment, the Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests. Our defense efforts help to promote regional stability, prevent or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis in many key regions of the world. To do so, the Department employs a wide variety of means including: forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and international arms cooperation.[372]

However, while the Clinton administration focused mainly on trans-national issues and on managing the end of the Cold War, its successor administration came to power thinking both in terms of the need to keep the edge on military power in order to confront potential peer competitors, if necessary, and also of '[performing] the "constabulary" duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions', based on a policy agenda defined by *The Project for the New American Century*.[373] The 9/11 events, nevertheless, tilted more decisively the U.S. security perspective towards adopting a risk approach. First, the 2002 U.S. national security strategy incorporated a central risk-management aspect in its policy of pre-emption in

[372] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, [online] available: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/sec2.html (03/10/98), p.2.
[373] The Project for the New American Century, *Rebuilding America's Defenses. Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*, A Report of the Project for the New American Century, September 2000, available [online]: http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (15/07/12), p.iv. See also J. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans. The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, (New York, NY: Viking, c2004).

reference to an 'elusive enemy',[374] even though pre-emption had never been used before by the 'strong'.[375] As a matter of fact, military superiority was considered necessary for '[shaping the environment'.[376] Second, the Bush administration was the first to take the United States to war in Afghanistan and Iraq in pursuit of more limited objectives based on a 'new American Realism', which was in contrast to previous U.S. war rhetoric that had been guided by the idea of achieving a 'New World Order'.[377] The more limited scope of U.S. realism recognised that supporting democracy and promoting development in weak states were not necessarily mutually excluding goals.[378] Third, the clearest expression about the adoption of a risk management approach by the Bush administration was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 in order to streamlining around 100 agencies with homeland security responsibilities -arguably the most significant bureaucratic reorganisation since the 1947 National Security Act-, to protect U.S. borders and confront trans-national threats such as global terrorism.[379] It is in this context that the logic of 'risk colonization' since 9/11 has had a profound impact on the notion of security, in particular by leaving society on a continued defensive posture where safety is the priority.[380] For all practical purposes, therefore, risk management became incorporated as standard approach in the United States as expressed in official documents such as the QDR process and the establishment of specialised organisations such as the DHS. It has been argued, nevertheless, that in contrast to the protection of the state that involved an enemy with a territory and clearly identified capabilities and intentions, defending the citizen from elusive actors is more complicated because of the fact they cannot be neutralised by the prospect of a forceful response.[381]

If it is true within the risk society framework that the individual has become more sceptical about the efficiency of bureaucratic structures, it is an irony that governments have at

[374] The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, [online] available: http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf (14/07/12), p.5.
[375] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.27.
[376] A. J. Bacevich, *American Empire. The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, c2002), p.242.
[377] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.12.
[378] See C. Rice, 'Rethinking the National Interest. American Realism for a New World', *Foreign* Affairs, July/August 2008.
[379] See President George W. Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, The White House, June 2002, available [online]: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf (14/07/12).
[380] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.26.
[381] *Ibid*., p.132.

the same time more responsibility as risk managers because of the ominous prospect if risks ever materialise. According to DHS Risk Management Doctrine, for instance,

> The United States homeland security environment is complex and filled with competing requirements, interests, and incentives that must be balanced and managed effectively to ensure the achievement of key national objectives. The safety, security, and resilience of the Nation are threatened by an array of hazards, including acts of terrorism, malicious activity in cyberspace, pandemics, manmade accidents, transnational crime, and natural disasters. At the same time, homeland security organizations must manage risks associated with workforce management, acquisitions operations, and project costs. Collectively, these external and internal risks have the potential to cause loss of life, injuries, negative psychosocial impact, environmental degradation, loss of economic activity, reduction of ability to perform mission essential functions, and loss of confidence in government capabilities.[382]

The paradox in this regard consists in the fact that while government resources are limited risks are not, and therefore a key feature of risk management is 'judgement'; that is, the ability of accurately establishing probabilistic scenarios to prepare for and to act in consequence.[383] Therefore, because 'instrumental' rationality in the context of traditional security turns into 'reflexive' rationality under a risk management orientation, the value of anticipation increases. The argument goes that if risk refers to consequences of actions yet to be made, then the concept of risk, according to Beck, 'reverses the relationship between past, present and future'.[384] This is what an observer refers to as 'colonising the future'.[385] In attempting to avoid risks, thus, one is defining present problems by their future consequences and this reinforces anticipatory action.

2.5. Comparison between the Copenhagen School Approach and Risk Society Theory

Risk society is a theoretical approach that became influential in the 1990s by identifying risk as a central concern of the increasingly individualised Western societies, which in turn resulted from modernisation and its process of industrialisation. The concept of 'reflexive modernisation',

[382] U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), *Risk Management Fundamentals. Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine*, April 2011, [online] available: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf (19/07/12), p.7.
[383] Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War*, p.4.
[384] Beck, *World Risk Society*, p.137.
[385] Yee-Kuang Heng, *War as Risk Management*, p.19.

which is a key aspect of the risk society perspective, refers to the growing awareness of a self-critical individual that questions man-made challenges brought about by progress itself.

In the context of international analysis, the risk society perspective establishes that both the end of the Cold War and the process of globalisation have created a new security paradigm characterised by a 'risk' rationality that emphasises probabilistic scenarios and consequences from non-state, non-military, challenges, in contrast to previous state-centred threats that dominated the traditional security concept based on calculations of intent and capability, distinctive of the military-security orientation. A key component of the new perspective is the idea of 'risk management' that is based on the recognition that risks can only be minimised and never eliminated because of their complexity and their 'boomerang effect'. This means that dealing with risks generates other unintended challenges in the process, and this is a situation that resembles a 'security dilemma' where providing by our own security often fosters insecurity on others defeating therefore the original effort at achieving greater security.

Risk management has important implications such as the need to accept a level of insecurity instead of aiming for a reasonable level of security. In this context, war has become risk management for all practical purposes, as reflected in the fact that under a risk perspective the purpose of the use of force is to keep a diffused and ambivalent challenge under control, rather than achieving a definitive settlement and a sense of closure that characterised past conflicts. A central aspect that defines both international security and war is the element of pre-emption that is the imperative to act in anticipation in order to avoid possible adverse consequences. This is the best alternative to deal with probabilistic scenarios where inaction is considered to be costly, and where access to only partial information is no impediment for making necessary decisions.

Even though risk management is the concept that dominates security thinking in the West, this does not mean countries in other areas of the world are oblivious to the concept for one reason or another. As a matter of fact, an interesting argument points out that risk can be considered 'only the latest stage of modernity',[386] which means that even if the West can be characterised as risk-averse, the fact that there are risk-taking societies and actors in other parts of the world may end up forcing the West to abandon its precautionary mentality, giving way eventually to a post-risk environment.

[386] Coker, *War in an Age of Risk*, p.x.

There are several risk society propositions that are relevant to the analysis of non-state, non-military challenges (risks) in U.S.-Mexican relations. First, trans-national issues emanating from Mexico such as drugs, undocumented immigration and border environmental degradation can be focused from the risk perspective because of its emphasis on complex issues brought about by both the end of the Cold War and globalisation. Second, these are complex issues that lend themselves to probabilistic scenarios and as such they demand the United States to adopt a risk management mode and to accept that a definitive solution to these issues is beyond its control. Therefore mitigation, instead of elimination, becomes the more realistic goal. Third, each one of these trans-national challenges require the implementation of anticipatory actions at the border such as investing in security and environmental infrastructure in the region, in order to prevent drug violence from spilling-over the border from Mexico, to avert an uncontrollable flux of economic undocumented immigrants or victims of drug violence from south of the dividing line, and to avoid serious damage to the border environment because of degradation brought about by rapid demographic growth and industrialisation, and lack of proper infrastructure to deal with this dual transformation.

The Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory have elements in common. First, both are European perspectives influential in the 1990s as efforts to explain post-Cold War non-military challenges in the context of globalisation. Second, both recognise a constructivist element in the formation of threats and risks, in particular because of the importance of 'risk discourse' as a legitimising or a de-legitimising aspect element in the case of the latter, and the 'speech act' as the condition to securitising an issue in the case of the former. They differ, nevertheless, in the following aspects: (1) the Buzan et.al analytical framework is a complex framework full of details, whereas Risk Society theory provides a more straight forward explanation of the way society deals with risk, which is through management based on anticipatory measures; (2) even though the Buzan et.al analytical framework explains how security issues are interconnected across sectors, it is inconclusive in its explanation about how an issue actually becomes securitised, which contrasts to Risk Society theory that provides a clearer explanation in the sense that 'reflexive modernisation' leads the individual to become more aware of problems and therefore to opt for preventive action; (3) while the Buzan et.al analytical framework provides an explanation of the scope of security through the designation of five issue-sectors, Risk Society provides elements to understand the depth of security concerns

by explaining the sources of risks; (4) Risk Society theory offers a better contextualisation of security issues beyond the simplistic 'post-Cold War issues' by explaining risks independently of the Cold War context; and (5) Risk Society, in contrast to the Buzan et.al perspective, represents a pro-active orientation as reflected in 'risk management' through preventive measures.

This thesis argues that notwithstanding the limitations of each perspective, both complement each other and thus the understanding of complex security issues in the current international environment.

2.6. Conclusions

The analytical framework proposed by Buzan et.al represents a criticism of the narrow security perspective that has been centred on the state and military factors. It is an approach that broadens the security agenda by incorporating an explanation about how issues are securitised (process), as well as different referent objects of security beyond the state and four security-issue sectors (structure), besides the military one, that contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of security.

The utility of the Buzan et.al perspective for the analysis of U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico, is evident in the fact that notwithstanding their characterisation as security issues from the U.S. point of view, they have not prompted so far a military response from the United States, as one would expect under realist principles.

Besides criticisms about lack of a definition, the idea of expanding the conception of security through issue-sectors beyond the military one is seen only as 'militarizing those other sectors'.[387] This criticism is important because applying the use of force is not always the best solution to long-term, structural problems. This is the case of drug trafficking in U.S. Mexican relations whose origin can be traced back to the demand of drugs in the United States, which could therefore be more efficiently confronted through treatment programmes. As these complexities demonstrate, even though the Buzan et.al analytical framework needs further conceptual development as well as refining the explanation of the securitisation process, it is, nevertheless, a useful analytical tool that contributes to the understanding of complex security

[387] E. Herring, 'Military Security', in A. Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Online Resource Centre, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, c2007), p.136.

dynamics, such as trans-border threats in the U.S.-Mexico security relationship, as it has been discussed in more detail above.

Risk Society is a theoretical orientation that derives from the criticism, through reflexive modernisation, to the consequences of modernisation and its process of industrialisation. It is a perspective concerned about the future, in particular about possible scenarios about the effects of 'manufactured risks'. Risk management, through preventive measures, is the key to confront uncertain developments and the best alternative to deal with challenges whose resolution is beyond reach. This perspective was considered to complement the Buzan et.al analytical framework in the analysis of U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico because of its utility to understand the nature of the non-state, trans-national, challenges that characterise the bilateral security relationship.

CHAPTER 3. MEXICO'S SECURITY RELEVANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES

3.1. Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to identify, from the U.S. point of view, the variety of threats that characterised the security agenda with Mexico in the 1990s. This analysis followed a series of specific steps. First, this chapter reviewed the U.S. military strategy, based on the 1997 QDR, in order to find out whether Mexico represented a military-type of threat to the United States. Second, since the previous question was responded in a negative sense, analysis thus turned to the wider 1997 *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, where it was actually possible to observe that Mexico's security relevance for the United States was defined in terms of both opportunities and threats. Regarding the latter, the common border is fundamental to understand the security dynamic between the two countries.

Mexico's security significance for the United States was identified first of all in relation to drug trafficking, as Mexico was directly mentioned within the U.S. national security strategy as a key 'transit' country in the efforts to stop the flow of drugs into the United States.[388] Even though there was no explicit reference to Mexico in the same document in terms of undocumented immigration as one of the trans-national U.S. concerns, it can be argued that by default Mexico is the greatest concern in this regard because of the sheer size of Mexican undocumented immigration in the United States, and this is the reason why including its analysis as a U.S. security issue was justified within this thesis. Although the U.S. national security document addressed environmental issues from a global rather than from a bilateral perspective,[389] this thesis also included the analysis of bilateral environmental matters in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the actual and potential security concerns along the U.S.-Mexico border and also because, in terms of the non-traditional security perspectives adopted by this thesis, it was interesting to analyse an important border issue that represents a potential rather than an actual security concern.

Therefore, while it can be argued that drug trafficking and undocumented immigration were explicit and implicit U.S. security concerns regarding Mexico, respectively, border environmental issues have been potential rather than actual security matters. In this context, the

[388] White House, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, May 1977, p.15.
[389] *Ibid*., p.16.

Buzan et.al analytical framework and the Risk Society perspective adopted by this thesis are useful not only to explain why drugs and undocumented immigrants were security concerns from the U.S. point of view, but also why the border environment -a potential security concern- has remained within the realm of 'risk management' measures on the part of the two countries instead of turning into an actual security concern as in the case of the other two issues. In synthesis, the 1997 U.S. national security strategy explicitly identified drugs as the main concern regarding Mexico; it recognised undocumented immigration as a relevant issue without any particular reference to Mexico -notwithstanding the major role of this country in unauthorised immigration flows to the United States; and it addressed global environmental matters without mentioning Mexico, even though bilateral environmental issues have the potential to turn into security concerns.

If it is true in the 1990s Mexico posed a risk to U.S. security because of the three challenges mentioned above, the country has also had the potential to contribute to U.S. efforts to limit the effects of those same trans-border security challenges, and this explains why bilateral co-operation has been essential in the context of the bilateral relationship. Moreover, Mexico has also been a benefit for the United States because of economic opportunities created by NAFTA; its role as a reliable oil supplier; and basically because it has so far also provided the United States with a stable southern border.

Even though Mexico has always been implicitly important for the security of the United States, its relevance gradually increased since the 1970s in direct proportion to the growing interdependence between the two countries. The intensification of interdependence has been evident in the variety of issues of a trans-national nature within the bilateral agenda such as drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, which have represented the most pressing bilateral issues from the U.S. point of view. Furthermore, towards the end of the 20th century the two countries formalised their economic integration through a free trade agreement. This created the paradox addressed in this thesis, in the sense that NAFTA not only expanded commerce between them –and Canada- but also increased U.S. concerns about the need to protect the United States from those same trans-national issues that were the outcome of interdependence. The United States faced the complex security challenge of facilitating legitimate trade with Mexico, on the one hand, while protecting itself from illegitimate flows from the Southwest border, on the other hand.

To accomplish the objective outlined above, the first section of this chapter focuses on providing a brief overview of the nature of the bilateral security relationship. The second section is devoted to explaining NAFTA's security implications for the United States in relation to Mexico. The third and fourth sections analyse the premises guiding U.S. defence and national security strategies in the 1990s, respectively. U.S. defence strategy is examined in order to discern what kind of role, if any, Mexico played at the military-strategic level, and then the broader political context represented by the U.S. national security strategy is addressed to identify U.S. security concerns in relation to Mexico. The fifth part provides the conclusions for this chapter.

3.2. Overview

U.S.-Mexican relations were marred by friction and open conflict from approximately the mid-1800s to the first three decades of the 20th century. This period encompassed the 1847 Mexican-American War; instability in Mexico due to the protracted internal struggle between Conservatives and Liberals; World War I (WWI); and the Mexican Revolution that extended from 1910 into the 1930s and included the nationalisation of Mexico's oil industry in March of 1938.[390] Yet, during WWII the United States and Mexico became allies and increased bilateral security co-operation to an extent not seen before, or ever since.[391] This collaboration, however, was scaled back after the end of WWII, and for all practical purposes their temporary alliance concluded.

For the next three Cold War decades, Mexico neither explicitly supported U.S. military objectives, nor did it become a security concern for the United States. In fact, according to Aguayo, the rather benign U.S. view towards Mexico at this time was explained not only by its stability-enhancing political and economic conditions, but also by an acceptable interaction with its neighbour to the north.[392] In general terms, during the Cold War Mexico provided a silent

[390] See various authors, *Historia General de México*, Tercera Edición, Tomos 1 y 2, Centro de Estudios Históricos, El Colegio de México, A.C., (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1981); and H. Aguilar Camín and L. Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution. Contemporary Mexican History, 1910-1989*, Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS), University of Texas, Austin, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, c1993).

[391] After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Mexico made several concessions of a military nature to the United States (i.e. by authorising U.S. military aircraft to fly over Mexican airspace in route to and from Panama, and by agreeing to a Joint U.S.-Mexico Defense Commission [JUSMDC] on 12 January 1942), except providing it with bases on its territory. See Paz, *Strategy, Security, and Spies*, p.6 and pp.61-73.

[392] Aguayo, 'The Uses, Misuses, and Challenges of Mexican National Security: 1946-1990', p.98.

advantage to the United States by basically keeping a stable common border. For instance, whereas the Soviet Union was confronted with the presence of adversaries on its security perimeter, the United States deemed it unnecessary to militarise its borders. Precisely because of the benefit provided by Mexico's stability, the United States was free to project its military power beyond the hemisphere and into areas of intense geo-strategic competition. It has been argued, in this context, that Mexico's stability 'contributed -passively but fundamentally- to the final triumph of the [U.S.] policy of containment'.[393] In retrospect, consequently, Mexico had an indirect yet positive impact on U.S. strategic calculations during the Cold War.

Mexico's 'defensive' external orientation,[394] and the relative domestic stability achieved by the one-party system that dominated its politics for 71 years (from 1929 to 2000), helped create a non-threatening atmosphere in its relationship with the United States. According to Michael Dziedzic, the United States and Mexico have represented a 'security community', meaning that between them 'the expectation of war has been abolished, together with the preparations for it'.[395] This view is shared by David Mares who notes that coercion has been out of the question as a means of settling disputes between the two countries; militarily, he concludes, the United States and Mexico form a 'pluralist security community'.[396] As already mentioned, the fact that the U.S. military's main mission along the border with Mexico has been restricted to assisting LEAs by providing them intelligence and infrastructure assets, supports the argument about Mexico not posing a military threat to the United States.

In the span of the first three decades of the Cold War, nevertheless, interdependence intensified between the two countries, thus expanding the bilateral agenda by increasing the number of issues that required to be addressed. In the United States, for instance, the 1978 *Presidential Review Memorandum* (National Security Council-41) dealing with Mexico, under

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[393] Coronel M. J. Dziedzic, 'México en la Gran Estrategia de Estados Unidos: Eje Geoestratégico para la Seguridad y la Prosperidad', in S. Aguayo y J. Bailey (coords.), *Las Seguridades de México y Estados Unidos en un Momento de Transición*, (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores, 1997), p.85.

[394] G. González, 'Tradiciones y Premisas de la Política Exterior de México', in R. Green y P. H. Smith (coords.), *La Política y la Agenda México-Estados Unidos*, Trabajos Preparados para la Comisión sobre el Futuro de las Relaciones México-Estados Unidos, (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989), p.42.

[395] K. W. Deutsch, *Tides Among Nations*, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1979), p.80. Quoted by Lt. Col. M. J. Dziedzic, 'Mexico: Converging Challenges', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 242, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), (London: Brassey's for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p.4.

[396] J. Muller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989), pp.240-244, and K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A New Analytical Framework*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), pp.423-437, quoted, respectively, by Mares, 'Intereses Estratégicos en la Relación México-Estados Unidos', in Aguayo and Bailey (coords.), *Seguridades de México y Estados Unidos*, p.41.

its subsection 'The Changing Relationship', established that 'developments in Mexico over the next generation will influence what Americans do for a living, even who Americans are and how they interact with each other'.[397] It emphasised that Mexico was increasingly relevant for the United States due to issues such as oil, the common border, and the growing impact of each country's domestic politics on the other.[398] By the 1970s, interdependence between the two countries was characterised by challenges such as drugs, undocumented immigration, Mexico's foreign debt, and the two countries' clashing perspectives on the nature of Central American armed conflicts. Regarding this latter point, it is important to mention that conflicts in Central America had created foreign policy differences between the United States and Mexico in the 1980s.

In contrast to the period of relative stability in U.S.-Mexican relations from the end of WWII to the 1970s, by the 1980s controversies in the bilateral relationship had become 'cumulative'[399] as a result of a variety of issues such as the 1977 disagreement over the Mexican trans-border gas pipeline, and Mexico's refusal to let the Sha of Iran to re-enter the country after receiving medical treatment in the United States, among others; as a matter of fact, 'by the end of the 1980s, the relationship that Carter had hoped to build with Mexico had become a casualty to miscalculations, divergent perceptions, and some policy differences'.[400]

There was a paradox, nevertheless, in the fact that if it is true U.S.-Mexican economic relations in the 1980s were characterised by increasing co-operation due in part to Mexico's 1982 crisis and its consequent efforts to reform its economy under free market principles, the U.S.-Mexican security relationship during this period was defined by the opposite; that is, by a growing level of tension between the two countries over two main factors: Central America and drug trafficking.

Since 1979, Mexico's recently-discovered oil reserves became a foreign policy instrument for the country to become a more influential actor in Central America among the region's centrist political forces, which in turn would allow it to counter-balance the significant

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[397] The White House, 'Presidential Review Memorandum NSC-41: Review of U.S. Policies Toward Mexico', National Security Council, November 21, 1978, *Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton, National Security Archive*, The George Washington University, Washington, DC, p.1.
[398] *Idem*.
[399] L. Whitehead, 'Mexico and the "Hegemony" of the United States: Past, Present, and Future', R. Roett (ed.), *Mexico's External Relations in the 1990s*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., c1991), p.245.
[400] R. A. Pastor, *The Carter Administration and Latin America: A Test of Principle*, The Carter Center, July 1992, [online] available: http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1243.pdf (19/08/12), p.32.

U.S. presence in the area.[401] The Central American conflicts from the end of the 1970s were of interest to Mexico because of the need to prevent conflict from spilling-over its southern border, and the course of action to accomplish this objective was to contribute to bring stability to the region; otherwise, potential intervention by Cuba and the Soviet Union, and of course by the United States, was considered to result in a further erosion of the region's 'autonomy'.[402] The radicalisation of the Sandinista revolutionary regime that ousted Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and increasing opposition from the *Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional* (FMLN) insurgency in El Salvador, nevertheless, turned Central America into an area of conflicting interests where Mexican and U.S. views were at odds under an assertive Reagan administration.[403] On the one hand, the United States considered the traditionally legalistic orientation of Mexican foreign policy as a hindrance to its efforts to contain revolutionary movements in the region.[404] On the other hand, Mexico considered U.S. regional policy, guided by an ideological rationale, not only inappropriate but also the main explanation for the 'militarisation' of the conflict and the consequent instability of the region. The elimination of this source of tension and the fact that trade integration had become a necessity, nevertheless, contributed later on to the Mexican approximation to the United States.[405] A military escalation of the conflict was not convenient for Mexico because it was seen as potentially intensifying the challenge it was interested in dealing with in the first place, which was preventing an influx of refugees into a problematic part of the country such as the state of Chiapas. In this context, Mexico became especially active in the region in 1982, after the November 1981 U.S. decision to support the *contra* paramilitary force in Nicaragua.[406]

The way out to reduce U.S. pressure on Mexican diplomacy in Central America, without Mexico abandoning its position, consisted in transforming its regional approach from bilateral to

[401] Aguilar-Camin and Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution*, p.232.
[402] *Ibid*., p.233.
[403] Mexico provided material support to the Sandinista regime and, along the French, provided political legitimacy to the Salvadoran insurgency. See J. I. Domínguez and R. Fernández, *The United States and Mexico. Between Partnership and Conflict*, Contemporary Inter-American Relations, (New York, NY: Routledge, c2001), p.41.
[404] The United States viewed Mexican actions as granting the Sandinistas undeserved legitimacy, and also fundamentally naive as to the real intentions of a communist regime. See A. M. Cunningham, 'Mexico's National Security in the 1980s-1990s', in D. Ronfeldt (ed.), *The Modern Mexican Military: A Reassessment*, Monograph Series 15, (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1984), p.167.
[405] Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico*, p.22.
[406] National Security Archive (NSA), *The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations*, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2, The Gelman Library, George Washington University (GWU), [online] available: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm (19/08/12).

multilateral through the creation of the *Contadora* Group that included Venezuela, Colombia and Panama (the initiative was launched in the Panamanian isle of *Contadora*), to contribute to a negotiated solution of the conflict based on principles of international law such as non-intervention and peaceful resolution of controversies. This mechanism, nevertheless, was promoted by Mexico in order to find a compromise with, rather than to oppose, the United States.[407] It was until the Central American *Esquipulas* process replaced the *Contadora* Group in 1987 that tensions between Mexico and the United States gradually began to subdue.[408]

Strain in the bilateral relationship was also function of disagreement with respect to drug trafficking. In the 1980s, the 'war' against drugs was at the centre of the U.S. administration's agenda, and Mexico easily became the target of U.S. policies by being both producer of marijuana and heroin and also, from the second half of the decade on, a transit point for South American cocaine bound for the United States. Moreover, the assassination in 1985 in Mexico of DEA Agent Camarena by drug traffickers with protection from Mexican authorities, contributed to create an adverse atmosphere for Mexico in the United States where the country was criticised in terms of both its corrupt official structures, and its ill reputed political system, more in general.[409] In this context, the majority of U.S. observers of Mexico agreed that 'the most important source of friction in U.S.-Mexican relations is Mexico itself'.[410]

The United States continued imposing on Mexico a unilateral counter-drug approach based on interdiction abroad, and it again compelled Mexico to co-operate. Furthermore, in 1986 the U.S. Congress passed regulation requiring the White House to carry out an annual exercise consisting in verifying anti-drug efforts by other countries, based on the level of co-operation with the United States.[411] In this context, Mexico had to confront the threat posed by both, drug trafficking itself and pressure exerted by the United States, and therefore its anti-narcotics measures served to 'reassure and thereby contain the United States'.[412] As a matter of fact, in 1988 President de la Madrid explicitly designated drug trafficking, for the very first time, as a

[407] Aguilar-Zinser, 'Mexico and the United States', p.127.
[408] Whitehead, 'Mexico and the "Hegemony" of the United States', p.254. For a discussion about the Esquipulas process see J. Oliver, 'The Esquipulas Process: A Central American Paradigm for Resolving Regional Conflict', *Ethnic Studies Report*, Vol. XVII, No.2, July 1999, [online] available: http://www.ices.lk/publications/esr/articles_jul99/ESR-Oliver.pdf (19/08/12).
[409] Aguilar-Camin and Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution*, p.235.
[410] Aguilar-Zinser, 'Mexico and the United States', p.121.
[411] C. J. Arnson, 'Drug Certification and U.S. Policy in Latin America', Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, April 1998, in *Trends in Organized Crime*, Vol. 4., No. 2, (1998).
[412] Domínguez and Fernández, *The United States and Mexico*, p.43.

threat to Mexico's national security, a view that will be confirmed by subsequent Mexican presidents.[413] Efforts by the Mexican Government to reassure the United States after the Camarena debacle, such as the 1985 dissolution of the Federal Directorate of Security (DFS) that was related to the incident, and the arrest that same year of Rafael Caro Quintero in Costa Rica, one of the intellectual authors of the assassination of the DEA agent,[414] did not satisfy the United States and it continued insisting Mexico to restructure its security apparatus in order to deal with corruption.[415] This issue would be resolved by Mexico's gradual and unwilling steps to allow the United States a greater voice in Mexican security affairs, and this would become manifest in the following decade.[416]

In terms of security co-operation, in general, the period between 1970 and 1995 was characterised by scarce participation of the Mexican military in U.S. training and educational programmes. For instance, in the 25-period of reference, only 766 Mexican officers attended the so-called 'School of the Americas' (SOA), which in 1984 was relocated from Panama to Fort Benning, Georga, and in 2001 re-named Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC).[417] As a matter of fact, military training and exchanges between the two countries began to increase in the mid-1990s with the momentum provided by the October 1995 visit of U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry to Mexico, in order to intensify U.S. security assistance programmes (as a comparison, only in 1996 WHISC enrolled 153 Mexican students comprising 16.4% of the student body).[418]

It can be argued that in the 1980s there was a fundamental change in U.S. policies toward Mexico as explained by uncertainty about its governability and the ability of its political system to keep the stability of the country, which had implications for the security of the common border.[419] With the almost simultaneous arrival of new administrations in both countries, in Mexico at the end of 1988 and in the United States at beginning of 1989, U.S. views on Mexico

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[413] S. Aguayo, 'Mexico's Definition and Use of "National Security": Toward a New Concept for the 1990s', in Roett, *Mexico's External Relations in the 1990s*, p.61.
[414] O. Ramirez, 'Costa Rican agents nab suspect in Salazar killing', *Gainsville Sun*, April 5, 1985, available [online]: http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1320&dat=19850405&id=NcNPAAAAIBAJ&sjid=hAYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6630,1382297 (19/08/12).
[415] Aguilar-Camin and Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution*, p.235.
[416] Domínguez and Fernández, *The United States and Mexico*, p.36.
[417] G. H. Turbiville, Jr., *U.S.-Mexico Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging Future*, JSOU Report 10-2, March 2010, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), p.11.
[418] *Ibid*., p.22.
[419] Aguilar-Camin and Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution*, p.225.

changed as evident in the 'Spirit of Houston' and willingness to co-operate between Presidents George H. W. Bush and Carlos Salinas. To this change contributed the significant challenge the left had posed during the past presidential election in Mexico and the U.S. preference for a PRI government, especially if supporting democracy in the country would mean a triumph of the left over the right and centrist political forces; the arrest of the influential drug trafficker Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo by the new Salinas government; and, regionally, the new low profile of Mexican foreign policy in Central America and therefore the non-condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Panama; all these aspects contributed to set the stage, therefore, for a more collaborative stance between the two countries by 1989.[420]

Even though interdependence-related issues were not new in the bilateral relationship, in the United States they had been overshadowed by the more dire threat of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. By the end of the Cold War, however, the United States was able to devote more attention to trans-national challenges. Since trans-border issues with Mexico were the outcome of interdependence (this has been consistently the Mexican perspective), their very nature created therefore the need to confront them in a more collaborative way.[421] In the long-term, they were deemed to represent the main threat to U.S. society.[422]

In terms of trans-border challenges, however, even before the 9/11 attacks it had been suggested that 'Mexico [had to] be understood by the U.S. military establishment as an area that may pose unique asymmetric threats to [U.S.] national security in the not so distant future'.[423] It was noted, for instance, that the U.S. border with Mexico should be seen as an 'appealing avenue' not only for illicit flows but also for the possible infiltration of 'foreign terrorists bent on delivering weapons of mass destruction'.[424] This line of argument has often been used as a disguise to justify a hard-line against undocumented immigration, and it has provided the rationale behind proposals pointing out that the best way to secure the U.S. Southwest border is through its 'formal militarization'.[425] Fighting terrorism at the border, in fact, is the number one

[420] *Ibid*., p.237.
[421] J. A. Cope, 'En Busca de la Convergencia: Las Relaciones Militares entre México y Estados Unidos', in S. Aguayo and J. Bailey, *Seguridades de México y Estados Unidos*, pp.242-243.
[422] Dziedzic, 'México en la Gran Estrategia de Estados Unidos', p.104.
[423] Col. G. A. Pappas, *Our Own Backyard: Mexico and U.S. National Security*, SSC Fellow, Strategic Research Project, USAWAC Class of 1998, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 8 April 1998, p.24.
[424] *Ibid*., p.19.
[425] J. E. Ramírez, *The New Front Line: Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border*, Strategic Research Project, USAWAC Class of 1999, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 14 April 1999, p.28.

priority established by the U.S. Border Patrol strategy, even though this can also be seen as a convenient pretext for securing support and resources to basically continue dealing with undocumented immigration.[426]

The idea of confronting trans-national threats in a unilateral way, however, has been considered inefficient and counterproductive by specialists on both sides of the border.[427] It has been suggested, for instance, that the goal of U.S. strategy regarding Mexico should consist of turning this country into an asset rather than letting it become a liability.[428] An additional argument pointed out to the risk of conceptualising issues in the bilateral relationship as traditional security concerns, mainly because of its counter-productive effect, especially because they have not been amenable to coercive solutions.[429] The bottom line of these ideas has been that most of the security challenges in the U.S.-Mexico relationship cannot be dealt with effectively, and in the long-term, through military means. They have been challenges that have required integral responses. So far, however, both countries officially recognise a security dimension in some of the trans-border issues under consideration in this thesis, especially in reference to drug trafficking. Furthermore, after the 9/11 attacks undocumented immigration has been openly portrayed as a security issue in the United States. Mexico, for its part, has remained reticent to consider this issue under this light, categorising it instead as an economic development matter. The environment, in turn, has been a potential rather than ac actual security concern for both countries.

It is important to note, nevertheless, that NAFTA brought a new security dynamic to the bilateral relationship, with Mexico playing an important role in the creation of a 'virtuous circle' to deal with common challenges. On the one hand, promoting stability in the country has been paramount for addressing trans-border threats affecting U.S. national security. On the other hand, dealing with those threats has been considered fundamental to maintaining Mexico's stability.

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[426] Office of Border Patrol, *National Border Patrol Strategy*, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), September 2004, [online] available: http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/national_bp_strategy.ctt/national_bp_strategy.pdf (16/09/08).

[427] Bagley, Aguayo and Stark, 'Introduction: In Search of Security', in Bagley and Aguayo, *Mexico. In Search of Security*, p.14.

[428] M. J. Dziedzic, 'Mexico and U.S. Grand Strategy', in Bailey and Aguayo (eds.), *Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations Beyond the Cold War*, p.64.

[429] Mares, 'Intereses Estratégicos en la Relación México-Estados Unidos', pp.50-54.

The security significance of Mexico for the United States has been, therefore, not of a traditional military character but related to the trans-border nature of the bilateral challenges brought about by interdependence between the two countries.

3.3. The NAFTA Context

A detailed examination of NAFTA is beyond the scope of this thesis, which covers only the 1990s. Nevertheless, this section of the study will focus on the trade agreement's security implications for the United States, and its purpose is to set the context for the three trans-border issues that will be subsequently analysed.

3.3.1. *Background*

The period between 1940 and 1968 in Mexico is known as 'the Mexican miracle', and it was a phase characterised by both political and economic stability in the country. These were the years of the inward-looking development model (import-substitution industrialization strategy [ISI]) that allowed the country to sustain between 3% and 4% annual growth rates, as well as a low 3% annual inflation.[430]

The 1970s, in contrast, represented a phase of transition in both the economic and political arena after the government tilted internally to the left in order to respond to social demands that had been present in the *Tlatelolco* student movement in 1968,[431] and this process, in turn, created tensions with the domestic business sector.[432] By the end of this decade, the world's energy crisis, on the one hand, and, on the other, discovery in Mexico of oil reserves at a level of up to 200 billion barrels (at a price of $38 dollars in 1979 compared to $4 dollars at the beginning of the 1970s),[433] allowed the country to promote economic growth. It is estimated that by the end of the 'oil boom' (1978-1981), energy exports were generating more than $15 billion a year in revenues and fostering an 8% annual growth rate, one of the highest in the international context.[434]

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[430] T. L. Merrill and R. Miró (eds.), *Mexico. A Country Study*, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1997, p.147.
[431] See, for instance, S. Zermeño, *México: Una Democracia Utópica. El Movimiento Estudiantil del 68*, (México, D.F.: Siglo XXI Editores, c1978).
[432] Merrill and Miró, *Mexico. A Country Study*, p.153.
[433] Aguilar-Camin and Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution*, p.210.
[434] W. A. Cornelius, *Mexican Politics in Transition. The Breakdown of a One-Party Regime*, Monograph Series, 41, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1996, p.100.

Economic growth in Mexico during this period was explained by the import liberalisation policy pursued until 1981, notwithstanding the presence of warnings such as the fact that inflation was increasing more than it had been anticipated (27% between 1980 and 1981).[435] The government, however, decided to stay the course because of some positive indicators, such as the fact that the job-creation rate was higher than the labour force growth rate.[436]

Nevertheless, the key to Mexico's economic imbalance was that the value of oil exports did not grow enough to pay for the increasing volume of imports. It is estimated that while the value of oil exports grew from $560 million to $14.6 billion between 1976 and 1981, the value of imports increased from $9,400 million to $32,000 million in the same period, surpassing thus the country's revenue in absolute terms.[437]

Moreover, in mid-1981 the collapse of the world oil market and an increase in interest rates created in Mexico a crisis characterised not only by capital flight, but also by the Mexican government's indecision in terms of adjusting both expenditure trends and the exchange rate. In this context, by the end of 1982, Mexico had accumulated an $82 billion external debt.[438] At this point, the Mexican government was forced to devaluate the currency by 70% and eventually to embark on a transformation of its economic model through the adoption of free market policies.[439] This process started under President Miguel De la Madrid (1982-1988), and it was characterised by two important factors: (1) the protectionist model was replaced by a competitive framework based of free market principles; and (2) the interventionist state was replaced by a state whose function was to stimulate, rather than to direct, the economy.[440] By 1986, half of the total federal government budget was devoted to service the debt, and this situation in turn required cuts in social spending as well as in job-creating public investment.[441] The severity of the adjustment was reflected particularly in minimum real wages that fell by 66% during the 1980s.[442]

Between 1982 and 1987 Mexico experienced null economic growth, and this occurred at a time of a growing flow of people entering the labour market. In this context, the effects of the

[435] Aguilar-Camin and Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution*, p.211.
[436] *Idem*.
[437] *Ibid*., p.210.
[438] Cornelius, *Mexican Politics in Transition*, p.110.
[439] Aguilar-Camin and Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution*, p.212.
[440] *Ibid*., p.227.
[441] Cornelius, *Mexican Politics in Transition*, p.103.
[442] *Ibid*., p.104.

1982 crisis would be evident in the 1990s, with an accumulated social cost that would exacerbate inequality in the country, giving way to unemployment, underemployment and undocumented immigration to the United States.[443]

The economic crises experienced by Mexico in the 1980s basically represented the exhaustion of the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy adopted in the post-war period. The failure of the ISI programme, furthermore, eventually provided the justification for the adoption of a neo-liberal economic model in the country. Economic liberalisation in Mexico started with the government's decision to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in November 1985, and this process was later intensified under President Salinas' administration (1988-1994). The end of the Cold War offered Mexico almost no opportunities for trade diversification -as the preferred strategy to offset the traditional U.S. influence-, as powers in both Europe and Asia were more preoccupied with providing economic opportunities for their neighbours in order to prevent instability within their respective regions.[444] Mexico's economic relationship with Latin America, on the other hand, had always been more competitive than complementary, and opportunities there remained rather limited as well. In this context, Mexico was left with the United States as the most viable partner, especially because bilateral trade was already significant. The Mexican government thus decided to formalise an already existing trade relationship with the United States.[445]

Some analysts argue, nevertheless, that economic reform in Mexico followed in fact a political rather than an economic rationale. According to Susan Kaufman Purcell,

> The main reason for economic change was political. The outset of the foreign debt crisis in August 1982 seriously threatened the stability of the Mexican political system, and with it the continuing rule of the [Institutional Revolutionary Party] PRI.[446]

According to this argument, the PRI realised that economic reform was a condition to retain the reins of power. Both the exhaustion of the ISI model and political imperatives represented the stimulus for change.

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[443] Aguilar-Camin and Meyer, *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution*, p.228.
[444] Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico*, pp.19-23.
[445] See H. Von Bertrab, *Negotiating NAFTA. A Mexican Envoy's Account*, Foreword by Sydney Weintraub, The Washington Papers 173, (Westport, CT: Praeger, published with the Center for International and Strategic Studies [CSIS], c1997).
[446] S. K. Purcell, 'Mexico's New Economic Vitality', *Current History*, Vol. 91, February 1993, p.54.

The political effect of the end of the Cold War on the bilateral relationship, moreover, also contributed to facilitate a closer co-operation between the two countries to the extent that it reduced U.S. pressure on Mexico to support U.S. views.[447] In the opinion of Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, Mexico actually opted for 'bandwagoning' with the United States in the context of the new international environment.[448]

It is important to note that on the U.S. side of the equation, the idea of a trade agreement with Mexico was not new. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, for instance, both the Carter and Reagan administrations had proposed energy and free trade agreements, respectively, and Mexico had rejected both.[449] According to Margaret Cummings, nevertheless, the pivotal factor in U.S. efforts to get Mexico on board regarding bilateral agreements was that by the mid-to-late 1980s in the United States there were powerful forces pressing for free trade with Mexico.[450] Among the reasons explaining their support were the increasing globalisation of the economy, and Mexico's need to avoid repeating past financial crises related to capital borrowed abroad.[451] Equally significant, however, the agreement represented Mexico's implicit commitment to keep its market open, thus providing certainty to investors.[452]

The basic U.S. economic argument in favour of the agreement, nevertheless, was that it would increase income and employment in the United States. Even though during the campaign then-Governor Clinton had expressed reservations about the agreement, by the beginning of his administration he became convinced of its benefits. In early 1993 he stated:

> That agreement [NAFTA] holds the potential to create many, many jobs in America over the next decade if it is joined with others to ensure the environment, that living standards, that working conditions are honored. That we can literally know that we are going to raise

[447] Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico*, p.22.
[448] *Idem*.
[449] A. I. Pérez, 'Free Trade with Mexico and U.S. National Security', quoted in D. E. Schultz & E. J. Williams (eds.), *Mexico Faces the 21st Century*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), p.121.
[450] M. M. Cummings, *From Security to Trade in U.S.-Latin American Relations: Explaining U.S. Support for a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico*, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Prepared for presentation at the XVII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, September 24-27, 1992, (preliminary draft), pp.8-9.
[451] *Ibid*., p.10.
[452] S. Weintraub, 'U.S.-Mexico Free Trade: Implications for the United States', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 34, No.2, p.36.

> the condition of people in America and in Mexico. We have a vested interest in a wealthier, stronger Mexico, but we need to do it in terms that are good for our people.[453]

An additional positive prospect offered by the agreement -taking into account Mexico's past poor economic performance-, was that a healthier Mexican economy would have a positive impact on U.S. exports.[454]

In terms of the predictability the agreement was thought to provide, a further benefit of a free trade accord would consist in locking in liberal reform in Mexico. In this context, U.S.-Mexico free trade had '[grown] out of the desire to set a new structure in place that would be extremely difficult for future [Mexican] governments to reverse'.[455] It can be argued that this was not necessarily a positive outcome, at least for Mexico. For instance, according to Cummings, free trade agreements are often convenient 'anti-democratic' schemes used by powerful domestic economic groups to tilt the scale in favour of the private sector and in detriment of the government, which in turn finds itself unable to implement social programmes.[456] If it is true NAFTA's most positive impact has been located at the macroeconomic level, it is also true its benefits have been distributed unevenly across society.[457]

Furthermore, in order to facilitate bargaining, Mexico City agreed not to include immigration in the free trade negotiation while Washington refrained from asking its southern neighbour to open oil exploration and production to U.S. investment.[458] The lack of agreement on both issues, nevertheless, left each country frustrated with the other.

Even though both the Bush and Clinton administrations believed that NAFTA's economic benefits would contribute to Mexico's stability, both avoided the issue of Mexico's democracy.[459] According to Jacqueline Mazza, although democratisation in Mexico became more salient during the NAFTA negotiations, the subject basically did not play a role on the agreement's approval.[460]

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[453] American University, 'Clinton Speech sets new American Agenda for Leadership in the Global Economy', *The American Scene*, Special Centennial Issue, Vol. X, No.11, 12 March 1993, p.vii.
[454] Weintraub, 'U.S.-Mexico Free Trade', p.31.
[455] S. Weintraub and M. D. Baer, 'The Interplay between Economic and Political Opening: The Sequence in Mexico', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1992, p.193.
[456] Cummings, *From Security to Trade in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, pp.1-2.
[457] J. J. Audley, 'Introduction', in J. J. Audley, D. G. Papademetriou, S. Polaski and S. Vaughan, *NAFTA's Promise and Reality. Lessons from Mexico for the Hemisphere*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003, pp.5-6.
[458] G. W. Grayson, 'Mexico Moves toward Modernization', *Current History*, Vol. 90, No. 554, March, 1991, p.110.
[459] Perez, 'Free Trade with Mexico and U.S. National Security', p.127.
[460] J. Mazza, *Don't Disturb the Neighbors. The United States and Democracy in Mexico*, 1980-1995, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), p.91.

During its first five years of operation, NAFTA proved to be a success in terms of increasing trade. For instance, in 1998 U.S. exports to Mexico represented 11.5% of the U.S. total, up from 8.9% in 1993. In the same period, U.S. imports from Mexico went up from 6.9% to 10.4% of the U.S. total. Taking into account both exports and imports, by 1999 Mexico had replaced Japan as the second-largest U.S. trading partner, as shown in Table 3-1.[461]

Table 3-1. **Top Ten Countries with which the U.S. Trades (for the month of January 2000)**

Country Name	***Year to date Total in Billions* of U.S. $**
Canada	31.12
Mexico	**17.37**
Japan	15.03
China	7.78
Germany	6.43
United Kingdom	5.99
Republic of Korea	4.93
Taiwan	4.83
France	3.79
Singapore	2.62

Values given are for Imports and Exports added together.
These countries represented 70.26% of U.S. imports, and 67.27% of U.S. exports in goods.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 'Top Ten Countries with which the U.S. Trades', [online] available: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/current/balance.html (23/03/00), p.1. For the month of January 2000 the United States had a $1,767.23 million trade deficit with Mexico. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, 'Top Ten Countries with which the U.S. has a Trade Deficit', [online] available: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/current/deficit.html (23/03/00), p.1.

As far as Mexico was concerned, by 1998 exports to the United States represented 87.6% of the total, up from 82.7% in 1993; imports went up from 69.3% to 74.3% in the same period.[462] One important aspect for Mexico, nevertheless, was that it ceased to be an exporter of primary products. This change was evident in the structure of bilateral trade characterised by the exchange of intermediate goods –explained by the expansion of intra-firm trade-, as shown in Table 3-2.

[461] L. Vargas, 'NAFTA's First Five Years', (Part I), *El Paso Business Frontier*, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch, Issue 2, 1999, [online] available: http://www.dallasfed.org/htm/pubs/pdfs/busfront/299.pdf (15/05/03), pp.3-4.
[462] *Ibid*., p.4.

Table 3-2. **U.S. Trade with Mexico in 1998 (millions of dollars)**

Top U.S. Exports to Mexico		**Top U.S. Imports from Mexico**	
Total	**78,772**	**Total**	**94,629**
Electrical machinery and appliances	14,341	Motor vehicles	16,753
Motor vehicles	7,861	Electrical machinery and appliances	13,540
General industry machinery	3,762	Telecommunications equipment	10,882
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	3,423	Apparel and clothing	6,813
Telecommunications equipment	3,354	Office machines and ADP equipment	5,523
Office machines and ADP equipment	3,186	Petroleum, petroleum products	5,293
Manufactures of metals	2,705	Power generating machinery	3,844
Apparel and clothing	2,647	General industry machinery	3,166
Power generating machinery	2,544	Professional scientific instruments	2,717
Machinery, specialised	2,341	Vegetables and fruit	2,647
Textile yarn, fabrics	1,959	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	2,408
Plastics in primary form	1,939	Furniture and bedding	2,317
Professional scientific instruments	1,747	Manufactures of metals	1,811
Paper, paperboard	1,743	Iron and steel	1,253
Petroleum, petroleum products	1,481	Textile yarn, fabrics	1,196

Source: Vargas, 'NAFTA's First Five Years', (Part I), p.3.

In reference to U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI), while it averaged $2.2 billion annually between 1990 and 1993, it averaged $3.6 billion per year between 1994 and 1998, which represented an increase of almost 64%.[463] As these figures show, in terms of both trade and investment Mexico has been highly dependent on the United States, and this is a reflection of the asymmetry of power between the two countries. According to estimates at the beginning of the 2000s, for instance, U.S. imports from Mexico represented 25% of Mexican gross domestic product (GDP).[464]

Regarding Mexico, an alternative assessment of NAFTA noted that the agreement has actually been harmful in a variety of aspects. For instance, it depreciated real wages; it did not help to reduce undocumented immigration to the United States; it damaged the environment; it

[463] Vargas, 'NAFTA's First Five Years', (Part II), p.3.
[464] U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), *Mexico Country Commercial Guide FY2002*, The U.S. Commercial Service, [online] available: http://www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-MEXICO2002.htm (16/04/03), p.2.

contributed to deforestation (around 630,000 hectares between 1993 and 2003) in the southern part of the country; in addition to the fact that the number of new jobs created in the manufacture sector (500,000) between 1994 and 2002 did not offset the loss in the agricultural sector (1.3 million) in the same period.[465] The conclusion of this assessment established: 'put simply, NAFTA has been neither the disaster its opponents predicted nor the savior hailed by its supporters'.[466]

If it is true the agreement has had a positive impact on bilateral trade, its benefits have not permeated into the Mexican society in general. In 1999, for instance, 40% of Mexico's 100 million people still had incomes of less than $2 a day, and in this context it was difficult to see how NAFTA could contribute to the country's stability and democracy in the long term.[467]

3.3.2. *NAFTA's Security Implications*

In contrast to military and state-centred concerns that characterised competition between the two superpowers, the post-Cold War security environment was marked by the prominence of non-traditional, non-military, threats. Because it is common for these non-state threats to operate across national boundaries, the most effective way to confront them is through international co-operation, and this has been the rationale behind increasing security collaboration between the United States and Mexico since the mid-1990s, as shown in Graph 2, which shows an increase in 1997 to stabilise and then significantly grow from 2008 on in the context of the Merida Initiative.

[465] Audley, 'Introduction', pp.5-6.
[466] *Ibid*., p.7.
[467] The Globalist, *U.S.-Mexican Relations*, September 4, 2001, [online] available: http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2457 (15/05/03), p.2.

Graph 2. U.S. Economic, Military and Total Assistance per Capita by Year [Constant $US Obligations]



Sources: U.S. Overseas Loan and Grants (*Greenbook*), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN), International Database. Prepared by USAID Economic Analysis Data Services [statsunit@devtechsys.com], [online] available: http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do (25/08/12).

The specific values for the Graph above are:

FY	Economic	Military	Total
80	0.26	0	0.26
81	0.3	0	0.31
82	0.24	0	0.25
83	0.22	0	0.22
84	0.21	0	0.21
85	0.26	0.01	0.27
86	0.27	0	0.27
87	0.37	0.01	0.38
88	0.37	0	0.38
89	1.34	0	1.34
90	0.76	0.21	0.97
91	0.99	0.02	1.01
92	0.71	0.28	0.99
93	0.54	0.01	0.55
94	0.2	0	0.21
95	0.17	0.01	0.17
96	0.36	0.03	0.4
97	0.16	0.64	0.8
98	0.34	0.32	0.66
99	0.26	0.28	0.54
0	0.31	0.24	0.55
1	0.39	0.28	0.66
2	0.9	0.23	1.13
3	0.61	0.17	0.78
4	0.91	0.12	1.03
5	0.97	0.11	1.08
6	1.7	0.15	1.86
7	0.7	0.15	0.85
8	0.77	0.12	0.88
9	3.9	0.62	4.52
10	5.53	0.85	6.39

The United States has increasingly recognised that its security is connected to that of its neighbour to the south. According to Donald Schulz, for instance, this is evident in the fact that Mexico's problems have the potential to '[affect] socio-economic conditions in the United

States, especially near the Mexican border and in its inner cities'.[468] Furthermore, even though NAFTA was promoted as nothing more than a trade agreement during the negotiation process, it has had important security implications for North America as a whole. According to Dziedzic, for instance,

> As the tapestry of the three societies [Canada, the United States and Mexico] becomes more intricately interwoven, however, any fraying at the edges of one social order would have unavoidable consequences for the others. In this way, NAFTA could unintentionally create the necessity for future security cooperation.[469]

That is, the idea that NAFTA was purely a trade agreement that would not have any significant political or security implications was utterly wrong; to the extent that the three societies have been bound together more tightly, each has acquired a vested interest in the stability of the others. This basically meant an interest in Mexico's stability, due to the potential for social dislocations within the country as a result of the implementation of the accord. This prospect set the stage for increased security co-operation, in particular between Mexico and its immediate neighbour, the United States. The *Zapatista* uprising in 1994, in fact, represented only one instance of social unrest related to NAFTA's approval.[470]

Rochlin basically agreed with Dziedzic's point by establishing that NAFTA increased U.S. economic stakes in Mexico, and in so doing heightened the urgency of defending U.S. interests in the context of potential instability in Mexico. According to this rationale, U.S.-Mexican economic integration must be followed by military integration, which in turn has to be justified in terms of the need to address crime and drug trafficking in Mexico. In Rochlin's opinion, 'it is precisely in these circumstances that Mexican national security has transformed itself into regional security, largely in response to trans-national capital and U.S. strategic interests'.[471] In this context, one of the problems he identified was that Mexican security became susceptible to being defined by the United States.[472]

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[468] D. E. Schulz, *Mexico and the Future*, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle, PA, September 25, 1995, [online] available: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs95/ (22/12/98), p.vii.
[469] M. J. Dziedzic, 'NAFTA and North American Security', in *Strategic Forum*, No. 18, January 1995, p.2.
[470] H. Cleaver, 'Learning from Chiapas: Mobilizing to Resist Development', *Canadian Dimension*, Vol. 28, Issue 36, Winnipeg, May 1994.
[471] Rochlin, *Redefining Mexican 'Security'*, p.180.
[472] *Ibid*., pp.183-184.

The argument above, nevertheless, contrasts sharply with others for which NAFTA is actually an opportunity to manage trans-national threats more than a mere *façade* to control social unrest in Mexico.[473] Rochlin's perspective is also at odds with the view expressed by Schulz above for whom trans-border security concerns are serious enough to be relevant by themselves, independently of NAFTA.

In the end, it seems that the U.S.-Mexican security relationship under NAFTA has been characterised by the need to protect U.S. interests in Mexico, on the one hand, and the need to deal with trans-border threats that affect both societies, on the other hand. If it is true the agreement increased U.S. concerns about the need to avoid trans-border risks from Mexico, the irony is that these challenges have been in part the side-effects of the U.S.-supported neo-liberal reform in Mexico. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the agreement has not only stimulated further co-operation between the two countries, but also contributed to a more institutionalised bilateral relationship.

3.4. U.S. Defence Strategy

This section looks at U.S. defence planning at the end of the Cold War, and describes the main elements of a 'new' military strategy to confront the challenges of a more complex international environment. This is the basis for the subsequent analysis of Mexico's military significance for the United States.

3.4.1. *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*

3.4.1.1. Threat Assessment

In 1997, the first year of publication of the QDR, U.S. military strategy was in the process of adapting itself to a new international security environment where the threat of nuclear confrontation between the superpowers had been basically replaced by trans-national dangers as the main concern.

Firstly, the QDR recognised that regional dangers were at the forefront of U.S. security concerns, and that 'failed or failing states' could potentially generate instability as well as a

[473] J. Sweeney, 'Fulfilling the Promise of NAFTA: A New Strategy for U.S.-Mexican Relations', *Backgrounder*, The Heritage Foundation, No. 1070, March 6, 1996, p.5.

variety of non-traditional challenges in several areas of the world.[474] Secondly, the QDR underlined the problem of controlling the diffusion of military technology, and therefore the need of preventing the dissemination of WMD in strategic areas of the world.[475] Thirdly, the QDR established that U.S. interests were more likely to be affected in the future by a 'variety of transnational dangers', such as drugs and organised crime.[476] And fourthly, even though the scenario of a nuclear exchange between superpowers had been left behind, the U.S. territory was believed to be exposed to 'asymmetric threats' prompted by the superiority of U.S. conventional forces. Dealing with these challenges was considered 'an important element of U.S. defense strategy'.[477]

Finally, the threat-scenario section of the document pointed out to the possible emergence of a new 'global peer competitor' after 2015, and Russia and China were seen as having such potential notwithstanding their 'uncertain' future.[478]

3.4.1.2. Elements of Strategy

According to the principle of 'engagement' set forth in the 1997 *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, the QDR required DoD to pursue three main strategic tasks:

a) 'Shaping the International Environment'

DoD was assigned the mission of 'promoting regional stability' through military collaboration with other countries in order to influence the international environment.[479] The report, however, at no point defined allies and friends, or the practical steps to achieve the sated goals. Neither did it discuss who the adversary was, nor the potential for these actions to be accepted by the U.S. public opinion.[480]

[474] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section II, p.1.
[475] Of particular concern were the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery; information warfare capabilities; advanced conventional weapons; stealth capabilities; unmanned aerial vehicles; and capabilities to access, or deny access, to space. *Ibid*., p.2.
[476] *Idem.*
[477] *Ibid*., pp.2-3.
[478] See *Ibid*., pp.3-4. The estimate on potential 'peer competitors' can also be found in DoD Futures Intelligence Program, *Global Threat Assessment: Looking to 2016*, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), November 1997, p.iv.
[479] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, p.4.
[480] According to one assessment, there was no sign that great power rivalry would erode the essence of U.S.-European or U.S.-Japanese relations despite the collapse of the Soviet Union. See Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), *1998 Strategic Assessment. Engaging Power for Peace*, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC, Chapter 1, [online] available: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98/sa98ch1.html (17/11/98), p.1.

A further duty consisted of the application of U.S. military power to 'preventing or reducing conflicts and threats'. In addition to dealing with proliferation and terrorism, the document underlined the importance of '[reducing] the production of and flow to the United States of illegal drugs by means of DoD support to the joint interagency task forces operating along U.S. coasts and southern border', and of the deployment of U.S. forces to maintain stability in relevant areas.[481] Regarding this second objective, however, the QDR did not make any explicit reference to Mexico, neither established a connection between terrorism and WMD, nor did it define the kind of forces and actions that would be required to confront each potential threat.

The third assignment consisted in 'deterring aggression and coercion' in key areas of the world through 'the peacetime deployment of U.S. forces abroad'; however, the QDR recognised that the military relevance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal had lessened, except to 'deter aggression against the United States, its forces abroad, and its allies and friends'.[482]

One of the main criticisms to the series of objectives put forward by the QDR was that it created the impression of an overreliance on military means to confront non-military threats, as defined by the document itself. According to the National Defense Panel (NDP), for instance, the QDR did not properly consider the use of non-military means to advance its goals.[483] The problem, therefore, was that the United States was excessively relying on military means to confront the new, post-Cold War security environment, in spite of its own recognition about the increasing salience of non-military threats.[484] In this context, the application of military power could be not only costly, but also the cause of a 'security dilemma'-type of situation.[485] That is,

[481] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, p.4.
[482] *Ibid*., pp.4-5.
[483] The National Defense Panel (NDP), *Assessment of the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review*, [online] available: http://www.defenselink.mil/topstory/ndp_assess.htm (15/03/00), p.2.
[484] Rear Admiral E. J. Carroll, Jr. USN (Ret.), Deputy Director, 'Two Wars', A Commentary at the CATO Institute, 23 February 1998, Center for Defense Information (CDI), [online] available: http://www.cdi.org/issues/BottomUpReview/Carroll.html (14/12/99), p.3. According to an interesting perspective, however, 'American influence does not exist simply because of American military might, for that might is often not usable in the many conflicts that affect the national security of states around the world. American influence exists also by virtue of the fact that the United States is recognized in most capitals around the world as the only military superpower'. See P. J. Katzenstein, "Conclusions: National Security in a Changing World", in Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, p.531.
[485] C. Conetta and C. Knight, 'Military Strategy Under Review', *The Progressive Response*, Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol.3, No.1, Jan. 14, 1999, [online] available: http://foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/vol3/prog3n1.html (13/03/00), p.3.

the emphasis on military means to confront the new international security environment meant basically reproducing the principles U.S. Cold War strategy had been based on.

b) 'Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises'

Given that the effectiveness of efforts to influence the international security environment could not be taken for granted, the United States had to be prepared therefore to respond to a variety of challenges of different magnitude. For instance, the U.S. military had to be ready to operate in contexts demanding different kinds of responses, from 'deterring aggression and coercion in crisis', to 'conducting smaller-scale contingency operations (SSCO)', and to 'fighting and winning major theater wars (MTW)'.[486] This latter response was considered 'the most stressing requirement for the U.S. military', and it implied surpassing the military power of other states with objectives opposite to those of the United States.[487] In terms of the post-Cold War security environment, one of the relevant criticisms of the QDR was its insistence on the two-war scenario as the framework for determining the size of U.S. armed forces. According to the report itself,

> As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States now and for the foreseeable future be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies.[488]

Such an ability was seen as 'the *sine qua non* of a superpower and is essential to the credibility of our overall national security strategy'.[489]

By basically confirming the Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) framework,[490] nevertheless, the QDR advocated the retention of Cold War force levels that defence experts considered excessive. It was argued, for instance, that 'in most scenarios, probably less than half the U.S. force that was required for a Desert Storm-like conflict would suffice, because there was little chance that

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[486] Based on recent experience and intelligence projections, the demand for these smaller-scale contingency operations was expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years. See Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, pp.6-7.
[487] *Ibid*., p.7.
[488] *Idem*.
[489] *Idem*.
[490] On September 1st, 1993, the Clinton administration announced its defence posture. Its criteria for sizing U.S. military forces was based on the assumption that the United States had to be prepared to fight and win, without allies, two major regional conflicts occurring almost simultaneously. See L. Aspin, 'A Defense Strategy for the New Era', Section II, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, October 1993, [online] available: http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/part02.htm (15/11/99), p.4.

large forces would be needed in two places at once'.[491] In a report issued in December 1997 in reference to the low probability of a two-war scenario, the NDP stated:

> The Panel views this two-military-theater-of-war construct as, in reality, a force-sizing function. We are concerned that, for some, this has become a means of justifying current forces. This approach focuses significant resources on a low-probability scenario, which consumes funds that could be used to reduce risk to our long-term security.[492]

The NDP, therefore, pointed out to an implicit contradiction within the QDR: it emphasised the importance of platforms for a regular war, on the one hand, and it recognised that 'asymmetric treats' were an increasing concern, on the other hand.

c) 'Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future'

As established by the QDR, one important goal for the United States was to 'maintain its military superiority in the face of evolving, as well as discontinuous, threats and challenges'.[493] In particular, in order to sustain their dominance, U.S. forces were required to carry out both joint and combined operations based on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) *Joint Vision 2010*.[494]

There were several criticisms of this section of the document as well. Firstly, by equating supremacy with military power, the QDR retained the use of force as the essential factor of influence in the international context, which therefore basically reaffirmed the Cold War mind-set.[495] Secondly, the QDR report recommended maintaining the U.S. technological advantage over potential competitors. However, as shown in Table 3-3, in 1999 U.S. military spending was around 6 times more than that of Russia or China, the closest potential future 'peer competitors'.[496]

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[491] In these circumstances, the suggestion was to size forces for a Desert Storm plus Desert Shield plus Bosnia/IFOR kind of scenario. See M. E. O'Hanlon, 'The Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review', Policy Brief # 15, April 1997, The Brookings Institution, [online] available: http://www.brook.edu/comm/PolicyBriefs/pb015/pb15.htm (13/03/00), pp.4-6. A different proposal consisted on sizing forces able to fight one war while handling smaller peacekeeping operations elsewhere, with a budget large enough to maintain the technological edge. See L. J. Korb, Director, Center for Public Policy Education/ Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, 'The Pentagon's War on Thrift', *The New York Times*, May 22, 1997, [online] available: http://www.brook.edu/view/op%2Ded/korb/19970522.htm (16/03/00), p.2.

[492] National Defense Panel (NDP), *Transforming Defense. National Security in the 21st Century*, Report of the National Defense Panel, Arlington, VA., December 1997, p.ii.

[493] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, p.9.

[494] This document was based on four operational concepts: *dominant manoeuvre*, *precision engagement*, *full dimensional protection*, and *focused logistics*. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Joint Vision 2010*, Pentagon, Washington, DC, pp.19-25.

[495] Conetta and Knight, 'Military Strategy Under Review', p.4.

[496] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, p.9.

Table 3-3. **1999 Military Spending (selected countries)**

Selected Countries	**Military Budget**
United States	$288.8 billion
Russia*	$55.0
Japan	$41.1
China*	$37.5
United Kingdom	$34.6
France	$29.5
Germany	$24.7
South Korea	$11.6
Israel	$6.7
Iran	$5.7
Iraq	$1.4
North Korea	$1.3

* 1998 Funding.

Source: Center for Defense Information (CDI), 'Last Big Time Spenders: U.S. Military Budget Still the World's Largest, and Growing', [online] available: http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersFY00b.html (14/12/99), pp.1-2.

In this context, critics considered it 'foolish to focus concern and resources on preparations to meet a peer military competitor unless or until some potential competitor [began] spending 50% as much on defence as the United States'.[497] It was suggested that a better alternative to protect against a future challenger was to maintain 'a capacity for force reconstitution based on a strong training base, a powerful reserve, and a solid research and development establishment'.[498] Third, an additional NDP criticism, a fundamental one, pointed out:

> …in the report there is insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other. This is important, since the QDR addresses an even greater array of challenges than we faced in the past with even fewer resources than were available four years ago.[499]

A report issued by the then-General Accounting Office (GAO) also noted that the QDR had basically failed to identify a proper post-Cold War military structure, either because force requirements were not linked to the threat assessment, or because the latter was wrong.[500] That

[497] C. Conetta and C. Knight, 'U.S. Defense Posture in a Global Context: A Framework for Evaluating the *Quadrennial Defense Review*', Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA., USA, May 1997, [online] available: http://www.comw.org/qdr/ccck.htm (13/03/00), p.8.
[498] Conetta and Knight, 'Military Strategy Under Review', p.4.
[499] NDP, *Assessment of the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review*, pp.1-2.
[500] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Quadrennial Defense Review: Opportunities to Improve the Next Review*, (Chapter Report, 06/25/98, GAO/NSIAD-98-155), [online] available: http://www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad-98-155.htm (4/01/00), p.6.

is, the QDR paid more attention to budget rather than to strategy matters.[501] In the opinion of James Blaker,

> the Pentagon has opted to keep a slightly thinned out version of today's force structure, replace the equipment that is now wearing out, add some big ticket new tactical aircraft buys -and hope that Congress will agree to cut reserve components and the support infrastructure enough to pay for it all.[502]

Basically, the QDR did not reflect in its proposed structure the emerging asymmetric threats it itself defined, and instead opted for protecting against an uncertain potential peer competitor. The 9/11 events would prove that the threat assessment -if not the force requirements- was at least right.

The review and analysis of the issues above was a necessary step to support the argument that in the 1990s the U.S. military strategy was focused on managing the military transition to a post-Cold War security environment without really paying much attention to Mexico as an actual or potential security concern. That is, Mexico played a negligible role regarding the main military issues under discussion (i.e. regional scenarios beyond the Western Hemisphere and military technology) in the United States in the 1990s. Furthermore, the three objectives described above defined the essence of the U.S. defence strategy. Since these elements derived from the broader national security strategy, they represented the link between the defence and the national security strategies.[503] That is, the defence strategy had to fulfil the military requirements established by the national security outlook. Analysis will, at a later point, turn to that broader national security strategy.

3.4.2. *Mexico as a Military Variable*

Shaping, responding and preparing were the three central missions established by the 1997 U.S. defence strategy, and this section will analyse Mexico's significance in relation to each one of them.

In terms of the three goals outlined by the QDR, Mexico was of no relevance within the 'responding' and 'preparing' missions. Mexico, therefore, was important only to the extent that

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[501] Shanahan, *Statement Before the National Defense Panel Public Hearing April 29, 1997*, pp.1-2.
[502] J. R. Blaker, 'The QDR: An Assessment', *Backgrounder*, May 20, 1997, Democratic Leadership Council/Progressive Policy Institute, [online] available: http://www.dlcppi.org/texts/foreign/assess.htm (13/03/00), p.1.
[503] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, p.3.

'shaping' the international environment required addressing the flow of drugs through the U.S. southern border, as mentioned above. Firstly, one of the stated purposes of shaping the international security environment was 'to promote regional stability' where the United States had important interests to protect. Regarding this aspect of the strategy, it must be noted that while Mexico's geographic location has been a key factor for U.S. national security planning, the country has not been a regional threat because it has not had any outstanding territorial claim, nor has it been engaged in any menacing border dispute or resource competition with either the United States or, for that matter, with its two neighbours to the south. As a matter of fact, the IBWC has proven to be so far a long-standing bi-national institution (it celebrated its 120th Anniversary in 2009) that has successfully dealt with demarcation and resource issues over the years. Yet, Mexico and the United States have shared a concern over access to un-contaminated water in several areas along their common border.[504]

Furthermore, because of its historical experience, Mexico's international posture has for long been essentially defensive, and it has been focused on protecting the nation's territorial integrity and sovereignty against foreign challenges.[505] Mexico has promoted its national interests by relying on International Law, and in fact its principles have been incorporated in its Constitution.[506] This posture has been the best defence for a weak country, and it has made Mexican foreign policy both respectable and predictable in the international arena. For these reasons, Mexican foreign policy has been marked by a high degree of continuity in what is best described as a 'state policy' in contrast to a 'government policy', this latter defined by the group in power rather than by long-term national objectives.[507]

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[504] See D. M. Liverman, 'Seguridad y Medio Ambiente', in Aguayo and Bagley (eds.), *En Busca de la Seguridad Perdida*, pp.238-239.

[505] Examples of such challenges have been U.S. expansionism (1848), the French Intervention (1861-1867), and in the 20th century a variety of U.S. actions in the context of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) such as the Invasion of Veracruz (1914), Pershing's Punitive Expedition (1916), as well as additional pressures after nationalisation of the oil industry (1938).

[506] Section X, Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution, establishes that the president has the power to conduct foreign policy and to celebrate international treaties that must be ratified by the Senate. In conducting such a policy, the head of the Executive Branch must observe the following principles: the peoples' right to self-determination; non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; the peaceful resolution of conflicts; the proscription of the threat or the actual use of force in international relations; respect for the equality of states before the law; the promotion of international co-operation for development; and to contribute to guarantee international peace and security. See México, Leyes y Códigos de México, *Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, Colección Porrúa, (México, D.F.: Editorial Porrúa, S.A., 1995), pp.69-70.

[507] González, 'Tradiciones y Premisas de la Política Exterior de México', p.36.

Mexico has not been party to any hostile alliance to the United States either. With exception of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (ITRA), Mexico has in fact avoided participation in military coalitions. Its involvement in the Rio Pact itself was more symbolic than real, and the country has consistently opposed participating in any kind of multilateral military force, even within the framework of 'a treaty that [lacked] substance' such as the Rio Pact.[508] The weakening of this pact became evident after the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War when the United States supported the United Kingdom, a NATO member, instead of Argentina in that conflict. The obsolescence of the treaty was actually one of the arguments advanced by Mexico to justify its withdrawal from ITRA on 6 September 2002.

Secondly, Mexico has not been a concern for the United States in terms of 'preventing or reducing military conflicts and threats'. The reason is that the country has not been engaged in any WMD and delivery systems development programme; its government has not been an active supporter of terrorism –it has not appeared on the DoS list of countries supporting terrorism or on that of countries characterised as 'safe havens'; nor has it possessed the technological platforms to conduct cyber warfare against the United States.[509] Mexico had a tangential military significance for the United States within the 1997 QDR only to the extent that the U.S. military was required to help '[reducing] the production and flow to the United States of illegal drugs by means of DoD support to the joint interagency task forces operating along [U.S.] coasts and southern border', even though Mexico was not directly addressed, as mentioned above.[510] Furthermore, it can be argued that drug trafficking emerged not as a military issue but as a law enforcement one from the U.S. point of view. Counter-narcotics operations may involve the military -under particular circumstances (such as when drug cartels challenge the authority of the state)-, but this is different.

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[508] M. J. Dziedzic, 'Mexico', in D. J. Murray and P. R. Viotti (eds.), *The Defense Policies of Nations. A Comparative Study*, Second Edition, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p.138. It is important to note that between July 1991 and August 1995 Mexico participated in the United Nations Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) through the deployment of 120 police officers as part of the 315-strong police force (which reached its peak on May 1992) that assisted in training activities. Mexico, however, did not send any military advisers as in the case of other countries that intervened in the peace process in Central America. See United Nations (UN), 'El Salvador-ONUSAL', *Facts and Figures*, [online] available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusalfacts.html (24/06/11).

[509] U.S. Department of State (DoS), *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism, August , 2010, [online] available: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf (26/06/11).

[510] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, p.4 of 14.

The last element of DoD's proposed contribution to a stable international context consisted in 'deterring aggression and coercion in key regions of the world'.[511] Mexico again has not been an issue for the United States in this respect basically because of the overwhelming U.S. military power relative to that of its neighbour to the south. Moreover, the United States has had a stake in Mexico's security given the country's proximity and the damage its instability could potentially inflict on U.S. interests. According to Dziedzic,

> Mexico automatically falls within the security umbrella of its northern neighbor since an assault on its territory would undoubtedly be treated as a precursor to attack on the United States itself. Mexico consequently enjoys the benefits of a de facto alliance without its attendant obligations. This, coupled with a dearth of serious external threats, has historically liberated Mexico's defense planners from preoccupation with its international environment.[512]

Although the statement above is essentially correct, it is important to note that Mexico's main 'external threat' has historically been the United States itself. However, Mexico's singular geopolitical situation does explain why its military budget has traditionally been one of the lowest in Latin America in terms of GDP, as shown in Table 3-4 for the 1990s.

[511] *Ibid.*, p.5 of 14.
[512] Dziedzic, 'Mexico', p.111.

Table 3-4. **Military Spending in Latin America shown as % of GDP (selected countries)**

The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (1989-1998)

Country	*1989*	*1990*	*1991*	*1992*	*1993*	*1994*	*1995*	*1996*	*1997*
Argentina	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.2
Bolivia	1.8	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9
Brazil	1.7	1.3	0.7	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.8
Chile	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8
Colombia	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.7	1.8	2.3	---
Costa Rica	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.6
El Salvador	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.0	1.5	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.9
Guatemala	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.0	0.9	0.8
Honduras	2.4	2.2	1.5	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9
Mexico	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.5**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.4**
Nicaragua	6.5	2.1	2.8	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.4
Paraguay	1.2	1.2	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	---
Peru	1.9	2.0	1.5	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3	---
Uruguay	2.4	2.4	1.8	2.3	1.8	2.5	1.6	1.5	1.4
Venezuela	2.2	2.0	1.5	1.3	1.7	1.3	1.4	0.8	1.1

Source: SIPRI, *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, [online] available: http://www.sipri.se:8020/IRSIS/owa/milex_retrieve (23/03/00), several pages. According to data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in 1998 and 1999 Mexico's defence expenditure in terms of its GDP was 0.9%, which was a figure that departed from the trend showed by SIPRI. In absence of a significant increase in the Mexican military budget in 1998, both estimates show a clear disparity between them. See International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.300. According to SIPRI data, in 2010 Mexico spent $4.86 billion dollars on its armed forces, equivalent to 0.4% of its GDP, basically the same proportion as 20 years before. See P. Garibian, 'Analysis: Mexico needs more defense spending to fight cartels', *Reuters*, May 26, 2011, [online] available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/us-mexico-defense-idUSTRE74P7R420110526 (22/06/11).

This low profile of the Mexican armed forces means the country has not considered military power a fundamental aspect of its external relations.[513] As a reflection of its foreign policy, Mexico's military policy has not been oriented towards deterring a specific foreign threat. Yet, its armed forces have always had well-defined duties and precepts.[514] On the one hand, their responsibility, established in the Constitution, has been to protect the sovereignty and the stability of the country.[515] On the other hand, their principles have defined three main undertakings both of an internal and an external nature, notwithstanding that the latter kind of

[513] *Ibid*., p.114.
[514] D. Ronfeldt, 'The Modern Mexican Military: An Overview', in D. Ronfeldt, *The Modern Mexican Military. A Reassessment*, Monograph Series 15, (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1984), p.18.
[515] According to Section VI, Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution, 'the President will be able to dispose of the totality of the permanent armed forces; that is the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, for internal security purposes and the defence of the Federation against foreign threats'. See Leyes y Códigos de México, *Constitución*, p.69.

missions has not been the norm.[516] Because Mexico has not faced challenges to its territorial integrity since the 19th century, the country has not been under pressure to develop a traditional defence policy; that is, one oriented towards deterring an external aggressor. In this sense, even in terms of the domestic context, Mexico's armed forces in the 1990s were small in relation to its territory, population, and economic output,[517] and they have remained the same.

Another U.S. defence objective to influence the international environment was the promotion of co-operative and stable military relations in order to advance U.S. interests.[518] Regarding this goal, two important points are in order. Firstly, if it is true that in principle NAFTA was only a trade pact, it is also true it has entailed political consequences such as the imperative of a closer security co-operation between the two countries. That is, to the extent that trade interests have brought the United States and Mexico closer together, to that extent it has become increasingly difficult for their political interests to differ. In the opinion of John Negroponte, for instance, 'from a foreign policy perspective, an FTA [free trade agreement] would institutionalize acceptance of a North American orientation to Mexico's foreign policy'.[519] According to a similar view, 'for a document that does not explicitly mention security matters, NAFTA is nevertheless replete with implications for regional security cooperation'.[520] These opinions are related to the idea that the higher the economic stakes in the bilateral relationship, the higher the pressure to maintain Mexico's stability, as noted above.[521] Integration within

[516] Plan DN-I is oriented toward an external aggressor, and includes the participation of regular and irregular forces to expel the enemy. Plan DN-II provides for the defence against internal subversion; that is, against any political or armed movement against the Constitution, laws and institutions of the state. Plan DN-III comprehends the variety of responses to natural and human catastrophes, and its main objective is 'to assist the civilian population in cases of disaster'. It also provides for actions to confront illicit activities or those intended to take advantage of situations of national emergency. See J. L. Piñeyro, 'La Política de Defensa de México frente al TLC: Algunas Reflexiones', *El Cotidiano*, No. 71, Septiembre 1995, p.7.

[517] According to a 2000-2001 report, the number of Mexico's total armed forces was 192,700 in active service and 300,000 in the reserve. In 1999 the country's population was 104,000.000, and it had a $484 billion (U.S. dollars) GDP. See IISS, *Military Balance 2000-2001*, p.243. The country's area is 1,972,550 sq. km. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 'Mexico', *The World Factbook 1999*, [online] available: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/mx/html (31/03/00), p.1. For instance, a country such as Indonesia with a territory comparable in size (1,910,931 sq. km.) to that of Mexico, in 2009 devoted 0.9% of GDP to military expenditures, in contrast to Mexico's 0.5% GDP that same year. See SIPRI, *The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, [online] available: http://www.sipri.se:8020/IRSIS/owa/milex_retrieve (23/06/11), several pages.

[518] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section III, p.4.

[519] Quoted by Pérez, 'Free Trade with Mexico and National Security', p.130.

[520] Dziedzic, 'NAFTA and North American Security', p.2.

[521] *Idem*.

NAFTA, thus, created the context for increasing security co-operation between the United States and Mexico from a regional perspective.[522]

Secondly, the specific expression of this new atmosphere of 'co-operation' has been Mexico's apparent willingness to increase its military collaboration with its neighbour to the north. Although military contacts between the United States and Mexico had not been extensive -due to a history of U.S. interventionism-, they have nonetheless gradually increased, and one of the prime areas for bilateral co-operation has been the so-called 'war on drugs'.[523]

Taking into account the political-military context described above, the significance of Mexico for the two additional elements of the U.S. defence strategy, responding and preparing, was imperceptible. Both aspects were oriented towards confronting threats such as the potential use of WMD and the emergence of a 'peer competitor'. From the range of responses the U.S. armed forces could be called in to perform, from 'deterring aggression and coercion in crises', to 'conducting SSCO (small-scale contingency operations)', and 'fighting and winning a major regional war', the second one could be the most likely form of involvement in relation to Mexico. This could happen in the context of a deep instability in the country, which could require the U.S. army to seal the U.S. Southwest border in order to stop a significant flow of immigrants. In reference to this serious prospect, Schulz noted:

> But as important as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela are to U.S. security interests, they pale beside Mexico. Few countries are more vital to the well-being of the United States than its neighbor to the south. Not only is Mexico our second largest trading partner, but the two countries share a 2,000-mile boundary. Any serious political and economic turmoil below the Rio Grande River [sic] is almost certain to spillover the border in the form of illegal immigrants, political refugees, narcotrafficking, violence and corruption.[524]

[522] Rochlin, *Redefining Mexican 'Security'*, pp.2-3.
[523] Because of history, the bilateral military relationship with the United States has been very limited. First, within the Inter-American Defense Board, Mexico has always maintained the status of observer instead of that of a full-member, and it has constantly rejected multilateral military actions under the ITRA framework. See Piñeyro, 'Política de Defensa de México', p.11. Second, if it is true that México has participated in the Joint Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission (JMUSDC) created in 1942 in the context of WWII, this organisation has lost relevance ever since the end of that conflict. See Dziedzic, 'Mexico', p.138.
[524] D. E. Schulz, 'The United States and Latin America: A Strategic Perspective', in M. G. Manwaring (ed.), *Security and Civil-Military Relations in the New World Disorder: The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas*, An Anthology from a Symposium Cosponsored by the Chief of Staff, United States Army, The George Bush School of Government and Public Service, and the U.S. Army War College, September 1999, p.10.

Another potential scenario could be the need to secure access to Mexican oil by force, in the context of a simultaneous international oil crisis and deep instability in Mexico. A scenario such as this shows why Mexican stability is a high priority for U.S. national security.

It is interesting to note that in the QDR threat assessment the 'uncontrolled flows of migrants', with the potential to destabilise regions of the world, was considered to put at risk U.S. interests and citizens.[525] Nevertheless, nowhere in the entire document was there any reference to undocumented immigration from Mexico as a specific trans-border concern to the United States, notwithstanding DoD's indirect participation in immigration matters in support of LEAs assigned to securing U.S. borders and ports of entry (POEs).

In the whole QDR there was not a single direct reference to Mexico, and there was only one to the 'southern border' in allusion to drug trafficking, as mentioned above. Although Mexico's military importance for the United States has been limited, trans-border security concerns emanating from that country have had the potential to affect the well-being of the U.S. society. Mexico's military significance was, therefore, only tangential for the United States, and related to the support the U.S. military must provide to civilian agencies confronting trans-border security concerns.

3.5. U.S. National Security Strategy

The objective of this section is to analyse the 1997 *A National Security Strategy for A New Century* that is the basis for this thesis, in order to identify the issues Mexico is of relevance for the United States in the context of this more comprehensive strategy, on which the 1997 QDR was based on.

3.5.1. *'Selective Engagement'*

The 1997 U.S. national security strategy identified a variety of threats to the United States as a global power. They were classified into three categories as 'regional or state-centred'; 'transnational'; and those related to 'weapons of mass destruction'.[526]

In order to protect U.S. interests from these threats, the strategy emphasised an outward-looking orientation recognising the need for the United States to remain engaged abroad:

[525] Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Section II, p.2.
[526] White House, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, p.8.

> By exerting leadership abroad we can make America safer and more prosperous –by deterring aggression, fostering the resolution of conflicts, opening foreign markets, strengthening democracies, and tackling global problems. Without our leadership and *engagement*, threats would multiply and our opportunities will narrow. Our strategy recognises a simple truth: we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home.[527]

According to this view, the process of globalisation had blurred the line between foreign and domestic politics, and in this context the strategy of engagement was designed to mitigate the negative effects of globalisation.[528] The 1997 document explained, however, not only why engagement was important, but also justified the promotion of both international co-operation and a more efficient government response to the prospective challenges.[529]

A crucial point of the U.S. national security strategy, nevertheless, was its recognition that U.S. resources were limited, which therefore required a 'selective' response to the challenges by focusing on those most threatening to U.S. interests,

> Our resources are finite, however, so we must be selective in our responses, focusing on challenges that most directly affect our interests and engaging where we can make the most difference.[530]

In this context, it has been argued that 'selective engagement' was a 'realist' strategic outlook basically concerned with preventing war among the 'great powers'.[531] Within this framework, for instance, one of the most important U.S. objectives was preventing nuclear proliferation in 'rogue' states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea.[532] In fact, the need to maintain stability in key regions of the world was the justification for retaining the two-war military capability proposed in the QDR report discussed above.[533]

Selective engagement was therefore a deterrent strategy whose expression in the QDR was the need to maintain a forward presence in order to shape the international environment.[534] Nevertheless, the strategy also presented several problems, and the most significant was its focus

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[527] *Ibid*., p.6. (Emphasis by this author).
[528] *Ibid*., p.9.
[529] White House, *National Security Strategy* (1997), p.9.
[530] *Ibid*., p.13.
[531] B. R. Posen and A. L. Ross, 'Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy', in M. E. Brown, O. R. Coté, Jr., S. M. Lynn-Jones and S. E. Miller (eds.), *America's Strategic Choices*, An *International Security* Reader, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Second Printing 1998), p.13.
[532] *Ibid*., p.15.
[533] *Ibid*., p.17.
[534] R. J. Art, 'Geopolitics Updated', *International Security*, Vol.23, No.3, Winter 1998/99, pp.80-81.

on the 'great powers', rather than on the source of various trans-national threats defined by the strategy itself: weak/failed states.[535]

3.5.2. *Objectives*

The 1997 *A National Security Strategy for A New Century* defined three main lines of action to promote and defend U.S. interests in the new era: 'to enhance [U.S.] security; 'to bolster America's economic prosperity'; and 'to promote democracy abroad'.[536] From the U.S. perspective, these goals were closely interrelated to the extent that none of them could be achieved in isolation from the others.[537]

The first core objective, increasing security, required an efficient combination of the U.S. instruments of power in order to advance national security and international stability through diplomacy, among other means, as the 'first line of defense against threats to national and international security'.[538] The document noted:

> Our response might be diplomatic, economic, law enforcement or military in nature –or, more likely, some combination of the above. We must use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools –acting in alliance or partnership when our interests are shared by others, but unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand.[539]

From the U.S. point of view, this combination of instruments would facilitate the response to threats, as long as U.S. organisations and policies were also reformed to confront the 21st century challenges.[540] In 1998, for instance, DoS reorganised its structures and methods to address the new requirements through better interagency co-ordination, budget reforms, enhancing technology and by working closely with the private sector, among other measures.[541]

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[535] Posen and Ross, 'Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy', pp.18-19.
[536] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.2 of 39. These were basically the same core objectives defined in the 1999 document. See White House, *A National Security Strategy* (1999), p.iii.
[537] The background to this strategic perspective is found in the ideas advanced by former President Clinton's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake. In his view, *'the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement –enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies'*. See A. Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), 'From Containment to Enlargement', Remarks at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, DC, September 21, 1993, pp.4-5. (Emphasis original).
[538] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.9 of 39.
[539] *Ibid*., p.13.
[540] *Ibid*., p.18.
[541] *Idem*. For an interesting study in this regard see The Henry L. Stimson Center, *Equipped for the Future. Managing U.S. Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century*, The Project on the Advocacy of U.S. Interests Abroad, October 1998.

The second core objective, strengthening the economy, acknowledged the link between U.S. economic and security interests, and also the fact that a healthy economy was a precondition for gaining leverage abroad.[542] In this context, some of the most important steps to promote prosperity consisted of increasing access to foreign markets and promoting energy security.[543]

The strategy, however, did not explain how the only superpower could be expected to devote substantial resources to economic development abroad, especially in the absence of the competition-oriented motivation provided by the Cold War. An interesting argument pointed out, for instance, that 'as U.S. and former Soviet interest in stabilising political elites in the periphery faded [after the Cold War], economic assistance was expected to decline', mainly because of Russia's economic problems.[544]

The third core objective was to advance political freedom and human rights abroad, taking into consideration that democratic transitions in the world were seen as positive developments for the United States.[545] The document failed to specify, however, how this goal was supposed to be accomplished without the instability democratic transitions usually bring about. It thus ignored the view that countries on the path to democracy 'usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way'.[546] What the United States proposed in this section of the strategy was an integrated approach to the problems affecting developing countries, including promotion of free markets and support for judicial reform.[547]

The document also established the importance of human rights and of sanctions against those who did not adopt this international standard.[548] Finally, this objective also included to promote co-operation with other states to 'curb illegal immigration into the United States'.[549]

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[542] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.8.
[543] *Ibid*., pp.20-23.
[544] K. A. Oye, 'Beyond Postwar Order and New World Order: American Foreign Policy in Transition', in K. A. Oye, R. J. Lieber and D. Rothchild (eds.), *Eagle in a New World. American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era*, (New York, NY: *HarperCollins* Publishers, 1992), p.25.
[545] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.26.
[546] E. D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, 'Democratization and War', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, May/June 1995, p.79.
[547] White House, *National Security Strategy*, pp.26-27.
[548] *Ibid*., p.27.
[549] *Ibid*., p.28.

3.5.3. *Mexico as a Security Variable*

In contrast to the U.S. defence strategy that focused on the military dimension of security, in the broader context of the U.S. national security strategy Mexico was directly addressed in several occasions. Its relevance derived not only from the impact of trans-border threats emerging from its territory, but also from the value of its stability, long-term economic potential and significance as a reliable source of energy. Within this broader framework, Mexico's importance for the United States was determined thus not only by challenges but also by opportunities. Analysing the U.S. national security strategy was useful in explaining why Mexico, a medium range power, was important for the United States in the 1990s. Mexico's relevance for the United States, therefore, will be examined in terms of the three core objectives established by the U.S. national security strategy, as mentioned above.

a) Enhancing Security

According to the 1997 U.S. national security strategy, in the new international environment the United States was exposed to three different categories of threats. The one in which Mexico was significant was that of 'transnational' issues, in particular in reference to drug trafficking. Besides this latter issue, this category included terrorism, arms smuggling, international organised crime, refugee flows, and environmental damage (at no point was undocumented immigration mentioned here).[550]

In this context, Mexico was directly addressed in the document in relation to drugs, in reference to the *U.S. National Drug Control Strategy* and its objective of reducing the flow of drugs through the 'transit zone' that included Mexico.[551] It is important to point out that this reference is thus about Mexico as a 'transit' point, not as a producer country. An additional reference to Mexico in this regard was found in 'The Western Hemisphere' section within Chapter III 'Integrated Regional Approaches' which established that,

> as part of our comprehensive partnership with *Mexico*, we continue to increase counterdrug and law enforcement cooperation, while in the Caribbean we are intensifying a coordinated effort on counternarcotics, law enforcement and gun smuggling.[552]

[550] *Ibid.*, p.8.
[551] *Ibid.*, p.15.
[552] *Ibid.*, p.34 (emphasis by the author).

The document established that, in order to confront these non-state challenges, international co-operation '[would] be vital for building security in the next century'; the document, however, did not rule out the possibility of acting unilaterally, if necessary.[553] Despite the evident asymmetry of power between the two countries, and the higher margin of manoeuvre for the United States, it is important to recognise that the promotion of bilateral co-operation with Mexico has been essential for the United States, and this points to the relevance of efforts to strengthening its domestic institutions and to dealing with corruption and money laundering.[554]

From the variety of threats listed above, the most relevant to the U.S.-Mexico security relationship was drug trafficking where Mexico was explicitly addressed as a 'transit' point. Even though the document addressed within this section environmental issues from a global rather than from a bilateral perspective, this thesis analyses water pollution below as a significant potential security challenge on the U.S.-Mexico border in order to explain, from the Buzan et.al and Risk Society perspectives, why this item has remained a potential rather than an actual security concern within de bilateral agenda, in contrast to the more explicit concern about drugs and the implicit concern about undocumented immigration from the U.S. point of view. The justification for including border environmental issues in this study, therefore, does not reside in the 1997 U.S. national security strategy as in the case of drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, but in the importance of explaining why a potential security concern on the common border has been kept from becoming an actual security issue, in order to assess the contribution of the two complementary non-traditional security perspectives adopted in this thesis to understand the U.S.-Mexico security relationship.

Drug Trafficking

As will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent chapter, according to 2001 data (the closest available for the second half of the 1990s), the number of people age 12 years and older in the United States who had used an illicit drug during the month immediately prior to an official survey interview was 15.9 million, which provided an idea of the magnitude of drug demand in

[553] *Ibid*., p.13.
[554] *Ibid*., p.15.

the United States.[555] On the supply side of the problem, and also in reference to U.S. official figures, Mexico was the origin of 50-70% of cocaine, 80% of marijuana, 20-30% of heroin and the source of methamphetamine entering the U.S. territory, besides being an important money laundering centre.[556]

According to DEA's reports, the U.S. Southwest border was the major gateway for approximately 70% of all illicit drugs entering the United States.[557] Mexican DTOs, in particular, were deemed to pose 'the greatest challenge to U.S. law enforcement agencies charged with enforcing narcotics laws'.[558] These organisations have not only undermined the well-being of U.S. society by supplying drugs; they have also weakened Mexico's political stability because of their access to financial resources and arms -both of which originate within the United States-, and their ability to subvert the authority of the state. Viewing the problem in light of the supply-demand dynamic, in his May 1997 visit to Mexico President Clinton stated:

> Drugs are not simply a Mexican problem or an American problem –they are our common problem. The enormous demand for drugs in America must be stemmed. We have just a little less than five percent of the world's population –yet, we consume one third of the world's cocaine, most of which comes from Mexico. The money we spend on illegal drugs fuels narco-traffickers who, in turn, attack your police and prosecutors and prey on your institutions. We must face this curse together, because we cannot defeat it alone. My friends, the battle against drugs must unite our people, not divide them.[559]

From the U.S. perspective, therefore, both countries played a part in addressing this challenge, especially because of the potential for organised crime to exploit increased exchanges between the two countries in the context of NAFTA.[560] This is why the U.S. *National Drug Control*

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[555] Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), 'Highlights', *2001 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse*, [online] available: http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/nhsda/2K1nhsda/vol1/highlights.htm (22/11/02), pp.1-2.

[556] See D. E. Schulz, *Between Rock and a Hard Place: The United States, Mexico, and the Agony of National Security*, U.S. Army War College, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 1997), Part I, [online] available: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs97/ (17/12/98), p.3, Part I.

[557] W. E. Ledwith, Chief of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), *DEA Congressional Testimony*, Statement before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, U.S. House of Representatives, February 29, 2000 [online] available: http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct022900.htm (06/12/00), p.5.

[558] *Ibid*., p.1.

[559] The White House, *Remarks by the President in Address to the People of Mexico, Mexico City May 7, 1997*, Office of the Press Secretary, [online] available: http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/5/75.text.1 (17/11/00), p.5.

[560] Ledwith, *DEA Congressional Testimony*, p.1.

Strategy also deemed co-operation with Mexico as essential to deal with this country's drug DTOs.[561]

One of the problems of the U.S. 'comprehensive' response to drug trafficking, nevertheless, has been that it has emphasised coercive measures in detriment of addiction treatment.[562] In 1999, for instance, the U.S. anti-drug policy was supported by a $17.9 billion budget proposal that tilted the scale in favour of supply- over demand-reduction measures, as shown in Table 3-5.

Table 3-5. **U.S. Anti-Drug Budget (1999)**

Spending by Strategy Goal, FY1999 (millions of dollars)

	Enacted	**Supp***	**Total**
1. Reduce youth drug use	2,080.6	1.7	2,082.3
2. Reduce drug related crime	7,441.0	12.0	7,453.0
3. Reduce consequences	3,383.7	0.0	3,383.7
4. Shield air, land, and sea frontiers	2,159.3	525.9	2,685.2
5. Reduce sources of supply	1,977.7	304.3	2,282.0
Total	**17,042.3**	**843.9**	**17,886.2**

* Emergency Supplemental funding provided by P. L. 105-277. These funds were in addition to each department's annual appropriation. Source: The White House, *The National Drug Control Strategy: 1999*, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Washington, DC, p.91. According to the figures above, 69.4% of the budget ($12,420.2) was assigned to supply-reduction activities, while 30.6% ($5,446.0) was devoted to prevention and treatment.

This strategy was complemented by an *International Crime Strategy* that also underlined the supply part of the problem by proposing actions that included border security initiatives; the extraterritorial application of U.S. law enforcement; increasing international co-operation on

[561] The White House, *The National Drug Control Strategy: 1999*, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Washington, DC, p.83. Examples of Mexico's anti-drug commitment in the second half of the 1990s, besides the increasing military co-operation between the two countries already referred to, were its 1999 decision to earmark an additional $400-$500 million to purchase planes, ships, radar and other law enforcement equipment, including high-tech X rays for use on both of its borders; Mexico had the highest combined total opium and marihuana eradication in the world; it had criminalised money laundering; it had approved the 85% of U.S. detection and monitoring over-flights that supported law enforcement agencies of both nations; in 1998 it was the third country in extraditions to the United States, only behind Canada and Thailand; it had instituted a screening process for new hires in its counter-narcotics institutions and established a national police; and had arrested international methamphetamine kingpins. See The White House, 'Drug Enforcement Efforts', *The Trip of the President to Mexico*, [online] available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Mexico/fact2.html (17/11/00), pp.1-2.

[562] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.15.

intelligence; and protecting international trade from criminal organisations, among other measures.[563]

Even though the U.S. response to drug trafficking emphasised the application of coercive measures abroad, it can be argued that in the case of Mexico it included an additional interest in the country's fight against pervasive corruption which, in general, has been considered 'an extreme example of the weakness of the state in many developing countries'.[564] From this perspective, combating drug trafficking in Mexico represented more than just stopping the flow of drugs into the United States; it was also about avoiding a vacuum of power in Mexico to be filled by organised crime, a development that could potentially represent a more serious threat to U.S. security.[565]

The relevance of drug trafficking for the United States was also assessed in terms of opinion polls conducted in the 1990s. For instance, the closest available poll to the 1990s conducted between August-September 2000, established that 43% of people in the United States considered drugs an 'extremely serious' problem and 40% a 'very serious' problem; a poll carried out in 1997 established that 46% of the population considered the nation had lost much ground in coping with illegal drugs, in contrast to 31% who considered the opposite, while in August 1995 only 25% of the population supported the legalisation of marijuana against 73% who opposed it. [566]

Environmental Degradation

The U.S. national security strategy recognised that environmental threats did not respect national borders. While conflict was identified as the major threat caused by natural resource scarcities, danger to human health was a greater concern when it came to climate change, ozone depletion

[563] The White House, *International Crime Control Strategy*, Executive Office of the President (EOP), [online] available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/iccsi.html, (03/10/98), Chapter 1, pp.5-7.
[564] P. Andreas, 'The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico', *Current History*, April 1998, p.160.
[565] For instance, for FY 2000 DoS requested $10 million to support Mexico's anti-narcotics programmes. The budget's objectives were: to prevent use of Mexican territory as transhipment point for the movement of cocaine into the United States; to dismantle drug organisations; to promote legal reform; to reduce/eliminate illicit drug crop production and methamphetamine trafficking; to control money laundering; and to reduce demand and abuse of drugs in Mexico. See U.S. Department of State (DoS), *Fiscal Year 2000 International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Budget. Congressional Presentation*, Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, April 1999, [online] available: http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/fy2000_budget/latin_america.html (04/04/00), p.19.
[566] Gallup, *Illegal Drugs*, [online] available: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1657/illegal-drugs.aspx (25/08/12), pp.1-5.

and the trans-national movement of dangerous chemicals.[567] In response to these multidimensional threats, the document proposed adopting an appropriate variety of initiatives to protect the environment.[568]

Even though Mexico was not addressed at all in this section of the 1997 document, there has been in fact an environmental agenda in U.S.-Mexican relations focusing primarily on the effects of increasing economic activity along the common border. Industrial expansion has affected air quality and water resources, as well as health conditions and the ecology on both sides of the border. It has been common for hazardous waste to be stored in U.S. border cities -with the potential to affect communities on the other side of the boundary-, and water pollution problems have intensified as the demand for infrastructure has exceeded its availability.[569] This happened as border population has constantly grown. As will be discussed below, this thesis will focus on water pollution as a potential security concern on the U.S. border with Mexico, which on the other hand represents an issue that has remained as a potential rather than an actual security concern, as mentioned above. This issue, therefore, is an example of how the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory contribute to explain not only issues that are security concerns but also those that are dealt with through non-security measures. This is the justification for including the environment in the analysis of security issues in U.S.-Mexican relations in the 1990s.

b) Bolstering Prosperity

The second core objective of the U.S. national security strategy was to strengthening the U.S. economy. According to the document, exports were important to sustain U.S. economic growth.[570] Moreover, the strategy established that because of the high level of integration of the world's economy, the United States could not detach itself from the external environment and, therefore, that co-operation was crucial to sustain the international economic system.[571]

NAFTA

[567] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.16.
[568] *Idem*.
[569] *Bridging into the 21st Century. NAFTA Works for America*, Administration Update on the North American Free Trade Agreement (1993-1998), (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1999), p.15.
[570] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.20.
[571] *Ibid*., p.24.

In 1999, five years after NAFTA entered into force, the agreement had already created a market of 400 million consumers, with a combined GDP of $9.5 trillion.[572] As mentioned above, for the United States NAFTA was a response to the creation of economic blocs in other parts of the world; in the particular case of Mexico, the agreement represented the opportunity to secure its continued access to the U.S. market. According to the U.S. national security strategy, NAFTA not only increased U.S. exports to Mexico, but also, and more importantly, 'it helped stabilise Mexico through its worst [1995] financial crisis in modern history'.[573] This was the second time Mexico was directly addressed in the U.S. national security strategy document, this time not necessarily as challenge but as an opportunity. In this sense, the Clinton administration noted:

> NAFTA [would] continue to fulfill the best interests of the U.S. economy and American workers. It has kept Mexico on track toward more open markets for U.S. exports, and supported Mexican efforts to sustain internal economic reform.[574]

Similarly, according to its advocates, NAFTA not only had the potential to support U.S. job growth by helping to strengthen the U.S. export sector, but also provided the potential for Mexico to become more prosperous, thus reducing the need for people there to illegally migrate to the United States.[575] According to President Clinton,

> As the benefits of economic growth are spread in Mexico to working people what will happen? They'll have more disposable income to buy more American products and there will be less illegal immigration because more Mexicans will be able to support their children by staying home. This is a very important thing.[576]

It is worth mentioning that NAFTA's main objective was never to reduce undocumented immigration from Mexico *per se*. However, to the extent that in the long-term the accord was seen as having the potential to strengthen the Mexican economy, to that extent it was considered it would address this issue. NAFTA was also seen as essential to U.S. leadership in the hemisphere after the Cold War, especially because the United States had basically no other

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[572] *Bridging into the 21st Century*, p.3.
[573] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.22.
[574] *Bridging into the 21st Century*, p.7.
[575] U.S. exports to Mexico in 1998 supported almost a million jobs, up over 350,000 jobs from 1993. See *Ibid*., p.8.
[576] The White House, *Remarks by President Clinton, President Bush, President Carter, President Ford and Vice President Al Gore in Signing of NAFTA Side Agreements*, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, September 14, 1993, [online] available: http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1993/9/15/9.text.1 (17/11/00), p.6.

coherent policy towards Latin America at that time. Overall, the free trade agreement with Mexico was a benefit to U.S. national security rather than a risk.

Energy Security

According to the 1997 U.S. national security strategy, 40% of U.S. energy demand depended on oil; in turn, approximately half of U.S. oil requirements were satisfied with imports from the Persian Gulf area.[577] Nevertheless, the document noted:

> However, we are also undergoing a fundamental shift in our reliance on imported oil away from the Middle East. Venezuela is now the number one foreign supplier to the United States; Canada, Mexico and Venezuela combined supply more than twice as much oil to the United States as the Arab OPEC [Organisation of Petroleum Exporter Countries] countries; and Venezuela and Canada are each undertaking new oil production ventures.[578]

This was the third time the U.S. national security strategy made a direct reference to Mexico, this time again in terms of opportunity. The document recognised the increasing importance of future access to foreign oil because of a potential decline in domestic production. The United States, therefore, would continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to external sources of petroleum, notwithstanding parallel efforts to develop alternative energy projects.[579]

In these circumstances, promoting stability in oil-producing areas remained an important objective, and therefore the significance of Mexico for the United States resided in its potential role as a secure source of oil just across the border, especially in the context of a potential crisis in the Middle East. According to 1998 DoE statistics, for instance, differences among Canada, Mexico and Venezuela in terms of the value of crude oil imports were not substantial; as a matter of fact, as a supplier Mexico was second only to Canada.[580] That year, in Latin America, Mexico was the main non-OPEC oil exporter to the United States with 15.16% (482,252,000 barrels) of

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[577] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.24. According to data provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), the United States was the top petroleum net importer in 1999. From a consumption of 19.5 million barrels per day, 9.0 came from production while 9.8 from net imports. See U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), 'Top Petroleum Net Importers', Energy Information Administration (EIA), [online] available: http://gils.doe.gov:1782/cgi-bin/w3vdkhgw?qryADB6CzRN_;doecrawl-006617 (24/03/00), p.1.

[578] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.24.

[579] *Idem*.

[580] In 1998 the value of U.S. crude oil imports was $5.4 billion for Canada, $5.3 billion for Mexico and $5.0 billion for Venezuela. See U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), Figure 5.18 Value of Crude Oil Imports, [online] available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/energy.overview/aer98/graph/0518c.pdf (24/03/00), p.1.

total U.S. imports (3,177,584,000 barrels), while Venezuela supplied 15.81% (502,552,000 barrels) of that total.[581] That is, the difference between Mexico's share of U.S. oil imports and that of the only Latin American OPEC-member was not a substantial one. In this case, Mexico was also an asset for the United States in terms of its national security strategy.

c) Promoting Democracy

Emerging Democracies

The document established that promoting democracy, human rights and free markets abroad was a priority for the United States. In the Western Hemisphere, in particular, it was important to deal with corruption and political discontent through 'good governance practices'.[582]

Even though in this entire section the document did not mention Mexico at all, it is important to underline a couple of points in this regard. First, during the signing ceremony of NAFTA's side agreements, for instance, former President Jimmy Carter stated:

> And Mexico has a long way to go to have a truly honest democratic election. But I think the single most important factor that will (bring) [sic] democracy and honest elections to our next-door neighbor is to have NAFTA approved and implemented. If this is done, then I believe that we will have rich dividends for our own country.[583]

Notwithstanding President Carter's statement, it is important to note that democracy in Mexico had not been a priority for the United States -especially during the Cold War-, because of the more pre-eminent U.S. objective of supporting the Mexican authoritarian regime in order to maintain the stability of the country.[584] The end of the bipolar confrontation, nevertheless, had the effect of increasing U.S. pronouncements in favour of democracy in Mexico. However, the U.S. rhetoric was not echoed by concrete policies because the Mexican stability factor was still important within the new international context. Even though it is possible to argue that

[581] U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), *Petroleum Supply Annual 1998*, Vol. 1, Energy Information Administration (EIA), p.56.
[582] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.27.
[583] White House, *Remarks by Clinton, Bush, Carter, Ford and Gore*, p.10.
[584] In the case of Mexico, democracy was not pursued by the United States with determination during the Cold War. There are several reasons to explain this: 1) in the context of the U.S. containment strategy, by remaining non-communist Mexico satisfied the overall U.S. strategic interest; 2) Mexico's authoritarian regime managed to maintain stability on the U.S. southern flank, by assuring social order and providing a buffer from Central America's turmoil; and 3) since Mexico has been an important player in Latin America, the United States has had to moderate its criticism toward its neighbour to the south in order to secure its co-operation for key U.S. foreign and security policies in the region. See Pérez, 'Free Trade with Mexico and National Security', p.127.

democracy contributes to stability in the long-term, a more important U.S. objective in Mexico was of an economic nature.[585]

That is, aside from the crucial stability factor during the post-war period, U.S. policy towards Mexico was in fact dominated by economic considerations, before the 9/11 events brought security at the top of the bilateral agenda. The U.S. attitude towards Mexico's commitment to democracy and human rights, in general, was conditioned by the more preeminent objective of fostering a liberal economic system and stemming its social impact.[586] Furthermore, the 2 July 2000 election in Mexico assuaged any concern the United States might have had regarding Mexico's transition to democracy, even though this subject was not central in the context of bilateral dialogue.

The promotion of sound civil-military relations was an additional U.S. objective in order to promote democracy around the world.[587] Regarding this issue, it is important to mention that Mexico has had a long-standing tradition of civilian control over the military, which was confirmed precisely by the Mexican armed forces' submission to the opposition party that won the presidency for the first time in 71 years in July of 2000.[588] In this context, U.S. efforts to present U.S. civil-military relations as a role model for militaries in emerging democracies has not had a significant impact on Mexico.

Undocumented Immigration

It is remarkable that this issue was not included by the 1997 U.S. national security strategy within its list of 'transnational' threats. It was addressed, instead, under the 'Humanitarian Assistance' section of the document, which is part of chapter II 'Advancing U.S. Interests'.

Within the section of reference, the document noted that efforts needed to be directed at dealing with refugees and displaced people. The section also affirmed the importance of co-operating with other states to 'curb illegal immigration' into the United States.[589] This reference

[585] R. Grinspon and R. Kreklewich, *Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: 'Free Trade' as a Conditioning Framework*, Forthcoming, Studies in Political Economy, Department of Economics, York University, North York, Ontario, March 1993, revised December 1993, p.1.
[586] D. Brooks, 'In Focus: Mexico', Mexico-U.S. Dialogos in *Foreign Policy In Focus*, Vol. 2, No. 21, January 1997, [online] available: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol2/v2n21mex.html (14/12/99), p.1.
[587] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.27.
[588] See Cornelius, *Mexican Politics in Transition*, 85, and G. W. Grayson, *Mexico's Armed Forces. A Factbook*, A Military Studies Report of the CSIS Americas Program, Mexico Project, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p.6.
[589] White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.28.

to undocumented immigration is one of only two to be found in the entire document; one additional reference was found in the section titled 'The Western Hemisphere' within chapter III 'Integrated Regional Approaches'. In this latter section, the document established that,

> the principal security concerns in the hemisphere are transnational in nature, such as drug trafficking, organised crime, and money laundering, illegal immigration and instability generated from corruption and political and social conflict.[590]

Nowhere in the rest of the entire document, however, was there another allusion to this issue, nor did it make any explicit reference to Mexico at all.

It is important to note, however, that Mexico has not only been at the centre of the undocumented immigration concern, but also that the issue has been one of the most sensitive and outstanding in the context of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral agenda.

According to 1996 estimates provided by the then-INS, for instance, there were about 5 million undocumented immigrants in the United States.[591] Mexico was the leading country of origin of undocumented immigrants with 2.7 million or 54% of the total.[592] Mexico was also identified as a transit point for third-country nationals attempting to enter the United States, as well as the destination country for other migrants.[593]

Undocumented immigration from Mexico has been a complex issue that has not lent itself to easy solutions. One important explanation, as will be discussed below, has been the operation of push and pull factors, as well as the existence of an income gap that NAFTA has not addressed so far. In the short- and long-term, therefore, push and pull factors between the two countries are likely to continue, and cross-border social networks are also likely to perpetuate immigration even if the income gap narrows in the future.

Because of its dimension and its emotional nature, undocumented immigration from Mexico has been both a tacit and an explicit security issue for the United States (especially after the 9/11 events), even though its 1997 U.S. national security strategy did not explicitly link Mexico to this issue. Immigration in general, nevertheless, was a relevant issue for U.S. public opinion in the 1990s as shown in Table 3-6.

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[590] *Ibid*., p.34.
[591] U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), 'Illegal Alien Resident Population', Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), [online] available: http://ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/illegalalien/index.htm (23/03/00), p.1.
[592] *Idem*.
[593] S. Martin, 'Mexico-U.S. Migration', in The U.S.-Mexican Relations Forum, *Immigration in U.S.-Mexican Relations*, Brookings Institution/Inter-American Dialogue, January 1998, Washington, DC, [online] available: http://www.iadialog.org/immigrat.html (11/01/01), p.4.

Table 3-6. Sample of U.S. Opinion Polls on Immigration in the 1990s.

Poll	Opinion on Immigration
Wall Street Journal/NBC News, December 1998	72% feel 'immigration should not increase because it will cost U.S. jobs and increase unemployment'
Horatio Alger Association, August 1996	67% of teens feel illegal immigration to the U.S. should be reduced
NPG/Roper Poll, February 1996	83% of Americans favour a lower level of immigration
CBS News/NYT, September 1995	63% of Americans think immigration levels were too high
Time/CNN, September 1993	80% consider it important for the federal government to track down illegal aliens living in the United States
Newsweek, July 1993	60% feel that immigration is a bad thing for this country [United States] now
CNN/USA Today/Gallup, July 1993	89% of Hispanic Americans strongly support an immediate moratorium on immigration

Source: Negative Population Growth (NPG), *Immigration Polls: Why doesn't Congress Listen to the American People*, [online] available: http://www.npg.org/facts/immpolls.htm (25/08/12).

3.6. Conclusions

After reviewing the U.S. defence strategy, based on the guidelines provided by the 1997 QDR report, Mexico did not appear to be a priority for the United States in strict military terms.

In the military strategy document, the closest indirect reference to Mexico was the directive for U.S. armed forces to support LEAs operating along the U.S. Southwest border through the provision of intelligence and infrastructure assets to forestall trans-national threats, specifically drug trafficking. In this context, even though Mexico was nowhere addressed in a direct way in the whole QDR, its relevance in terms of the U.S. defence strategy was only tangential and related to the support the U.S. military must provide to civilian agencies dealing with security issues at the common border. The United States, nevertheless, has emphasised military-type of responses to drug trafficking abroad, even though the U.S. military's role itself in confronting this challenge has been rather circumscribed.

When examination turned to the broader 1997 *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, in particular to the analysis of its strategic objectives, it was then possible to appreciate the full extent of Mexico's relevance for U.S. national security. First, in terms of 'enhancing security', Mexico represented a concern regarding trans-national threats, especially drug trafficking, and the country was even explicitly mentioned twice in this regard. Even though Mexico has also been central in terms of undocumented immigration, it is important to note that the country was not addressed at all in relation to this concern. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, this study analyses this issue because of Mexico, by default, has been at the centre of the

U.S. security concern, even though it was not openly recognised by the 1997 U.S. national security strategy.

Among other issues of a trans-national nature identified by the U.S. national security strategy, this study also addressed the environment as one of the issues with potential security ramifications on the U.S.-Mexico border, even though this region was neither mentioned in this regard nor Mexico for that matter. The justification for addressing this issue in this analysis, nevertheless, was to explain that not all challenges on the U.S.-Mexico border are necessarily actual security concerns because some of them, such as the environment, have been dealt with by the two countries through co-operation. The Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk society Theory make a relevant contribution to the explanation of this fact.

On the subject of 'bolstering prosperity', Mexico stood out as an important partner to promote free trade in the rest of the hemisphere through NAFTA's demonstration effect; it was also significant as a reliable source of oil just across the border.

In terms of 'promoting democracy', undocumented immigration was addressed within the 'Humanitarian Assistance' section and, later on in the document, within 'The Western Hemisphere' section that was part of chapter III 'Integrated Regional Approaches'. There, the issue was defined as one of the main security concerns of a trans-national nature, but no details were given as to why this is so. Mexico, however, was directly addressed at no point within either section as discussed above. This study, nevertheless, included the analysis of undocumented immigration to the United States because of Mexico's evident impact on this subject.

Taking into account the three strategic objectives, in sum, while Mexico represented opportunities for the United States in terms of trade, energy, and support for democracy in the rest of the hemisphere because of its membership in NAFTA, it represented an explicit concern in terms of drug trafficking, and implicitly in terms of undocumented immigration. Within the document, Mexico was explicitly mentioned only in relation to drug trafficking: it was neither addressed in terms of undocumented immigration, nor in terms of the environment, notwithstanding that the latter issue has had potential border security ramifications. Therefore, even though references to Mexico were absent from the discussion of relevant items such as undocumented immigration and the environment within the 1997 U.S. national security strategy, it is important to mention that this country has influenced in a significant way both issues

because of its geographical proximity. Nevertheless, the risks the United States identified -explicit and implicit- in relation to Mexico, in contrast to opportunities offered by this country, have originated from non-state actors as they have not been planned or openly encouraged, or facilitated, by the Mexican state.

Each one of the trans-border issues regarding Mexico referred to above are analysed in the following chapters. Chapter 4 addresses drug trafficking in order to understand why this issue has been an explicitly security concern in the United States. Chapter 5 is devoted to undocumented immigration that has been an underlying U.S. security concern related to identity, and which became more explicitly linked to U.S. security after the 9/11 events as a result of the terrorist threat. Chapter 6 deals with environmental issues along the U.S.-Mexico border, in particular with the potential for an epidemic to occur in the region because of water pollution. This latter subject, however, has so far not turned into an actual security concern for either the United States or Mexico, and part of the explanation is based on the existence of a long standing bi-national institutional infrastructure to deal with common border environmental challenges that has contributed to approach the issue from a risk-management perspective.

CHAPTER 4. DRUG TRAFFICKING

4.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter consists in explaining, based on the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society Theory, why drug trafficking has been a security issue from the U.S. point of view, within the U.S.-Mexico bilateral agenda.

In terms of the analytical framework -and in contrast to the implicit securitisation of undocumented immigration and the potential security concern represented by the environment in relation to Mexico in the 1990s-, drug trafficking has been explicitly recognised as a security concern in the United States, and in this context this issue represents the most interesting subject matter for security analysis.

Even though drug trafficking is a trans-national challenge not restricted to U.S.-Mexican relations, it has been an issue with a long history in the bilateral agenda that has been characterised by both conflict and co-operation. This has been a predictable situation in a part of the globe where an industrialised nation, which happens to be the world's largest drug market, shares a long and permeable border with a developing neighbour that is also a significant drug producer and transit country.

Drug issues became prominent in the bilateral relationship after WWII when drug consumption turned into a significant concern in the United States. After a long period of bilateral, albeit often forced, co-operation during the post-war years, tension escalated between the two countries at the end of the 1960s. In September 1969 the United States carried out an interdiction operation on its Southwest border to force Mexico, by slowing down legitimate cross-border traffic in the area, to intensify its efforts against drug trafficking. As a result of this unilateral measure, the United States and Mexico strengthened co-operation and drugs became more central in the bilateral agenda ever since. In 1985, nevertheless, the murder of a DEA Special Agent in Mexico gave way to a new cycle of conflict, with the United States pointing to corruption in Mexico as a the key problem in the bilateral efforts to confront this threat.

If it is true that Mexico has indeed contributed to U.S. counterdrug efforts, it has been argued that U.S. drug policy towards its southern neighbour has been 'cyclical in nature, often

unilateral, incident-prone and highly contentious'.[594] Regarding drug trafficking, the prevalent view in Mexico has been that the origin of the problem has been U.S. demand. The dominant U.S. view has been that at the centre of the challenge has been Mexican pervasive corruption. The bilateral management of the issue, nevertheless, has been defined mainly in U.S. terms, reflecting thus the asymmetry of power between the two countries and the resulting unbalanced approach.

Differences about the impact of the problem in each of the two countries have also explained differing approaches. While in Mexico drug use had been low (it has gradually increased in the last decades), the major threat from drug trafficking has been the challenge it has posed to its institutions.[595] In the United States, in contrast, drug consumption has been considerably higher and it has affected its society (including public health and order) and economy. Nevertheless, the corrupting power of drug trafficking has compromised the security of producer/transit and consumer countries alike.

According to one analyst, one additional factor complicating a co-ordinated response to the problem has been 'the overtly political treatment of the drug problem' in the United States.[596] The negative connotation for politicians to appear 'soft on drugs', on the one hand, and aversion to the consequences of fighting drugs in terms of violence within its own territory, on the other hand, have limited available options to deal with the problem in the United States. As a result of these constrains, the United States has basically transferred abroad the costs of fighting drugs, in this particular case, into Mexican territory. The U.S. supply-side approach, nevertheless, has

[594] R. B. Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy toward Mexico: Consequences for the Bilateral Relationship', in G. González and M. Tienda (eds.), *The Drug Connection in U.S.-Mexican Relations*, Dimensions of U.S.-Mexican Relations, Vol. 4, Papers prepared for the Bilateral Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, (San Diego, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1989), p.78.

[595] According to Mexico's National Council Against Addictions (CONADIC), whereas the percentage of people in Mexico in 1999 who had ever tried marihuana in their lifetime was 4.7, in the United States that figure was 32.9. See México, Secretaría de Salud (SSA), 'Datos Epidemiológicos', Consejo Nacional Contra las Adicciones (CONADIC), [online] available: http://www.ssa.gob.mx/unidades/conadic/epidem.htm (22/01/03), p.5. For instance, whereas in 1976 the percentage of high school and preparatory school students in Mexico City who used marihuana, inhalants and cocaine was 1.9, 0.9 and 0.5, respectively, the figures for 2006 increased to 8.8, 6.7 and 3.3 for the same types of drugs. México, National Council Against Addictions (CONADIC), *Prevención de las Adicciones y Promoción de Conductas Saludables para una Nueva Vida. Guía para el Promotor de Nueva Vida*, Capítulo III. "El Consumo de Drogas en México y sus Consecuencias Sociales", 13 November 2008, [online] available: http://www.conadic.salud.gob.mx/pdfs/nueva_vida/nv1e_prevencion.pdf (06/07/11), p.52.

[596] G. González, 'The Drug Connection in U.S.-Mexican Relations: Introduction', in González and Tienda, *Drug Connection*, p.1.

proved to be 'ineffective' so far.[597] The explanation for this, in the opinion of a Mexican analyst, has resided in 'failing to view the drug market as an integrated market'.[598] This viewpoint has not been unique to Mexican scholars. For instance, according to Peter Smith,

> The fundamental source of the drug problem, of *narcotrafico* in the Americas, is the presence of and power of consumer demand. Demand for drugs is most conspicuous in advanced industrial countries, in Europe, and –especially important for Latin America- in the United States. Demand is what creates the market for drugs. So long as demand continues, there will be people engaged in supply.[599]

Notwithstanding general agreement on the relevance of demand in determining the phenomenon, Mexico has for long co-operated with U.S. anti-drug efforts. In fact, in the opinion of Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt, 'Mexico may represent the "end case", in terms of what the United States can reasonably expect from efforts at drug control within the context of continued U.S. demand'.[600] It is important to note, nevertheless, that while the 'dealing with supply'-argument has been politically convenient in the United States, it has not contributed to a long-term solution of the problem. In the whole research process for this thesis, for instance, it was difficult to come across with a report or study explaining why drugs are consumed in the United States, in the first place, especially if compared to the amount of analyses on the coercive side of the problem.

In the specific case of Mexico, this U.S. supply-oriented strategy has resulted in the militarisation of anti-drug policies. The Mexican military involvement in drug control has not only led to a higher level of violence and human rights abuses in the country, but it has also increasingly exposed the armed forces, one important pillar of stability in Mexico, to drug-related corruption.

The first section of this chapter analyses the history of conflict and co-operation arising from drug trafficking in the bilateral relationship, and describes the way in which U.S. views on drug control (i.e. drug use has been considered a law enforcement rather than a health matter) were gradually imposed on the Mexican government. That is, to the extent that the United States has emphasised the challenge posed by foreign supply, to that same extent it has favoured the

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[597] M. Ruíz-Cabañas, 'Mexico's Changing Illicit Drug Supply Role', in González and Tienda, *Drug Connection*, p.63.
[598] S. I. Del Villar, 'Controlling the U.S.-Mexican Drug Market', in González and Tienda, *Drug Connection*, p.94.
[599] P. H. Smith, 'The Political Economy of Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy Options', in P. H. Smith (ed.), *Drug Policy in the Americas*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1992), p.2.
[600] P. Reuter and D. Ronfeldt, 'Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-U.S. Drug Trade in the 1980s', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Fall 1992, p.90.

militarisation of the response in Mexico. The second section assesses the impact of drug trafficking and consumption in the United States, in particular in terms of prevalence of use and of the economic drain this problem represents to the U.S. society. It also addresses the domestic and bilateral consequences of drug trafficking for Mexico. The third section explains the U.S. concerns regarding drug trafficking in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory, and the fourth section provides the conclusions of this chapter.

4.2. Drug Trafficking in U.S.-Mexican Relations

Historically, the primary U.S. response to domestic drug use has consisted in dealing with the supply side of the problem. Besides its proximity, Mexico's dual role as producer of marijuana and heroin, and later on also as a transhipment point for cocaine from South America bound for the U.S. market, has explained the country's location at the centre of U.S. anti-drug policy.

The U.S. government has consistently 'encouraged' Mexico to deal with drug production and trafficking, and Mexican authorities have responded not only because of U.S. pressure but also because the need to protect the country's institutions from the corrupting power of drug trafficking. Nevertheless, Mexico's anti-drug activities have failed so far to stem the flow of drugs into the United States not only because of the persistence of U.S. demand, but also because of the existence of corruption within its security organisations. The relevance of this issue for the bilateral relationship, according to a high-ranking Clinton administration official, has been explained by: (1) 'the central position of Mexico in trafficking of cocaine and methamphetamine'; and (2) the fact that 'in Mexico there is a growing realisation that drugs are not just a *"gringo"* problem, that drug trafficking is also dangerous to Mexico because it creates corruption and undermines its law enforcement institutions, and also because there is a growing demand in the country'.[601]

4.2.1. *Background: Anti-smuggling Measures*

Historically, there has been a symbiotic relationship between U.S. domestic and international drug control efforts. This has been explained basically because U.S. domestic anti-drug

[601] Interview with Thomas J. Umberg, Attorney at Law, Morrison & Foerster LLP, former Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, The White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Irvine, CA, 7 August 2001.

enforcement has relied on the collaboration of producer countries.[602] Latin America, for instance, was from the beginning 'an early target of U.S. anti-drug diplomacy by being the closest source of drugs',[603] even though countries in the region were often reticent to co-operate with the United States because of their interest in preserving, such as in the case of Bolivia and Peru, their traditional coca leaf production.[604] Mexico, in contrast, was more amenable to help basically because its ultimate objective was to avoid U.S. intrusion in Mexican affairs.[605]

In response to this problem, in 1916 the Mexican government banned purchases of opium from abroad (even though opium had been brought into the states of Sinaloa and Sonora by Chinese immigrants between the 1910s and 1920s) in order deprive U.S. authorities of any justification to enter Mexico without authorisation.[606] If it is true that illegal drug flows and the use of the border as a refuge for Mexican outlaws had not been new, increasing anti-smuggling co-operation between Mexico and the United States turned illegal activities at the border into a profitable business.[607]

In the second half of the 1920s Mexico strengthened its anti-smuggling measures and, as a matter of fact, they became established as part of its criminal law.[608] These domestic efforts, however, were shored up by Mexico's accession to the International Drug Control Convention in 1931.[609] It is important to note, nevertheless, that one of the defining characteristics of this period

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[602] See Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, 'The Warfare Against Opium-Smoking in America', *Outlook*, Feb. 6, Vol. 91, p.275, [online] available: http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/history/opiumwarfare1909.htm (15/12/02), and Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, 'Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, 1914', Full Text of the Act, Public Acts of the 63rd Congress of the United States, [online] available: http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/e1910/harrisonact/htm (15/12/02).

[603] M. C. Toro, *'War' on Drugs. Causes and Consequences*, Studies on the Impact of the Illegal Drug Trade, Volume Three, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995 by the United Nations University and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), p.6.

[604] See W. O. Walker III, 'U.S. Narcotics Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century: An Analytical Overview', in R. F. Pearl (ed.), *Drugs and Foreign Policy, A Critical Review*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), p.11, and D. R. Bewley-Taylor, *The United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997*, (London: Continuum, 2001), p.35. Among the reasons that led to attempts at strengthening the Harrison Act were growing concerns about drugs due to exaggerated estimates (e.g. 1 million of addicts according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury), fears of increasing addiction after the return of World War I (WWI) veterans, and passage of the 18th Amendment on alcohol prohibition (enforced through the January 1919 Volstead Act). See D. F. Musto, 'Patterns in U.S. Drug Abuse and Response', in Smith, *Drug Policy in the Americas*, p.35.

[605] Toro, *'War' on Drugs*, p.7.

[606] *Idem.*

[607] *Ibid*., p.8.

[608] *Idem*.

[609] Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy', p.72. The '1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs' was one of the pillars of international drug control. It restricted drug use to medicinal purposes, and limited the access to drugs within signatory countries. See Bewley-Taylor, *United States and International Drug Control*, p.39.

was that control emphasised trafficking rather than production, and for this reason Mexico's heroin output, which was between 10% and 15% of the U.S. total supply, basically remained unaltered.[610] Its production actually increased in the context of WWII, when it became more difficult to get hold of extra-hemispheric production.[611]

It is important to note that from the very beginning, Mexican law enforcement activities were affected by corruption. A dispatch sent to DoS on 7 May 1926 by U.S. Consul Henry C. A. Damm in Sonora illustrates this situation:

> … The informant states that last year an attempt was made to grow poppy but that the plantations were destroyed by order of officials of the Mexican government… This year, however, no effort seems to be made to stop the production of the narcotic, although two weeks ago an inspector from Nogales visited Oquitoa and Altar. The American informant has heard that this inspector collected 15,000 pesos, as tax on the fields…[612]

Corruption of Mexican officials would eventually become one of the most contentious issues in the bilateral relationship in the years to come. However, and even with all their limitations, the Mexican programmes were regarded as 'a drug control system exceeded in the Western Hemisphere only by that of the United States'.[613]

4.2.2. *Post-war Years: Eradication Campaigns*

During the second half of the 1930s, continued U.S. demand and proposals in Mexico for a more flexible regulation of its domestic market led Washington to explicitly 'invite' Mexico City to adopt a restrictive policy similar to that of the United States.

During this period, the Mexican government adopted a proposal for the creation of a state monopoly on the sale of drugs, which eventually entered into effect in 1941. Concerned because of the prospect for this measure to increase drug trafficking and consumption in the United States, the U.S. government threatened to impose an embargo on all medical drug exports, which

[610] Ruíz-Cabañas, 'Mexico's Changing', p.53.
[611] *Idem*.
[612] General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 812.104/108, National Archives, Washington, DC, in W. O. Walker III (ed.), *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere. An Odyssey of Cultures in Conflict*, Jaguar Books on Latin America, Number 12, (Wilmington, DE: A Salisbury Resources, Inc. Imprint, 1996), p.59.
[613] Quoted by Toro, *'War' on Drugs*, p.11.

in turn led Mexico to abandon its initiative and to follow the parameters established by U.S. officials.[614]

Sending a contradictory signal, however, during WWII the United States '*encouraged*' legal production of Mexican opium and marijuana (i.e. morphine and hemp) for the allied war effort, which contributed by 1943 to turn opium into Sinaloa's main source of agricultural income, at a time when the United States wanted to revert this trend.[615] According to a July 1943 letter from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

> It is with regret the Bureau of Narcotics must report that along with Iran and Cuba, Mexico has now become the principal source of supply of smuggled drugs seized in the illicit traffic throughout the United States… There are indications that the acreage planted to the opium poppy in Mexico has been increasing each year. Since a large portion of this opium is unquestionably intended for entry into the illicit traffic in the United States, the situation should be viewed with much concern.[616]

It is important to note that if growth of marijuana production in Mexico was the result of increased U.S. demand after WWII, growth of Mexican heroin production was the outcome of interrupted flows from Europe and Asia through Central America.[617] On the Mexican border, for instance, seizures of opium in 1943 were 30 times as large as two years before.[618]

In this context, it was in 1948 that Mexico implemented its first 'national eradication campaign', based on two important components: (1) the military started its involvement in the destruction of drug plantations; and (2) by the end of the 1950s these efforts were extended beyond the usually problematic areas (i.e. Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua, referred to as the 'Critical Triangle'), to cover both peninsulas and the central region of the country.[619]

Notwithstanding the eradication campaign, drug production and trafficking continued unabated basically because of three factors: lack of aerial reconnaissance capabilities; shortage of

[614] W. O. Walker III, *Drug Control in the Americas*, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), 119-33, 259-61, Reprinted by permission of the University of New Mexico Press, in Walker, *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere*, pp.64-80.
[615] Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy', p.72.
[616] General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 812.114, Narcotics 1363, p.125.
[617] Toro, *'War' on Drugs*, pp.11-12.
[618] General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 812.114 Narcotics/1363, p.126.
[619] Toro, *'War' on Drugs*, p.13.

chemicals for eradication; and the violent response from drug producers and traffickers.[620] It was not until late 1961, after Mexico again became the target of U.S. pressure, that it modernised its equipment with U.S. help in order to conduct a more effective campaign.[621]

On 4 and 5 January 1961 U.S. and Mexican officials met in Washington, DC, to informally explore ways to improve anti-drug co-operation. On that occasion, the United States and Mexico agreed on the procurement of U.S. training and equipment for Mexico's efforts, and thus both sides issued 'The United States-Mexico Joint Communiqué on the Control of Illicit Narcotics' that, according to William Walker, not only recognised shared responsibility for the drug problem, but also 'marked the first step toward militarization of the war on drugs in the Americas'.[622]

Under this agreement, the United States supplied:

> two helicopters, two light planes, ten *Jeep* trucks (all with radios and spare parts), twenty flame-throwers and fifty rifles (with spare parts and ammunition), and provided training for three helicopter pilots and three mechanics, plus transportation to the United States and factory check-outs for the pilots of the fixed-wing aircraft.[623]

According to the 'United States-Mexican Narcotics Control Program' issued by DoS on 27 September 1962, the provision of this aid 'would emphasise continued faith in control at the source as the basis of U.S. anti-drug policy'.[624] As shown in Table 4-1, the assistance package contributed to reduce the number of opium poppy plantations in Mexico after only one year of operation.

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[620] R. B. Craig, 'La Campaña Permanente: Mexico's Antidrug Campaign', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 1978: 107-31, notes omitted. Reprinted by permission of the *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, in Walker, *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere*, p.176.
[621] Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy', p.73.
[622] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Press Release, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene Kansas, in Walker, *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere*, p.169.
[623] Records of the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Box 1, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Columbia Point, Massachusetts, in Walker, *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere*, p.173.
[624] *Idem*.

Table 4-1. **Opium Poppy Plantations Destroyed in Mexico**

Year	Number of Fields
1958	110,243
1959	513,000
1960	521,092
1961	316,863
1962	63,890

Source: Records of the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, Box 1, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, p.174.

Mexico's new capability, however, incited a creative response from drug producers and traffickers who opted for hiding drug production among legal produce, and for moving plantations to secluded areas.[625] Given the fact that the U.S. demand for drugs did not recede during this time, there was a continuous flow of Mexican marijuana and heroin into the United States in the 1960s,[626] and this is part of the reason why, in spite of bilateral co-operation, the U.S.-Mexico relationship deteriorated at the end of the 1960s, as will be discussed below.

Again in response to U.S. pressure, in 1961 the Mexican government signed the UN Single Convention, which became law in April 1967.[627] The convention, however, included several provisions that were controversial. Article 33 on 'Possession of Drugs' established that 'The Parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority'.[628] According to one interpretation, given that the 1961 convention established the parameters for controlling drugs, the provision above had therefore an impact on the U.S.-Mexico illegal drug trade by virtually suppressing supply while accepting demand.[629]

It is important to note that in the 1960s, increasing drug trafficking across the U.S.-Mexico border responded to a growing demand for drugs in the United States. From 1962 to 1967, for instance, the proportion of people between 19 and 25 years old that had ever tried

[625] *Ibid*., pp.176-177.
[626] Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy', p.73.
[627] In 1961 the UN adopted the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs which, in its Article 44 'Termination of Previous International Treaties', established that 'The provisions of this Convention, upon its coming into force, shall, as between Parties hereto, terminate and replace the provisions of the following treaties:…', effectively placing under one legal instrument all previous international anti-drug accords. See United Nations, Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961*, UN Treaties and Resolutions, [online] available: http://www.incb.org/e/conv/1961/index.htm? (17/12/02).
[628] *Idem*.
[629] Del Villar, 'Controlling the U.S.-Mexican Drug Market', p.107.

marijuana went up from 4% to 13%,[630] and this level of consumption eventually put Mexico under the radar of U.S. authorities.[631] On 14 July 1969, President Richard Nixon recognised drug use as a 'serious national threat' in a message to the U.S. Congress, and in June 1971 he formally declared a 'war on drugs'.[632]

In order to respond to increasing drug consumption in the United States, the Nixon administration implemented a series of policies to deal with Mexican marijuana, in particular. On 21 September 1969 President Nixon ordered 'Operation Intercept' on the border with Mexico, which was described as 'the nation's largest peace-time search and seizure operation by civil authorities'.[633] This unilateral measure, supposedly designed to stop the northbound flow of marijuana into the United States, was in reality intended to take the legitimate cross-border flow hostage, in order to compel Mexico to deal with drug trafficking in a more forceful way. This was evident in the fact that,

> Although more than 5-million citizens of the United States and Mexico passed through this dragnet during the 3-week operation, virtually no heroin or narcotics were intercepted from tourists. But… the ultimate objective of Operation Intercept was not to seize narcotics but to pressure Mexico to control it at the source by eradicating the production of marijuana and opium poppies in Mexico.[634]

While in the short-term the operation only became a major diplomatic irritant, in the long run it succeeded in influencing Mexico to reinforce its anti-drug measures. As an indirect result of the U.S. operation, Mexico began to acknowledge the existence of a growing domestic drug problem that required to be incorporated within its national campaign. Moreover, after 11 October 1969 the successor to 'Operation Intercept', known as 'Operation Co-operation', led to an improvement of bilateral efforts.[635]

Under this bilateral arrangement Mexico increased its eradication and interdiction efforts in the 'Critical Triangle', but the result was far from satisfactory due to a variety of logistical, geographical and technological factors. While the U.S. government was interested in joint law enforcement operations along the common border in order to increase effectiveness, the Mexican

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[630] González, 'Drug Connection', p.15.
[631] Ruíz-Cabañas, 'Mexico's Changing', p.47.
[632] National Public Radio (NPR), *Timeline: America's War on Drugs*, April 2, 2007, [online] available: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490 (06/07/11).
[633] Craig, 'Campaña Permanente', p.177.
[634] E. Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam's, 1978), p.83.
[635] *Idem*.

authorities opted instead for an aerial herbicide programme, a decision that was influenced by the need to avoid more violence from drug traffickers in the interior of the country.[636] As in the 1930s, in the 1970s Mexican officials were willing to fight the flow of drugs into the United States basically because of the need to keep the United States at bay.[637]

With U.S. assistance, however, in the 1970s Mexico took a step further in its anti-drug efforts called 'Operation Condor', which was based on the aerial herbicide programme discussed above.[638] The Attorney General's Office (AGO) managed the campaign, and acquired from the United States the aircraft required to launching the 'largest herbicide program in history'; the operation allowed Mexico to improve bilateral and domestic inter-agency co-ordination, as well as to strengthen anti-corruption efforts.[639]

With 'Operation Condor', Mexico in fact established a U.S.-style 'war on drugs', 'The Permanent Campaign', which has been basically a supply-side-oriented programme. Under this framework, Mexican marijuana decreased from more than 75% of U.S. consumption in 1976 to a low level of 4% in 1981 (to rebound to 30% in 1986), which represented a temporarily vacuum that was filled by Colombia, Jamaica and the United States itself.[640]

As a further example of the problem inherent in supply-oriented strategies, opium production in Mexico had recently expanded to fill a gap left by the dislocation of the so-called 'French Connection' (i.e. manufacturers of Turkish heroin based in Marseilles with extensive distribution networks in the United States).[641] From 1972-1975, after opium control was imposed on Turkey, opium cultivation in Mexico exploded from 10-15% to 80% of the U.S. market as Mexican producers continued to supply the U.S. demand of heroin.[642] In this sense, Mexico's emergence as a major heroin production and smuggling centre clearly resulted from stricter enforcement efforts in other parts of the world, showing that drug production has been extremely resilient and adaptable in the face of individual supply-reduction initiatives. Mexico's intensified eradication efforts, in the context of its already mentioned anti-drug campaigns, decreased its

[636] Toro, *'War' on Drugs*, pp.16-17.
[637] *Idem*.
[638] Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy', p.74.
[639] *Ibid*., pp.74-75.
[640] Ruíz-Cabañas, 'Mexico's Changing', pp.48-49.
[641] When the Italian government prohibited the manufacture of heroin in 1952, the Mafia replaced this supply with Turkish morphine that was usually transformed in heroin in the French city of Marseilles. See *Ibid*., p.53.
[642] *Idem*.

output of heroin for the U.S. market from 67% to 25% between 1976 and 1980.[643] As in the case of marijuana, however, reduction of supply in Mexico was compensated by the 'Golden Crescent' increasing participation in the U.S. drug market, from virtually 0% in 1976 to 60% in 1980.[644]

By the early 1970s drug trafficking had become one of the most salient issues in U.S.-Mexican relations. Toward the end of the decade, and in spite of its efforts, Mexico was the focus of U.S. attention as a major exporter of both marijuana and heroin. The Mexican government countered that if it not were for the U.S. demand there would be no reason for Mexican peasants to cultivate drugs. According to Guadalupe González, the approach to the problem favoured by the U.S. (i.e. treating use with relative tolerance while strongly attacking production) had only contributed to high drug prices that in turn provided the main incentive for the growth of the illegal industry.[645] This has actually been one of arguments most frequently used by Mexican officials to criticise the U.S. drug control perspective.

The success of Mexico's anti-drug campaigns in the 1970s did not last long. By 1983-1984 Mexican production and trafficking were up again, not only in the traditional marijuana and heroin markets but also in the cocaine trade as well. The most important explanation for this was the one related to the fact that Colombia's growth as a drug trafficking centre opened lucrative opportunities for Mexican drug smugglers, as cocaine transhipment routes shifted to Mexico during the early 1980s.[646] This occurred when the establishment of Joint Task Force No. 4 (JTF-4) in South Florida closed the Caribbean cocaine trafficking route, opening thus the opportunity for Mexican smugglers to assist their Colombian counterparts by taking care of cocaine shipments bound for the United States, taking advantage of the established overland corridors leading to the U.S. border.[647] According to DEA officials, JTF-4 operations were 'highly successful' since a third or more of the cocaine entering the United States was flowing across the U.S.-Mexican border, rather than through the traditional routes across the Caribbean.[648] This was hardly an accomplishment, nevertheless, because JTF-4 operations did not disrupt, much less halt, cocaine smuggling into the United States; they merely shifted routes and Mexico became

[643] *Ibid*., p.54.
[644] *Ibid*., p.55.
[645] González, 'Drug Connection', p.14.
[646] Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy', pp.76-77.
[647] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.53.
[648] B. M. Bagley, 'Myths of Militarization: Enlisting the Armed Forces in the War on Drugs', in Smith, *Drug Policy in the Americas*, p.135.

the casualty of the U.S. 'success'.[649] One interesting phenomenon that eventually occurred was that Mexican smugglers would demand to be paid with part of the cargo, with around '40 to 50 percent of each cocaine shipment', and this condition set the stage for them to become involved in marketing operations within the United States.[650]

The JTF-4 model was eventually extended to the U.S.-Mexican border in March 1983, when President Ronald Reagan created the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to act as 'interface' between DoD and LEAs in order to co-ordinate anti-drug resources.[651] In fact, according to Dunn, the 'war on drugs' significantly expanded on the U.S.-Mexican border during the 1986-1992 period in response to increasing drug trafficking in the region.[652]

4.2.3. *1980s and Beyond: Escalation of Militarisation*

4.2.3.1. Corruption

The Mexican government began relying even more on the Mexican military in order to respond not only to more powerful drug trafficking organisations, but also to corruption within its LEAs. The Mexican military's participation, however, was not enough to stem the flow of drugs, mainly because of corruption among Mexican anti-drug officials.[653]

In this context, relations between the United States and Mexico began to deteriorate in the first half of the 1980s. For instance, in 1984 thousands of tons of marihuana were discovered in a location called *'El Búfalo'* in the state of Chihuahua.[654] The initial suspicion that an operation of such a magnitude could only be explained by corruption within Mexico's security apparatus, proved to be correct after the assassination of DEA Special Agent Camarena-Salazar in February 1985, which apparently was carried out by elements of the DFS, in collusion with drug traffickers.[655] It was later discovered that the Camarena case had actually been related to the discovery of *'El Búfalo'* the year before.[656]

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[649] *Idem*.
[650] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.59.
[651] Dunn, *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border 1978-1992*, p.109.
[652] *Ibid*., p.112.
[653] Toro, '*War' on Drugs*, p.30.
[654] *Ibid*., pp.30-31.
[655] Quoted by Reuter and Ronfeldt, 'Quest for Integrity', p.105.
[656] Toro, '*War' on Drugs*, p.31.

The murder of Camarena created a new cycle of conflict in the bilateral relationship, as members of the U.S. Congress and drug policy officials began to express negative views about Mexico. According to Walker, 'tensions across the border had not been so great since the oil controversy began in 1938', and reconciliation would have to wait the accession of new governments in the two countries.[657] Meanwhile, in response to the Camarena incident, the DEA launched 'Operation Intercept II' that partially closed the border for eight days in February 1985, and 'Operation Leyenda', discussed below, which reminded Mexican officials of their country's vulnerability to U.S. drug policy. Because of intense public criticism from the DEA, police work in Mexico led to the arrest of drug trafficker Rafael Caro-Quintero, believed to be behind Camarena's murder.[658]

As a response to U.S. pressure, the Mexican government recognised that drug trafficking posed a threat to Mexico's society and institutions, and set out to reform its security apparatus. Firstly, while Mexican authorities had traditionally avoided identifying drugs as a national security threat in order to prevent the United States from using the concept to justify interventionist policies, President Miguel De la Madrid eventually echoed President Reagan by declaring that drug trafficking should be considered a threat to national security.[659] It is important to note that in response to raising political pressures in anticipation of the November 1986 mid-term elections, President Reagan set the stage for a further expansion of the U.S. military's participation in drug control. On 8 April 1986, the president issued National Security Decision Directive No. 221 (NSC-NSDD-221) 'Narcotics and National Security', which established that 'the expanding scope of global narcotics trafficking has created a situation which today adds another significant dimension to the law enforcement and public health aspects of this international problem and *threatens the national security of the United States*'.[660]

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[657] W. O. Walker III, 'The Foreign Narcotics Policy of the United States since 1980: An End to the War on Drugs?', *International Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 1, (Winter 1993-94): 37-65. Reprinted by permission of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, in Walker, *Drugs in the Western Hemisphere*, p.238.
[658] Toro, '*War' on Drugs*, p.32.
[659] K. Doyle, 'The Militarization of the Drug War in Mexico', *Current History*, Vol. 92, No.571, February 1993, p.84.
[660] See The White House, 'Narcotics and National Security', National Security Decision Directive Number 221 (NSC-NSDD-221), April 8, 1986, in NSDD – National Security Decision Directives, Reagan Administration, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Intelligence Resource Programs, [online] available: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.htm (19/12/02), p.1, (emphasis by the author).

Secondly, the DFS was disbanded in 1985 and it was replaced by the General Direction for Investigation and National Security (DGISN), which included the National Office for Information and National Security, an intelligence unit for the analysis of security issues.[661]

4.2.3.2. An Uneasy Transition

President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), De la Madrid's successor, reasserted the previous administration's declaration that drug trafficking represented a national security threat:

> The fight against drugs is a high priority in my government for three fundamental reasons: because it constitutes an assault on the health of Mexico's citizens, because it promises to affect Mexican national security, and finally, because the community of nations must stand together on this issue.[662]

In contrast to the United States where the definition of drug trafficking as a national security issue helped to justify the military's support to LEAs in the 'war on drugs', in Mexico the definition did not have the same purpose because the military was already involved in anti-drug missions.[663] Instead, it allowed the Mexican government to portray the fight against drugs to be in the interest of the country, and not only in that of the United States. This declaration had a political objective which was '[to provide] the base for rallying new political support for an increasingly expensive, difficult, and controversial effort'.[664]

Ironically, the shift in cocaine flows from the U.S. Southeast to the U.S. Southwest border occurred almost at the same time the United States and Mexico were planning to establish a closer economic relationship. Mexico's growing participation in the cocaine trade, as discussed

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[661] Reuter and Ronfeldt, 'Quest for Integrity', p.112.

[662] C. Salinas, *Speech to U.S.-Mexico XIX Interparlamentary Meeting*, Zihuatanejo, Mexico, 28 April 1989, quoted by Reuter and Ronfeldt, 'Quest for Integrity', p.110.

[663] The 1982 Defense Authorization Act (P. L. 97-86, 1 December 1981) '[Permitted] the Secretary of Defense to make available to Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement officials information, equipment, facilities and training and advisory personnel to assist law enforcement efforts. [Directed] the Secretary to issue regulations concerning the furnishing of and reimbursement for such assistance'. See 97th U.S. Congress, 'Title IX General Provisions', *Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982*, (P. L. 97-86, 1 December 1981), (S.815), *Thomas*, Legislative Information on the Internet, Public Law, [online] available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d097:SN00815:@@@D|TOM:/bss/d097query.html (17/12/02). This act added sections 371 ('Use of information collected during military operations'), 372 ('Use of military equipment and facilities'), 373 ('Training and advising civilian law enforcement officials'), and 374 ('Maintenance and Operation of Equipment') to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which provided for military support of LEAs. See U.S. House of Representatives, 'U.S. Code, Title 10-Armed Forces, Subtitle A-General Military Law, Part I-Organization and General Military Powers, Chapter 18-Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies', Sections 371, 372, 373, and 374, in *Search the United States Code*, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, [online] available: http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t09t12+170+1++%28%29%20%20AN (17/12/02).

[664] Reuter and Ronfeldt, 'Quest for Integrity', p.115.

above, strengthened its criminal organisations such as the so-called 'Gulf', 'Tijuana' and 'Juarez' cartels.[665] In this context, the task for the Salinas administration consisted not only in confronting more capable drug organisations within Mexico, but also showing the United States the determination of the new government in its fight against drugs.[666]

The Salinas government implemented several reforms. It formed a National Security Cabinet within the Office of the Co-ordination of the Presidency; late in 1988 it created the Office of the Assistant Attorney General for Investigation and Combat of Drug Trafficking as well as new units within the FJP; and in early 1989, it established a new intelligence agency, the Centre for Investigation and National Security (CISEN), which replaced DISEN.[667] In general terms, in spite of economic austerity, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s anti-drug resources assigned to the AGO increased by three times, and some of its restructuring included the 1992 creation of an intelligence unit called Centre for Drug Control Planning (CENDRO) within the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, and in 1993 the establishment of the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD) to co-ordinate anti-drug efforts.[668]

Showing a renewed willingness to work with the United States after the Camarena incident, in 1989 Mexico signed a comprehensive agreement on bilateral co-operation and in 1990 it endorsed the 'Treaty on Co-operation for Mutual Legal Assistance'; on the multilateral front, and in order to strengthen Mexico's international image, in 1990 the government became party to the 1988 UN Convention against Trafficking in Illicit Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.[669]

At the operational level, that same year Mexico created the Northern Border Response Force (NBRF) in order to detain drug smugglers and to disrupt their aerial operations leading to the U.S. border. Out of the U.S. embassy in Mexico City, a U.S. antinarcotics unit co-operated with the NBRF on strategy and exchange of information matters.[670] From the U.S. point of view, this co-operation was seen as key to ultimate counter-drug success because, in the words of one

[665] P. R. Andreas, 'U.S.-Mexico Drug Control in the Age of Free Trade', *Borderlines*, Vol. 8, No. 4, April 2000, p.1
[666] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.53.
[667] Reuter and Ronfeldt, 'Quest for Integrity', pp.112-113.
[668] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.54.
[669] This convention was relevant first of all because it recognised drug trafficking as a trans-national challenge with the potential to affect all states, and therefore it emphasised the need for international co-operation to confront this threat. United Nations, *United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*, Adopted on 19 December 1988, Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Treaties and Resolutions, [online] available: http://www.incb.org/e/conv/1988/index.htm? (18/12/02).
[670] Dunn, *Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border*, p.139.

U.S. military officer, 'without Mexican support the situation closely paralleled a low-intensity conflict in which the guerrilla had a perfect sanctuary'.[671]

One important aspect of drug control in Mexico during the Salinas administration was the increasing participation of the armed forces, which was reflected in the fact that 'about one-third of the military's budget was devoted to that effort by the end of the 1980s'.[672] As a result of this growth, the Ministry of Defence (SEDENA) became the predominant official presence in several areas of the country.[673] U.S. anti-drug and military aid to Mexico increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s, after economic integration was accompanied by security and military co-operation, as shown in Table 4-2 regarding U.S. anti-narcotics assistance.

[671] Maj. D. E. Brown, Deputy Chief of Operations (JTF-6), 'Drugs on the Border: The Role of the Military', *Parameters*, Vol. XXI, No. 4, Winter 1991-1992, p.58.
[672] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.55.
[673] R. A. Camp. *Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.92, cited by Andreas, *Border Games*, p.55.

Table4-2. U.S. Anti-narcotics Assistance to Mexico (1977-2010), obligations in millions, constant 2010 $US

FY	Program: Narcotics Control
1977	43,617,840
1978	51,384,892
1979	28,011,740
1980	16,176,346
1981	19,998,905
1982	16,894,915
1983	15,114,432
1984	15,474,734
1985	17,471,642
1986	20,429,440
1987	24,875,347
1988	24,102,405
1989	24,001,294
1990	23,149,098
1991	28,698,530
1992	28,984,110
1993	1,657,424
1994	1,305,139
1995	894,620
1996	2,934,476
1997	6,547,147
1998	6,466,930
1999	10,211,770
2000	5,095,963
2001	12,228,816
2002	44,512,812
2003	14,441,495
2004	43,984,679
2005	56,629,551
2006	128,499,593
2007	38,515,889
2008	2,437,522
2009	353,189,920
2010	531,814,917

Source: U.S. Overseas Loan and Grants (*Greenbook*), *Standard Country Report, Mexico*, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services (EADS), [online] available: http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do?_program=/eads/gbk/countryReport&submit=submit&output=2&unit=R&cocode=5MEX (25/08/12).

For instance, traditional low levels of U.S. military and security assistance to Mexico began to increase during the early 1980s as the country implemented International Monetary Fund- (IMF) mandated 'structural adjustment' policies in response to its economic crisis. According to a report, 'between 1984 and 1993 Mexico obtained 10 times more U.S. military hardware than it

had received between 1950 and 1983'; it is estimated that Mexico had access to U.S. military assets valued in $750 million dollars between 1982 and 1992.[674]

On the U.S. side, the shift in drug smuggling from the Southeast to the Southwest provided the rationale for escalation of militarisation, and in this context in November 1986 Joint Task Force No. 6 (JTF-6) was established at Fort Bliss, in El Paso, Texas. Its objective, in general, was to co-ordinate active duty and reserve military support for civilian LEAs along the Southwest border.[675] Since the beginning, however, this initiative faced several limitations that included not only the *Posse Comitatus* statute, but also Mexican sensitivity to U.S. military presence on the common border.[676] Although this sensitivity has often been expressed by Mexico in terms of the 'militarisation of the border', according to one U.S. military officer this has been more a concern about the military apprehension of undocumented immigrants and potential human rights abuses, an issue that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.[677] What is frequently called the 'militarisation of the border', nevertheless, is not the permanent presence of U.S. troops along the dividing line, but the intelligence and infrastructure support DoD has provided the LEAs in order to deal with illegal flows. This information was confirmed, for instance, by the head of the U.S. Customs Service in San Diego, CA. Asked whether his agency received support from DoD he replied:

> We do. Is very small in the sense of dozens of National Guards people, and when we say 'militarization' it is not in the common sense; they are not carrying guns, they are not making arrests, they are simply helping perhaps… maybe to look at cargo or running x-

[674] S. B. Wilson, *The Slippery Slope. U.S. Military Moves into Mexico*, Mexico Committee, Earth First! Media Center, March 1997, Berkeley, CA, [online] available: http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/usa/slip_slope_feb97.html (22/09/00), p.4.

[675] See Brown, 'Drugs on the Border', pp.53-58.

[676] It is important to note that before enactment of sections described in footnote 382, only court interpretations of the *Posse Comitatus* Act, as Title 18 of the U.S. Code became commonly known, permitted the assignment of such activities to the military. It states that 'whomever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years or both'. See U.S. House of Representatives, 'U.S. Code, Title 18-Crimes and Criminal Procedure, Part I-Crimes, Chapter 67-Military and Navy', Section 1385 'Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus', in *Search the United States Code*, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, [online] available: http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t17t20+688+0++%28%29%20%20AND%20%28%2818%29%20ADJ%20USC%29%3ACITE%20AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%281385%29%29%3ACITE%20%20AND%20%28CHAPTER%20ADJ%20%2867%29%29%3AEXPCITE%20%20AND%20%28PART%20ADJ%20%28I% (17/12/02).

[677] Brown, 'Drugs on the Border', p.58.

> rays, things like that so, at least for Customs we don't have deployed units with automatic weapons and things like that.[678]

In 1990 the Southwest border was also formally designated as a High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), as part of a programme authorised by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to be administered by the ONDCP. According to that office,

> The Southwest border HIDTA was designated as a single HIDTA with the awareness that due to the complexity and enormous challenges posed by the Southwest border, more so than in any other part of the nation, a high level of coordination among law enforcement agencies is required with other related drug law enforcement and intelligence entities in the region.[679]

The HIDTA headquarters were originally located in El Paso, Texas, in order to implement border-wide initiatives and co-ordinate regional partnerships in Arizona, California, New Mexico, West Texas and South Texas. Its overall mission has been to integrate law enforcement efforts at the three levels of government in the region in order to confront the distribution of narcotics.[680]

These efforts were complemented in 1994 with the establishment of the Southwest Border Initiative (SWBI), which was a regional strategy to dismantle Mexican drug trafficking organisations. The SWBI was also a co-operative effort carried out by the LEAs in order to combat the threat posed by Mexican-based trafficking groups. Under this initiative, several bi-national operations were carried out by units in Monterrey, Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana allowing for the detention of 156 drug traffickers, and the confiscation of more than 22,000 kilos of narcotics and $35 million dollars.[681]

The significant results of Mexico's anti-drug efforts during the Salinas years, especially those against the top ranks of old drug cartels,[682] seemed to be proof of unparalleled co-operation between Mexico and the United States. On the one hand, both governments were hopeful these efforts would contribute to generate a propitious political atmosphere to negotiate the NAFTA

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[678] Interview with Edward W. Logan, Special Agent in Charge, Office of Investigations, United States Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, San Diego, CA, 6 August 2001.
[679] The White House, 'Southwest Border HIDTA', *High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas* (HIDTA), Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), [online] available: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/sw-content.html (19/02/03), p.2.
[680] *Ibid*., p.3.
[681] U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), 'Southwest Border Initiative', *DEA Programs*, Inside the DEA, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), [online] available: http://www.dea.gov/programs/sbip.htm (19/02/03), p.1.
[682] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.61.

agreement; on the other hand, the U.S. administration tried to reassure the public that opening the border to free trade with Mexico would not necessarily entail its exploitation by criminal organisations.[683]

However, all these indicators of effective drug control were misleading because they obscured the weaknesses of the enforcement effort. According to Peter Andreas, the seemingly positive results of bilateral anti-drug efforts were explained not by the effectiveness of the measures; they were simply facilitated by the growth of the drug trade itself.[684] If it is true this image served well its purpose of supporting NAFTA, its most pervasive consequence was to increase corruption in Mexico.[685]

Notwithstanding that the artificial impression of efficient bilateral anti-drug co-operation was sufficiently convincing to support the NAFTA negotiation process, the intensification of coercive measures, as in the past, only contributed to increase the profits from illegal activities and thus the resources available to corrupting authorities, especially on the Mexican side of the border.[686] According to one perspective, part of the corruption problem in Mexico was the fact that, far from implementing a comprehensive judicial reform, the Salinas government only enlarged security agencies long ago tainted by corruption.[687] Moreover, contrary to the assurances of the U.S. government, drug trafficking organisations took in fact advantage of free trade, as reported by a U.S. intelligence analysis pointing out that Mexican drug cartels were investing in infrastructure in order to be poised to exploit opportunities to be created by NAFTA.[688]

As already noted, this prospect was not publicly discussed during negotiations over the free trade accord in the early 1990s. For instance, U.S. law enforcement agents who worked in and on Mexico while President Salinas was negotiating the agreement with the United States claimed that political pressure kept them from discussing NAFTA's potential negative impact in terms of drug trafficking from Mexico.[689] As a matter of fact, the notion that increasing cross-

[683] *Ibid*, p.58.
[684] *Ibid*., p.60.
[685] Andreas, 'U.S.-Mexico Drug Control', p.2.
[686] *Idem*.
[687] Andreas, *Border Games*, p. 62.
[688] P. R. Andreas, 'U.S.-Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Borders', *Foreign Policy*, No. 103, Summer 1996, p.57.
[689] T. Golden, 'Mexico and Drugs: Was U.S. Napping?', *The New York Times*, July 11, 1997, [online] available: http://query.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F10812F7 (20/02/03), p.2.

border trade was entirely beneficial contrasted sharply with the picture described by the DEA in 2001:

> Illicit drugs are smuggled in record levels into the United States via the 2,000-mile U.S./Mexico border. Over the past few years, Mexican based trafficking organizations have succeeded in establishing themselves as the preeminent poly-drug traffickers of the world, using our shared border to smuggle illicit drugs into the United States. These organizations present an increasing threat to the national security of this country, with voluminous amount of drugs, violent crime, and the associated corruption of public officials in Mexico. Mexico is the largest transhipment point of South American cocaine destined for the United States, and 65% of this cocaine reaches American cities via the U.S./Mexico border. Mexico also remains a major source country for heroin and marijuana, and many of these Mexican based trafficking organizations are utilized by Colombian Cartels to tranship drugs destined for the United States.[690]

Notwithstanding the threat described above, the U.S.-Mexican border basically remained highly porous. In FY2000, for instance, 293 million people, 89 million cars, 4.5 million trucks, and 572,583 rail cars entered the United States from Mexico, each one representing opportunities for drug trafficking organisations to introduce their illegal substances into the United States.[691] This is the reason why the drug threat posed by the Mexican border was compared to the 'U.S. national drug threat'.[692] The DEA's perception of the threat from the Mexican border was shared by the then-U.S. Customs Service. In Logan's view,

> With the Mexican border, of course, it's a very robust activity you know, certainly drug smuggling is number one activity that we see coming out of Mexico, marijuana, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, pharmaceuticals, and often times because of the increasing volume of trade caused by NAFTA, the drug cartels try to mask their smuggling activity in legitimate cargo. So it is very difficult, and of course most of the legitimate trade, maquiladora factories want to avoid the utilization of their operations for drug smugglers; the fact is that their operations get penetrated either in the trucking area or low-level employees who certainly can't stand the pressure of organized crime.[693]

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[690] U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), *Statement by Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)*, Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee, March 29, 2001, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct032901.htm (22/11/02), p.1.
[691] *Idem*.
[692] *Ibid*., p.2.
[693] Interview with Logan.

Compelled by the economic imperative of cross-border trade, U.S. border authorities have been unable to search every single vehicle entering from Mexico. According to a source quoted by Andreas, between 1994 and 1998 the U.S. Customs Service went from inspecting 5 to 25% of trucks coming from Mexico.[694]

A different perspective pointed out that effective drug control was not really sacrificed for the sake of NAFTA, but became more problematic with the easing of border controls. In the opinion of Logan, trying to reconcile an open border for legitimate trade with the need to protect against undesirable flows has been a 'continuing balancing act'; and he added, 'there is political pressure to make sure on certainly the U.S. side that we have enough controls to make sure that the border is not completely wide-open'.[695]

It is important to mention that toward the end of the Salinas administration the government of Mexico decided to combat drug trafficking activities with reduced U.S. assistance. The reason was Mexico's protest over 'Operation Leyenda', mentioned above, after the United States encouraged the abduction of Doctor Humberto Álvarez-Machaín from Mexican territory on 2 April 1990 in order to face charges in the United States of involvement in Camarena's murder. When the U.S. Supreme Court decided the abduction did not contravene the bilateral extradition treaty, Mexico suspended the operation of U.S. agents on its territory, and in 1993 it ceased the reception of all U.S. counternarcotics assistance for all practical purposes.[696] This policy remained in effect until 1995 when the incoming Mexican government again accepted U.S. counter-drug assistance.

4.2.3.3. Increasing Bilateral Co-operation

In general terms, the U.S. and Mexican response to the continued failures of interdiction has been the intensification of coercive measures. After taking office in December 1994, President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) declared that drug trafficking was 'Mexico's number one security

[694] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.76.
[695] Interview with Logan.
[696] K. L. Storrs, Specialist on Latin American Affairs, 'Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Zedillo, December 1994 to March 1998', *CRS Report to Congress*, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Received through the CRS Web, 98-161F, Congressional Research Service (CRS), The Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Updated March 4, 1998, p.5.

threat'.[697] The fact that the situation had not improved in comparison to previous Mexican administrations was evident in DoS's reports covering 1991-1997. They established that Mexico was the origin of the majority of drugs entering the U.S. illegal market (between 20 to 30% of the heroin, 80% of marijuana, 80% of synthetic drugs, and the platform for 50 to 60% of cocaine from South America).[698]

President Zedillo's response to continuing corruption in Mexico was to turn once again to the military. In late 1995, the armed forces increasingly took over several state police departments, and co-ordination for public security increased among the military, state and local police.[699] In December 1996, generals also took over the FJP nationwide, the INCD and CENDRO, at the same time military personnel increased its participation in CISEN as well.[700] In this context, by early 1998 it was estimated that around 40% of the Mexican military (out of 180,000 troops) was engaged in counternarcotics activities.[701]

The intensified participation of the Mexican military in anti-drug activities, however, did not produce a significant change. Comparison between President Salinas' last 3 years and President Zedillo's first 3 years shows more continuity than change in the pattern of aggressive drug enforcement, according to Table 4-3.

[697] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Drug Control. Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico*, Report to Congressional Requesters, National Security and International Affairs Division, GAO/NSIAD-96-163, Washington, DC, 12 June 1996, p.18.
[698] Storrs, 'Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Zedillo', pp.2-3.
[699] Schulz, *Between Rock and a Hard Place*, p.2.
[700] *Ibid*., p.3.
[701] Andreas, *Border Games*, pp.65-66.

Table 4-3. **Mexican Counter-drug Activities, 1992-1997**

	1992	1993	1994	Totals	1995	1996	1997	Totals
Seizures								
Cocaine (mt)	38.8	46.2	22.1	**107.10**	22.2	23.6	34.9	**80.7**
Opium (mt)	0.17	0.13	0.15	**0.45**	0.22	0.20	0.34	**0.76**
Heroin (mt)	0.09	0.06	0.29	**0.456**	0.203	0.363	0.115	**0.681**
Marihuana (mt)	405	495	528	**1,428**	780	1,015	1,038	**2,833**
Methamphetamine (mt)	-	-	0.26	**-**	0.496	0.172	0.039	**0.707**
Ephedrine (mt)	-	-	-	**-**	4.9	6.7	0.608	**12.208**
Illicit Drug Labs	4	5	9	**18**	19	19	8	**46**
Arrests								
Nationals	27,639	17,551	6,860	**51,780**	9,728	11,038	10,572	**31,338**
Foreigners	208	75	146	**429**	173	207	170	**550**
Total	27,577	17,626	7,006	**52,209**	9,901	11,245	10,742	**31,888**
Eradication								
Opium (ha)	6,860	7,820	6,620	**21,300**	8,450	7,900	8,000	**24,350**
*			10,959		15,389	14,671	17,416	**47,476**
Marihuana (ha)	12,100	9,970	8,495	**30,565**	11,750	12,200	10,500	**34,450**
*			14,207		21,573	22,769	23,385	**67,727**

* Government of Mexico's figures.

Source: Storrs, 'Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Zedillo', p.4.

While arrests and cocaine seizures decreased during this entire period, seizures of marijuana and drug laboratories increased by a larger margin. It is important to consider that these figures, however, did not provide the total amount of drugs produced, neither reflected the capabilities of drug traffickers nor the effectiveness of reporting methods.

The U.S. encouraged militarisation of drug control in Mexico, consequently, resulted in increasing the militarisation of the bilateral relationship. Even though Mexico had traditionally rejected U.S. military aid in order to safeguard its independence and sovereignty, military contacts between the two countries began to increase, and an important step in this direction was the October 1995 visit to Mexico of the then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry (the first ever visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defense), which in the following April was reciprocated by his Mexican counterpart visiting the United States. In the 1995 meeting, Secretary Perry stated,

> Standing side by side, our two presidents showed the world that the United States and Mexico are good neighbors and good friends. My goal, and the goal of my visit, is to help our nations forge closer security ties, because when it comes to stability and security, our

> destinies are inextricably linked. So let us build a new bilateral security relationship based on openness, trust, cooperation and mutual respect.[702]

In the meeting the following year, both armed forces agreed to establish a bilateral working group to explore ways to co-operate in four different areas: a) counter-narcotics, b) natural disasters, c) force modernisation, and d) education and training.[703] While most of these efforts concentrated on the fourth area, it is important to note that they emphasised the challenge posed by drug trafficking.[704] According to GAO, during FY1996 and FY1997, DoD provided the Mexican military with $76 million worth of equipment and training. The equipment provided is shown in Table 4-4.

Table 4-4. **DoD Counter-drug assistance provided to, or planned for, the Mexican Military, Fiscal Years 1996-97**

	Dollars in Millions	
Source of Assistance	**Value of Assistance**	**Type of Assistance**
Excess defence articles	$5	20 UH-1H helicopters
Section 506 (a)(2) drawdown	$37	53 UH-1H helicopters 4 C-26 aircraft 2-year UH-1H spare part package
Section 1004	$26	About 70% was planned to be used for training and the remainder for the purchase of equipment
Section 1031	$8	UH-1H spare parts

Source: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Drug Control. U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges*, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-98-154, National Security and International Affairs Division (NISIAD), Washington, DC, June 1998, p.3.

[702] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 'New Generation of U.S.-Mexico Cooperation and Trust', Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Mexican Ministry of Defense, Mexico City, Oct. 23, 1995, *Defense Issues*, Vol. 10, Number 96, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, DC, [online] available: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/di95/di1096.html (10/07/97), p.1.
[703] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 'US/Mexico Defense Meeting, April 24, 1996', *Background Briefing*, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASDPA), [online] available: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr1996/x042896_x0424mex.html (23/03/00), p.2.
[704] U.S. security assistance to Mexico included the following: a) Mexico received more assistance through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme than any other country in the region in 1996 and 1997; b) Mexican personnel ranked first in the region in attendance at the School of Americas in 1997 and second in 1996; c) Mexican personnel ranked first in the region in attendance at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy in 1996 and 1997; d) in 1997, Mexico was second in the region in counter-drug assistance received through DoD's 'Section 1004' account. See Grayson, *Mexico's Armed Forces. A Factbook*, p.66.

Regarding military hardware, all of the helicopters and the C-26 aircraft were delivered to the Mexican military during 1996 and 1997, and Mexico also received some logistical and training support.[705] In addition to this assistance, the Mexican military used its own funds to purchase two Knox-class frigates from the United States through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme, valued at about $7 million, which were delivered to Mexico in August 1997.[706]

U.S. counter-narcotics assistance was supposed to enhance the ability of the Mexican military to conduct counter-drug missions by increasing its air mobility. At that time, however, key elements of DoD counter-drug assistance resulted of limited utility. For instance, the 73 UH-1H helicopters '[were] of limited usefulness in meeting some counternarcotics missions, and their operational capabilities [were] limited because of the lack of spare parts'.[707] Eventually, in an episode without precedent at such scale, all the helicopters were returned to the United States by the Mexican government (which were intended to enable the U.S.-trained Special Forces Airborne Groups [GAFES] to reach clandestine runways to seize aircraft loaded with cocaine). According to the account of an insider during the affair,

> The problem was that Mexico was being given old equipment, and the problem with old equipment, we are talking about helicopters and ships that were used in Vietnam, is that it requires a lot of maintenance, and this is expensive maintenance; and this is not only in Mexico but also in other parts of the world; when countries are given this equipment, overnight they have a capability which cannot be used because it does not have the right maintenance, and besides they [helicopters] are unable to fly at the altitude required by the Mexican armed forces. Thus, at some point the helicopters did not fly anymore because of problems such as cracks, they have problems because they are old, then you have a problem and what to do? What happened was that Mexico, and this had never happened before, returned the 73 helicopters to the United States which, never equipment had been returned to that level… Dangerously it became a problem in which Mexicans would say, 'you are giving us this "junk"', and the United States would say 'the problem is that you do not know how to keep the helicopters', and the truth is that both had some reason… This was absolutely a problem that could have been diplomatically very complicated and could have affected other areas of the relationship.[708]

[705] GAO, *Drug Control. U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges*, p.2.
[706] *Ibid*., p.3.
[707] *Ibid*., p.5.
[708] Interview with Ana Maria Salazar, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Mexico City, 21 June 2002.

The increasing involvement of the Mexican military in drug control operations confronted not only the problem of inadequate co-ordination but also, and more ominously, the already mentioned predicament of greater exposition to corruption. During the Salinas administration there were several cases that were evidence of this challenge. In 1991 in Tlalixcoyan, Veracruz, for instance, federal police were engaged by soldiers on a clandestine runway when they were about to seize drugs and make arrests; some agents died as a result of this incident and no traffickers were arrested.[709] The most serious incident, however, was the February 1997 arrest of General Jesús Gutiérrez-Rebollo, the head of INCD, on charges of working for Amado Carrillo Fuentes, leader of the Juárez cartel. This occurred only eight days after the then-'Drug Czar', General Barry McCraffrey, had described him as an 'honest man and a no non-sense field commander'.[710] As a result of this incident the INCD was dismantled, and the Mexican government created the Special Prosecutor's Office for Health Crimes (FEADS). The Mexican response to such corruption, however, was to reinforce the trend towards militarisation.

Regarding the U.S. anti-drug certification process, it is important to mention that there was no controversy during the Salinas years. During President Zedillo's term of office, however, revelations of deepening corruption put Mexico at the centre of Washington's certification debate.[711] Because of congressional pressure to encourage Mexico to intensify its anti-narcotics activities through the certification process, in 1996 President Clinton found itself confronting a dilemma between certifying Mexico in spite of corruption issues, and provoking the outrage of the U.S. Congress, or decertifying it and complicating the bilateral relationship in the context of the recently approved NAFTA. The solution was to deflect attention from Mexico by disapproving Colombia's anti-drug efforts, but this course of action ended up the 'integrity' of the whole certification process.[712] It was in this context that U.S.-Mexico counter-drug co-operation increased, as already described.

In a bilateral commitment to confront the drug threat, both governments signed the *Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs,* which established the High Level Contact Group for Drug Control (HLCG) to provide for cabinet-level co-ordination twice

[709] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.67.
[710] Golden, 'Mexico and Drugs', p.13.
[711] K. L. Storrs, Specialist on Latin American Affairs, 'Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-1998', *CRS Report to Congress*, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Received through the CRS Web, 98-174 F, Congressional Research Service (CRS), The Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Updated April 9, 1998, p.2.
[712] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.71.

a year, and working groups on money laundering, chemical control, demand-reduction, prisoner transfer, extradition and mutual legal assistance met four times a year to co-ordinate policies. Acting through these groups, the two countries agreed to develop a joint strategy when President Zedillo visited Washington, DC, in mid-November 1997, which was announced in February 1998. The *United States/Mexico Bi-national Drug Strategy* defined three main objectives set forth in the declaration: 1) to 'stop the increase in and the illicit consumption, production, and traffic of narcotics and psychotropic substances in both countries'; 2) to 'treat the problems generated by drugs in the realms of health and safety in both societies'; and 3) to 'agree on the actions necessary to reduce production, trafficking, distribution and consumption of drugs, as well as to eliminate crimes related to drugs such as diversion of precursors and essential chemicals, money laundering, and arms trafficking'.[713]

Following the mid-February 1997 arrest of General Gutiérrez-Rebollo, some members of Congress urged President Clinton to censure Mexico by making a 'national interest certification'. When the president disregarded this advice and fully certified Mexico in late February 1997, both houses introduced resolutions of disapproval (H. J. Res. 58 and S. J. Res.19, 20 and 21).[714] In order to not openly contradict the administration, on 20 March 1997 the U.S. Senate voted 94 to 5 to pass an amendment to H.R Res. 58 that instead of disapproving the president's certification, required a report by 1 September 1997 on bilateral anti-narcotics efforts, requiring also the strengthening of law enforcement operations and an increase in the number of INS agents deployed to the common border.[715] The Clinton administration complied with the Senate version of H.R Res. 58, and reported on the established date.[716]

President Clinton certified Mexico again on 26 February 1998 emphasising the country's willingness to work with the United States through the HLCG and the bi-national drug control strategy; several members of Congress on both Houses found this situation unacceptable and each presented initiatives critical of the administration's decision mentioning, for instance, Mexico's lack of co-operation by resisting requests to allow U.S. agents to be armed within its

[713] The White House, *United States/Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy*, February 1998, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), p.2.
[714] Storrs, 'Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Zedillo', p.3.
[715] *Ibid*., p.4.
[716] *Idem*.

territory.[717] The Senate discussed the measures on 26 March 1998 and neither resolution passed.[718]

It is important to note that while the certification process served the interests of those U.S. policymakers who wanted to appear 'tough on drugs', its punitive approach did little to improve bilateral co-operation in drug enforcement. According to Toro,

> the so-called 'certification process' has become a source of considerable irritation for Latin American governments and societies that do not understand why supposedly cooperative endeavors should be judged unilaterally by the country that created the entire problem in the first place.[719]

In fact, the dynamics of this process, and other unilateral actions carried out by the U.S. government in the 1990s, complicated efforts to promote co-operation with Mexico. For instance, on 18 May 1998, the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and Justice made public the conclusion of an undercover initiative called 'Operation Casablanca' targeted at drug traffickers from Mexico and Colombia, that had resulted in the arrests of representatives of financial institutions and in the confiscation of drug proceeds (more than $100 million dollars).[720] The Mexican government, nevertheless, in due course condemned the initiative after it became clear that U.S. authorities had operated unilaterally on its territory, and this incident led to a bilateral agreement on 'guidelines for consultation on sensitive law enforcement activities' in February 1999.[721] This episode exposed the fragility of co-operation between the two countries, especially because it showed the deep distrust of U.S. officials regarding their Mexican counterparts in the context of past corruption scandals.

4.3. Implications for U.S. National Security

The high-level of demand and consumption of drugs in the United States has been defined mainly by its federal government as a national security issue not only because of its obvious impact on the health and well being of its citizens, but also because of its detrimental effect on economic productivity and the burden it has created for the judicial system.

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[717] *Ibid*., pp.4-5.
[718] *Idem*.
[719] M. C. Toro, 'Unilateralism and Bilateralism', in Smith, *Drug Policy in the Americas*, p.318.
[720] U.S. Department of State (DoS), *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1998*, Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington, DC, February 1999, [online] available: http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_rep/major/Mexico.html (04/04/00), p.5.
[721] *Idem*.

Beyond the pervasive domestic impact drug abuse has had in the United States, the tendency of the U.S. government to transfer the costs of drug control to other societies has also represented a potential threat to U.S. national security. Nowhere has this prospect been more evident than in the case of Mexico, where drug trafficking has constantly threatened to subvert internal order, to corrupt government institutions, and to erode the stability of the country, more generally. It can be argued that obstacles to a sound bilateral relationship posed by instability and corruption in Mexico actually represent a more pernicious threat to U.S. security than drug trafficking itself.

This section will assess the health, economic, and judicial challenges posed by the drug trade within the United States, and then it will address the risks that drug trafficking represents for U.S. and the bilateral relationship with Mexico.

4.3.1. *Domestic Impact*

The use of illegal drugs in the United States has been a problem that has had important social, economic, and political consequences for the country. The magnitude of the challenge, from the U.S. government's perspective, is evident from the fact that historically, and formally since 1986, drug trafficking was characterised by President Reagan as a threat to U.S. national security.

In contrast to the other two issues covered by this thesis for which there has been more U.S. ambivalence about their definition as 'security concerns', the threat posed by drug trafficking has been unequivocal. For instance, Schulz points out that drugs could well be 'the most important U.S. national security interest in this [Western] hemisphere', and he adds, 'they are poisoning our society, destroying the social fabric, and spreading crime, violence, and death'.[722] Regarding the health impact, in 2001 the U.S. government reported that more than 10,000 U.S. citizens died each year from drug-related causes. It estimated that in the first decade of the 21st century, without a significant decrease in domestic consumption, around 100,000 people would die, almost twice the number of U.S. soldiers who died in the Vietnam War.[723] A

[722] Schulz, *Between Rock and a Hard Place*, p.2.
[723] The White House, 'Emerging Drug Threats to U.S. National Security and the Security of the Community of Nations, and the Role of the Department of Defense in Combating these Threats', Prepared Remarks by General Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Executive Office of the President, *Survival in a Century of New Threats*, Economic Strategy Institute, April 28, 1999, [online] available: http://www.econstrat.org/NmcCaffrey.htm (11/01/00), p.2.

further concern was the increasing evidence of the corrupting effect of Mexican drug organisations operating within the United States on federal, state and local law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border.[724] In a similar opinion, according to the former ONDCP Deputy Director for Supply Reduction,

> Yes, I think it is [drugs] a national security issue… national security as broadly defined includes protection against all threats, and the preservation of the wealth and welfare of the United States and its citizens, and drug trafficking, the one, it degrades the health of the nation, that's one; two, it degrades productivity, so it hurts us economically, because of lost productivity and because of increased cost to government because drug addiction and those kinds of things; and three, it undermines our institutions, just as it does in other countries, so for example drug trafficking begets corruption…[725]

4.3.1.1. Use

According to previously mentioned 2001 U.S. official drug statistics, the number of drug users in the United States (12 years of age and older, who had consumed drugs at any point during the 30 days previous to the study), was 15.9 million. This figure represented 7.1% of the total U.S. population, up from 6.3% in 2000. Consumption had also increased during this period for every type of drug (marijuana from 4.8% to 5.4%; cocaine from 0.5% to 0.7%; pain killers from 1.2% to 1.6%; and tranquilisers 0.4% to 0.6%).[726]

In terms of drug users by age, the 2001 study established that consumption increased among both the 12 to 17 group (from 9.7% to 10.8% between 2000 and 2001), and the 18 to 25 group (from 15.9 to 18.8% during the same period), with no statistically significant changes for adults 26 years and older.[727] It was estimated there were 2.4 million first time-marijuana users in 2000 (compared to 3.2 million between 1976 and 1977), as well as 1.9 million first time-methamphetamine users in 2000 (from 0.7 million in 1998).[728]

In order to appreciate the extent of substance use among young people in the United States, it is important to consider the following 2000 National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) facts: (a) while nearly four out of ten students (35%) had tried an illicit drug by the end of the

[724] *Idem*.
[725] Interview with Umberg.
[726] SAMHSA, 'Highlights', *2001 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse*, pp.1-2.
[727] *Idem*.
[728] *Ibid*., p.3.

eighth grade, 56% of students had already tried drugs by the twelfth grade; (b) while more than three-fifths (61%) of people in their late twenties had consumed drugs, 33% had tried an illicit substance other than marijuana; (c) in 2001, while more than one out of seven young adults (15%) had used cocaine, 8% had done it by 17 or 18 years of age; about 1 out 25 high school seniors (3.7%) had tried crack, and the rate for the 29 to 30 group was 3.9%; finally (d) in 2000 1 out of 16 high school seniors (5.8%) smoked marijuana daily; for the 19 to 28 group the rate was 5.0%; in 2001, while 1 out of 5 or 6 seniors were daily marijuana smokers (18%), the rate among young adults was 1 in 7 (14.5%).[729]

4.3.1.2. Drug Spending

Spending estimations of both licit and illicit drugs is complicated due to the uncertainty in data about amounts used and prices paid. In general, however, we can observe that cocaine consumption declined over the course of the 1990s as indicated in Table 4-5. While heroin consumption also appeared to decline in the early 1990s, it seems that it had rebounded by the end of the decade.

Table 4-5. **Total Amount of Cocaine and Heroin Consumed in the United States, 1988-2000 (metric tons)**

Year	Cocaine	Heroin
1988	660	14.6
1989	576	16.6
1990	447	13.6
1991	355	12.5
1992	346	12.5
1993	331	11.2
1994	323	10.8
1995	321	12.0
1996	301	12.8
1997	275	11.8
1998	267	14.5
1999	271	14.3
2000	259	13.3

Source: The White House, *What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs 1988-2000*, Office of Programs, Budget, Research and Evaluations, under HHS contract no. 282-98-0006, Prepared by Abt Associates, Inc., December 2001, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), p.4.

[729] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DoHHS), *Monitoring the Future. National Survey Results on Drug Use, 1975-2000*, Volume I: Secondary School Students, 2001, National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), [online] available: http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/vol1-2000.pdf (22/11/02), p.31-32.

According to one study commissioned by ONDCP, in 2000 U.S. citizens spent about $64 billion dollars on drugs in 2000, as shown in Table 3-6. Overall drug spending, nevertheless, seems to have decreased during the decade of the 1990s from a total of $115 billion dollars in 1990 to the $64 billion figure in 2000 mentioned above, due basically to a price increase with an average spending per year of $79 billion during the whole decade.

Table 4-6. **Total U.S. Expenditures on Illicit Drugs, 1988-2000 ($ in billions, 2000 dollar equivalents)**

Year	Cocaine	Heroin	Meth.	Marihuana	Other	Total
1988	107.0	26.1	5.8	12.1	3.3	**154**
1989	88.4	24.3	5.8	11.0	2.8	**132**
1990	69.9	22.5	5.7	15.0	2.2	**115**
1991	57.1	20.3	3.7	14.0	2.3	**97**
1992	49.9	17.2	4.8	14.6	1.5	**88**
1993	45.0	13.8	5.1	12.0	1.5	**78**
1994	42.8	13.2	7.6	12.2	2.6	**78**
1995	40.0	13.2	9.2	10.2	2.7	**75**
1996	39.2	12.8	10.1	9.5	2.7	**74**
1997	34.7	11.4	9.3	10.5	2.5	**68**
1998	34.9	11.1	8.0	10.8	2.3	**67**
1999	35.6	10.1	5.8	10.6	2.6	**65**
2000	35.3	10.0	5.4	10.5	2.4	**64**

* Estimates for 2000 are projections.

Source: ONDCP, *What America's*, p.3.

The price paid by the society as a result of drug consumption in the United States, nevertheless, seems to have been more significant than the figures shown above in terms of issues such as crime, health, the economy as well as social integration, as will be discussed below.

4.3.1.3. Costs

According to data on the economic burden drug consumption represents to the U.S. society, between 1992 and 1998 the price increased from $102.2 billion dollars to $143.4 billion (5.9% per year) even though spending on drugs decreased, as shown above.[730]

It is important to note that the price by spending category (health, lost productivity, and other effects) was similar during the period of reference. While spending on health care diminished (from 10.6% to 9.0%), that associated to productivity losses and other effects

[730] The White House, *The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-1998*, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Washington, DC, September 2001, p.2.

increased (from 68.0% to 68.7% and from 21.5% to 22.4% during the period, respectively).[731] Moreover, the price tag of drug abuse was estimated to continue growing at 5.8% per year, from $143.4 billion to $160.7 billion between 1998 and 2000 (outpacing the annual combined 3.4% population and consumer prices increase).[732]

In total, spending on health services increased 2.9%, from $10.8 billion dollars to $14.9 billion between 1992 and 1998. It is important to note that spending within this category remained almost constant during the period of reference, due to new medicines that allowed for a moderate price reduction (from $3.7 billion to $3.4 billion) in the treatment of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) care, which in 1992 was the main drug use-related cost. In contrast, by the end of the period community-provided care became the most expensive category, as shown in Table 4-7. Another important item was hospital and ambulatory care costs, which increased around 9.5% during this period.

[731] *Ibid*., p.3.
[732] *Ibid*., p.4.

Table 4-7. **U.S. Health Care Costs, 1992 and 1998 (millions of dollars)**

Cost categories	1992	1998	Annualised % change
Community-based specialty treatment	3,415	4,933	6.3
Federally-provided specialty treatment			
DoD	14	5	-15.9
Indian Health Services	26	32	3.4
Bureau of Prisons	17	21	3.4
Dept. Veteran Affairs	468	416	-2.0
Support			
Federal Prevention	616	725	2.8
State and Local Prevention	89	85	-0.8
Training	49	60	3.5
Prevention Research	158	250	8.0
Treatment Research	195	328	9.1
Insurance Administration	223	286	4.2
Medical Consequences			
Hospital/Ambulatory care costs	562	969	9.5
Special disease costs			
Drug-exposed infants	407	503	3.6
Tuberculosis	30	24	-3.5
HIV/AIDS	3,700	3,337	-1.5
Hepatitis B and C	462	434	-1.0
Crime victim health care costs	92	127	5.4
Health Insurance Administration	298	287	-0.6
Total	**10,820**	**12,862**	**2.9**

Source: White House, *Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States*, p.5.

Drug-emergency cases in hospitals increased from 333,100 in 1978 to a pike of 638,484 in 2001. From the 2001 cases, those related to cocaine amounted to 193,034 (30%); those related to marijuana were 110,512 (from 15,706 in 1990 or a 604% increase). While in 2000 heroin emergency cases reached the 94,804 figure (from 33,884 in 1990 or a 180% increase), by 2001 this incidence showed a slight reduction to 93,064 cases. For its part, methamphetamine-related cases decreased from an all-time high of 17,537 in 1994, to 14,923 cases in 2001.[733]

The figure estimated for productivity losses was $69.4 billion in 1992. By 1998, this cost was estimated to have risen to $98.5 billion, which represented a 6.0% annual increase. The projected figure for 2000 was $110.5 billion. The fastest growing productivity losses were

[733] The White House, 'Fact Sheet', *Drug Use Trends*, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), [online] available: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.PDF (22/11/02), p.4.

related to health and imprisonment services, with annual rates increasing between 1992 and 1998 to 8.5% and 9.1%, respectively, as shown in Table 4-8.

Table 4-8. **U.S. Productivity Losses, 1992 and 1998 (millions of dollars)**

Cost categories	1992	1998	Annualised % change
Premature death	14,575	16,611	2.2
Drug abuse-related illness	14,205	23,143	8.5
Institutionalisation/Hospitalisation	1,477	1,786	3.2
Productivity loss of victims of crime	2,059	2,165	0.8
Incarceration	17,907	30,133	9.1
Crime careers	19,198	24,627	4.2
Total	**69,421**	**98,476**	**6.0**

Source: White House, *Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States*, p.6.

All factors considered, in the 1990s the use of illegal drugs in the United States represented around $110 billion in social costs.

Most of the social costs categorised as 'other' involve expenditures on criminal justice. Contradicting the argument that most drug users do not commit crimes other than the crime of possession itself, survey data demonstrates that between 1986 and 1997 50% to 57% people arrested had used drugs within 30 days before their offence. The figure for drug use at the time of offense for people at state detention centres was between 31% and 36% in the same period. For federal prisoners, drug use within 30 days before their offense increased from 32% to 45% between 1991 and 1997, while the commission of crimes while intoxicated increased from 17% to 22% between 1991 and 1997. According to the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) programme for U.S. selected cities, the number of male prisoners under the influence of drugs at the time of their arrest was between 54% and 83%, and that for females was between 44% and 81% in 1998. One year later, the ranges decreased slightly from 50% to 77% in the former category, and from 22% to 81% in the latter.[734]

In fact, according to the 1997 Survey of State and Federal Prison Inmates published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 51% of the prison population was intoxicated when transgressing the law. In terms of specific drug violations, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in 1997 there were 1,583,600 non-federal arrests in the United States. While in 1987 arrests related to drugs amounted to 7.4% of the total reported to the FBI, by 1997 the

[734] *Ibid*., pp.4-5.

figure increased to 10.4%. Moreover, the proportion of drug delinquents grew from 6% to 23% in relation to the total population of both state and federal prisons between 1980 and 1996. Only in federal prisons, the proportion of drug criminals increased to 60% in 1997 from 25% in 1980. In 1997 the median time served for drug offences was 82 months.[735]

According to Cárdenas, Policy Analyst at the ONDCP, in past years different states and even the U.S. federal government have pursued several laws aimed at stiffly penalising those charged with simple possession of drugs.[736] However, in a statement that helps explain these oddly punitive responses to drug possession, a former high-ranking ONDCP official said of convicts:

> They are there because of distribution… Well, typically by the amount you… if you get a kilogram of cocaine that's not for your own use; if you get one gram of cocaine that may be for your own use, so you distinguish it by the amount in your possession, one; or two, if you are caught in the act of selling it and clearly you are in the business of selling drugs, so that's how you distinguish it, but many people are arrested for distribution but they plead guilty to a possession, so they may end up going to jail not for the crime that they originally were charged with but for a crime that they plead guilty to…[737]

This explanation, therefore, shows why people have been convicted on the basis of possession rather than distribution charges. In some cases, however, such laws have appeared to be excessively harsh and for this reason, in order to reduce prison populations, the ONDCP has been dealing with non-violent drug offenders by trying a treatment programme instead of incarceration.[738]

It is important to note that all of the drug cost categories mentioned above are related in one way or another to the cost of crime. In general, the cost of crime in the United States increased from $60 billion dollars to $88.9 billion (6% per year) between 1992 and 1998, and were estimated to reach $100.1 billion by 2000. Within this cost, the most rapidly increasing categories were police protection (i.e. law enforcement activities) and productivity losses (i.e. unmet production targets because of unmanned positions) because of people in prison, with annual increases of 9.3% and 9.1% respectively, as shown in Table 4.9.

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[735] *Ibid*., pp.1-3.
[736] Interview with Juan Pablo Cárdenas, Policy Analyst, Mexico, Central America & Caribbean, The White House, Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Washington, DC, 29 May 2001.
[737] Interview with Umberg.
[738] Interview with Cárdenas.

Table 4-9. **U.S. Crime-Related Costs, 1992 and 1998 (millions of dollars)**

Cost categories	1992	1998	Annualised % change
Health care costs			
Crime victim health care costs	92	127	5.4
Productivity losses			
Productivity loss of victims of crime	2,059	2,165	0.8
Incarceration	17,907	30,133	9.1
Crime careers	19,198	24,627	4.2
Cost of other effects			
Criminal justice system and other public costs			
Police protection	5,348	9,096	9.3
Legal adjudication	2,716	4,489	8.7
State and Federal corrections	7,495	11,027	6.6
Local corrections	1,333	1,660	3.7
Fed. spending to reduce supply	4,126	4,827	2.6
Private costs			
Private legal defence	365	548	7.0
Property damage for victims of crime	193	186	-0.5
Total	**60,832**	**88,887**	**6.5**

Source: The White House, *Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States*, p.9.

Drug trafficking has also put U.S. citizens and institutions at risk. Violence, as in other parts of the world, has been endemic to the drug trade. In 1997, for instance, 786 U.S. citizens were killed in drug-related incidents, the lowest number in over a decade, but still a perceptible toll.[739] This figure, nevertheless, cannot be compared with the mayhem brought about by drug trafficking in other countries such as in Colombia and Mexico where U.S. anti-drug policies have been exported.

Neither has the United States been immune to the drug corruption that has affected other countries. Drug traffickers have tried to buy protection from U.S. law enforcement and public officials, and in some cases they have succeeded. For instance, over the six-year period from 1992 and 1997, 28 U.S. Customs Service and INS employees on the Southwest border were convicted of drug-related crimes, even though this number seemed a low proportion in terms of

[739] White House, 'Emerging Drug Threats', p.2.

the 9,600 agents who remained committed to their duty during this period; these cases, nevertheless, demonstrate that corruption has in fact existed.[740]

What was striking during the course of this research was to find only a limited number of analyses concentrating on the causes of drug addiction, as opposed to the number of reports focusing on its consequences in the United States. This approach is reflected by the fact that in 2001 only 1.4% of drug users (3.1 million out of 15 million people 12 years and older) had access to rehabilitation in the year before the survey; moreover, almost half of the people who in fact received treatment -1.6 million-, obtained it from NGOs.[741] Efforts to prevent drug consumption seem to have been limited at best. For instance, in contrast to the increasing proportion of the population who considered smoking to be unhealthy (71% in 2001 from 69.3% in 2000), in 2000 only 56.4% perceived the use of marijuana once or twice a week as a great health risk, and only 53% maintained this view in 2001.[742]

The reason for insufficient access to treatment and education programmes may reside in the fact that even though supply-side policies have been by far the most expensive kind of response to the problem, they have been easier to implement and more politically convenient than demand-side measures, and that might well explain the support for them in the United States. That is, in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework, this could be the explanation about why the 'audience' has legitimised the coercive U.S. approach to drugs, provided that 'extraordinary measures' to deal with drugs as an 'existential threat' are only applied abroad. Questioned about the lack of balance in U.S. drug policy, Umberg stated:

> Well, we can always do better. There are sort of broadly defined… there are several different areas that we focus on; one is demand reduction, reduction of demand for drugs in the United States, and there is a couple of different ways to do that, is by prevention, by teaching other people about the dangers of drug abuse and by treatment. We are doing a… we could do better specially in those two areas, there is a large treatment gap and there is people in the United States who need treatment, don't have access to it, typically; and secondly, in terms of prevention, we are trying to educate America's young people and adults on the dangers of drugs, but we haven't been 100% successful.[743]

[740] *Idem.*
[741] SAMHSA, 'Highlights', p.4.
[742] *Ibid.*, p.3.
[743] Interview with Umberg.

Given the context described above, both a coercive strategy at home and the prospect for the legalisation of drugs are completely out of the question for the U.S. government. The primary concern about legalisation seems to be its impact in terms of affecting a whole generation of young people (given the figures on the age composition of drug users provided above). That is, legalisation has been rejected basically because of fear that a growing acceptance of drugs will lead to increased levels of drug use, worsening crime, and to consequences such as drug-related illness, death and absenteeism. This was especially so at a time when use of marijuana by 8th graders, as already discussed, was fuelled by a measurable decrease in the number of young people who perceived drugs as dangerous substances. In this context, drug legalisation would send a conflicting message to the youth of the country by telling children that adults believe that drugs can be used without ill consequences. That would in turn eventually lead to the *de facto* legalisation of cultivation and production.[744]

4.4. Bilateral Relations

As discussed above, no issue in U.S.-Mexican relations has generated more controversy than that of drugs. Most accounts of U.S.-Mexican diplomacy regarding drug trafficking have stressed the pressure on Mexico to 'do something about drugs'. Interpreting Mexican drug control policy as a direct response to U.S. diplomatic pressure, however, disregards Mexico's own interest in fighting an illegal activity that has posed a significant challenge to Mexican institutions.[745] Within the wider issue of drug control, one of the most sensitive aspects for the bilateral relationship has been the way in which the drug trade has corrupted Mexican authorities. This corruption, which has taken many forms and has occurred at different levels, has often complicated the process of forging a bilateral response to the drug trafficking threat. Reuter and Ronfeldt point out that the United States has been led to more aggressive postures, 'not so much by the extent of drug flows from Mexico as by the perception that the Mexican control efforts are corrupt', and they add, 'the Mexican drug problem, as it affects bilateral relations with the United States, is essentially an issue of integrity'.[746]

[744] E-mail message sent by Juan Pablo Cárdenas as part of the interview conducted in Washington, DC, on 29 May 2001.
[745] Ruíz-Cabañas, 'Mexico's Changing', p.61.
[746] Reuter and Ronfeldt, 'Quest for Integrity', p.131.

The most serious drug corruption-related incident between the two countries was the previously mentioned murder of Camarena in 1985. In the opinion of Craig, 'it was not the reality of the drug program's corruptibility but the extent to which [corruption] had corroded the [anti-drug] campaign that came as a surprise'.[747] After that incident, the U.S. media and U.S. Congressional hearings widely covered the issue of corruption in Mexico. From the Mexican perspective, the really irritating aspect of this situation was the 'public nature' of U.S. criticisms and their potential to produce a Mexican nationalist backlash.[748] Criticisms also touched on the question of commitment, as Mexicans argued that their efforts surpassed by far those of Washington, even at a time of economic and political instability.[749] Following this line of argument in Mexico, the question about why Mexicans have not often heard about major U.S. anti-drug achievements was posed during the interviews for this thesis. In the opinion of Cárdenas,

> Definitely happens [the dismantling of networks in the United States]. But I think it all is a problem of perception because the fact that a drug trafficking network has been dismantled in New York or Chicago or in Los Angeles does not necessarily is going to be a headline news here in the United States, because for one news to be a headline news in the United States, it has to compete with many, many other news, so TV channels and media in general have to determine that a news is valid for the half an hour on air of their programme, so it is very difficult… unless there had been casualties during an operation, or there had been a super-multimillion dollar seizure, it is difficult for an operation to make it to the news. I'll give you a specific example: the seizures of the U.S. Coast Guard in the Pacific area right now, normally, these seizures which involve really big amounts of metric tons of cocaine, normally do not make it to the news programs…[750]

According to Umberg, the reason that explains the 'lack-of-U.S. commitment' perception in Mexico has been the different structure of the drug trade in the United States:

> Yes. That's a custom question. The question is usually posed: 'How come you don't arrest your kingpins in the United States? There is so much… there are so many drugs being distributed that there must be kingpins…'… drug trafficking in the United States is organised differently than in Mexico and Colombia. It's much more diffused; in other words, there're maybe more people involved in drug distribution and typically once we

[747] Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy', p.81.
[748] *Idem.*
[749] *Ibid.*, p.82.
[750] Interview with Cárdenas.

> know their name, they're arrested… there are not too many people, drug dealers, who dominate… unless you get to be pretty well-known, after we get enough information to indict you, we usually catch you pretty quickly, before you get to be charged of drugs for a large area. Now, we did, you know, years ago, there were I think even larger drug traffickers that we did arrest them by… and that was a big deal, now it is much more spread out. Do we still have drug distribution? Obviously so. Do we… If we had some success? We had some success, internationally, production in Peru and Bolivia of cocaine is down dramatically, I think there have been successes between the United States and Mexico in the last four years that… for example, poppy production in Mexico is down, marijuana production in Mexico is down, there are… the cartels that existed in Colombia don't exist the way they used to exist. So, all those things are successes. Do we still have a long way to go? Yes, absolutely, we still have a long way to go.[751]

In the context of the 1985 incident, however, the Mexican government considered the accusations and scrutiny of its programmes a violation of its sovereignty. Reflecting public outrage, the Mexican press made a case against 'American police agents' whose presence in Mexico represented a '"violation of national sovereignty", and presented the activities and declarations of those agents as unacceptable meddling in Mexico's internal affairs'.[752]

Mexicans have criticised the United States for trying to manipulate one issue in order to exert pressure on Mexico in other areas, to raise concerns about the country's stability, and to damage its image for political reasons. In the 1980s, for instance, it was argued that the United States was deliberately exaggerating the drug problem to the detriment of Mexican sovereignty and security, possibly to compel Mexico to change its policies toward Central America.[753] Regarding the question of whether U.S. pressure in the Camarena affair was really motivated by Mexico's policies toward Central America, Craig suggested that it did derive from U.S. impatience about issues such as the deterioration of Mexico's eradication programme in the face of continued U.S. warnings; the Camarena incident was only the last straw in a series of bilateral disputes.[754]

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[751] Interview with Umberg.
[752] Toro, *'War'on Drugs*, p.63.
[753] G. González, 'El Problema del Narcotráfico en el Contexto de la Relación México-Estados Unidos', *Carta de Política Exterior Mexicana*, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), Abril-Septiembre 1985, pp.20-28.
[754] Craig, 'U.S. Narcotics Policy', p.86.

Even though ties between the United States and Mexico have been strengthened since NAFTA, the problem of Mexican corruption and lack of U.S. trust has still been present. According to Cárdenas, the issue of corruption in Mexico has not disappeared in the context of the bilateral relationship, but at least it has not been exploited in the way it was in the aftermath of the Camarena incident. He also stated that although trust has been complete at the highest levels of government, it will take a matter of years for this trust to filter down to the lower levels.[755] Logan agreed with Cardenas' perspective by pointing out that, 'at the level of personal trust' is where the best work is done between the United States and Mexico. Nevertheless, interpersonal trust ceases to facilitate policy solutions the moment people leave office and the new policy-makers are 'back to square one'.[756] According to his experience as Deputy 'Drug Czar', Umberg pointed out that there was trust between certain people and institutions, but accepted that the DEA and the U.S. Customs Service did not trust either their counterparts or any other institution in Mexico. He mentioned that notwithstanding that bilateral trust was improving, 'all it takes there is one really bad incident and that trust goes away… you know, another Kiki Camarena, another Gutiérrez-Rebollo, something like that and it all is gone'.[757]

4.5. Drug Trafficking from the Copenhagen School and Risk Society Theory Perspectives

Drug trafficking in U.S.-Mexican relations, first of all, has been a trans-border issue that has originated from an integrated drug market between the two countries, where Mexico has been a major supplier and transhipment point, and the United States the world's biggest consumer market. Drug trafficking, therefore, has been a reflection of the negative effects of globalisation.

According to the evidence analysed in this chapter, drug trafficking in the United States has been defined as both a law enforcement matter and a national security issue because of its impact on the country's health and social fabric; because of its negative effect on its economy in terms of lost productivity and the burden it has represented for the health and judicial systems; and because of its political consequences associated to official –though limited- corruption. This coercive U.S. approach to drug trafficking has been based on the idea that drug consumption has been is a law enforcement rather than a health matter.

[755] Interview with Cárdenas.
[756] Interview with Logan.
[757] Interview with Umberg.

In terms of the elements provided by the Buzan et.al analytical framework, in the United States the process of securitising drugs has been characterised by the prominent role of the state as the main 'securitising actor'. Drug use was first conceived as a security concern in 1969, two years before President Nixon declared the 'war on drugs' in 1971. In the mid-1980s, President Reagan officially designated drug abuse as 'national security threat'. That is, at least since the end of the 1960s, the U.S. government has been using the language of security ('speech act') in reference to drugs as a threat to the 'survival' of U.S. society.

The central securitising actor that has traditionally made the 'securitising move' in the United States in reference to drugs has been the federal government, mainly by framing the issue as a 'national security' rather than a as 'health', matter, as discussed above. Within the U.S. federal government, for instance, both the DoS and the DEA have not only defined drugs as a security concern, but also Mexican drug trafficking organisations, in particular. This does not mean that additional securitising actors such as state or local governments, or those within the education and health systems, or religious leaders and the media have not been important; it just means that the most salient securitising actors found in the course of this research were federal officials.

The interests and the intentions of those who securitise drugs in the United States have been related, first, to the genuine concern over preventing social erosion and the potential impact consumption could have in terms of new generations, especially because of the age composition of drug consumers in the United States. In this sense, government officials cannot afford to be perceived by the population as being 'soft on drugs', because this posture is not in line with the seriousness and sense of urgency authorities themselves have accorded to the drug threat, as reflected on the 'war on drugs' rhetoric.

Second, the U.S. government itself has had an interest in designating drugs as a security matter due to the need to justify and maintain the international anti-drug regime of its own creation, and in this sense the need to sustain also the international obligations demanded from other nations that keep the anti-drug system alive. Maintaining this orientation is important to the United States to continue transferring the costs of fighting drugs abroad, which has meant concentrating on interdiction efforts beyond its shores instead of emphasising drug prohibition domestically, in order to avoid significant political consequences because of the possibility for internal violence.

Third, in more practical terms, the U.S. government has had an interest in maintaining drugs as a security threat because the public's acceptance of this designation has been essential to justify the significant budgets that have sustained the 'law enforcement industry' in the country. Just as an example, the Border Patrol, which has been a key factor in dealing with illegal flows at the border with Mexico, increased its budget 148% (from $354 million to $877 million) and more than doubled its personnel on the U.S. Southwest border (from 3,389 to 8,000) in just five years, between 1993 and 1998.[758] More recently, border violence has been a subject that has attracted both public and official attention, not only in border communities but also at the national level. In this context, the discourse on 'secure our borders' in the United States led in 2003 to the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the most significant reorganisation of the U.S. security bureaucracy since the 1947 National Security Act. 'Protecting the nation's borders' (including from the threat posed by drugs), therefore, has been not only a phrase that has been related to sovereignty, but also to an 'existential threat' and to the recognition that security is nothing such as 'politics as usual'.

In the case of the United States, the 'audience' that has accepted and legitimised the use of 'extraordinary measures' to confront drugs as an 'existential threat' has been the U.S. public, in general, an also government officials who at the same time have been the stake-holders that have proposed the designation of drugs as a security issue. As part of the audience, fighting drugs has represented for government officials the continuity and permanence of their institutions.

It can be argued that the process of securitisation of drugs in the United States has been successfully completed because the audience has legitimised the use of 'extreme measures' to deal with a problem that has been perceived in terms of 'survival', which in turn has been evident in accepting the existence of a considerable law enforcement infrastructure to confront the threat. It can be argued that the acceptance of drugs as a security issue has been facilitated, first, by a genuine concern about the need to deal with the high level of addiction in the country, Second, the fact that drugs have been considered as something alien to U.S. society, something that comes from abroad, has allowed the United States to emphasise interdiction internationally

[758] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.90. The Border Patrol increased its number of agents from 10,000 in FY2004 to 20,500 in FY2010. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 'Securing America's Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet', Tuesday, March 15, 2011, [online] available: http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/fy2010_factsheet.xml (06/07/11).

in detriment of treatment at home. That is, even though interdiction has been by far the most expensive response to the problem in terms of the U.S. budget, as shown in Table 4-10, it has been the most convenient response compared to addressing demand-side measures that might as well increase the levels of internal violence in the United States.

Table 4-10. **U.S. Anti-drug Budget (1999)**

Spending by Strategy Goal, FY1999 (millions of dollars)

	Enacted	**Supp***	**Total**
1. Reduce youth drug use	2,080.6	1.7	2,082.3
2. Reduce drug related crime	7,441.0	12.0	7,453.0
3. Reduce consequences	3,383.7	0.0	3,383.7
4. Shield air, land, and sea frontiers	2,159.3	525.9	2,685.2
5. Reduce sources of supply	1,977.7	304.3	2,282.0
Total	**17,042.3**	**843.9**	**17,886.2**

* Emergency Supplemental funding provided by P. L. 105-277. These funds were in addition to each department's annual appropriation. Source: White House, *National Drug Control Strategy: 1999*, p.91. According to the figures above, 69.4% of the budget ($12,420.2) was assigned to supply-reduction activities, while 30.6% ($5,446.0) was devoted to prevention and treatment.

It is important to mention, nevertheless, that even though the securitisation of drugs have been successfully securitised, this does not mean that all sectors of the U.S. society necessarily favour a coercive approach to the problem, or accept the law enforcement orientation of U.S. drug control policy which has been considered a failure. There have been other perspectives that have emphasised different alternatives to the problem, mainly in the form of dealing with the demand side of the equation.

According to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, understanding the securitising process of a given issue allows the analyst to determine whether securitisation has been a 'bad' or a 'good' decision.[759] In the case of the securitisation of drugs in the United States, it can be argued that securitising drugs has been a bad idea because emphasising the law enforcement rather than the health aspect of the problem has not only been costly for the United States but also ineffective, evident in the fact that drug consumption and its social, political and economic consequences in the United States have not been adequately addressed so far. If it is true that by adopting a coercive approach the United States has also been able to transfer the costs of fighting drugs abroad -avoiding thus the domestic consequences in terms of violence as already

[759] Buzan et.al., *Security*, p.34.

mentioned, in the specific case of Mexico fighting drugs has not only fostered corruption with potential negative consequences in terms of its process of democratic change -because of the erosion of its efforts at strengthening its institutions-, but it has also promoted high levels of violence with the potential to create instability in the country with consequences that could be more costly for the United States than drug trafficking or consumption itself.

In terms of sectors, in the United States drug trafficking has been related to the military sector only to the extent that the U.S. military has provided infrastructure and intelligence in support of the LEAs dealing with this problem on the border with Mexico. That is, U.S. military forces are only indirectly involved in anti-drug activities. In the political sector, drug trafficking has been a threat to the United States because, although to a lesser extent than in Mexico, it has undermined its institutions and the legitimacy of the state. Although less prevalent than south of the border, drug-related corruption cases have also been present within federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and within the private sector.[760] In the societal sector, in principle, drug trafficking and consumption are dangers within society, not threats to society. However, if the dimension of these problems becomes considerable enough, which is precisely the point of no return that U.S. drug policy has tried to avoid, especially regarding consumption, then it has the potential to affect societal security by threatening the U.S. population itself. Drug trafficking and consumption in the United States, therefore, have had the potential to affect the U.S. society as a whole. Drug trafficking and consumption have also influenced the economic security sector because of the existence of an illegal market fuelled by a global phenomenon such as drug trafficking, with impact on the well-being of the population. Drugs have not had any apparent effect on the environmental sector.

In terms of Risk Society theory, drug trafficking is a trans-national concern related to the existence of an integrated drug market between Mexico and the United States, which is the product of a global process and therefore a manufactured risk. In the United States, drug trafficking is a security concern that has affected the social fabric of the country, and in the context of possible scenarios, it is considered not only to worsen social conditions but also negatively affect future generations. In this context, the United States is dealing with an actual security concern but it is also minimising, through a risk management perspective, the future

[760] M. Mendoza and C. Sherman, 'Convictions of corrupt U.S. border police rise', *Associated Press*, Monday, August 10, 2009.

consequences of this problem based mainly on law enforcement measures. This course of action, nevertheless, has had a boomerang effect in the fact that increasing coercive measures have only resulted in more profits for DTOs. Risk management, nevertheless, is seen as the best alternative to deal with a problem that will be difficult to solve without addressing the demand side of the equation.

4.6. Conclusions

Historically, the United States has defined drug use as a law enforcement -and a national security- rather than as a public health, issue, and this view has resulted in a biased and unbalanced approach towards the problem. This perspective has not only fostered tougher domestic policing that has resulted in a significant burden for the U.S. judicial system, but it has also created destabilising effects for those producer and transit countries on which the U.S. supply-side orientation has been imposed. After several decades of considerable spending in eradication and interdiction campaigns abroad, U.S. drug control policy has been demonstrated to be ineffective. Both demand and supply have shown a remarkable resilience, not only in terms of the mobility of production as a response to increased control efforts, but also on the demand side in the adaptability to new drugs.

Due to its geographical proximity and dual role as producer of marijuana and heroin, and later as a transhipment point for cocaine from South America bound to the U.S. market, Mexico guaranteed its place at the centre of U.S. anti-drug policy. Under U.S. pressure, Mexico adopted a prohibitionist approach in its drug policy whose clearest expression was the militarisation of its eradication efforts early on. This response to the challenge, however, has not been without consequences for the country to the extent that increased enforcement has led to the strengthening of drug trafficking organisations by making their activities more lucrative, and therefore by increasing their availability of resources to corrupt authorities on both sides of the border, but mainly on the Mexican side. Continued demand for drugs in the United States, and a lack of sufficiently strong law enforcement and judicial institutions in Mexico, are two factors eroding the security of the two countries.

Drug trafficking and consumption have been successfully securitised in the United States because the audience, the public and the U.S. government itself, have legitimised the ‘breaking of rules’ to use ‘extreme measures’ to deal with an ‘existential threat’ that has been portrayed in

terms of ‘survival’, because of its negative social, economic and political consequences in the country. The acceptance of drugs as a security issue has been facilitated not only because of a genuine concern for its health impact, but also because it has been a convenient justification to keep considerable law enforcement structures and budgets, as well as U.S. influence abroad on producer and transit countries. This emphasis on coercive rather than on treatment measures, however, has demonstrated that the U.S. securitisation of drugs has not been an effective measure because of the lack of success evident in U.S. drug policy and in the so-called ‘war on drugs’. According to Risk Society theory, drug trafficking is a trans-national security concern that has to be addressed through a risk management perspective involving preventive measures to stop the flow of drugs, as the best alternative for an issue that is far for a definitive solution.

CHAPTER 5. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION

5.1. Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to analyse undocumented immigration from Mexico as a security issue for the United States in the 1990s, in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society Theory. As in the case of the other two trans-border issues under consideration in this thesis, drug trafficking and environmental degradation, both perspectives were used to understand why undocumented immigration has been a U.S. security concern. It can be argued that immigration, throughout the years, has represented an underlying security issue for the United States because of its impact on the country's identity (which is the subject matter of the Buzan et.al societal security-issue sector), even though this concern has been more often expressed in terms of apprehension about unemployment rates, low-wage levels and abuse of public services by unauthorised immigrants. Notwithstanding that the time-frame of this thesis is limited to the 1990s, it is important to note that a more direct link between security and immigration was established as a result of 9/11 and the Islamic terrorist threat,[761] which has had significant consequences for Mexican undocumented immigration in terms of increasing human smuggling and corruption of authorities on both sides of the boundary as consequence of heightened U.S. border security.

While drug trafficking was explicitly defined as a security concern regarding Mexico within the 1997 U.S. national security strategy, undocumented immigration was addressed as a concern of a trans-national nature in reference to the Western Hemisphere, without Mexico being mentioned at all notwithstanding the fact that this country has historically been one the main sources of both legal and unauthorised immigration to the United States.[762]

For instance, according to a comprehensive bi-national study on Mexican immigration to the United States,

> *the total size of the Mexican-born population in the United States in 1996 (both enumerated and unenumerated, legal and unauthorized) was 7.0 - 7.3 million persons. Of this population, legal residents accounted for about 4.7 - 4.9 million persons,*

[761] See, for instance, Cato, 'The Weaponization of Immigration', *Backgrounder*, Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), February 2008.
[762] The White House, *National Security Strategy*, p.34.

about 0.5 million of whom were naturalized United States citizens). Unauthorized migrants accounted for 2.3 - 2.4 million persons.[763]

There are several historical factors that have sustained the movement of Mexicans, legal and without authorisation, to the United States. One factor in the decision to migrate has been the combination of so-called 'demand-pull' factors in the United States and 'supply-push' factors in Mexico, in addition to the existence of 'social networks' across the U.S.-Mexican border that have facilitated migration. Even though migration has not been an issue restricted to U.S.-Mexican relations, it has certainly been one of the most complex, intricate, and sensitive, issues in the bilateral agenda.

The first section of this chapter looks at the history, characteristics, and dynamics of Mexican immigration to the United States. Its purpose is to show the dominant economic character of this flow in the context of U.S. labour demand and Mexican labour supply, as well as to explain the creation of social networks across the border as a result of this historical pattern. It charts the attitudes toward Mexican immigration in terms of the changing conditions in the United States, as reflected in U.S. immigration legislation. The analysis of the characteristics of Mexican immigration, in turn, will demonstrate that notwithstanding the demand-supply relationship regarding this flow, Mexicans have also been attracted to the U.S. labour market by the facilitating conditions provided by social networks. This point is relevant to understand why economic measures *per se* are unlikely to address this complex problem.

The second part focuses on Mexican undocumented immigration in the context of the bilateral relationship. The prospects for Mexican immigration in terms of the demographic and economic transformations in each country, and discusses why, because of -rather than in spite of- NAFTA, Mexican undocumented immigration to the United States is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.

The third section addresses U.S. concerns about Mexican undocumented immigration from the U.S. point of view, as related to territorial integrity, identity, and economic impact in the context of the last two decades of the 20th century, and discusses the U.S. response to this challenge in the second half of the 1990s through increased law enforcement both in the interior

[763] F. D. Bean, R. Corona, R. Tuiran and K. Woodrow-Lafield, 'The Quatification of Migration Between Mexico and the United States', Team Report to Mexico/United States Binational Study on Migration, 1997, quoted by U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States. Binational Study*, A Report of the Binational Study on Migration, 1997, [online] available: http://utexas.edu/lbj/uscir.PDF (25/09/02), p.7. (Emphasis original).

of the country and at the border. The fourth part focuses on analysing Mexican undocumented immigration to the United States in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society Theory in order to understand its securitisation during the 1990s. The fifth section provides the conclusions for this chapter.

5.2. Mexican Immigration to the United States

Except for a brief period during the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), when a sizeable number of Mexicans moved north escaping from conflict in their country, Mexican immigration to the United States has responded to labour demand in the United States. This section will show how this immigration flow has historically been determined to a large extent by 'pull' factors, and how U.S. attitudes toward Mexican immigration have changed according to the U.S. political, economic and social context. U.S. barriers to the entry of Mexican workers have generally been relaxed when Mexican labour has been considered an advantage, a 'benefit', as in the context of labour shortages and in times of economic expansion. It has had a negative character when these immigrants have been perceived as a disadvantage, as a 'threat', as in times of economic slowdown or in the context of xenophobic political campaigns, or simply because their number and presence has strained the tolerance of the U.S. society.

If it is true that Mexican immigration to the United States has been dominated by demand-side considerations, Mexico's pace of economic development and the establishment of social networks across the border have also significantly contributed to this phenomenon. The durability of social linkages between immigrants in the United States and potential immigrants in Mexico means that even a closing of the income gap between the two countries would not necessarily end Mexican immigration. This is a bilateral issue and one that does not lend itself to simplistic or one-sided solutions.

5.2.1. *Historical Overview*

Seem from abroad as a country characterised by political freedom and economic opportunity, the United States has not only enticed immigrants from all over the world, but also expressly invited them into the country in times of labour shortages. During economic slowdowns, however, it has implemented measures to curb these flows. According to Kitty Calavita,

> Documented and undocumented immigration to the United States are historically the predictable consequence of *de facto* and *de jure* immigration policies; these policies coincide with the perceived need for an immigrant work force.[764]

As a matter of fact, the 19th century in the United States was characterised by the political manipulation of migration in favour of a continued flow, thus recognising its economic importance.[765] Even before the beginning of the 20th century immigration waves, the U.S. economy began to attract Mexican workers because they represented a pool of cheap seasonal labour that could be returned to its country given Mexico's adjacent position to the United States. The benefit of having access to 'temporary' workers, as will be discussed below, turned out to be far from reality. Although Mexicans were initially recruited to work in agriculture and some industries around the mid-1880s, they eventually moved to other better-paid and more long-term occupations.[766]

The first significant immigration flow across the U.S.-Mexico border occurred during the Mexican Revolution. This movement –which accounted for 890,371 individuals according to U.S. official records-, was also in part influenced by the U.S. involvement in WWI.[767] However, since refugees and undocumented immigrants were not included, it is estimated that the actual number of Mexicans who spent at least part of that decade in the United States was around 1.5 million.[768]

Before the Immigration Act of 1917, Mexican immigrants were not a concern for U.S. immigration policy.[769] Enactment of the law, however, 'imposed a literacy test and a head tax of $8.00 on Mexican immigrants and reiterated the prohibition against contract labor'.[770] Even

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[764] K. Calavita, 'The Immigration Policy Debate: Critical Analysis and Future Options', in W. A. Cornelius and J. A. Bustamante (eds.), *Mexican Immigration to the United States*, Papers prepared for the Bilateral Commission on the Future of United States-Mexican Relations, (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1989), p.153. (Empasis original).

[765] K. Calavita, 'U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses: The Limits of Legislation', in W. A. Cornelius, P. L. Martin & J. F. Hollifield (eds.), *Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p.57.

[766] G. W. Grayson, *The United States and Mexico. Patterns of Influence*, Praeger Special Studies, (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p.140.

[767] L. B. Hall and D. M. Coerver, *Revolution on the Border. The United States and Mexico, 1910-1920*, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), p.133. From that total flow, it is estimated that 71% settled in Texas, 12.4% in Arizona, 8.1% in California, and 8.3% in all other states. See *Ibid*., p.126.

[768] *Idem*.

[769] In 1882, high unemployment on the West Coast in the late 1870s led to passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, prohibiting entry to labourers from that country. Furthermore, in 1906-1907 a 'Gentlemen's Agreement' signed with Japan limited entry to family members of Japanese residing in the United States.

[770] Hall and Coerver, *Revolution on the Border*, p.132.

though these measures fostered undocumented immigration, flows remained low because Mexicans were afraid of conscription into the U.S. armed forces in the context of WWI. U.S. manpower transferred to the European theatre of war created a serious labour shortage in the United States to the point that in May 1917 (three months after the passage of the act) the U.S. government decided to exempt Mexican agricultural workers from its provisions; one year later (June 1918), Mexican railway workers were freed from those measures as well.[771] The U.S. Bureau of the Census estimated that in the span of two decades, from 1910 to 1930, the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States went from 200,000 to 600,000.[772]

After the sizeable immigration flows of the early 20th century, pressures for restrictions built up and eventually led to passage of the National Origins Act of 1924, which 'substantially curtailed the flow of immigration to the country', except for Mexican immigrants and for people from the Western Hemisphere who were considered more submissive than European immigrants.[773] The Border Patrol was created that same year.[774]

Although Mexican immigration persisted throughout these years, the effects of the Great Depression contributed to stem the flow. In fact, it is estimated that 300,000 Mexican immigrants were deported between 1929 and 1932.[775] Unemployment in the United States fostered hostility against foreigners, and 'prejudice, physical intimidation, and ethnic slurs abounded'.[776] In response to this situation, in the following years the Mexican government launched a repatriation programme to redirect migrants into agricultural production centres back in Mexico.[777]

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[771] *Ibid*., p.134-135.
[772] The Library of Congress, 'A Growing Community', *Mexican Immigration*, American Memory, The Learning Page, 04/20/05, [online] available: http://international.loc.gov:8081/learn/features/immig/mexican4.html (28/07/11).
[773] F. D. Bean, G. Vernez and C. Keely, *Opening and Closing the Doors. Evaluating Immigration Reform and Control*, Program for Research on Immigration Policy, 1989 Yearbook, (Washington, DC: The RAND Corporation/The Urban Institute, 1989), p.5. The first law to limit immigration quantitatively was passed in 1921. This 'quota law' limited the number of immigrants, whatever their nationality, to 3% of the total population of that nationality. See G. Belsasso, 'Undocumented Mexican Workers in the U.S.', in R. H. McBride (ed.), *Mexico and the United States. Energy, Trade, Investment, Immigration, Tourism*, The American Assembly, Columbia University, A Spectrum Book, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981), p.132.
[774] See K. Lytle-Hernández, *Migra. A History of the U.S. Border Patrol*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, c2010).
[775] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Immigration. Studies of the Immigration Control Act's Impact on Mexico*, Briefing Report to the Honorable Dennins DeConcinni, U.S. Senate, National Security and International Affairs Division (NSIAD), NSIAD-88-92BR, Washington, DC, February 18, 1988, p.11.
[776] Grayson, *United States and Mexico*, p.141.
[777] At the level of rhetoric, the programme was hailed as part of the General Law of Population of 1936, which explicitly called for the repatriation of Mexicans to be incorporated to the 'tasks of national development'. See J. A. Bustamante, 'Mexican Migration: The Political Dynamic of Perceptions', in C. W. Reynolds and C. Tello (eds.), *U.S.-Mexico Relations. Economic and Social Aspects*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983), p.266.

The decade-and-a-half of low Mexican immigration to the United States, from around the middle of the 1920s to 1942, however, turned out to be the exception to the rule. This pattern was reversed during WWII when, as a 'wartime measure', the U.S. government asked Mexico to supply workers to fill positions vacated by conscription as it had been during WWI. In 1942, the United States engaged in a series of bilateral agreements with Mexico known as the '*Bracero* programme'. Enacted as 'Public Law 45' by the U.S. Congress, and revised twice thereafter (in 1951 and in 1964, the same year it was terminated), the programme established annual quotas for temporary Mexican workers in the United States. According to some estimates, after 22 years of operation, the programme sent around 5 million Mexican labourers to the United States (as much as 400,000 annually in years of highest demand in the 1950s).[778]

A decade after the beginning of the agreements, the U.S. Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act). Among its main provisions, the act retained the quota system established by the 1924 act except for the Western Hemisphere, and set up a preference system based on the U.S. economy needed skills and family reunification criteria.[779] Regarding Mexican immigration, the act included one of the most controversial dispositions ever found in U.S. legislation. The 'Texas Proviso' was an amendment promoted by Texas legislators designed to tolerate employers who hired undocumented immigrants, while criminalising those immigrants who took a job without legal admission in the United States.[780] In the opinion of Jorge Bustamante, this law 'made the United States the only country in the world where immigration laws explicitly allowed employers to hire aliens who had entered the national territory in violation of those same laws'.[781]

From a different point of view, however, this kind of legal contradiction in the United States has obscured an underlying economic logic. The law's loopholes and lax enforcement could be attributed, according to Wayne Cornelius, to 'the common interest of political and economic elites in supplying a steady pool of cheap, pliant, productive and disposable labor to agribusiness and certain other sectors of the United States economy'.[782] Although this provision

[778] J. D. Cockcroft, *Outlaws in the Promised Land*, (New York, NY: Grove Press Inc., 1986), p.285.
[779] U.S. Department of State (DoS), 'The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (The McCarran-Walter Act)', *Milestones 1945-1952*, Office of the Historian, [online] available: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/ImmigrationAct (28/07/11).
[780] Cockcroft, *Outlaws in the Promised Land*, p.285.
[781] J. A. Bustamante, 'U.S. Immigration Reform: A Mexican Perspective', in Purcell, *Mexico in Transition*, p.70.
[782] W. A. Cornelius, 'Mexican Migration to the United States', in S. K. Purcell (ed.), *Mexico-United States Relations*, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 1, New York 1981, p.68.

was discarded in 1986 when employer sanctions were included in the Simpson-Rodino bill, the basic (though less overt) orientation of the law remained: to control entry without endangering U.S. businesses that rely on undocumented workers.

The sizeable dimension of undocumented immigration that had grown parallel to the *Bracero* programme was considered in the United States to depress wages; because of the illegal flow, furthermore, in the words of Herbert Brownell Jr., President Dwight Eisenhower's first Attorney General, 'America was faced with a breakdown in law enforcement on a very large scale'.[783] In this sense, in 1954 the U.S. government implemented 'Operation Wetback', leading to the deportation of around 1.1 million Mexican undocumented workers.[784]

The United States unilaterally terminated the *Bracero* programme on 31 December 1964, in spite of Mexican preferences to the contrary. This decision was influenced by a variety of religious, labour and Mexican-American groups that expressed their concern about insufficient protection of human and labour rights of Mexican immigrants; the programme was mainly resisted by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) which contended that workers from Mexico only contributed to negatively affect labour rights and benefits at the local level.[785] The termination of the programme, however, stimulated even more undocumented immigration because a mutually advantageous relationship had already been established between workers and employers. In the end, as Carlos Rico pointed out, 'what changed was not the flow but the status of workers'.[786] This is attested by the steady upward trend of undocumented immigrants apprehended soon after the programme ended, as shown in Table 5-1.

[783] J. Dillin, 'How Eisenhower solved illegal border crossings from Mexico', *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 6, 2006, [online] available: http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0706/p09s01-coop.html (28/07/11).
[784] Cockcroft, *Outlaws in the Promised Land*, p.286. 'Wetback' has been the derogative name given in the United States to those who illegally cross the Grande/Bravo River.
[785] M. García y Griego, 'Comments on Bustamante and Sanderson Papers and on Research Project ENEFNEU', in Reynolds and Tello, *U.S.-Mexico*, p.301.
[786] C. Rico, 'The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and Mexican Perceptions of Bilateral Approaches to Immigration Issues', in G. Vernez (ed.), *Immigration and International Relations*, Proceedings of a Conference on the International Effects of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), (Washington, DC: The RAND Corporation/The Urban Institute, 1990), p.92.

Table 5-1. **Deportable Aliens Located: Fiscal Year 1961-1970**

Year	Deportable Aliens Located
1961	88,823
1962	92,758
1963	88,712
1964	86,597
1965	110,371
1966	138,520
1967	161,608
1968	212,057
1969	283,557
1970	345,353
Total	**1,608,356**

Source: U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), *1998 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) [online] available: http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/ENF98.pdf (14/10/02), p.9.

This phenomenon had occurred because U.S. labour demand became attractive to more Mexicans than the programme had anticipated. The *Bracero* programme, therefore, had two important effects on Mexican immigration to the United States: (1) 'temporary' migration actually turned into long-term immigration because of consolidation of the demand-supply relationship;[787] and (2) the higher level of undocumented immigration was also function of cross-border social networks established by legal migration, as discussed above, which facilitated the northbound flow.

Undocumented immigration to the United States has, of course, not been restricted to Mexicans. As a matter of fact, there is a difference between 'Mexican immigration' and 'immigration from Mexico', because Mexicans have not been the only nationals in the northward flow crossing the U.S.-Mexico border.[788] This fact became evident around the mid-1960s, after passage in 1965 of amendments to the 1952 Act. These amendments included important measures that eventually had important consequences for the size and composition of immigration to the United States, such as family reunification as the central criteria for people admitted in the United States; abolition of the quota system; and an increase in the number of

[787] Bean, Vernez and Keely, *Opening and Closing the Doors*, p.7.

[788] According to David Randolph, there has been a sizeable number of non-Mexicans entering Mexico with the ultimate purpose of illegally reaching the United States. He commented about a significant number of Brazilians crossing the Mexican border with Texas, who had joined people from Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, and Peru, and not only from Latin America, but also from China, India, Thailand and several African countries. There had also been cases of people from Iraq and Iran found in these flows. Interview with David E. Randolph, Coordinator, U.S.-Mexico Border Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 22 May 2001.

visas for Western Hemisphere countries.[789] The amendments resulted in a shift in the national origin composition of immigrants by increasing the Hispanic and Asian components of the population, as shown in Table 5-2.[790]

Table 5-2. **Region of Birth of the Foreign Born Population 1960 to 1990**

Region	**1960**	**1970**	**1980**	**1990**
Europe	7,256,311	5,740,891	5,149,572	4,350,403
Asia	490,996	824,8872,	539,777	4,979,037
Africa	35,355	80,143	199,723	363,819
Oceania	34,730	41,258	77,577	104,145
Latin America	908,309	1,803,970	4,372,487	8,407,837
Total	**9,738,091**	**9,619,302**	**14,079,906**	**19,767,316**

Source: C. J. Gibson and E. Lennon, *Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850-1990*, Population Division Working Paper No. 29, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), Washington, DC, February 1999, [online] available: http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab03.html (26/09/02).

For instance, in the 1950s 70% of the immigrant flow came from Europe and Canada; in the 1970s that proportion decreased to 20%; and in the 1980s to 15%; in contrast, Latin American and Caribbean immigration increased 30%, 75% and 80% in those same periods, respectively.[791] The end of the 1970s was marked by the outbreak of armed conflicts in Central America, which also contributed to refugee flows. Regarding Mexico, the 1965 legislation had an important impact because by that time the country was the largest source of legal immigrants to the United States. The act resulted in increased incentives to migrate illegally, especially for those Mexicans without relatives in the United States.[792]

The effect of these changes was to create a perception in the United States that the country had 'lost control of its borders' and that the costs of immigration were greater than its benefits, leading by the mid-1970s and early 1980s to efforts to reform U.S. immigration policy.

[789] G. J. Borjas, 'Introduction', in G. J. Borjas (ed.), *Mexican Immigration to the United States*, (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, c2007), p.3.
[790] The terms 'Hispanic' or 'Latino' or, for that matter, 'Latin American', represent the same community in the United States. In 2000, this population was 32.8 million or 12.0% of the total U.S. population. Among the Hispanic population, 66% were of Mexican origin, 14.5% Central or South American, 9.0% Puerto Rican, 4.0% Cuban, and the remaining 6.4% of other Hispanic origins. See M. Therrien and R. R. Ramirez, *The Hispanic Population in the United States. Population Characteristics*, Current Population Reports, U.S. Census Bureau, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), March 2001, p.1.
[791] F. D. Bean, B. Edmonston and J. S. Passel (eds.), *Undocumented Immigration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s*, (Washington, DC: The RAND Corporation/The Urban Institute, 1990).
[792] Report of the Bilateral Commission, *The Challenge of Interdependence*, pp.102-103.

Importantly, these transformations also coincided with Mexico's economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, and therefore with greater economic incentives to migrate to the United States due to unemployment and the income differential between the two countries. The relationship between economic crises in Mexico and emigration to the United States can be observed, in particular, in a study that pointed to the positive correlation between peso devaluations and immigration flows to the north. For instance, from the 1960s to the 1990s, it was estimated that for each 10% variation in the exchange rate favourable to the dollar in reference to the peso, there was a spike of about 2% and 5% of detentions at the border, even after controlling for the level of wages in Mexico and the United States.[793]

After one previous unsuccessful attempt to reform immigration legislation at the beginning of the 1980s (i.e. Simpson-Mazzoli bill), on 6 November 1986 President Reagan signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Also known as the Simpson-Rodino bill (P.L. 603), this legislation was intended 'to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to effectively control unauthorized immigration into the United States, and for other purposes'.[794] The objective of IRCA was to deal with undocumented immigration through legalisation by offering amnesty and a Special Agricultural Worker programme (SAW); and through enforcement, by establishing for the first time ever employer sanctions as 'the centerpiece of the legislation', among other measures.[795]

The results of the law were divergent. On the one hand, there was a decline in the number of unauthorised immigrants in the United States as a total of 3,040,475 people applied for immigrant status regularisation (out of between 3 and 5 million), 1,763,434 for temporary residence and 1,277,041 for the SAW programme.[796] On the other hand, after a temporary decrease in illegal border crossings in which would-be immigrants adopted a watchful/waiting

[793] G. H. Hanson and A. Spilimbergo, 'Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy Options', in Brookings Institution and Inter-American Dialogue, *Immigration in U.S.-Mexican Relations*, A Report of the U.S.-Mexican Relations Forum, Washington, DC, January 1998 [online] available: http://www.iadialog.org/immigrat.thml (11/01/01), p.23.
[794] U.S. Congress, S. 1200, *Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986* (IRCA) (P. L. 603, June 6, 1986), [online] available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d009:SN01200:ITOM:/bss/d099query.html (26/09/02).
[795] D. M. Meissner, 'The New Immigration Law and Mexico', in Purcell, *Mexico in Transition*, pp.95-100.
[796] N. Rytina, *IRCA Legalization Effects: Lawful Permanent Residence and Naturalization through 2001*, Office of Policy and Planning, Statistics Division, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), paper presented at 'The Effects of Immigrant Legalization Programs on the United States: Scientific Evidence on Immigrant Adaptation and Impacts on U.S. Economy and Society' conference, The Cloister, Mary Woodward Lasker Center, NIH Main Campus, October 25, 2002, [online] available: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/irca0114int.pdf (28/07/11), pp.3 and 7.

attitude regarding implementation of the law, the number of annual apprehensions increased again as shown in Table 5-3.

Table 5-3. **Immigration Enforcement Statistics**

Year	Total Apprehensions	Total Border Patrol Apprehensions	Mexicans Apprehended by Border Patrol	Mexican Undocumented Immigrants (estimated)
1980	910,361	759,400	734,200	910,361
1981	975,780	825,300	797,900	975,780
1982	970,246	819,900	795,400	970,246
1983	1,251,375	1,105,700	1,076,300	1,251,375
1984	1,246,981	1,138,600	1,102,600	1,241,489
1985	1,348,749	1,262,400	1,218,700	n.a.
1986	1,767,400	1,692,500	1,635,700	n.a.
1987	1,190,488	1,159,000	1,124,000	n.a.
1988	1,008,145	971,000	929,800	n.a.
1989	954,243	893,000	832,200	n.a.
1990	1,169,939	1,103,400	1,105,400	n.a.
1995	1,394,554	1,324,202	1,293,500	n.a.

Source: M. R. Rosenblum, *U.S. Immigration Policy: Unilateral and Cooperative Responses to Undocumented Immigration*, Policy Paper 55, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, San Diego, [online] available: http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_paper/pp55.html (29/03/01), p.3.

In this context, the main criticism of IRCA was the absence of a mechanism for effectively sanctioning employers of unauthorised immigrants. According to the law, employers had to request prospective workers evidence of right to apply for a job; employers, however, were not accountable for assessing the validity of identification documents. In principle, therefore, an employer was supposed to satisfy the requirements of the law just by arguing that a worker had in fact been able to prove being qualified to be employed in the country, even if such event had not occurred at all.[797] Given the government's inability to enforce such legislation through actual checks on employers, the effectiveness of the law depended on voluntary compliance, which was considered better than no procedure at all. In the opinion of Manuel García y Griego, IRCA's objective was twofold: to stem illegal immigration flows into the United States, and to shrink the volume of unauthorised immigrants already in the country.[798] Bustamante suggests, nevertheless, that the law's objective was to satisfy various political interests without confronting the economic motor of immigration, and that one of its results was, mainly, to promote the

[797] See J. A. Bustamante, 'Undocumented Immigration: Research Findings and Policy Options', in Roett, *Mexico and the United States*, p.110.
[798] M. García y Griego, 'The Mexican Labor Supply, 1990-2010', in Cornelius and Bustamante (eds.), *Mexican Immigration to the United States*, p.49.

proliferation of falsified documents.[799] Just as in the case of drug trafficking, stricter immigration enforcement also turned immigration into a more difficult activity, but not to the point of actually becoming an efficient deterrent; it only fostered more extended periods in the United States because costs associated to immigration had evidently increased.[800]

After IRCA represented a partial solution to the undocumented immigration issue, U.S. authorities focused on the legal flow through the Immigration Act of 1990. The context in which this law passed was that of a rapid transformation of the U.S. economy away from manufacturing and towards service industries, which was also a period characterised by lower U.S. fertility rates that in part explains both the contribution of immigration to population numbers and to the figure for newly-job seekers, which accounted for 30% and 33%, respectively.[801] This reform, which was intended to satisfy the demand of labour, was implemented against the background of the anti-immigrant sentiment that had surrounded the passage of IRCA, and in the context of an escalating recession. This kind of political decisions created a tension in the United States between those who have seen immigration policy in social and humanitarian terms, and those whose main concern has been reversing a perceived labour shortage.[802] IRCA, nevertheless, confirmed the significant influence economic factors have had on U.S. immigration policy.

As the unauthorised immigrant population increased in the early 1990s, pressure built for new law enforcement rules. In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed three laws to deal with this matter. The first was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) (H.R. 2202) that had as its purpose,

> To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United States by increasing Border Patrol and investigative personnel, by increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, by reforming exclusion and deportation law procedures, by improving the verification system for eligibility for employment, and through other measures, to reform the illegal immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States, and for other purposes.[803]

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[799] Bustamante, 'U.S. Immigration', p.74.
[800] J. S. Passel, 'Comment by Jeffrey S. Passel', in B. Bosworth, S. M. Collins and N. C. Lustig (eds.), *Coming Together? Mexico United States Relations*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p.179.
[801] Calavita, 'U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses', p.74.
[802] R. Skeldon, 'Migration Policies and National Security', in N. Poku and D. T. Graham (eds.), *Redefining Security. Population Movements and National Security*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), p.31.
[803] 104th U.S. Congress, *Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996* (IIRIRA) (P. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, September 30, 1996), [online] available: http://www.thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR02202:1/bss/d104/query.html (26/09/02).

Among the relevant dispositions of the law, it authorised an increase in Border Patrol personnel through FY2001 (Title I/A); authorised and provided for INS undercover operations (Title II/A/Sec. 205); provided for a rapid deportation of undocumented immigrants (Title III/A); required to test more secure methods of employment verification (Title IV); and denied public services, with specific exceptions, to immigrants who were not permanent residents (Title V/A).[804]

The second law was the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) (P. L. 104-132), which was created 'to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes'. The law mandated the exclusion of immigrants who had not been inspected and admitted (Title IV/Sec.414); facilitated the implementation of inspection and exclusion measures by immigrant officers themselves (Title IV/C/Sec.422); and authorised state and local law enforcement officials to arrest and detain certain undocumented immigrants (Title IV/D/Sec.439).[805]

The third piece of legislation was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, also known as the 'Welfare Reform Act' (H.R. 3734), which denied unqualified immigrants any federal public benefit except in cases of medical emergency, disaster relief and public immunisations (Title IV/Sec.401), and mandated that any 'qualified alien who entered after the enactment of the law', not to be eligible for any federal public service for a period of five years beginning on the date of the individual's entry into the United States (Title IV/Sec.403).[806]

The irony was that these measures came only two years after NAFTA had strengthened bilateral co-operation between Mexico and the United States. In this anti-immigration atmosphere, the Mexican government was forced to adopt an even more active role in migration matters because of the potentially negative effect of this series of laws on the labour and human rights of Mexican immigrants, both legal and undocumented, in the United States. The relationship between NAFTA and Mexican immigration to the United States will be discussed in more detail in the NAFTA section below.

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[804] *Ibid*.
[805] 104th U.S. Congress, *Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996* (AEDPA) (P. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996), [online] available: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?/dbname=104_cong-public_laws&doc.1=fpubl132.104 (26/09/02).
[806] 104th U.S. Congress, *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996*, (Welfare Reform Act of 1996) (H.R. 3734) [online] available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D/c104:1:./temp~c104sFN6Gd:e498942 (26/09/02).

5.2.2. *Characteristics*

The Mexican-born population in the United States does not represent a homogeneous group. There are persons with different combinations of legal standing and migratory background. On the one hand, the legal standings are (1) 'legal temporary visitors'; (2) 'legal permanent residents'; (3) 'naturalized United States citizens'; and (4) 'unauthorized immigrants' (people who 'entered without inspection' [EWIs], and those who exceed the expiration of their visas); on the other hand, the two principal backgrounds are 'sojourners' (or 'circular migrants'), who stay temporarily in the United States but live mainly in Mexico, and 'settlers', who live in the United States.[807] The fact that these categories and distinctions have not always been clearly understood, has contributed to false interpretations about Mexican immigration to the United States, in particular in reference to the real dimension of undocumented immigration.

According to data provided by the bi-national study on migration referred to above, the characteristics of Mexican immigrants in the United States have changed over time in response to the more diverse demand, supply, and social network factors that have historically shaped immigration flows. The general characteristics of Mexican immigrants in the United States in the first half of the 1990s are presented in Table 5-4.

[807] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, pp.6-7.

Table 5-4. **Characteristics of Mexican Immigration to the United States**

Characteristics	(1992) Mexico Resident	(1992-1994) Sojourners	Settlers	Naturalised	(1990) U.S. Resident
Age (avg.)	25 yrs	28-32 yrs	30 yrs	42 yrs	33 yrs
Males	49%	73-94%	55%	54%	49%
Married					
Men	83%	56-85%	59%	76%	56%
Women	72%	43-66%	61%	80%	57%
Schooling (avg.)	5 yrs	6 yrs	8 yrs	-	-
Fewer than 5	46%	39%	28%	24%	3%
Fewer than 12	90%	91-99%	76%	67%	28%
More than 12	10%	1-9%	24%	33%	72%
English					
(not speaking well)	-	93%	71%	57%	6%
Labour Force part.	43%	83%	70%	69%	65%
Male	68%	91%	85%	82%	75%
Female	20%	58%	50%	53%	59%
Unemployment	3%	6-11%	11%	9%	6%
Employment in					
Agriculture	23%	47-53%	13%	10%	3%
Manufacturing	29%	25-26%	37%	36%	25%
Services	48%	23-26%	51%	54%	72%
Annual ind. earnings	-	$185-240 (week)	$14,138	$16,553	$24,408
Ann. household income	$8,880	-	$27,120	$28,210	$38,940
Poverty	36%	-	27%	25%	13%

Source: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, pp.14-15.

Mexican immigrants to the United States have usually come from the less economically favoured social strata, and this characteristic has been in part explained by the non-specialised, rural, nature of early U.S. labour demand.[808] However, over time this pattern has changed. The majority of immigrants, both men and women, have been married, and even though they have had less years of formal education than the typical U.S. citizen, they have been better prepared than the average Mexican population; Mexicans with higher levels of education also migrated to the United States as consequence of their country's recurrent economic predicament in the 1980s.[809] Although immigration flows have been dominated traditionally by young males, the number of female immigrants has increased. In fact, women became the dominant sex among legal immigrants in the last decades leading to the 1990s.[810]

The category of 'sojourners', in general, has been made up of less formally trained young men taking up farm jobs, and their short-term employment has explained their low earnings. The

[808] *Ibid.*, p.15.
[809] *Ibid.*, p.21.
[810] *Ibid.*, p.20.

'settler' group has been more evenly made up of both men and women with higher levels of academic preparation, and this category has been characterised by its better command of English than sojourners; most of its individuals work in the service sector earning higher salaries.[811]

Mexican-origin U.S. citizens have had a better command of English than any of the other Mexican migratory groups, and have received higher salaries than non-citizen settlers. According to an INS report, between 1977 and 1982 Mexican-born persons who naturalised came from the more 'highly-skilled' group.[812]

A commission for the study of U.S.-Mexican relations documented a general consensus that Mexican immigration to the United States has been 'ultimately driven by economic realities'.[813] The catalyst for much undocumented immigration has rested on the effect of 'demand-pull' forces in the U.S. economy, although other aspects have also contributed to sustain the flow.[814] This does not mean, however, that Mexicans have not had access to jobs in their home country; in fact, most immigrants had some source of income before deciding to migrate, notwithstanding the increasing proportion of those unemployed at that particular stage.[815] Rather, wage differentials between the two countries more often underlie the decision to emigrate. In general, wages in the United States have been 8 to 10 times higher than in Mexico, with variations depending upon fluctuations in the exchange rate. In the 1980s, for instance, while the U.S. minimum wage was $3.35 per hour, in Mexico it was 38 cents per hour.[816] 'Supply-push' forces were accorded more importance in the 1980s given Mexico's 1970s high fertility rate, and the 1980s economic downturns; however, both privatisation and agricultural reform processes contributed to elevate the unemployment rate.[817]

Even though Mexican workers have traditionally been employed in the agricultural sector of the U.S. economy, since the 1980s the demand for Mexican labour has diversified at the same time that Mexico's crises led more people from urban areas to look for jobs in the U.S. service sector.[818] In fact, Mexican immigrants have benefited from the expansion of U.S. low-wage

[811] *Ibid*., p.17.
[812] *Idem*.
[813] Report, *Challenge of Interdependence*, p.78.
[814] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, p.25.
[815] *Ibid*., p.22.
[816] Report, *Challenge of Interdependence*, p.90.
[817] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, p.26.
[818] *Ibid*., pp.30-31.

service industries by taking jobs of no interest for U.S. workers. Moreover, according to Cornelius:

> The diminishing interest in blue-collar work among young people in the United States has produced shortages of skilled workers in industries ranging from shoe manufacturing to masonry to ornamental metal work; for such industries, workers trained in Mexico provide skills and experience that are in short supply among the U.S.-born population.[819]

Because Mexican-born immigrants have been employed in more diverse jobs, a lower proportion has worked in agriculture. As a matter of fact, it seems undocumented immigrants have been increasingly employed in non-agricultural jobs in the United States.[820]

All the factors described above, nevertheless, provide only a partial picture of the phenomenon because other variables need to be taken into account. If profit-maximising behaviour were the prime motive for emigration to the United States, poor zones in Mexico located just south of the U.S. border would be the main source of immigration (travel costs and proximity to the United States are inversely related). Yet, Mexican immigration (legal and undocumented) has not typically originated in those areas. According to Table 5-5, traditional sending states in central Mexico have dominated as the origin of most emigration, even as flows have increasingly come from other regions.

Table 5-5. **Source of Mexican Immigration to the United States by Region**

Region 1	**Region 2**	**Region 3**	**Region 4**	**Region 5**	**Region 6**
Guanajuato	Baja California	Sinaloa	Fed. District	Oaxaca	Veracruz
Michoacán	Sonora	Durango	State of Mexico	Guerrero	Tabasco
Jalisco	Chihuahua	Nayarit	Querétaro	Puebla	Chiapas
Colima	Coahuila	Zacatecas	Hidalgo	Morelos	Campeche
	Nuevo León	San Luis Potosí	Tlaxcala		Yucatán
	Tamaulipas	Aguascalientes			Q. Roo
38%	**21%**	**22%**	**9%**	**8%**	**2%**

Source: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, pp.18-19.

Thus, there are areas in Mexico with a deep-seated tradition of immigration to the United States, and their economies, as a consequence, are intrinsically reliant on remittances from Mexican workers there.[821]

[819] Cornelius, 'Mexican Migration', p.3.
[820] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, p.22.
[821] Cornelius, 'Mexican Migration', p.69.

Due to the imperative of location and a variety of social as well as economic factors, Texas was the main area of Mexican immigration before the third decade of the 20th century, which was followed later on by other West Coast and Midwest states (such as California and Illinois). [822] Although Mexican-born immigrants are usually found in specific states and cities, they have increasingly moved around the United States. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, it seems in 1990 about 85% of the total Mexican born-population was concentrated in the three states mentioned above; since the 1920s, California has been the major destination with 50% of all Mexican immigrants, and Los Angeles their main point of arrival.[823]

Given that Mexican immigration to the United States has traditionally originated in specific localities within Mexico, social networks across the border have represented a significant historical development.[824] According to Cornelius,

> A century of migration from these places [Mexican source states] has led to the development of many thousands of binational kinship-employer networks that directly link potential migrants in Mexico to their United States-based relatives and United States employers. These networks play a fundamental role in making migration an attractive and economically feasible option for many Mexicans.[825]

The existence of these social networks explains in part why immigration has not been responsive to legal controls, and why these measures (i.e. legalisation initiatives) have not only increased the likelihood of more permanent residence but actually strengthened cross-border social links.

5.3. Immigration in the Bilateral Relationship

This section looks at the prospects for future flows based on 1990s demographic and economic considerations, as well as on the potential effects of NAFTA.

In general terms, the subject of Mexican immigration to the United States has been marked by 'ambivalence and misunderstanding'.[826] The simplistic U.S. view has often stressed that Mexican immigration is the result of 'push' factors deriving from unemployment; the narrow Mexican view frequently emphasises the role of 'pull' factors created by the U.S. demand for migrant labour. The U.S. official position has been that the formulation of

[822] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, p.19.
[823] *Ibid*., pp.19-20.
[824] GAO, *Immigration*, p.13.
[825] Cornelius, 'Mexican Migration', p.69.
[826] M. S. Teitelbaum, 'Mutual Ambivalence, Mutual Misunderstood: Mexico-U.S. Immigration Issues', in Roett, *Mexico and the United States*, p.133.

immigration policy is a sovereign right and, therefore, a unilateral matter; the Mexican government has seen migration more as a bilateral issue that requires a shared response. Regarding benefits, while Mexicans have considered the U.S. consumer as the main beneficiary of undocumented immigration, the most common opinion in the United States has been that the main winner has been the Mexican economy as a whole because of remittances.[827] One observer even noted that keeping the 'safety valve' open has only allowed 'Mexican notables' to neglect the political, economic, and social reforms required by their country.[828]

Furthermore, the two countries have also had different objectives. Mexico's favoured objective has been the legalisation of its undocumented nationals, which the United States has often deplored, although it was actually the course of action adopted under IRCA.[829] The U.S. objective has been ostensibly to reduce immigration, an aim that has not aligned well with Mexico's national interest. Moreover, the Mexican government has avoided deploying law enforcement to restrain emigration from its territory, as this would be a violation of Article 11 of the Mexican Constitution. The article reads as follows:

> Every individual has the right to enter and exit the Republic, to travel throughout its territory, and to change his place of residence without the need of a security card, passport, safe-conduct or other similar requirements. The exercise of this right will be subordinated to the faculties of the judicial authority in cases of criminal and civil responsibility, and to those of administrative authorities regarding the limits imposed by emigration and immigration laws, public health, or those concerning unauthorised foreigners residing in the country.[830]

Notwithstanding increased bilateral co-operation under NAFTA, U.S. and Mexican objectives seemed to have remained at odds. On the one hand, the United States saw the agreement as an opportunity to promote Mexico's economic development, and thus indirectly to reducing incentives for immigration. On the other hand, Mexico expected the free movement of people as the logical consequence of free trade, even though NAFTA has not represented a common market.

Regarding the prospects for the future, low birth rates in the United States and its shift towards a service-based economy, coupled with Mexico's comparatively higher birth rate and its inability to generate well-paid jobs in the short term, are both likely to sustain the flows. It can be

[827] Report, *Challenge of Interdependence*, pp.78-79.
[828] Grayson, *United States and Mexico*, p.166.
[829] M. García y Griego, 'A Bilateral Approach to Migration Control?', in Purcell, *Mexico in Transition*, pp.81-82.
[830] México, Cámara de Diputados, H. Congreso de la Unión, 'Título Primero, Capítulo I de las Garantías Individuales, Artículo 11', *Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos*, [online] available: http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfo/1/11.htm (24/03/03).

argued, nevertheless, that not even full employment in Mexico would guarantee the termination of the flows, given the existence of the social networks mentioned above, and because of the well established patterns of interaction between employers and workers and between communities on both sides of the border.

5.3.1. *Prospects*

Social networks are likely to contribute to the continuation of Mexican immigration -legal and undocumented- to the United States in the future, but other structural factors are also important. These include demographic and labour market dynamics in both countries, as well as the impact of economic integration under NAFTA.

5.3.1.1. Demographic and Labour Trends

According to WB statistics, in 2000 the population of the United States was 281.6 million people, with an average annual growth rate of 1.1% during 1980-2000; Mexico's population, in contrast, was 98 million people, with an average annual growth rate of 1.9% for the same period.[831] In terms of birth rates, the United States had 15/1,000 people and Mexico 25/1,000 people.[832] In 2000, whereas the median age of the U.S. population was 35.3 years old, that of Mexico was 22 years.[833]

In terms of the younger structure of the Mexican population, a study carried out in 1998 estimated that the key 10- to 19-year old age group in the country, which accounted for 21.85 million people in that year, would rise to 23.65 million by 2010. It was estimated that if only 80% of males in that group became active job seekers, an average of nearly one million new workers would enter the Mexican labour force each year over the second decade of the 21st century; consequently, while Mexico's population growth rate has been slowing down in the course of the last decades, the number of Mexicans entering the workforce was estimated to be increasing an average of at least 30% in the first two decades of the new century.[834] Just to keep pace with this demand for new jobs,

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[831] The World Bank, 'Population Dynamics', in *2002 World Development Indicators*, [online] available: http://worldbank.org/data/wdi2002/tables/table2-1.pdf (27/09/02), pp.4950.
[832] *Idem*.
[833] J. Meyer, 'Age 2000', in *Census 2000 Brief*, October 2001, [online] available: http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbx01-12.pdf (10/10/02), p.1; and México, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), 'Población Total, Edad Mediana e Indice de Masculinidad', *XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000*, [online] available: http://www.inegi.gob.mx/difusion/espanol/fpobla.html (10/10/02).
[834] R. Manning, *Five Years After NAFTA. Rhetoric and Reality of Mexican Immigration in the 21st Century*, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, DC, March 2000, p.4.

without considering existing unemployment and underemployment, the Mexican economy had to expand well over the 6.9% GDP growth reached in 2000.[835] In fact, a U.S. study carried out in the early 1990s estimated that Mexico's economy would have to expand at a rate of more than 10% annually to absorb all the new labour force entrants.[836] These trends, therefore, emphasised the potential of the so-called 'push' factors to continue in the future.

Regarding 'pull factors', it was estimated that these could be strengthened by the effects of demographic change in the United States over the latter part of the 20th century. The U.S. labour force was expected to grow more slowly, to age, and to exhibit increasing diversity.[837] On the one hand, it was projected that with the ageing of the 'baby boom' generation (that is, people born between 1946 and 1964), the older segments of the population would represent a sizeable proportion of the working population in the years to come: in particular, people from 55 years of age and older would increase their participation in the workforce from 13% to 20%, from 2000 and 2020, respectively; on the other hand, jobs would continue to multiply in sectors that had typically attracted immigrant workers despite falling rates of population growth.[838]

To the extent that the 'baby boom' generation retires within the five years from 2010 to 2015, the pension burden will gradually grow to 37 retirees per 100 people employed, which is more than double the 1950 15 per 100 ratio; however, according to U.S. Census Bureau projections, in the 30 years between 2020 and 2050 immigrants will increasingly replace retiring workers. [839]

Furthermore, it was expected that the number of jobs that would be created in the United States in the first decade of the 21st century would be around 22.2 million, even though the job creation rate would be less robust than in the previous ten years (1.6%); the total number of jobs was estimated to reach 167.8 million by the end of this period.[840] Continuing the 1990-2000 trend, the service sector was estimated to create jobs at an annual rate of 1.8%; the manufacturing sector would also contribute its share but at a less robust rate of 0.5% per year; and the service industry and retail trade would represent 73% growth of urban employment between 2000 and 2010.[841]

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[835] J. García Mújica, 'México', in *Situación Económica y Prospectos*, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, March 2002, [online] available: http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/sep/me-sep.htm (08/10/02).
[836] Congress of the United States, *U.S.-Mexico Trade: Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?*, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 1992), p.122.
[837] M. Tossi, 'A Century of Change: The U.S. Labor Force, 1950-2050', *Monthly Labor Review*, May 2002, p.1.
[838] *Idem*.
[839] *Idem*.
[840] J. M. Berman, 'Employment Outlook: 2000-2010. Industry Output and Employment Projections to 2010', *Labor Monthly Review*, November 2001, p.39.
[841] *Ibid*., p.40.

These economic trends have been significant for immigration patterns because immigrants have tended to cluster in low-paying occupations, especially in the service sector. In 2000, about 19% of the foreign-born were employed in service occupations, and another 19% worked as operators, fabricators and labourers; in contrast, a little less than 13% of the U.S. born was employed in each of these occupational categories.[842] Lower levels of formal preparation and no command of English, have been some of the factors that have explained the significant presence of non-U.S. citizens in low-wage occupations.[843]

The greater availability of jobs within sectors that have historically recruited Mexican immigrants would likely portend a spike in Mexican immigration or, at least, more job opportunities for immigrants already in the county. In the service sector, the food and drink industry was expected to add about 1.5 million jobs between 2000 and 2010. It was estimated that social and economic change would contribute to expand jobs within this category of economic activity by 1.5 million (from 8.1 to 9.5) in the first decade of the 21st century.[844] In the manufacturing sector, the most dynamic source of jobs would be construction, growing at an average rate of 12% by 2010 (7.5 million openings), retaining its position as one of the most vigorous employment sources.[845] In the agricultural sector, higher production as a result of technological innovation was bound to have a positive impact on the overall output. Technology-intensive production, however, was projected to decrease total employment by 155,000 jobs within this sector, to reach 1.8 million in 2010.[846] Thus, in the three activities where it has been common to find foreign-born people employed, only agriculture would create fewer jobs. Notwithstanding that the Mexican workforce has historically been concentrated in traditional sectors such as in agriculture, railroads, and mining, it has become increasingly diversified in response to the labour demands created by the shift from manufacturing to service-based activities in the U.S. economy, as discussed above.

Even though the preceding projections regarding 'push' and 'pull' factors pointed to greater immigration in the future, it is important to mention that one bi-national study on migration projected the opposite result. On the 'push' side, the study established that job growth would basically surpass job demand, and under these conditions it was estimated that Mexico could even

[842] A. T. Mosisa, 'The Role of the Foreign-born Workers in the U. S. Economy', *Monthly Labor Review*, May 2002, p.9.
[843] *Idem*.
[844] Berman, 'Employment Outlook', p.48.
[845] *Ibid*., p.54.
[846] *Ibid*., p.53.

start dealing with prior labour market challenges in a more comprehensive way.[847] As for the 'pull' side of the equation, the U.S. labour markets where Mexican immigrants have usually worked were undergoing a rapid change due to technological advances, trade trends, labour force adjustments and legislation changes. In terms of demand, in the U.S. labour market employers were adjusting to higher minimum wages and to more global competition. In terms of supply, it was considered that the United States not only maintained 'a sizeable low-skill labor force' but also that the result of new social initiatives could be to increase that supply by pushing more U.S. citizens into the labour market and into sectors previously dominated by Mexican immigrants.[848]

5.3.1.2. NAFTA

Another important factor to take into account has been U.S.-Mexican economic integration under NAFTA. Since the end of WWII, U.S. efforts to establish an open international system for the free flow of capital, goods and services, also created the conditions for international migration by establishing economic links between the countries. Foreign investment, in particular, had an important role in this process. According to Saskia Sassen,

> … significant levels and concentrations of direct foreign investment are one, and only one, factor promoting emigration through: (a) the incorporation of new segments of the population into wage labor and the associated disruption of traditional work structures both of which create a supply of migrant workers; (b) the feminization of the new industrial workforce and its impact on the work opportunities of men, both in the new industrial zones and in the traditional work structures; and (c) the consolidation of objective and ideological links with the highly industrialized countries where most foreign capital originates, links that involve both a generalized westernization effect and more specific work situations wherein workers find themselves producing goods for people and firms in the highly industrialized countries.[849]

In the case of U.S.-Mexican relations, this process began to take place between 1940 and 1970, when U.S. capital and technology promoted Mexico's agricultural development. As noted by Bustamante, such linkages made evident that 'push' factors were not necessarily endogenous to

[847] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, p.31.
[848] *Ibid*., p.27.
[849] S. Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital. A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.120.

Mexico.[850] Yet, Mexico's development strategy did cause what Sassen referred to as a 'disruption of traditional work structures'.

The important point here is that measures assumed to deter emigration, such as foreign investment and the creation of an export-oriented economy, often end up creating the opposite effect. It is therefore paradoxical that NAFTA was sold in part in the United States precisely with the idea of reducing immigration from Mexico (although it was not designed explicitly for that purpose). During the signing of the NAFTA side agreements in The White House in September 1993, speaking in the context of Mexico tying its minimum wage to the growth of its own economy, President Clinton stated:

> What does that mean? It means that there will be an even more rapid closing of the gap between our two wage rates. And as the benefits of economic growth are spread in Mexico to the working people, what will happen? They'll have more disposable income to buy more American products and there will be less illegal immigration because more Mexicans will be able to support their children by staying home. This is a very important thing.[851]

He thus sought to persuade the U.S. public that Mexico's future growth, as a result of increasing foreign investment under NAFTA, would stem emigration to the United States in the long-term. This view was consistent with that expressed by the Asencio Commission, which in its July 1990 report *Unauthorized Migration: An Economic Development Response*, recommended the establishment of a free trade area between the United States and Mexico as the best hope for fostering Mexican development and thus for reducing migration pressures.[852]

Far from stopping emigration from Mexico, it was estimated that the consolidation of NAFTA could in fact promote it. According to Douglas Massey,

> As trade relations expand, a continent wide infrastructure of transportation and communication will facilitate the circulation between the two countries, and an expanding network of interpersonal ties created trough trade, tourism, education and migration itself

[850] Bustamante, 'Mexican Migration', p.271.
[851] White House, *Remarks by President Clinton, President Bush, President Carter, President Ford and Vice President Al Gore in Signing of NAFTA Side Agreements*, p.6.
[852] S. Weintraub, *Responses to Migration. IRCA and the Facilitation of U.S.-Mexico Migration Dialogue*, Commission on Immigration Reform, 29-Apr-1998, [online] available: http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/binpapers/v3c-3weintraub.pdf (25/03/03), p.1232.

> will lower the costs and risks of international movement –thus putting a U.S. job within easy reach of a growing fraction of the Mexican population.[853]

In the opinion of Robert Manning, however, the reason why NAFTA could increase Mexican immigration to the United States is its effect in decreasing employment and salary levels in Mexico due to non-labour intensive manufacturing, and also because of an unbalanced concentration of investment in the border *maquiladora* industry.[854] Massey concurs with this view by pointing out that NAFTA has actually promoted Mexican immigration to the United States.[855] U.S. immigration policy, nevertheless, has been formulated with disregard of these processes.

In the build up to the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico wanted immigration to be included in the agenda but the United States rejected the proposal pointing to the prospect for the issue to be rejected by some federal legislators.[856] In order to avert an impasse, therefore, those involved in the discussion about the prospective trade agreement deliberately skipped immigration matters, focusing instead only on minor issues such as the more lenient movement of highly skilled people among the three countries –Canada, the United States, and Mexico.[857]

The Mexican government, however, made it clear that some kind of arrangement would have to be reached in the future. Underlying this conviction was not only evidence pointing to the structural nature of the problem, but also the belief that it was only logical to include the free movement of people as part of the integration process. In reference to the trade agreement, then-President Salinas stated:

> This is a negotiation in goods and services. But eventually we will have to sit down and talk about labor because the American economy is demanding Mexican workers. I want Mexican workers to work in Mexico not out. But nevertheless there is a demand pool coming from the U.S. economy, and it is a reality that we will have to look at carefully. [Answering how long did he expect it would take to reach an agreement on labor in a free market, he added]: It [the flow] is quite free now. Nevertheless, it is not in accordance with the law, and there are

[853] D. S. Massey, 'Free Trade and the Economic Underpinnings of Mexico-U.S. Migration', *Borderlines*, Vol. 8, No. 8, Sept. 2000, p.1.
[854] Maning, *Five Years After NAFTA*, p.15.
[855] Massey, 'Free Trade', p.3.
[856] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, p.62.
[857] The United States, Canada and Mexico negotiated special non-immigrant visa categories (TN) under NAFTA to allow for the entry of business visitors, intracompany transferees and professionals. The transitional limit of 5,500 such visas for Mexico expired in 2003, after which an unlimited number of professionals who otherwise qualify for entry would be admitted. See *Ibid*., p.69.

> abuses on the Mexican side and on the American side on Mexican workers, and I want to end those abuses. Therefore I would say the sooner the better.[858]

Mexico ultimately did not manage to place migration on the negotiation agenda. For many of the same reasons, there was no discussion of Mexico's state oil monopoly. Both have been sensitive domestic political issues, migration for the United States, oil for Mexico.

5.4. U.S. Concerns and Responses to Undocumented Immigration

Within the debates about undocumented immigration to the United States, it has been common to find several lines of argument that have focused exclusively on its negative impact. When immigration has been convenient for national economic security, the United States has overlooked it, both at times of war and prosperity. Negative attitudes have generally surfaced whenever immigrants have been judged to threaten national identity and cohesion, or impose economic burdens on the rest of the U.S. society.

These views, in turn, have expressed themselves through U.S. immigration policies that have concentrated on the law enforcement rather than on the social and economic integration aspects of the problem. Even though these policies have served to quiet the political clamour to 'do something about the border' in the short term, in the long run they have failed to provide for effective measures to control or stem the flows. The emphasis on the law enforcement approach has not only proved to be a failure on both counts, but it has also contributed to the growth of corruption, smuggling organisations, human rights violations and, in the specific case of undocumented immigration from Mexico, to an increasing number of deaths along the common border.

However, the 9/11 events made it more complicated to relax the law enforcement approach. To the contrary, security co-operation between the United States and Mexico has expanded, making it increasingly difficult, though not impossible, for Mexican undocumented immigrants to respond to the demand coming from the U.S. labour market. The arguments about 'loss of border control', undocumented immigrants as a 'disruptive force in society' and as an 'economic burden', are discussed in turn.

[858] News Transcripts Incorporated, 'The New U.S.-Mexico Partnership', in *American Interests*, TV Programme, October 27, 1990, Washington, DC.

5.4.1. *'Loss of Border Control'*

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the phrase 'we are losing control of our borders' became popular among those concerned about undocumented immigration to the United States. This argument, as already noted, stemmed from reactions to the changes in immigration patterns that took place beginning in the mid-1960s, and in particular from the idea that the costs of immigration outweighed its benefits, especially in the case of undocumented flows.

Anxiety about undocumented immigration has derived from several sources. Firstly, the outbreak of the Central American conflicts in the late 1970s and the Mexican economic crises of the 1980s increased U.S. concerns about the potential of either of these events, or the combination of both, to expand immigration flows from this region to the United States. These were the kind of perceptions likely to have influenced the passage of IRCA in 1986, which was hailed as the legislation that would enable U.S. citizens to 'regain control of their borders'.[859] Secondly, the increasing proportion of Hispanics and Asians among legal immigrants over the last decades of the 20th century also drew more attention to the issue. Because almost all undocumented immigrants have been Hispanic or, to a lesser extent, Asian, the increasing number of legal immigrants within these groups contributed to create the impression that the volume and impact of undocumented immigration has been greater than it has actually been.[860] The overblown reaction to undocumented immigration can be partly explained as an outgrowth of advances in communications and transportation, which have facilitated interaction and therefore increased the fear of the 'outsider'. If this fear intensifies, according to Ronald Skeldon, it usually becomes an official concern especially when different political views are at play.[861]

One criticism of the 'loss of border control' argument has been that, to the extent that border control has failed, it is primarily because the U.S. Congress has subtly undermined immigration laws by confusing them with labour supply laws. From this perspective, Washington's 'lack of control' over national borders has been a self-inflicted condition.[862] In strict terms of 'border control', a real Mexican immigration-related threat to U.S. territorial integrity would come not from the usual flows, but from the prospect of a deep deterioration of stability in Mexico that could lead to a massive northward migration, as happened during the Mexican Revolution. This would

[859] Meissner, 'New Immigration', p.92.
[860] F. D. Bean, E. E. Telles and B. L. Lowell, 'Undocumented Migration to the United States: Perceptions and Evidence', *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 13, No.4, December 1987, p.671.
[861] Skeldon, 'Migration Policies and National Security', p.37.
[862] Bustamante, 'U.S. Immigration', p.71.

represent the materialisation of the loss of control-argument which had been invented for domestic political consumption by those who favoured more restrictive immigration policies during the debate leading to IRCA. A situation of 'deep deterioration' of stability means open civil war in Mexico, which could generate a mass exodus from the country. In terms of such a hypothetical scenario, according to Thomas Moorer and Georges Fauriol, 'from the U.S. perspective, few developments could be more disastrous than a serious deterioration of Mexico's prosperity and political stability'; they add that 'U.S. preoccupation with regional socio-economic problems could be easily distracted by potentially more troublesome crises such as those in Mexico', and conclude by pointing out that 'Mexico's problems are our own, we underestimate their ability to damage U.S. security...'[863] Concern for a potential problem of this magnitude was even reflected in calls made in the 1980s for the United States to plan for a 'Mexican contingency' and to be ready for the 'defense of the Mexican border', reminding that,

> the idea of having to entertain a U.S. border defense mission, which goes against the very psychology of the nation's [United States] recent historical experience is unsettling, yet defense of the Mexican border has traditionally been an Army mission, forgotten in the age of thermonuclear warfare and bipolar worlds.[864]

Turning the 'loss of border control' view up-side down, it is also possible to argue that Mexican migration to the United States, given Mexico's economic problems during the last decades, has in fact prevented another major conflict in Mexico. In that sense, Mexican immigration to the United States has actually served as a safety valve that has contributed to Mexico's political stability and, therefore, to U.S. security as well.

5.4.2. *'Inassimilable' Immigrants*

Another argument which underlined the negative impact of undocumented immigration, and all migration for that matter, has been the effect of a sizeable number of foreigners on the identity of the country, especially when these individuals are perceived as difficult to 'assimilate' and, therefore, likely to erode social cohesion.

In the book *Population Growth in Latin America and U.S. National Security* published in 1986, John Saunders pointed out that it could be expected that North Americans would be

[863] See T. H. Moorer and G. A. Fauriol, *Caribbean Basin Security*, The Washington Papers/104, (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, 1984), pp.4, 47 and 102, respectively.
[864] G. A. Fauriol, 'Social and Economic Challenges to Hemispheric Security', in G. A. Fauriol (ed.), *Security in the Americas*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), pp.6 and 7.

outnumbered by 2 to 1 in the Western Hemisphere by 2005. In his view, the main impact of Latin America's population growth on the United States would be increasing immigration from the area. In this sense, efforts to deter undocumented immigration along its southern border would lead the United States to adopt 'draconian measures'; Saunders considered that these measures, in contrast to U.S. principles, 'will tend to create within the United States an underclass of less than equal residents and citizens, thus sowing the seeds of social discontent'.[865]

This differentiation in U.S. society as consequence of immigration, especially because of the concentration of undocumented immigrants among Hispanics, has been believed to have the potential to lead to conflicts by creating cultural divisions that could affect the assimilation process that has characterised immigration to the United States.[866] The source of these divisions could be the perception within U.S. society that there are too many immigrants who do not share its culture and national identity, let alone its standard of living.[867] This kind of concern could explain the fact that U.S. society, in general, has not been supportive of immigration into the country. According to polls conducted in different years during the 1990s, there were periods in which a majority of U.S. citizens opposed immigration and at no point was there a majority of citizens in favour of increasing immigration.[868] Concerns about immigrant assimilation coalesce around issues such as geographic concentration, social interaction (especially inter-marriage), linguistic assimilation and political unity.

Firstly, the proliferation of Mexican neighbourhoods, in particular, has increased concerns among the U.S. population insofar as residential concentration has been seen as evidence that Mexican immigrants cannot be integrated into the U.S. society. According to a different view, residential segregation has not necessarily indicated resistance to social integration and may have actually been a mechanism aiding assimilation. During the period of economic growth in the 1960s, Mexican immigrants tended to spread; after the 1970s economic slowdown, they gathered closer together once more.[869] Furthermore, contrary to the general impression, most immigrants have not lived in cities because they have been as likely as local populations to live in the suburbs. In fact, the

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[865] J. Saunders, 'Preface', in J. Saunders (ed.), *Population Growth in Latin America and U.S. National Security*, (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1986), p.xix.
[866] G. A. Fauriol, 'U.S. Immigration Policy and National Interests', *The Humanist*, Vol. 44, May-June 1984, p.10.
[867] K. J. Franzblau, *Immigration's Impact on U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy*, Research Paper, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, October 1997, p.8.
[868] R. J. Simon and J. P. Lynch, 'A Comparative Assessment of Public Opinion toward Immigrants and Immigration Policies', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer 1999, p.458.
[869] Report, *Challenge of Interdependence*, p.99.

large number of immigrants (13 million) who lived in suburban areas in 2000 showed that immigrants were assimilating into mainstream U.S. society, and that they were obtaining a middle class standard of living, even though these areas also started experiencing challenges associated to population and urbanisation growth.[870] These problems have been, in turn, usually attributed to the foreigners.

Secondly, while the continuing arrival of Mexican immigrants has left the impression of no assimilation, one notes important changes over time when each generation is viewed separately. According to a 1989 report, 13.3% of first-generation Mexican origin men married non-Hispanics; in the third generation this rose to 36.2%, and for men with high level wage the figure was 48%; intermarriage was around 50% in California, and in northern New York it was over 90%; moreover, by the third generation 84% spoke mostly English at home.[871] After looking at these figures, it seems that the question might be not whether Mexican immigrants can be integrated, but rather how much the increasing Mexican presence has strained the tolerance for ethnic diversity in the United States, particularly in the Southwest. According to one former U.S. Attorney General 'the level of immigration has to remain within the political tolerance of the American people'.[872]

Whatever the role of race in the popular perception of immigrants, it is important to note that linguistic divisions have stood out in terms of racial prejudices in discussions of immigration. People in the United States have been concerned about their sense of national identity when Spanish seems to have been competing against English as the dominant language in some areas. For instance, from 1980 to 1990, the Spanish speaking population in the United States increased from 11 million to 17.3 million people. Its use, however, concentrated in a few metropolitan centres and in the Southwest, particularly near the Mexican border. In 1990, the proportion of people living in Laredo, McAllen and Brownsville, Texas, who used English within the nuclear family circle was 8%, 12% and 22%, respectively, notwithstanding the fact that most of them were U.S. citizens.[873] This phenomenon has been frequently explained by the replenishment of Mexican population in these areas, caused by constant immigration.

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[870] S. A. Camarota, *Immigration in the United States-2000. A Snapshot of America's Foreign-Born Population*, Backgrounder, Center for Immigration Studies, January 2001, p.18.
[871] Report, *Challenge of Interdependence*, p.99.
[872] William French Smith quoted by Fauriol, 'Social and Economic Challenges', p.12.
[873] T. Muller, *Immigrants and the American City*, A Twentieth Century Fund Book, (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1993 by the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.), p.230.

Figures such as those above led to a highly politicised debate in the United States about bilingual education. While proponents considered this learning method to strengthen students' confidence and therefore their opportunities to succeed, opponents have claimed that 'political forces behind bilingual education are those that promote separatism'.[874] Moreover, it has been said that 'maintenance of non-English languages, particularly as a matter of public policy, will slow the assimilation of immigrants',[875] which seems to have been a more ideological rather than scientific assessment of the issue.

In the case of the United States, national identity has been based on values such as the free will of the individual. It has been argued that constructing national identity, nevertheless, would have been more difficult had it not been for the English language as the common denominator in U.S. society.[876] In reference to national identity, for instance, Anthony Smith makes a distinction between that that derives from cultural factors and that which originates from ethnic elements. On the one hand, cultural identity is related to the formation of a 'civic religion' based on shared experiences and sustained through education and language in order to foster 'cultural homogeneity'; on the other hand, ethnic identity derives from a 'pre-existing *ethnie*' that has to be developed into a nation by 'elevating customs into laws'.[877] Therefore, in absence of primeval ties, language is more important for the construction of civic identity than it is for ethnic identity which has more shared original elements of national unity. Nevertheless, in the particular case of the United States, it is important not to exaggerate the importance of language in constructing national identity given the influence of English and U.S. culture around the world. In this context, it is difficult to think of immigrant communities within the United States itself isolating themselves from those two powerful forces.[878]

Finally, there has been a concern about the potential impact of the Hispanic-origin population on politics. Firstly, by its size, this population has been seen as capable of fostering trends in favour of its own interests as opposed to those of the rest of the U.S. society.[879] Regarding the participation of Mexican-Americans in the U.S. political system, in particular,

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[874] *Ibid*., p.232.
[875] Nathan Glazer quoted by Muller, *Idem*.
[876] *Ibid*., p.243.
[877] Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp.136-138.
[878] A. R. Zolberg, 'Immigration and Multiculturalism in the Industrial Democracies', in R. Baubock, A. Heller, and A. R. Zolberg (eds.), *The Challenge of Diversity. Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration*, (Aldershot, Hants: Avebury, 1996 by the European Centre, Vienna), p.61.
[879] Fauriol, 'U.S. Immigration', p.9.

analyses have shown that they have usually followed a similar pattern to that of other ethnic and immigrant groups, by being concerned about the same issues such as income, education and political underrepresentation. While these factors may help explain the convergence of Mexican-American voters around key issues, they have also limited their political clout as a group.[880]

Secondly, an issue debated in the United States has been the impact of immigrants and ethnic groups on the U.S. foreign policymaking process. According to some views, U.S. foreign policy has in part been influenced by domestic foreign-born constituencies.[881] However, some arguments have held that 'seldom, if ever, have major U.S. foreign policy decisions been affected by purely ethnic reasons'.[882] In the opinion of Kenneth Franzblau, ethnic lobbies have been able to 'influence' U.S. foreign policy only under very specific circumstances: (a) where the matter has not been related to a vital national interest; (b) where the suggested course of action has not been challenged by an equally powerful resistance; or (c) where the course of action has been anyway the preferred alternative of the U.S. population at large.[883] In the case of Mexican-Americans, they seem to have had the same narrow set of interests than any other foreign-born population group in reference to their countries of origin. Moreover, Mexicans who have already lived for long in the United States seem to have been as integrated to the U.S. mainstream society as any other foreign-born population.[884]

5.4.3. *Economic Burden*

Some of the most common arguments in favour of tighter border controls have pointed out that immigrants, especially those illegally in the country, have had a significant impact on a wide variety of economic woes, from unemployment, low wage levels and inadequate working conditions, to the federal government's fiscal deficit.

Firstly, it has been argued that the presence of insufficiently trained immigrants has usually depressed wage levels. According to labour market estimates that compare income for U.S. citizens residing in locations with elevated and minor levels of immigration, it turned out

[880] N. Glazer, 'The Political Distinctiveness of the Mexican-Americans', in W. Connor (ed.), *Mexican-Americans in Comparative Perspective*, (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1985), p.224.
[881] M. S. Teitelbaum, 'Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy', *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer 1984, p.441.
[882] L. L. Gerson, 'The Influence of Hyphenated Americans on U.S. Diplomacy', in A. A. Said (ed.), *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1977), p.55.
[883] Franzblau, *Immigration's*, p.24.
[884] *Ibid*., p.28.

that the average local wage was slightly lower in immigrant cities, but the difference was relatively small, of about 0.2% for a city with 10% more immigrants in comparison to others.[885] This correlation became stronger by sector, which was evident in a 2% wage decrease in activities experiencing the presence of 10% more immigrants in comparison to others.[886] Although these impacts were not significant, it is important to point out that these estimates did not distinguish between legal and illegal workers. This is a relevant consideration, because it has been demonstrated that undocumented immigrants, by accepting lower wages because of their undocumented standing, often end up depressing wages within specific occupations, or eliminating job competition from non-immigrant individuals for particular activities.[887] The fact is that salaries in the U.S. economy have been affected to a greater extent by wage differentials in the international context, particularly in the less-skilled enterprises because of the high mobility of capital and technology.[888]

A second issue related to immigration has been its impact on expenditures in welfare programmes. After reviewing data on cash benefits, (Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] and Supplementary Security Income [SSI]), and from the Survey of Income Program Participation, George Borjas found that in 1970 non-Mexican immigrants were less likely, on average, to receive cash benefits than the U.S. population, whereas Mexican immigrants were substantially more likely to receive them than the U.S. population. In 1990, these percentages were 8.6 for non-Mexican immigrants, 7.4 for the U.S. population, and 11.3 for Mexican immigrants. Once welfare programmes were included in the calculations (Medicaid/Food Stamps/Housing Assistance), it turned out that the proportions increased to 16.7%, 14.1% and 36% respectively.[889] One comment regarding these estimates is that they reported welfare usage rates by households rather than by individuals. And since Mexican immigrants have been more likely than the U.S. population as a whole to live in extended family households, their higher proportion of welfare usage might have been attributable to welfare receipt by household members other than members of the nuclear family. There have been geographical differences as well. For instance, California has had substantially higher welfare usage rates than other states

[885] G. J. Borjas, 'The Economic Impact of Mexican Immigration', in Bosworth, Collins and Lustig, *Coming Together?*, p.164.
[886] *Ibid*., p.165.
[887] Passel, 'Comment', p.173.
[888] Cornelius, 'Mexican Migration', p.73.
[889] Borjas, 'Economic Impact', pp.166-167.

and, as noted earlier, it has had a higher concentration of Mexican immigrants than other states. According to Jeffrey Passel, welfare usage rates for Mexican immigrants in the Midwest have been far below those of Mexicans in California, and even below those of the U.S. population in the Midwest.[890]

A third issue has dealt with estimates of the undocumented immigration fiscal burden (which is the deficit in taxes paid measured against welfare services used by immigrants). According to Borjas' 1997 analysis, while some estimates pointed out that the net contribution of undocumented immigrants in the United States was in the vicinity of $27 billion dollars in taxes, other reports set their welfare tag at $40 billion to be paid by U.S. citizens.[891] At the federal level, however, revenues exceed costs. The largest source of revenue from immigrants came from federal income taxes and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) or Social Security/Medicare taxes, whereas there were few direct federal expenditure for the benefit of immigrants.[892]

Nevertheless, and despite the ambiguity in these calculations, it seemed that most studies concluded that the undocumented population in California (which has been predominantly Mexican) created a fiscal burden for that state's taxpayers. According to GAO, in 1994 undocumented immigrants imposed a fiscal burden on California's taxpayers of around $1 billion annually.[893] Therefore, even though the evidence was inconclusive as to whether Mexican immigration created a fiscal burden at the national level, 'Mexican immigrants may well be

[890] Passel, 'Comment', p.176.
[891] Borjas, 'Economic Impact', p.167.
[892] According to one report, undocumented workers have apparently paid billions of dollars a year in income. This has been explained by the fact that those immigrants have been on the 'books'; that is, they have received a wage from a tax-deducting employer. For instance, in 1998 there was evidence of $4 billion dollar payments made by undocumented immigrants at the Social Security Administration (SSA). This evidence was found in the administration's 'suspense file', which has been a computerised registry of workers' income where the name or number of the employee is different from the one in the SSA's record. The file was created to keep the individual's information until he or she updated their changed names, for instance, because a change in their marital status. Given the size of this file, nevertheless, it was suggested that contributions could come from no other source than from undocumented immigrants who have used false social security numbers to get a job. M. B. Sheridan, 'Illegals Paying Millions in Taxes. Most Don't Seek Refunds for Fear of INS Action', *The Washington Post Online*, 15 April 2001, [online] available: http://www.wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=digest&contentId=A19565=2001Aprl (30/10/10), pp.1-2.
[893] According to the estimates, while the state spent $2.35 billion annually in education, incarceration and Medicaid regarding undocumented immigrants, revenues generated by this population were $1.4 billion annually. See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Illegal Aliens: Assessing Estimates of Financial Burden on California*, Report to the Honorable Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senate, Health, Education and Human Services Division (HEHS), GAO/HEHS-95-22, Washington, DC, November 28, 1994, p.2.

responsible for fiscal dislocations in the most affected localities'.[894] Part of California's fiscal burden originated because a large fraction of the taxes paid by undocumented immigrants were federal taxes used for federal programmes. In contrast, a large number of the social benefits provided to them came from state programmes paid for with state revenues. According to Passel, nevertheless, the largest cost for the state has been education for the children of immigrants, which in strict sense has been used on the payroll of U.S. teachers; in this context, spending in education could be understood as an 'investment' rather than as a 'cost'.[895] In his opinion, this 'somewhat diffuse character of the benefits, plus the more apparent governmental costs, account for much of the political reaction against immigration (particularly undocumented immigration) in some of the major receiving areas'.[896]

Given the high concentration of Mexicans in California, it is evident that this population has had an impact on the state. Without denying this impact, however, it is important to note that much of the reaction against immigration in the state has been based on the erroneous assumption that all or most Mexican immigrants are undocumented. This perception has had a significant impact on California politics, which in turn has permeated the national debate. Outside of California, the fiscal burden of Mexican immigration has been either minimal or inexistent.[897]

According to some 1995 estimates of the benefits for the United States from Mexican immigration, the economic gains seemed to have been marginal. On the one hand, it was estimated that the presence of around 20 million immigrants in the United States was responsible for a wage decrease of about $133 billion dollars (1.9% of GDP) for the U.S. work force; on the other hand, the main beneficiaries of this presence were U.S. employers who made $140 billion (2% GDP) in profits by paying cheap salaries. The total benefit from immigration for the U.S. economy, therefore, was around $7 billion (0.1% of GDP). Moreover, the presence of a low-skilled immigrant work force in the United States was supposed to be the main factor explaining the shift in prosperity from the low- to the higher-income sectors of society.[898]

[894] Borjas, 'Economic Impact', p.168.
[895] Passel, 'Comment', p.177.
[896] *Idem.*
[897] *Ibid.*, pp.178-179.
[898] Borjas, 'Economic Impact', p.169.

5.4.4. *Responses*

In 1996 the INS released its most recent estimates at the time about undocumented immigration in the United States. According to Table 5-6, in October 1996 there were about 5 million undocumented immigrants in the country (with a margin of error of 0.8 million), with a population growth of about 275,000 each year.[899]

Table 5-6. **Estimated Illegal Immigrant Population for Top Twenty Countries of Origin and Top Twenty States of Residence: October 1996**

Country of Origin	Population	State of Residence	Population
All Countries	**5,000,000**	**All States**	**5,000,000**
1. Mexico	2,700,000	1. California	2,000,000
2. El Salvador	335,000	2. Texas	700,000
3. Guatemala	165,000	3. New York	540,000
4. Canada	120,000	4. Florida	350,000
5. Haiti	105,000	5. Illinois	290,000
6. Philippines	95,000	6. New Jersey	135,000
7. Honduras	90,000	7. Arizona	115,000
8. Dominican Republic	75,000	8. Massachussets	85,000
9. Nicaragua	70,000	9. Virginia	55,000
10. Poland	70,000	10. Washington	52,000

Source: U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), 'Estimates, Fiscal Year 1999', in *1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), [online] available: http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/Est99pdf (04/09/02), pp.3-4.

The 5 million undocumented immigrants represented 1.9% of the total U.S. population, with the highest concentrations in California (2 million or 40% of the total), followed by Texas and New York; Mexico was the main source of undocumented immigration (2.7 million or 54% of the total) growing annually to about 150,000 from 1988 onwards.[900] It is important to note that in the past, apprehensions of undocumented immigrants were frequently used as the basis for estimating their number in the United States. Nevertheless, what such statistics represented was not the actual number of persons but the number of times one particular individual would try to illegally crossing the border. Therefore, numbers based on such a flawed interpretation of data only misled the public and created animosity towards these immigrants.[901]

Before considering responses to popular concerns over immigration in the 1990s, it is useful to situate them within the wider panorama of U.S.-Mexico integration as implemented under NAFTA. Distinctions and tensions between 'core' and 'periphery' still exist within the

[899] See footnotes 591 and 592 above.
[900] DoJ, 'Estimates, Fiscal Year 1999', p.6.
[901] Bustamante, 'U.S. Immigration', p.76.

free trade region. In this sense, the purpose of U.S. law enforcement along the common border has been to maintain the relative economic advantage of the U.S. population in reference to the Mexican population –by definition this U.S. posture has failed to recognise the existence of an integrated labour market-, at the same time that the U.S. population has benefited from access to inexpensive goods produced in Mexico, and sustained the financial structure required to perpetuate this process.[902]

In 1994 the INS created a new record system, IDENT, which became operational three years later. The system consists of biometric data of people arrested by the then-INS and ever since, including any police report as background information.[903] The system not only allowed for a more accurate assessment of the flows, but for the first time it provided the INS with critical information on criminal immigrants. Its database contained over 400,000 hits on people with previous immigration violations, and it helped the INS to determine whether an immigrant with a record of illegal border crossings should be detained for prosecution.[904]

In dealing with immigration, in general, the U.S. government has had a variety of tools at its disposal, including political, economic, and military measures.[905] Regarding undocumented immigration from Mexico, the U.S. government has frequently placed emphasis on law enforcement, which over the decades has been increasingly supported by military intelligence and technology. Beginning in 1993, the INS enhanced its programmes as part of the reform of the immigration system, which included the expansion of its budget and an increase of the Border Patrol force. The allocation of resources to the INS went from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion dollars between FY1993 and FY1999, with the Border Patrol receiving the greater share of the funding to reach a total annual budget of $887 million in 1998 from $354 million dollars at the beginning of the period; during those years, the number of Border Patrol agents on the Southwest border went up from 3,389 to 8,000.[906]

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[902] J. McC. Heyman, 'Why Interdiction? Immigration Control at the United States-Mexico Border', *Regional Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 7, November 1998, p.621.
[903] U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), *Inspector General Report on Resendez-Ramirez/IDENT*, Statement, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Washington, DC, March 20, 2000 [online] available: http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/statements/igstate.htm (13/03/03).
[904] *Idem*.
[905] Franzblau, *Immigration's Impact*, p.2.
[906] Andreas, *Border Games*, p.90. The force was expected to grow to 12,000 by FY2002. McC. Heyman, 'Why Interdiction?', p.620. This number contrast sharply with the 300-900 Border Patrol officers assigned to the Canadian border. See H. Adelman, 'Canadian Borders and Immigration Post 9/11', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 34, No. 1, Spring 2002, p.20.

With more resources and personnel, the Border Patrol put into practice a new strategy to deal with undocumented immigration along the border with Mexico:

> The INS 'prevention through deterrence' strategy calls for deploying Border Patrol agents along the border to prevent and deter illegal entry, rather than apprehending undocumented immigrants after they have entered the United States.[907]

This strategy (1) intensified law enforcement at key points of unauthorised entry along the border, and (2) required inspections along major transportation routes leading to the interior. Regarding the second component, Figueroa, a Border Patrol Supervisor, explained that these 'back up' inspections were intended to create a series of echelons as one moved north from the international line. The first echelon was formed by agents right at the international limit; the second was composed of those who patrolled the surrounding areas; and the third was made up of the interior roadway checkpoints themselves, established to stop undocumented immigrants in case they avoided detention at the first two echelons.[908] The tacit purpose of this strategy was to push unauthorised immigration to non-urban areas where the assets of the Border Patrol translate into greater operational control. In particular, the idea has been to channel undocumented immigrants into zones far from major U.S. population centres and through inhospitable settings, hoping that faced with this scenario they would be deterred from adventuring themselves into dangerous areas.

The first of such initiatives, 'Operation Hold the Line' (first designated with the less diplomatic name of 'Operation Blockade'), was launched in El Paso, Texas, in September 1993. This operation was reported to produce a 50% decline in apprehensions from FY1993 to FY1996.[909] The second was 'Operation Gatekeeper' which started in October 1994 and covered a 66-mile stretch along the Mexican border in the San Diego sector; as a result of its implementation, apprehensions were reported to have reached an 18-year low in 1998 in this area, which accounted for 45% of all apprehensions nation-wide before Gatekeeper, but only 16% in FY1998.[910] Additionally, 'Operation Safeguard' was launched in Arizona in FY1995 in order to divert illegal border crossings away from urban areas near Nogales.[911]

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[907] DoJ, 'IV. Enforcement', *1998 Statistical Yearbook*, p.2
[908] Interview with Manuel Figueroa, Supervisory Border Patrol Agent, Public Information Officer, United States Border Patrol, El Centro Sector Headquarters, El Centro, CA, 9 August 2001.
[909] U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), *The National Border Patrol Strategy*, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), [online] available: http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawenfor/bpatrol/strategy.htm (08/12/00).
[910] *Idem.*
[911] *Idem*.

It is important to point out that the most immediate effect of operations Hold the Line and Gatekeeper was mainly to redirect the flows. For instance, from FY1994 (after Operation Gatekeeper) to FY2000, the number of apprehensions increased more than eight-fold in El Centro, California (the sector east of San Diego) and in Tucson, Arizona, apprehensions more than quadrupled to 616,346. McAllen, Texas, surpassed El Paso in apprehensions after implementation of Hold the Line, with 124,251 in FY1994 to 133,243 in FY2000.[912] Whether part of a staged plan or a response to unexpected increases, 'Operation Rio Grande' started in August 1997 to expand coverage to all of Texas and New Mexico. By FY1998, apprehensions had decreased by 35% in Brownsville and 27% in Laredo, while immigration shifted to other corridors.[913]

Far from deterring immigration, therefore, these operations merely led people to attempt crossings at different locations along the border, frequently at remote and rugged areas where immigrants have been at a greater risk of injury and death. According to an analysis of immigrant deaths at the border covering the period from 1993 to 1997, during the span of the study there were more than 1,600 possible such events.[914] According to the INS, by 2000, deaths were reaching more than one a day.[915]

As a result of the redirection of undocumented immigration towards more dangerous terrain, there was an increase in the number of deaths at the border. The leading causes of death during the 1993-1997 period were: drowning (29%) in the Rio Bravo/Grande segment; hypothermia, hyperthermia, and dehydration (14%); highway incidents (13%); violent death (14%); run over fatalities (9%); train-related (5%); and some others attributed to previous medical or physical conditions; about 12% of deaths were related to non-specified reasons.[916] It is interesting to note that the characteristics of the victims (85% were males in their 20s) provided relevant information about the flows, as women were found to be less likely to risk dangerous crossings and instead more prone to utilise the POEs using phony identification cards.[917]

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[912] U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), 'Table 60. Deportable Aliens Located by Program, Border Patrol Sector, and Investigation Districts, Fiscal Years 1994-2000', in *2000 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), [online] available: http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/00yrbk_ENF_REV/ENF2000.pdf (10/10/02), p.14.
[913] DoJ, *National Border Patrol Strategy*.
[914] K. Eschbach, J. Hagan, N. Rodriguez, R. Hernandez-Leon and S. Bailey, 'Death at the Border', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer 1999, p.430.
[915] M. Flynn, 'Donde esta la Frontera?', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2002, p.28.
[916] Eschbach et.al, 'Death', pp.441-447.
[917] *Idem*.

In the opinion of Timothy Dunn, this approach to undocumented immigration represented the application of a LIC strategy to a non-military issue.[918] He noted that the increasing militarisation of immigration after 1986 was connected with the simultaneous emergence of a more militarised approach to drug control and its redefinition as a problem of border security. In his opinion, 'this outcome [was] not surprising, given that undocumented immigration and drug trafficking have been portrayed as security issues by policymakers.[919] Although immigration law enforcement has increased in the last decades, interdiction against drug trafficking has been the largest U.S. governmental operation on the Mexican border, as already discussed in the previous chapter.

According to INS statistics, during FY2000 the Border Patrol carried out 12,174 narcotics seizures (9,941 of marijuana, 225 of heroin, 1,024 of cocaine, 470 of dangerous pills and 514 of other kind of drugs).[920] These statistics, however, did not provide information about whether these drugs were seized at the U.S. Southwest border, or whether they were related in any way to immigrants. According to the interview with Figueroa, there have been several arrests of Mexicans used as 'mules' by drug trafficking organisations to smuggle drugs, mostly marijuana, into the United States. Another tactic has consisted in sending in a group of immigrants with the drugs, which after detection by the Border Patrol splits into one bigger and one smaller party, under the logic that Border Patrol agents will chase the bigger group giving the smaller party carrying the drugs the opportunity to escape. But such cases are not typical of the 'big' drug smuggling operations carried out by international DTOs that deal not only with marijuana but also with heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamines. [921]

Nevertheless, one of the consequences of the overlapping of the relatively 'non-violent' undocumented immigration flow, and the drug trade that has been violent in terms of the responses of both smugglers and the government, has been increased physical danger to immigrants and Border Patrol agents alike. For instance, during the deployment of a Marine unit to carry out surveillance operations close to the border at Redford, Texas, one Marine

[918] Dunn, *Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border*, p.151.
[919] *Ibid*., p.149.
[920] DoJ, 'Table 71. Service Participation in the Control of Marijuana, Narcotics, and Dangerous Drug Traffic Fiscal Years 1989-2000', in *2000 Statistical Yearbook*, p.35.
[921] Interview with Manuel Figueroa.

accidentally killed a Mexican-American goat herder named Ezequiel Hernández.[922] Officials from both the Border Patrol and the DoS, made it clear during interviews that the only function of the military at the border has been to support federal agencies in terms of equipment, infrastructure, surveillance, and cargo checks. They expressed the view that the U.S. armed forces have not had any law enforcement role whatsoever, neither in terms of immigration nor of drug trafficking.[923] According to an interesting account, however, within the U.S. government there have been efforts to strengthen immigration control using funds and programmes that were intended to combat drug trafficking. According to Salazar, a DoD official during the Clinton administration,

> … at the time I was at the Pentagon there was a lot of pressure on my office at different moments, from different legislators, who wanted to use the National Guard for immigration control purposes. Therefore, there were often proposals to completely militarise the border, and these proposals usually came from legislators who wanted to use my office's drug-control budget to militarise the border under the 'drug-control' title, when in reality what they were concerned about was immigration. Therefore, there was a very interesting struggle from the ideological and political point of view, because they knew that if they tried to get funding for using the armed forces for immigration control, they were not going to succeed. Then the pressure was on me to justify an increasing amount of programmes under the 'drug-control' title. However, my office's attorneys would always make sure that those programmes were in fact dealing only with drug control issues.[924]

It is important to note that efforts such as those described above, and the presence of the U.S. military along the border with Mexico -even for drug control purposes-, created serious concerns

[922] On the evening of 20 May 1997, Ezequiel Hernández, a 17-year old resident of Redford, Texas, took out his goats for grasing. Unknown to the town residents, a group of four Marines had been camping in the area for three days in order to establish an observation post each night near the Rio Grande River. Their mission was to help the Border Patrol to maintain surveillance of a drug smuggling route close to Hernandez's property. That evening, however, according to the Marines and for some reason, Hernandez shot twice his 22-caliber rifle at them and was preparing to shoot a third time when one of the soldiers returned fire with his automatic weapon. That was the first time, in the battle against drugs, that a U.S. citizen was killed by his own military on U.S. soil. There was a discrepancy in the version of events as some neighbours claimed hearing only one shot that evening. What this case did was to restore the long-standing debate over the use of U.S. troops on U.S. soil, a once-forbidden measure that gained favour because of the so-called 'drug war'. See J. Katz, 'Teen's Death Sours Image of Border Drug War', *Los Angeles Times* & *San Francisco Examiner*, June 21, 1997, [online] available: http://www.dpft.org/hernandez/sfx_062197.html (04/06/03).

[923] Interview with Randolph and Figueroa.

[924] Interview with Salazar.

in Mexico about the human rights of immigrants. Incidents like the killing of Hernández seemed to confirm these fears.

In general terms, escalation of law enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border has failed to deter undocumented immigration, and instead it generated counterproductive consequences that in turn justified calls for further escalation. Firstly, more law enforcement led to a burgeoning smuggling business, as it was estimated that around 75% of all Mexican illegal border crossings involved the help of a smuggler; secondly, as security at the border became increasingly tight, smugglers became more prone to exploit the use of lost or stolen documents or to corrupt U.S. authorities. [925] Finally, the growing price to be paid by attempting an illegal entry into the United States, as discussed above, also prevented undocumented immigrants already in the country from even considering the possibility of temporarily returning to Mexico, and therefore encouraged them to remain in the United States indefinitely.[926]

As in the case of drugs, the law enforcement approach to deter undocumented immigration between ports of entry was not effective in dealing with the challenge. On the one hand, it is estimated that a sizeable proportion of all undocumented individuals in the United States (40% to 50%) entered using legal documents through the POEs, and then became 'illegal' immigrants by exceeding the authorised time of stay in country.[927] On the other hand, very little attention was paid to the issue of employer sanctions, as it represented only 2% of the INS enforcement budget.[928] This situation and the series of restrictive laws passed in 1996 seemed to confirm the U.S. preference for the law enforcement approach to undocumented immigration, in spite of its lack of effectiveness and the potential of other measures to deal more effectively with the problem.

Although in the United States, in general, concern about undocumented immigration served to justify a hard-line approach, there are arguments that establish that this orientation itself, more than a relaxed immigration policy, may undermine national security. Firstly, in the opinion of Mark Miller, violence and discrimination against immigrants often results in a backlash from the immigrant community. The consequences of restrictive immigration policies, nevertheless, are hardly ever part of the discussion about immigration and security, which often neglects the fact that coercion instead of opportunities for integration, frequently leads to social

[925] Andreas, *Border Games*, pp.95-99.
[926] *Ibid*., p.109.
[927] *Ibid*., p.100.
[928] *Ibid*., pp.100-101.

unrest.[929] Secondly, according to Skeldon, policies that incorporate an inclusive view of immigration are more likely to succeed in the face of a continued flow, especially if the state in developed countries is able to accommodate immigrants within a context of social diversity, capable of transforming societies at both ends of the immigrant's journey.[930] These are two interesting arguments that point to the convenience of moving immigration out of the security realm by having a more balanced approach to the issue that takes into consideration a more comprehensive rather than a narrow, coercive, response to the problem.

As already discussed, in the United States there has been a debate about undocumented immigration that has frequently emphasised its negative political, social and economic consequences. Although most of these arguments have not been well supported by the facts, they have served to legitimise a law enforcement approach to the issue. This approach has not only been highly ineffective, but has also intensified a variety of problems such as corruption, human smuggling and immigrant deaths at the U.S.-Mexico border, which in turn have provided the rationale for further law enforcement escalation.

5.5. Undocumented Immigration from the Copenhagen School and Risk Society Theory Perspectives

The purpose of this section is to discuss the most relevant aspects of undocumented immigration as a U.S. security concern, which include infringement of the country's sovereignty, the threat to democratic institutions deriving from the presence of a second-class group of people, and erosion of U.S. identity. Based on the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society Theory, the specific objective is to find out why this issue is seen as a security concern in the United States.

First of all, from the Buzan et.al analytical framework perspective, it can be argued that Mexican undocumented immigration has been a security concern for the United States because any illegal entry into the country is a violation of its territorial integrity and, therefore, of U.S. sovereignty. According to Buzan, the state has three main components: its idea, its territory, and its institutions, and they are 'objects of security in their own right'.[931] In this context, it does not matter whether an undocumented immigrant entered the U.S. territory looking for a job or with

[929] M. J. Miller, 'International Migration and Global Security', in Poku and Graham (eds.), *Redefining Security*, p.26.
[930] Skeldon, 'Migration Policies and National Security', p.46.
[931] Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, p.65.

the intention of doing harm; this action represents a threat because it erodes the sovereignty of the country, even though this is empirically difficult to demonstrate.

An argument has been made that border crime is a factual example of the danger of having people illegally crossing the international boundary. Even though crime has been in fact a problem along the U.S.-Mexican border, both for the undocumented immigrants themselves and for the communities in the area, it is important to note that arguments linking immigration and crime have usually been marred by methodological deficiencies. For instance, neither figures from studies carried out in the 1960s nor analyses by specific location have been able to conclusively establish a direct relationship between these two factors, except some evidence of non-aggressive felonies committed in the area.[932] According to the logic, undocumented immigrants, in principle, maintain a low-profile in order to avoid detention by U.S. immigration authorities, and this is the reason why they usually keep away from trouble.

Secondly, according to one interpretation, undocumented immigration has not only represented a transgression of the law, but has also denied the receiving society the right to decide who can be admitted into a given community, which in turn is a factor that determines the level of acceptance of an individual in that same community.[933] In reference to Mexican undocumented immigration in the 1980s, for instance, John DeWitt, former director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at DoS stated,

> For a country based on the rule of law and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal, it is a serious problem for the maintenance of our most basic traditions and beliefs to have such a large and growing proportion of the population relegated to a clearly, second class status, subjected to exploitation and abuse, and denied full access to due process of law, one of the most cherished possessions of the citizens and legal residents of this country. I strongly believe that our inability to reach even a partial legislated solution to this problem [the defeat of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill] saps our inner strength and is indeed a national security problem.[934]

Having 'second-class citizens' (i.e. undocumented immigrants), in fact, is considered to be incompatible with democratic values,[935] basically because the presence of an unincorporated

[932] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, p.11.
[933] Franzblau, *Immigration's Impact*, p.6.
[934] J. W. DeWitt, 'Population Growth, Population Pressure and Political Stability in Latin America', in Saunders, *Population Growth*, p.5.
[935] Skeldon, 'Migration Policies and National Security', p.37.

group within society represents a challenge to political order. In this context, according to Zolberg, this is the reason why democracies have developed a variety of devices to make sure the stay of temporary workers or refugees is 'extremely temporary'.[936]

Thirdly, besides the state-related risks discussed above, other kinds of concerns are those connected to social and economic issues. Regarding social threats, it is important first to remember that according to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, societal security is about 'identity'; in this context, 'societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community'.[937] In the particular case of Mexico, Samuel Huntington articulated this concern about identity in concrete terms by distinguishing Mexican immigration from other immigrant flows, and thus converting it into the 'Mexican problem.' In his opinion, the 'problem' originates from Mexico's contiguity to the United States, and from the dimension, continuity and accumulation of Mexican immigrants in some areas of the United States. In his view,

> If over one million Mexican soldiers crossed the border Americans would treat it as a major threat to their national security and react accordingly. The invasion of over one million Mexican civilians, as [President Vicente] Fox seems to recommend [after calls to eliminate restrictions on the movement of people], would be a comparable threat to American societal security, and Americans should react against it with comparable vigor… Mexican immigration is a unique, disturbing, and looming challenge to our cultural integrity, our national identity, and potentially to our future as a country.[938]

It was revealing that Huntington identified the main problem regarding Mexican immigration not in political or economic terms but with regard to U.S. national identity. He believed that the self-contained Mexican subculture in the United States has been inconsistent with the 'melting-pot' ideology that has characterised the process of assimilation in the country. The Buzan et. al. analytical framework's diagnosis about societal security in North America, actually concurs with the concerns expressed by Huntington by establishing that,

[936] Zolberg, 'Immigration and Multiculturalism', p.57.
[937] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.119.
[938] S. P. Huntington, 'Reconsidering Immigration. Is Mexico a Special Case?', *Backgrounder*, Center for Immigration Studies, November 2000, p.5.

> At present, migration is securitized mainly at the state level for those areas –especially California- in which the population balance has already shifted the most significantly because of immediate adjacency to the mainland of origin for migrants –Mexico.[939]

From this perspective, Mexican immigration in the United States is securitised because of the double challenge it poses to U.S. identity: Mexico is not only culturally very different but geographically very close. Both Mexico's distinctiveness and its proximity have contributed to the U.S. perception that Mexican immigration is a threat to the U.S. identity, and therefore, to its security.

When society's identity is perceived as being threatened by immigration, the population may call upon the state to confront this challenge through legislative or law enforcement measures, or both. In the case of undocumented immigration to the United States, these types of U.S. responses have been common, and they have often represented a cycle that has involved first, placing the responsibility for economic problems on undocumented immigrants; second, the implementation of coercive measures; and third, a return to 'business as usual' regarding undocumented immigrants after the economic situation has stabilised.[940] Something similar has happened in the context of political campaigns when fear of undocumented immigrants among U.S. voters has been exploited by politicians and commentators for political purposes. In both cases, however, it is interesting to note that the measures to deal with undocumented immigration have been detached from the so-called 'pull factors' in the United States. According to Bustamante,

> In fact, the activation of the political apparatus towards restricting immigration has never succeeded in closing the door to migration from Mexico… Despite massive deportations during various periods of unemployment crisis, these measures have translated into pressures exerted on the supply without substantially affecting the conditions of demand for undocumented labor.[941]

Lack of recognition about the impact of U.S. demand on unauthorised immigration to the United States, therefore, seems to indicate that behind social and political campaigns against undocumented flows there has been in fact a deeper concern about their 'deleterious' effect on the U.S. 'melting pot' ideology, in the context of the imperatives imposed by the U.S. economy.

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[939] Buzan et.al, *Security*, pp.130-131.
[940] Bustamante, 'Mexican Migration', pp.259-260.
[941] *Ibid*., pp.261-262.

According to Desmond King, nevertheless, the 'melting pot' ideology in the United States has been oblivious to the reality about how the U.S. identity was actually constructed. Firstly, the traditional 'melting pot' idea has not recognised the difference between 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' (i.e. slaves) migration, and this has allowed the U.S. historical account to emphasise the former in disregard of the latter; secondly, the same narrative has obscured the fact that containing diversity was actually a requirement to give way to U.S. identity; and thirdly, for all practical purposes, 'assimilation' has basically meant for people to be adapted to the 'white' U.S. identity.[942] This explains why Mexicans, who have been able to keep some of their customs by replenishing their numbers in the United States due to proximity to their country, have been seen as posing a threat to U.S. identity.

The main securitising actors regarding undocumented immigration have been, in general, conservative groups that have been mainly concerned about the erosion of identity, and they have included politicians, unions, state officials and legislators, radio and TV commentators and right-wing anti-immigrant organisations such as those in Table 5-7.

[942] D. King, 'Making Americans: Immigration Meets Race', in Gerstle and Moltenkopf, *E Pluribus Unum?*, pp.143-172.

Table 5-7. **Active Anti-immigrant Groups in the United States**

	Arizona
Mesa	US Border Guard & Border Rangers
Phoenix	United for a Sovereign America (USA)
Sierra Vista	American Border Patrol
	California
Huntington Beach	California Coalition for Immigration Reform
San Bernardino	Save Our State
Sherman Oaks	American Patrol/Voice of Citizens Together
	District of Columbia
Washington	Federation for American Immigration Reform
	Massachusetts
Framingham	Concerned Citizens and Friends of Illegal Immigration Law Enforcement
	Michigan
Petoskey	Social Contract Press
	Mississippi
Jackson	Press 2 For English
	Nevada
Henderson	Emigration Party of Nevada
	Texas
Livingston	Border Guardians
	Virginia
Monterey	American Immigration Control Foundation/Americans for Immigration Control

Source: Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 'Anti-immigrant Groups', *Intelligence Files*, [online] available: http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/anti-immigrant/active_hate_groups (29/07/11).

They have been more ideological than practical, to the extent that issues such as the immigrants' impact on the economy have usually occupied a secondary place in their concerns. As in the case of the 1964 termination of the *Bracero* programme mentioned above, there have also been unions and Hispanic groups that have opposed immigration basically because they have perceived competition from newcomers. These sectors have often been supported by individual politicians during political campaigns, and by each of the political parties, for different reasons. While Republicans have been responsive to conservatives that see immigration mainly as a societal threat -often linking the issue to drugs and crime-, Democrats have been sympathetic to unions and minorities that are concerned about immigration's economic (i.e. the argument discussed above about undocumented immigrants being responsible for depressing wages) and social impact. Some of the most important securitising actors in this area, nevertheless, have been state governments with a sizeable presence of undocumented immigrants. They have usually bore the brunt of the social and economic costs associated with this presence (this was actually one of the central concerns that supported the promotion of Proposition 187 in

California in 1994) and have been those more active in pressing the federal government to assume its constitutional responsibility in dealing with this challenge.

Governmental actors such as the Border Patrol, for instance, have also securitised undocumented immigration because of reasons other than protecting the integrity of the country. That is, one of its motivations has been the need to maintain the vitality of the 'law enforcement industry' referred to above, which has been evident in the rapid growth of the force during the 1990s. As discussed above, just in the Southwest border, the most demanding area of operations for the Border Patrol, the number of agents expanded from 4,000 to 8,000 in the span of four years, from 1994 to 1998.[943]

The designation of immigration as a security matter has been accepted by a heterogeneous audience –comprising conservative politicians at every level of government, right-wing organisations, nativists and unions- that has approved of its security designation for different reasons such as identity, the discourse on 'secure our borders', state sovereignty and economic reasons. This audience has also included those who have securitised immigration, such as state governments that have had the obligation to respond to public demands to put in place measures to stop what has been seen as an 'invasion'. This helps explain why the National Guard has often been called upon at the border, and also the erection of the border fence at the dividing line in the 2000s that has satisfied voters but has not necessarily either stopped undocumented immigration or addressed the root of the problem. [944] The federal government has also been an important part of the audience that has accepted immigration as a security issue, and the evidence was the creation of the DHS on 1 March 2003, which has '[represented] the largest reorganization of the Federal Government since World War II'.[945]

It is possible to argue that securitising undocumented immigration became increasingly politically acceptable in the United States especially after the 9/11 events, even though the Executive Branch has been less resounding than the U.S. Congress about framing undocumented immigration as a security issue, let alone portraying it as threat to identity in a country that is

[943] McC. Heyman, 'Why Interdiction?', p.620.
[944] D. B. Wood, 'Billions for a US-Mexico Border Fence, but is it Doing any Good?', *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 19, 2009, [online] available: http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2009/0919/p02s09-usgn.html (16/07/11).
[945] U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), *Congressional Record – House*, 107th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 147, Pt.8, June 12, 2001 to June 25, 2001, June 20, 2003, [online] available: http://books.google.com/books?id=s4Mr9J8dOscC&dq=dhs+most+significant+reorganization+since+the+1947 (12/07/11), p.15805.

supposed to be multicultural. As in the case of drugs, the mass media has also contributed to construing immigration as a security issue, especially because of right-wing radio and TV stations, and conservative commentators, such as Lou Dobbs, for instance, at CNN, who characterised himself for his hard-line comments regarding undocumented immigration from Mexico.[946]

The interest and intentions in defining and accepting immigration as security matter have been primarily related to xenophobic impulses and concern about the erosion of identity within conservative sectors of the U.S. society, as discussed above, and also to preoccupation about preserving economic advantages for the legitimate (citizens) members of the society. According to Zolberg,

> at every level of skill, an individual is better off working and living in a developed rather than in a developing country. Given the rational desire of the less favoured individual to improve his standard of living by relocating, the restrictive regulation of immigration flows is therefore a mechanism of those who are better off to protect their more advantageous position.[947]

Immigration controls, therefore, are not only a matter of security but also an instrument for maintaining the division of power and wealth in the international system. This is why international immigration, in general, has been an 'inherently security sensitive' issue.[948]

In this context, it can be argued that the Border Patrol has been devoted to protecting the identity and the economic advantages of the U.S. society. To detain undocumented immigrants has become thus a societal as well as an economic security matter, hidden behind the veil of the 'border security' discourse which has been a more palatable 'speech act', to use the language of the Buzan et.al analytical framework.

An important concern that cannot be overlooked regarding undocumented immigration has been the need to incorporate newcomers into the mainstream of the U.S. society, not only because of the importance of providing them economic opportunities but also because isolating them is incompatible with the principles of democracy in terms of having equal political rights.[949] This is a significant point of consensus within the U.S. society, independently of the

[946] I. Macdonald, 'Lou Dobbs, American Hypocrite', *The Nation*, October 25, 2010, , [online] available: http://www.thenation.com/article/155209/lou-dobbs-american-hypocrite (16/07/11).
[947] Zolberg, 'Immigration and Multiculturalism', p.43.
[948] Miller, 'International Migration and Global Security', p.19.
[949] Skeldon, 'Migration Policies and National Security', p.37.

individual opinion about either Mexico or undocumented immigration. This posture has been very pragmatic, and has been in line with the shared sense of identity of the U.S. society, even though the treatment of undocumented immigrants in the country represents a contradiction.

The threat-perception associated with undocumented immigration, in general, has led the United States to adopt a law enforcement approach to the problem in detriment of alternatives to integrate immigrants in more constructive economic and social terms in the face of a continued illegal flow in the foreseeable future. If it is true this coercive approach has served to assuage the concerns of sectors that have demanded the government to 'do something about the border', U.S. immigration policy has basically failed to provide for long lasting solutions to the problem, and has created additional challenges such as corruption, the use of fake documents to cross the border, human rights violations and the strengthening of human smuggling organisations, as well as undocumented immigrant deaths along the inhospitable corridors to the north. The process of securitisation of undocumented immigration in the United States has been successful because the audience has basically approved the use of 'extraordinary measures' to deal with the problem by strengthening both the legal and the law enforcement capacities to deal with problem. Securitisation, however, has not resulted in adequately addressing the problem. It cannot be argued that it has been the best course of action to confront this challenge.

In terms of issue sectors, it can be argued, first of all, that undocumented immigration from Mexico originates, similar to drug trafficking, as an issue in the economic sector in the form of the existence of an integrated illegal labour market. It is also a highly politicised matter in the United States because of the efforts of conservative sectors of its society, and some politicians during electoral campaigns, whose intention is to exploit for political purposes the fears of U.S. voters regarding the threat to U.S. identity posed by undocumented immigration. An additional reason why undocumented immigration has been more explicitly securitised, is because of the link that has been established between immigration and terrorism after the 9/11 events, in particular because of the U.S. concern about the possibility of undocumented flows being exploited by terrorists to introduce themselves into the United States. In this context, the main securitising actor has been the federal government through its statements about the need to reinforce border security in order to prevent terrorist attacks.

Mexican undocumented immigration has not been a military threat to the United States in the strict sense. It can be argued that any entry into the country without authorisation,

technically, is a violation of its territorial integrity and thus of its sovereignty. However, Mexican undocumented immigration has been marginally related to the military sector to the extent that the U.S. military, as in the case of drug trafficking, has provided infrastructure and intelligence support to the LAEs operating at the Southwest border. A more controversial issue from the Mexican point of view, has been the presence of U.S. troops on the common border, supposedly to discourage the flow of drugs but equally useful to prevent undocumented immigration, which therefore creates the potential for human rights violations in the region.

In the political sector, while technically Mexican undocumented immigration has been a violation of U.S. sovereignty, it is difficult to assess empirically how much sovereignty the United States has lost with every Mexican entering without inspection into its territory. In the aftermath of the 9/11 events, the perceived vulnerability of the border to penetration by terrorists heightened anxiety about their potential infiltration through the porous U.S.-Mexico border, which in turn produced tougher security policies. Even though these measures have increased the costs and dangers for Mexican undocumented immigrants, so far they have not completely deterred illegal flows. Were the U.S. government to ignore the demand for increased border security, it would face a different political security threat to its legitimacy. This prospect could emerge not from immigrants transgressing national sovereignty but from a citizenry concerned by the unresponsiveness of its political representatives. There has also been a concern that the presence of undocumented immigrants in the country could lead to create a fragmented society that, by definition, is incompatible with a democratic system, and for that reason it could potentially undermine U.S. institutions.

In the United States it has been easier to define immigration as a security issue in the societal sector. There has been a long-standing U.S. concern that Mexican immigration, whether legal or undocumented, could weaken or erode the cultural identity of the country, even though this has not been conclusively demonstrated. Preoccupation with cultural homogeneity has been pervasive and influential though it has rarely been explicitly mentioned as a justification for more restrictive immigration policies that have more often been articulated in terms of border security. The threat undocumented immigration has posed to U.S. identity is key to understanding the securitisation of this issue, from the U.S. perspective, regarding Mexico.

In the economic sector, the existence of an integrated illegal labour market has been considered to adversely affect the well being of the U.S. population by the burden undocumented

immigration places on U.S. taxpayers. According to the evidence, the economic effects of Mexican undocumented immigration to the United States have been mostly felt at the local level and have been marginal, at best, at the national level. As a matter of fact, easy access to cheap labour from Mexico can be argued to support, more than undermine, U.S. economic security by increasing the competitiveness of certain sectors of the U.S. economy such as services and construction.

In the environmental sector, even though it can be argued that the flow of undocumented immigrants has represented an environmental challenge in the corridors to the north, such as in the Arizona desert, no reliable neutral study or analysis has pointed out to a significant impact on environmental degradation on the U.S. side of the border as consequence of undocumented immigration. Most of the reports on the issue come from anti-immigrant organisations which make reference to 'the devastating environmental impacts of illegal immigration', such as 'Numbers USA for Lower Immigration Levels'.[950] Moreover, Mexican immigrants tend to diffuse throughout the country once they cross the dividing line, and this is the reason why they have not concentrated in the border region. Most of the people living in unincorporated settlements on the U.S. side of the border, the so-called 'colonias', have been more often U.S. citizens of Mexican origin than Mexican undocumented immigrants.

From the Risk society perspective, undocumented immigration is a trans-national security concern that is the product of an integrated illegal labour market between the United States and Mexico and as such an effect of global economic forces. Undocumented immigration from Mexico is an actual security concern for the United States because of its perceived negative effect on the identity of the country and because, in the context of possible future scenarios, the intensification of the flow might further erode the 'Melting pot' narrative in the country. In this context, the United States has adopted a risk management approach regarding this concern, which consists on a variety of legislative and law enforcement measures to minimise the flow and therefore to prevent societal challenges. As in the case of drug trafficking, the risk management approach does not have the purpose of dealing definitively with the problem but

[950] For instance, this organisation estimates that undocumented immigrants dump more than 2,000 tons of trash annually in the Arizona desert; pointed to undocumented immigrants as those responsible for the fire devastation of 68,413 acres in the desert area in 2002; and for more than 30 vehicles abandoned in the Organ Pipes National Park each year. See Numbers USA for Lower Immigration Levels, 'Illegal's Immigration Negative Impact on the Environment', [online] available: http://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/issues/environment/illegal-immigrations-negative-impact-environment.html (16/07/11).

only to prevent this risk from growing, even though this course of action has a boomerang effect in the form of longer periods of stay for Mexican immigrants in the United States, as well as an increase in both profits for human smuggling organisations and in deaths at the common border.

5.6. Conclusions

Undocumented immigration in the United States in the 1990s was the outcome of a historic process influenced by economic factors, in particular by demand for labour in the country. Over the course of several generations, a structural relationship developed through the interaction of 'pull' and 'push' factors in the United States and Mexico, respectively, which in turn contributed to the creation and perpetuation of trans-border social networks. This characteristic helps explain, for instance, why immigration has not only been driven by economic forces, even though they have been of paramount importance.

Historically, Mexican immigrant labour in the United States used to be concentrated in certain economic sectors such as agriculture, railways, and mining in the Midwest and Southwest. The shift in the U.S. economy from manufacturing to service-based activities in the last decades, however, has diversified the demand for immigrant labour just as recurrent economic crises in Mexico have increased the skill- and education-levels of immigrant labour supply. In the last decades, Mexican workers have been found in more regions and in a wider variety of occupations in the United States.

The two countries have usually held different perspectives about immigration. For the United States, the preferred option has been to have immigrant workers perform the required activities, and then facilitate their return to their places of origin. The United States has not openly acknowledged the existence of an integrated labour market with Mexico, and has usually blamed the problem of undocumented immigration on the inability of the Mexican economy to generate the required level of employment in the country (as if immigration responded only to this variable). Its answer to the problem has been instead based on unilateral and limited legalisation schemes, as well as law enforcement measures. Policies grounded in ignorance of the unrelenting demand for immigrant labour, and trust in border security solutions, have failed to curb undocumented immigration and even encouraged more permanent stays.

Although immigration matters were not addressed during NAFTA negotiations between 1990 and 1993, the U.S. government considered that as a consequence of the agreement,

investment in Mexico would result in more jobs being created and more incentives for Mexicans to stay home. The effects of NAFTA, and the economic reforms implemented by Mexico since the mid-1980s and until the end of the 1990s, this latter period covered by this thesis, however, have resulted in more rather than less immigration. To these factors it is important to add the effect of demographic and labour market trends in both countries, which have reinforced the supply-demand relationship.

Undocumented immigration has been considered a security concern in the United States because of its perceived negative impact on the fiscal and employment stability of the country, but more importantly, because of its deleterious effect on U.S. identity. The societal threat posed by undocumented immigration has often been hidden behind arguments about the economic burden unauthorised immigrants have represented for the country. Although these arguments have been emphasised for political purposes during electoral campaigns and at times of economic slowdown, an unequivocal link was established between undocumented immigration and security in the aftermath of the 9/11 events, due to U.S. official concerns about the susceptibility of illegal flows to be exploited by terrorists bent on attacking the country.

In the United States, the securitisation process of undocumented immigration has been successful to the extent that the audience has legitimised the 'breaking of rules' and the use of 'extraordinary measures' to confront the challenge, which has been evident not only in the series of restrictive immigration legislation approved by the U.S. Congress and local legislatures, but also in the sizeable budgets appropriated for LEAs dealing with border security.

The U.S. law enforcement approach to the issue, however, has not been up to the task of effectively dealing with problem, which has been evident in its negative effects reflected in the strengthening of smuggling business, the use of false documents at U.S. POEs, increasing corruption and undocumented immigrant deaths at the common border. These coercive measures have not prevented the continuation of the illegal flows, basically because they have not addressed the root causes of the problem, which have been related to the U.S. economy continued demand for foreign labour due to structural factors that have been beyond the control of both the U.S. and the Mexican governments. Undocumented immigration might be a self inflicted predicament created by the United States resulting from the process of globalisation U.S. foreign policy has vigorously pursued around the world.

Since the end of the 1990s, a more direct link was established between security and immigration, in general, in the United States especially as a result of 9/11. Due to the fact that 'pull' and 'push' factors have not been eliminated from the *de facto* U.S.-Mexico integrated labour market, Mexican undocumented immigration flows have continued, albeit at a slower peace, because of the U.S. economic contraction brought about by the 'housing bubble' (second half of the 2000s) and heightened security at the common border. In this context, undocumented immigrants have continued attempting more dangerous crossings in rough areas such as in the Sonoran desert in Arizona, while others have resorted to human smuggling that has increasingly been controlled by Mexican DTOs, especially in the Gulf of Mexico area, turning undocumented immigration into a more dangerous and violent alternative for people looking for better economic opportunities in the United States.[951]

According to Risk Society theory, undocumented immigration is a trans-national security concern that has to be addressed through a risk management perspective involving preventive measures to stop the flow of people as the best alternative for an issue that is far for a definitive solution.

[951] A. M. O'Connor, 'Mexican cartels move into human trafficking', *The Washington Post*, July 27, 2011, [online] available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/mexican-cartels-move-into-human-trafficking/2011/07/22/gIQArmPVcI_story.html (29/07/11).

CHAPTER 6. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

6.1. Introduction

As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the main objective of this research consists in analysing the non-state, trans-border, threats Mexico indirectly posed to the United States in the 1990s. This, in turn, is an exercise that requires a non-traditional conception of security in order to understand the dynamics of non-military threats.

In this context, the analytical value of this chapter -which addresses environmental issues in U.S.-Mexican relations-, consists in explaining why environmental degradation along the U.S. border with Mexico, in particular water pollution, has been an issue that has so far remained only as a potential security concern.

As already mentioned, analysing border environmental issues from the Buzan et.al analytical framework and Risk Society theory perspectives contributes to provide a more comprehensive understanding of trans-border bilateral concerns, in particular the fact that not all of them translate into security challenges, especially compared to drug trafficking that is an unambiguous security issue from the U.S. point of view.

This chapter argues that an epidemic at the U.S.-Mexico border, derived from water pollution, represents the most serious potential concern in the context of the variety of challenges that have characterised the region. This issue, nevertheless, has not turned so far into a U.S. security issue, or a Mexican security concern, for that matter. This has to do with both an analytical and with an empirical explanation.

First, according to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, the key 'to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations'; that is, it is fundamental to understand the process by which 'securitizing actors' manage to 'legitimize' the adoption of 'emergency measures' to deal with 'existential threats' to the 'survival' of a 'referent object' of security.[952] As will be discussed in more detail below, water pollution has not successfully been portrayed as an existential threat to the object of security, which is the U.S. border population, basically because the securitising actors (i.e. government officials, scholars, environmental organisations) have not been able to legitimise the adoption of extreme measures to deal with the potential threat. In other words, they have not been able to complete the securitisation process in a

[952] Buzan et.al, *Security*, p.21.

successful way. Second, as far as Risk Society theory is concerned, a risk management approach to the issue, as expressed in the existence of a bi-national institutional structure that constantly addresses issues through initiatives and programmes –albeit insufficient- has been able so far to keep border environmental matters from the security realm. This bilateral institutional infrastructure is addressed at length below.

Moreover, the fact that bilateral environmental issues are not securitised, helps to illustrate that the U.S.-Mexico security relationship is in fact more complex than what is reflected in the scarce literature on the subject, and therefore that this field of study deserves a more detailed analysis.

After five decades of intense economic activity across the U.S.-Mexico border, which started in the mid-1960s, the region has undergone a rapid demographic and environmental transformation. On the Mexican side, establishment of the *maquiladora* industry created employment in the area, attracting people not only from the interior of the country but also nationals returning from the United States after the end of the *Bracero* programme (1942-1964). On the U.S. side, communities providing services and materials for assembly plants across the border also shared some of this growth.

Increasing industrialisation and population growth eventually resulted in degradation of the border environment, as both processes surpassed the capacity of local infrastructure to meet growing demands. While these conditions represented a threat to the region's ecosystem in the long-term, degradation of air and water quality standards, as well as pollution generated by hazardous waste, posed a health risk to residents on both sides of the boundary in the medium- to short-term.

The U.S.-Mexico border is one of the longest and busiest international boundaries in the world, which is characterised by the presence of 14-pairs of 'sister cities' along the dividing line. The intense trans-boundary movement of people, goods and resources, as well as the fact that communities on both sides of the border basically share the same natural resources, has represented the potential for the spread of environmental health risks across the international frontier. From an epidemiological point of view, the region's population is highly integrated, and

for this reason health challenges do not stop at the border.[953] Environmental degradation, and its effect on public health, therefore, does not respect political boundaries.

Although the need to broaden the traditional military focus of the concept of 'national security' -to explain increasingly complex international issues- has been debated since at least the 1970s, it was only since the beginning of the 1990s that environmental aspects gradually became part of the U.S. national security outlook.[954] This issue has been incorporated as part of the U.S. foreign policy rhetoric that recognises the potentially negative effects, as well as the benefits, of globalisation. There is a particular concern about the combined effect of population growth and resource scarcity on issues such as poverty, disease, and ultimately on international stability, because of the potential for conflict over resources and massive movement of displaced people.[955] In the 2002 *National Security Strategy* announced by the then-Bush administration, for instance, the most important statement on the subject was the need to reconcile protection of the environment and economic growth.[956] The difficulty of reconciling these two objectives, more precisely, the tendency to pursue economic growth in detriment of environmental quality, is actually the key to understanding the most pressing ecological problems affecting the U.S.-Mexican border, and is an issue that has attracted a wider debate not only in the context of U.S.-Mexican relations.[957] This study argues that unless this imbalance is redressed in favour of environmentally sound, national and bilateral, economic and social policies, the U.S. population residing in the area, like Mexican border-dwellers, will continue to be potentially exposed to the trans-border degradation of the environment.

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[953] Author (s) not available, 'Two Countries, One Population, Shared Problems. Community Health in the Borderlands: An Overview', *Borderlines*, Vol. 6, No. 4, May 1998, p.1.

[954] 'In the United States, the first mention of environmental issues in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the document that periodically updates the strategy to make the nation secure, was made by President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s. President Clinton highlighted it, and his defense secretary, William Perry, even made the environment a key point in his call for a revolution in security strategy… Since the Clinton era, there has been an environmental officer in the National Security Council'. See A. H. McGowan, Editorial, 'The Environment and National Security', *Environment. Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, June 2007, [online] available: http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/June%202007/editorial-jun07.html (10/06/11).

[955] See the influential analysis of Kaplan in this respect: R. D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy. Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, c2000).

[956] White House, 'National Security Strategy of the United States', *The New York Times*, September 20, 2002, p.23-24 (of 38 pages).

[957] Within the United States, for instance, the most recent Gallup poll found by this author established that 53% of U.S. citizens considered protecting the environment should be a top issue, 'even at the risk of curbing economic growth', compared to 36% of those who responded that the economy should be a priority 'even if the environment suffers to some extent'. Eleven percent answered both should be equally addressed or expressed no opinion at all. See Gallup, 'Public Priorities: Environment vs. Economic Growth', *Gallup Daily News*, April 12, 2005, available [online]: http://www.gallup.com/poll/15820/public-priorities-environment-vs-economic-growth.aspx (10/06/11).

As discussed above, this chapter holds that although air quality degradation and inadequate disposal of hazardous waste have had an impact on environmental conditions along the border, during the 1990s -the time frame of this study- water issues had the greatest potential to become the main environmental security issue for U.S. residents in the area. Water issues can be divided into two different challenges: those that derive from scarcity and those from pollution. Firstly, addressing the scarcity aspect of the challenge is beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice to say that this problem, in principle, can be dealt with through better management and conservation initiatives, and that there is no evidence of the possibility for a conflict between the United States and Mexico over water. Scarcity most often comes as the result of atmospheric conditions, and therefore it is likely that the issue will be addressed through negotiation and co-operation. At least this has been the course of action followed in past experiences regarding access to water from the Grande/Bravo River.[958]

In this context, the possibility of a 'water conflict' in the form of an armed confrontation between the United States and Mexico is very limited, to say the least. On the one hand, the United States is not only the superior power in the relationship with Mexico, but also the upstream state in the two river basins along the common border (i.e. Colorado and Grande/Bravo). These two conditions leave Mexico with no option but to look for a negotiated solution with the United States. On the other hand, the United States might be willing to co-operate with Mexico in order to avoid a crisis of water scarcity in that country as this could hurt U.S. interests by causing instability and accelerating the pace of immigration. Problems deriving from scarcity, therefore, could create tensions in the relationship but also incentives to co-operate, and the latter outcome is actually more likely because of the existence of a comprehensive bi-national institutional infrastructure to deal with environmental issues.

Secondly, besides scarcity, the other relevant water-related issue is pollution. Of all security concers, it is possible to argue that none of them is more serious than a threat to the health of the individual or the society. Problems related to water pollution represent the most serious environmental challenge to U.S. national security in the border region. This is because of the potential for waterborne diseases to spread on both sides of the border, not only because of

[958] See U.S. Department of State (DoS), 'United States Allocation of Rio Grande Waters During the Last Year of the Current Cycle', Minute No. 308, International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), June 28, 2002, Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, [online] available: http://ibwc.state.gov/FORAFFAI/MINUTES/minindex.HTM (22/10/02); and J. A. Román, 'Saldó México Histórica Deuda de Agua que Mantenía con Estados Unidos', *La Jornada*, Lunes 10 de Octubre de 2005, [online] available: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/10/10/016n1pol.php (10/06/11).

the common access to water sources but also because of the intense two-way flow of people across the boundary. Throughout history, migration has been an important element in the propagation of infections, even though it is complicated to establish the precise link between both factors.[959] In any event, the consequences of a waterborne epidemic along the border would be greater than the health problems caused either by air pollution or hazardous waste. This is because of its mode of transmission and the higher risk of contagion in the case of diseases such as amebiasis, hepatitis, shigellosis or typhoid fever.

The prospect of an epidemic from contaminated water could be even more worrisome than the risk of a chemical accident or a toxic terrorist attack, because it could affect even more people. Although water infrastructure in the region has gradually improved since NAFTA entered into force, there are important needs yet to be met that represent potential gaps in the barrier against the outbreak of disease. Such a scenario constitutes a challenge to the U.S. national interest concerning the well being of the population, as stated in the U.S. national security strategy.[960] If an epidemic were to occur, nevertheless, the United States and Mexico would likely strengthen bilateral co-operation in order to contain the spread of disease. Therefore, because of the complexity of border environmental issues, and the existence of a bilateral institutional infrastructure to deal with environmental challenges at the border, these issues are potential rather than actual security concerns in the U.S.-Mexican relationship.

The first part of this chapter describes the demographic characteristics and the environmental infrastructure conditions of the U.S.-Mexico border area, to show how the combination of these two factors has created environmental challenges in the context of the economic transformation of the region. The second part focuses on water problems generated by industrial and demographic growth in order to understand the nature and magnitude of the challenge, in particular water poluution. The third part provides an overview of the institutional infrastructure created by the United States and Mexico, especially in the context of NAFTA, to deal with environmental problems. It includes the obstacles these institutions have confronted so far in their operation, as well as the issues that have yet to be addressed. The final part deals with water pollution along the U.S.-Mexico border in terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework

[959] D. T. Graham and N. Poku, 'Population Movements, Health, and Security', in Poku and Graham (eds.), *Redefining Security*, p.204.

[960] For instance, the Preface's opening statement of the Clinton's U.S. National Security Strategy that is the basis for this research establishes that 'Protecting the security of our nation –our people our territory and our way of life- is my foremost mission and constitutional duty'. See White House, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*.

and the Risk Society Theory perspectives, and explains why this issue has remained as a potential rather than as an actual security concern, in contrast to drug trafficking which has been considered an unequivocal security issue from the U.S. perspective.

6.2. Setting

As noted above, this chapter focuses on environmental issues in U.S.-Mexican relations in the 1990s. Its objective is to analyse bilateral challenges in order to understand, in terms of the Buzan et.al. analytical framework and the Risk Society Theory perspectives, why border environmental issues, in general, have remained potential rather than actual security concerns.

The combination of expanding economic activity, and related population growth, has overburdened the existing infrastructure capacity along the U.S.-Mexico border. As discussed below, this situation led to a gradual deterioration of environmental conditions in the region, in spite of bilateral efforts since the 1980s to deal with this challenge in a more systematic way. In this context, in the 1990s –the period of study of this thesis- many environmental hazards persisted, and they represented a potential risk not only to the ecological equilibrium but also to the health of people living in the region.

Despite sporadic claims of both federal governments to the contrary, for decades conditions in border communities were adequately addressed by neither Washington, DC, nor by Mexico City. Although inattention to the borderlands has not been unique to the U.S.-Mexico border,[961] lack of proper attention from both federal authorities to the plight of this region has been highly peculiar in light of its significance as an item on the bilateral agenda. Moreover, the importance of the region would eventually become more evident in the context of negotiations leading to NAFTA.

As already noted, environmental issues in U.S.-Mexican relations have related mainly to industrial and demographic growth along the common border. This region has been defined by NADB as the area covering 100 kilometres (62 miles) each way to the north and south of the international boundary.[962] As shown in Table 6-1 below, according to 1995 estimates, the

[961] Interview with David C. Fege, Assistant Director, San Diego Border Liaison Office, U.S. EPA, carried out in San Diego, CA, 18 April 2001.

[962] North American Development Bank (NADB), *U.S.-Mexico Border Region*, [online] available: http://www.nadbank.org/about_bank/border_region/Border_Region_Text.htm (06/12/00), p.1. This definition is based on the previous one established by the international accord that is the foundation of U.S.-Mexico border environmental co-operation, the 1983 La Paz Agreement, which will be referred to below.

population living within 100 kilometres of the border was about 10.6 million people with 5.8 million living on the U.S. side and 4.8 million on the Mexican side. The largest population concentrations on either side of the border were located in California and Baja California on the Pacific Coast. Whereas the total population of the 24 U.S. border counties was 6,899,904 in 2006, which represented a 9.5% increase in relation to 2000, population on the Mexican side of the border was estimated at 6.4 million, representing a 16% increase in reference to 1999.[963]

Table 6-1. **Population Adjacent to the Border 1980-1995**

Area	**1980**	**1990**	**1995**
Border Total	**6,976,622**	**9,103,319**	**10,585,265**
U.S. Subtotal	**4,009,079**	**5,213,774**	**5,827,439**
California	1,953,956	2,607,319	2,767,796
Arizona	728,142	914,919	1,038,156
New Mexico	117,974	159,578	188,841
Texas	1,209,079	1,531,958	1,832,646
Mexico Subtotal	**2,967,543**	**3.889,545**	**4,757,826**
Baja California	1,002,459	1,400,873	1,750,172
Sonora	312,079	394,712	469,804
Chihuahua	635,490	869,951	1,086,559
Coahuila	151,623	191,135	238,288
Nuevo León	16,475	17,312	18,276
Tamaulipas	849,417	1,015,562	1,194,727

Source: J. Peach and J. Williams, *U.S.-Mexico Border Region Population Projections to 2020*, Paper presented at the Association of Borderlands Studies and Western Social Science Association Annual Conference, Ft. Worth, Texas, April 22, 1999 (Unpublished manuscript, April 1999), in A. Canales, 'Industrialization, Urbanization, and Population Growth on the Border', *Borderlines*, Vol. 7, No.7, August 1999, p.4.

Based on growth rates from the end of the 1990s, it was estimated that by 2020 the region could more than double its population, reaching around 24 million people.[964]

In the opinion of NADB, the projected population increase, based on 1990s data, had the potential not only to stress the insufficient infrastructure capacity to deal with wastewater and

[963] U.S.-Mexico Border Counties Coalition, *Undocumented Immigrants in U.S.-Mexico Border Counties: The Costs of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Services*, prepared by the Eller College of Management, School of Public Administration and Policy, The University of Arizona, c2008, [online] available: http://www.bordercounties.org/vertical/Sites/%7BB4A0F1FF-7823-4C95-8D7A-F5E400063C73%7D/uploads/%7B690801CA-CEE6-413C-AC8B-A00DA765D96E%7D.PDF (10/06/11), p.4.

[964] See Peach and Williams, *U.S.-Mexico Border*, p.4. The most recent available estimate indicates there are 13 million people living in the area, and this number is expected to double by 2025. See *United States-Mexico Border Health Commission*, 'The United States-Mexico Border Region at a Glance', New Mexico State University (NMSU), [online] available: http://www.nmsu.edu/~bec/BEC/Readings/10.USMBHC-TheBorderAtAGlance.pdf (08/05/11).

solid waste treatment but also the drinking water supply, especially because of the prospect for increased agricultural activity under NAFTA and the fact that crops have been the main consumer of water in the region. This situation was complicated by the fact that 90% of border settlements have been characterised by their limited size and non-urban condition, and therefore have been unable to address their own infrastructure needs.[965] In this context, in the 1990s the absence of infrastructure at the border was considered the main factor affecting the ability to deal with environmental challenges. For instance, according to a 1996 GAO report,

> Although the United States and Mexico have expanded efforts in recent years to address environmental problems in the border region, many environmental infrastructure needs remain unmet and continue to pose *serious threats* to human health and the environment on both sides of the border. These unmet needs are particularly acute on the Mexican side of the border, where the basic infrastructure is generally insufficient and sometimes non-existent for connecting the outlying communities to services for municipal sewage collection, wastewater treatment, and solid and hazardous waste disposal. The colonias [sic] however, have many unmet environmental infrastructure needs, and some other communities need to expand or upgrade the capacity of their existing infrastructure to meet the ever-increasing demand from population and industrial growth.[966]

Notwithstanding that the two countries have increasingly co-operated to address environmental issues along the common border since the 1980s with the establishment of La Paz Agreement that will be addressed below, the reasons behind the awkward development of the region have also been related to the fact that each one has had a different view about the border itself.

In the 1990s, the United States regarded the border with Mexico as an area confronting environmental and standard of living-related problems, evidencing thus deficiencies in almost every social indicator (similar to those of its 'inner cities').[967] Although most U.S. Southwest border communities have shown these conditions, there have been differences among some

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[965] NADB, *U.S.-Mexico*, p.1.

[966] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *International Environment. Environmental Infrastructure Needs in the U.S.-Mexican Border Region Remain Unmet*, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division (RCED), GAO/RCED-96-179, Washington, DC, July 1996, p.7. 'Colonias' is the name given to unincorporated communities on the U.S. side of the border. They are characterised by extreme poverty, usually lacking basic services such as drinking water, sewage, drainage, and electricity. (Emphasis by the author).

[967] U.S. Department of the Treasury (DoT), 'Profile of the Southwest Border Region', Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, [online] available: http://www.treas.gov/sw_border/profile.html (06/12/00), pp.1-5.

states and counties as there are zones of prosperity, such as San Diego County, inserted in broader areas of poverty. In general terms, however, these communities have shared similar characteristics with their neighbours south of the border and have had lower standards of living and levels of economic development than the rest of the United States.

With the prospect of the eventual implementation of NAFTA in 1994, cross-border trade was expected to become a benefit for all in the United States. Nevertheless, U.S. border communities have been experiencing most of the trade's negative impact both in terms of continued unbalanced development and demographic growth.[968] In order to cope with this situation, in May 1999 President Clinton signed Executive Order 13122 creating the 'Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border', to improve social and economic conditions in the region.[969] Notwithstanding that in principle its objectives included the environment, the initiative was intended to deal mainly with economic problems. In the opinion of one of its members,

> The Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border was a positive thing in bringing together all the federal agencies that work on the U.S.-Mexico border. We met weekly and shared with one another our agency's activities on the border. However, very little substantive results and discussion came out of the task force with regard to the environment. Nothing new emerged that can be said was the cause of the taskforce. Coordination and information sharing was its strength. Unfortunately, the change of administration ended the task force and its activities.[970]

Besides its neglect of environmental problems, lack of decision-making capacity, absence of co-ordination among federal authorities, and its focus on economics, together these factors contributed to the inability of the task force to support federal efforts to deal with environmental

[968] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), *Protecting the Environment of the U.S.-Mexico Border Area. A Briefing Paper for the Incoming U.S. Administration, December 2000*. A paper developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Border Program in consultation with the environment agencies of the U.S. border states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, p.6.

[969] Its goals included promoting economic development, improving access to health, education and housing services, addressing infrastructure needs, protecting the environment and enhancing the security of the border, as well as increasing co-operation with Mexico. See U.S. Department of the Treasury (DoT), 'Mission, Framework and Goals', Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest Border, [online] available: http://www.treas.gov/sw_border/mission.html (06/12/00), pp.1-2.

[970] E-mail interview with Marico Sayoc carried out on 26 June 2001. At the time of the interview, Marico Sayoc was the U.S.-Mexico Program Coordinator at the EPA in Washington, DC.

problems on the border.[971] That is, in spite of initiatives to deal with the needs of U.S. border communities, lack of adequate development policies remained a recurrent problem.

The Mexican view of the border in the 1990s contrasted sharply with that of the United States. While U.S. border communities have fared less well in terms of standards of living than the rest of the country, they have been better off than Mexican border communities, which in turn have been better off than those of the rest of Mexico because of employment opportunities in the region. For Mexico, its northern border has represented an 'economic engine' characterised by lower unemployment and relatively high wages (despite infrastructure similar to that found in the rest of the country). Although the expansion of urban concentrations in the area has not been a new phenomenon, it is important to note that this growth has been different than that of other Mexican cities due to the combination of economic activity and migration. In particular, the *maquiladora* industry has taken advantage of an increasingly diversified economy and proximity to the United States to generate jobs, which in turn has attracted migrants from other parts of Mexico.

The growth of Mexican border cities, as discussed above, can be traced back to the establishment of the *maquiladora* industry in the region in the 1960s.[972] Even though the government's first major economic development programme along the U.S. border began in 1961, the end of the *Bracero* programme in 1964 led to a new initiative aimed at promoting industry to absorb the expected influx of ex-*braceros*. The government created the 'Border Industrialisation Programme' (BIP) that provided for the establishment of *maquiladora* plants in the region. Access to cheap labour from Mexico, and application of U.S. tariffs only to the value added during the production process, became the incentives that led some U.S. firms to move part of their production to Mexico. Initially, *maquiladora* plants manufactured clothing and electronic products, and after two decades they assembled a wide variety of goods.[973] The expansion of economic activity in the border area, therefore, can be attributed to Mexico's *maquiladora* programme.

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[971] G. Kourous, 'Border Environmental Policy: Where Do Things Stand?' (Part I: Recent Initiatives and Policy Recommendations), *Borderlines*, Vol. 8, No. 9, October 2000, p.11.
[972] This issue was dealt with in Chapter 6 on Undocumented Immigration.
[973] R. Morales and J. Tamayo-Sanchez, 'Urbanization and Development of the United States-Mexico Border', in L. A. Herzog (ed.), *Changing Boundaries in the Americas. New Perspectives on the U.S.-Mexican, Central American and South American Borders*, U.S.-Mexico Contemporary Perspectives Series 3, (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1992), p.63.

According to an EPA document, between 1990 and 1998 the number of plants went from 2,100 to 4,000, and by 2000 it was estimated they were employing around 800,000 people in the border region.[974] However, the 4,000 figure might have been an overstatement because, according to 1997 Mexican official figures, the number of such plants in the country was around 2,000 (see Table 5.2 below). The most recent number of *maquiladoras* on the Mexican side of the border is 4,760, 700 of them located in Tijuana providing 115,000 jobs.[975] Nevertheless, the key point here is that while these plants have been successful in generating jobs, they have also contributed to environmental stress. *Maquiladora* plants basically represent a production rather than a development model. Therefore, the combination of industrial and population growth has brought with it unplanned urbanisation, air and water pollution and erosion of natural resources. This has occurred because development of basic infrastructure did not keep pace with economic and demographic growth, as already mentioned, and because natural resource depletion has occurred independently of whether there has been proper infrastructure or not.

In 1992, during the NAFTA debate, the cost of providing the border with basic environmental infrastructure was estimated at between $2 and $8 billion.[976] To put this in perspective, the total amount of NADB's resources available to the region through September 1996, two and a half years after NAFTA had entered into force, was $3 billion.[977] This figure fell far short of the $8 billion upper estimate, and therefore it could be considered insufficient to respond to economic growth and population pressures. According to Cyrus Reed, part of the problem can be explained by the fact that earnings generated by *maquiladoras* have been in the form of taxes appropriated by the Mexican federal government, and they have not been necessarily re-invested at the border.[978] Wealth generated by this industry, therefore, has not translated into infrastructure benefits for the cities where the plants have been located.

There have been additional problems associated with the presence of assembly plants at the border. Besides proximity to the market and the consequent reduction of transportation costs,

[974] EPA, *Protecting the Environment*, p.2.
[975] *Am-Mex International*, 'Maquiladora', [online] available: http://www.am-mex.com/maquila.html (08/05/11).
[976] A. D. Hecht, P. Whelan and S. Sowell, *Sustainable Development on the U.S.-Mexico Border: Past Lessons, Present Efforts, Future Possibilities*, Paper Proposed for Border Institute 17-Apr-00, Submitted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 11-Apr-00, p.6.
[977] North American Development Bank (NADB), 'General Overview', [online] available: http://www.nadb.org/english/general/general_frame.htm (27/10/02).
[978] C. Reed, 'Hazardous Waste Management on the Border: Problems with Practices and Oversight Continue', *Borderlines*, Vol. 6, No. 5, July 1998, p.3.

maquiladora profits have come mainly from access to cheap labour. Even though salaries paid by these plants are higher than those for equivalent jobs in other areas of Mexico, it is important to note that a city such as Tijuana, despite its high number of plants compared to other Mexican border cities as shown in Table 6-2 for the year of 1997, had relatively high rates of poverty and low standards of living. According to some estimates, more than half of families in that city qualified as poor, even though 42% of people had a job in the manufacturing sector.[979] Whereas in 1998 there were 681 plants in Tijuana (40% of the total in the country in 2000),[980] 18.4% of its population was still considered to be poor (those earning equivalent to two minimum wage or less) by 2000.[981]

Table 6-2. **Number of *Maquiladoras* in Mexico's Northern Border in 1997 (Total 1,910)**

***Baja California* 901**	***Coahuila* 152**	***Chihuahua* 372**	***Sonora* 222**	***Tamaulipas* 263**
Mexicali 182	Ciudad Acuña 35	Cd. Juárez 372	Agua Prieta 30	Matamoros 149
Tijuana 719	Piedras Negras 117		Nogales 168	N. Laredo 64
			San Luis 24	Reynosa 50

Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), *United States-Mexico Border Environmental Indicators 1997*, U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program, EPA909-R-98-001, [online] available: http://www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/indica97/1997report.pdf (19/10/02), p.27.

Moreover, because of the priority given in Mexico to attracting and promoting a favourable climate for investment, a recurrent problem has been the lack of enforcement of environmental regulations, which has meant the region's economic growth has been attained at the cost of environmental damage and inadequate health conditions for the population. Thus, the negative side of the assembly plant production process, often erroneously described as a 'development model', has not only been the perpetuation of low wages but also the generation of environmental problems.

Although for different reasons, both the United States and Mexico have neglected environmental conditions around the common border and overexploited its natural resources. As noted above, for the former the border has been an underdeveloped area of marginal economic

[979] Canales, 'Industrialization', p.3.
[980] K. Kopinak, 'Maquiladora Industrialization of the Baja California Peninsula: The Coexistence of Thick and Thin Globalization with Economic Regionalism', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 27, No.2, June 2003, [online] available: http://publish.uwo.ca/~kopinak/IJURRFin.pdf (10/06/11), p.319.
[981] International Community Foundation (ICF), 'San Diego and Tijuana at a Glance', Demographics, in *Blurred Borders. Transboundary Issues and Solutions in the San Diego/Tijuana Border Region*, March, 2004, [online] available: http://www.icfdn.org/publications/blurredborders/39sdtjataglance.htm (10/06/11).

importance, and policies to control drug trafficking and undocumented immigration have taken precedence over efforts to deal with environmental issues. For the latter, the border region has been an economic powerhouse where production has traditionally overshadowed other social or environmental considerations. The long-standing tolerance of pollution along Mexico's northern border and indifference to such problems in the United States have contributed to the deterioration of the environment in both U.S. communities and in the region as a whole. In the last two decades, and partly as a result of the pressures generated by free trade, the two governments resumed efforts to address the border's environmental issues. However, as these problems have persisted even in the presence of NAFTA's environmental institutions, it is likely that their resolution will require dealing with accumulated infrastructure needs, which means environmental problems are expected to continue posing a threat to people living in the region.

6.3. Water Challenges

The human impact on water and air resources as well as hazardous waste management, were significant challenges to the border region's environmental health in the 1990s. In this context, analysis focuses on the situation regarding water resources at the border in the 1990s. Water-related health issues are dealt with in depth towards the end of the chapter.

Water has been the most important resource at the border and, at the same time, one of the most scarce and fragile. In addition to environmental pressures deriving from industrial activity and population growth, access to an adequate water supply has been affected by agriculture. Communities in several areas have also had to deal with water scarcity as the result of recurrent droughts, and several cases serve to illustrate water's dual pollution/scarcity problem.

The common challenge shared by the Texas/Mexico border region has been pollution affecting its limited water supply. For example, a bi-national study carried out in 1994 found that at several locations along the Rio Grande/Bravo there was a 'high potential for toxic chemical impacts', including segments close to the sister cities of El Paso/Ciudad Juárez and Laredo/Nuevo Laredo.[982] It is important to note that cases of river water pollution have been basically related to inadequate wastewater infrastructure, and they frequently have involved the

[982] M. Kelly and C. Reed, 'Water Quality in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region' (The Texas/Mexico Border Region), *Borderlines*, Vol.6, No.3, April 1998, p.2.

presence of saline substances and a variety of toxic chemicals, in addition to the problem of overexploitation.[983]

The combination of high fertility rates and intense *maquiladora* and agricultural activity (both in the Imperial and Mexicali valleys), are all factors that have affected the San Diego-Tijuana water supply. Firstly, because of its own demographic explosion, the San Diego-Tijuana region has lacked the proper wastewater treatment infrastructure to deal with the area's output. For instance, wastewater has frequently surpassed the capacity of the San Diego's Point Loma treatment plant, and overflows have often contaminated coastal waters because of wastewater running from pluvial outlets.[984]

Tijuana, for its part, has been even less able than its neighbouring city to deal with its industrial and urban outputs. The problem with its wastewater management plant, besides poor equipment's maintenance, consisted of receiving more wastewater than it could actually treat, which basically meant that not all wastewater reaching the plant was completely recycled or that some wastewater did not even make it to the plant. This wastewater, because of the area's topography, flowed to the ocean affecting beaches on the U.S. side of the border.[985] It also affected one of the few estuaries in California which has been characterised by the presence of both endangered and rare species.[986] There have been several efforts to deal with these problems. For example, in 1991 the San Diego's Point Loma treatment plant was treating up to 13 mgd. of Tijuana's overflows.[987] An international wastewater treatment plant located on the U.S. side of the border was also carrying out basic recycling to reduce sewage flows into the Tijuana River and the Pacific Ocean, and in 1999 a $20 million project was implemented to increase the efficiency of the Tijuana sewage system.[988]

In areas characterised both by a shortage of water and a limited coverage of public water services, low-income people has usually procured water by digging their own wells without their quality ever being assessed. For instance, according to a 2000 report, the testing of 86 private wells by the New Mexico's Border Health Office (BHO) found significant concentration of both

[983] *Idem*.
[984] L. Saldaña, 'Water Quality' (The West Coast), p.4.
[985] *Idem*.
[986] Interview with Fege.
[987] *Idem*.
[988] Hecht, Whelan and Sowell, *Sustainable Development*, p.6.

organic and inorganic contaminants in most of the samples, in some cases exceeding EPA accepted standards.[989]

In the Arizona-Sonora border, water quality issues have involved contamination from *maquiladora* waste discharge and untreated municipal effluent, but most critically from traditional mining operations in the area. In Bisbee, Arizona, for example, in 2000 it was found that a bi-national aquifer that supplied Bisbee itself and the two Nacos (Arizona and Sonora) was contaminated by the presence of minerals accumulated on the surface, which in turn penetrated into water deposits as confirmed by the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ).[990]

This section has discussed water challenges in U.S.-Mexican relations in the 1990s underlining those deriving from pollution. It described the nature of pollution challenges and their relationship to lack of adequate infrastructure to deal with growing needs.

6.4. Bilateral Co-operation

This section analyses the bilateral efforts of the United States and Mexico to confront the challenges posed by environmental degradation along the common border, focusing on the 1990s and in particular on the environmental institutions created by NAFTA. This analysis provides some data from 2000 and 2001 only to the extent it contributes to explanations, but it does not cover more recent years because they are beyond the scope of this study.

Although co-operation has not been new in this area of the bilateral relationship, it is important to mention that efforts to deal with the environment had not been systematic. In the context of NAFTA, both countries took a further step in environmental co-operation by adding to the institutional infrastructure to deal with these problems. However valuable these efforts were in the 1990s, the reality is that problems persisted in the second half of the 1990s because these measures were insufficient to rectify the long-standing neglect of environmental infrastructure on both sides of the border.

[989] G. Kourous, 'Water Quality' (Rural New Mexico), pp.2-3.
[990] M. Coles-Ritchie, 'Water Quality' (Arizona/Sonora), pp.3-4.

6.4.1. *Background*

Even though U.S.-Mexican relations have always been complex, the history of bilateral environmental affairs has been characterised by willingness to deal with common problems. The beginning of co-operation along the common border started with the Treaty of 2 February 1848 that established the international boundary, which was later modified by the Treaty of 30 December 1853. A commission created by the Convention of 29 July 1882 was charged with the establishment of markers along the land boundary from El Paso-Ciudad Juárez to San Diego-Tijuana. Regarding shared river systems, the Convention of 12 November 1884 defined the procedures for the rectification of the boundary if altered by changing river flows. Almost five years later, the Convention of 1 March 1889 created the International Boundary Commission (IBC) to enforce the guidelines of the 1884 Convention. The Convention of 21 May 1906, provided for the allocation of Rio Grande/Bravo river water.[991]

The 1944 'Water Treaty', in its Article 2, created the IBWC as successor to the IBC.[992] Under this treaty and subsequent agreements, the IBWC has been responsible for resolving boundary problems, maintaining the border between the United States and Mexico, and managing issues involving the waters of the Grande/Bravo and Colorado Rivers. Over time, the IBWC's agenda has changed itself to deal with water pollution, in particular with all matters related to wastewater management as a result of the transformation of the border.[993]

Although the era of increased stress on the border environment began in the mid-1960s after the establishment of the *maquiladora* industry on the Mexican side of the border, its consequences did not draw the attention of Washington, DC, and Mexico City until decades later. By 1983, deteriorating border conditions -such as increasing pressure over water resources,

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[991] U.S. Department of State (DoS), 'The Boundary and Water Treaties', International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), [online] available: http://ibwc.state.gov/FORAFFAI/foreign_affairs.htm (27/10/02).

[992] Article 2. 'The International Boundary Commission established pursuant to the provisions of the Convention between the United States and Mexico signed in Washington March 1, 1889 to facilitate the carrying out of the principles contained in the Treaty of November 12, 1884 and to avoid difficulties occasioned by reason of the changes which take place in the beds of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) and the Colorado River shall hereafter be known as the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, which shall continue to function for the entire period during which the present Treaty shall continue in force…'. See U.S. Department of state (DoS), 'United States-Mexico Treaty "for Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande", dated February 3, 1944', (Water Treaty), International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), [online] available: http://ibwc.state.gov/FORAFFAI/foreign_affairs.htm (22/10/02).

[993] U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *International Boundary and Water Commission. U.S. Operations Need More Financial Oversight*, Report to Congressional Requests, National Security and International Affairs Division (NSIAD), GAO/NSIAD-98-238, Washington, DC, September 1998, p.2. The IBCW is under the DoS; the *Comision Internacional de Limites y Aguas* (CILA), as it is known in Mexico, reports to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs.

air and water pollution and growing production of hazardous waste- had finally attracted the attention of both federal governments, and in August of that year the two countries signed the 'Agreement between the United States and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area'. Better known as the 'La Paz Agreement', the accord set as its main objective to 'establish a cooperative mechanism to preserve and foster the environment along the common border, based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit'.[994] This agreement launched a broad range of environmental co-operation initiatives between the United States and Mexico, and by 1989 five technical working groups had been established for each of its annexes.[995] This accord resulted in the institutionalisation of regular consultations among senior federal officials, and in the creation of a framework for assessing and dealing with outstanding issues. La Paz Agreement 'was a new and more extensive mechanism for facilitating trust and openness among officials of the two countries in the 1980s'.[996]

6.4.2. *NAFTA Context*

After the La Paz Agreement, political and governmental attention did not return to the border again until 1990, when Presidents Bush and Salinas began to discuss the prospects for a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement. Advocates often presented a trade agreement as the key to Mexico's prosperity and, thus, to the possibility of investing on the border's sustainable development. However, it became clear that without a formal side agreement for addressing

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[994] J. C. Belausteguigoitia and L. F. Guadarrama, 'United States –Mexico Relations: Environmental Issues', in Bosworth, Collins and Lustig (eds.), *Coming Together?*, p.108.

[995] *Annex I*. Signed in July 1985. Deals with the construction and operation of water treatment plants in the San Diego-Tijuana area.

Annex II. Signed in July 1985. Subsequently complemented by an emergency plan on hazardous waste spills in the border area in 1988, this annex deals with the establishment of a joint response team to handle any emergencies in the border region.

Annex III. Signed in November 1986. The intent of this annex was to establish procedures and regulations for the transportation and trade of trans-boundary hazardous wastes between Mexico and the United States. In general, these restrictions require prior notification and approval before waste can be transported from one country to the other.

Annex IV. Signed in January 1987. This section was devised to deal with trans-boundary air pollution caused by copper smelters located on the border, mainly in the area of southern Arizona and northern Sonora.

Annex V. Signed in October 1989. With the aim of analysing and determining possible solutions to the problem of urban air pollution, this annex targets pairs of border cities designated as 'study areas'. The first one was the metropolitan area of El Paso-Ciudad Juarez.

See *Ibid*., pp.108-111.

[996] Hecht, Whelan and Sowell, *Sustainable Development*, p.6.

border environmental concerns, the trade accord would not obtain public and congressional approval.[997] Opponents of a formal environmental side agreement, in turn, countered that its provisions could only increase the regulatory burden on enterprises.[998]

Nevertheless, both governments acknowledged that an environmental initiative would put the United States and Mexico in a better position to address issues that could arise in the context of NAFTA negotiations. In particular, most U.S. environmental groups feared that the outcome of a trade agreement with Mexico would be the erosion of environmental controls in the United States or that international business would consider establishing themselves in Mexican territory as an opening to avoid strict environmental regulations.[999] Yet, other groups, such as the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), argued that economic and social factors already present in 1994 would intensify interaction between the two countries either with or without NAFTA, and that the agreement could at least formalise the governments' intention to deal with environmental issues.[1000]

In this context, the 'Integrated Border Environmental Plan' (IBEP) released in February 1992 in the midst of NAFTA negotiations, was implemented beginning in that same year and completed its first stage in 1994. It was designed by the EPA and Mexico's Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL), and its specific objectives included compliance of environmental legislation, adoption of environmental-friendly technology, extension of collaboration to fields with impact on the environment (urban planning, education), and promoting a more accurate assessment of environmental needs at the border.[1001] Although several projects were developed and concluded under this programme, its objectives were not fully achieved. According to one assessment, the plan was insufficient because it did not adequately deal with water problems as a central issue, and because planning depended on federal initiatives more than on the preferences of individual communities.[1002] Moreover, the programme was criticised for being a political

[997] *Ibid*., p.1.
[998] M. Tiemann, *NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives*, Report for Congress, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, Congressional Research Service (CRS), March 1, 2000, p.3.
[999] Hecht, Whelan and Sowell, *Sustainable Development*, p.7.
[1000] S. Mumme, 'NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement: Almost Green', *Borderlines*, Vol.7, No.4, October 1999, p.1.
[1001] Belausteguigoitia and Guadarrama, 'United States-Mexico', p.111.
[1002] Report of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.-Mexico Border Environmental Plan, Public Advisory Committee, 'State of the U.S.-Mexico Border Environment', Prepared for the Committee by The Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, The University of Arizona, *Initiative*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Fall 1993, [online] available: http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/publications/initiative/6-1epareport.html (13/12/00), p.4.

justification for NAFTA negotiations, which was evident in its limited operational and financial structure.[1003] Suggestions to improve co-operation in the future included streamlining bilateral co-ordination, developing indicators to measure implementation and strengthening institutions.[1004]

As trade negotiations reached a basic accord by August 1992, then President-elect Clinton became the one in charge of pushing the agreement through Capitol Hill, notwithstanding that during his campaign he had advocated NAFTA provided that there were two parallel negotiations on measures to deal with pollution, and to guarantee a minimum of acceptable working conditions. Once in office, the Clinton administration adopted President Bush's dual approach to border environmental matters. That is, while some of them were dealt with within the NAFTA side agreement that would be negotiated, the majority of issues were addressed in the 'parallel track' of the normal bilateral relationship. Both processes are described below.

6.4.2.1. Border Institutions

As it was clear that the success or failure of NAFTA in Congress would depend to a large extent on the side agreements mentioned above, public and governmental concerns in the United States about lack of environmental enforcement in Mexico were addressed trough a trilateral side agreement, the 'North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation' (NAAEC). This side agreement created the 'Commission on Environmental Cooperation' (CEC), which encouraged parties to the agreement to effectively enforce their environmental laws and regulations.[1005] Regarding the U.S.-Mexico border, infrastructure needs were addressed through the November 1993 'Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border

[1003] G. Kourous, 'The Border XXI Program: An Overview', *Borderlines*, Vol.7, No.4, April 1999, p.2.

[1004] In reference to this point, the argument made was that existing institutions such as the IBWC and the La Paz Agreement were having an increasingly difficult time facing the rapidly changing conditions at the border. While the former has mainly focused on quantity and allocation of water, the latter has co-ordinated agencies mainly concerned with national issues. See Report, 'State of the U.S.-Mexico Border Environment', p.4.

[1005] Article 8. The Commission. Section A: The Council. Article 10: Council Functions. 4. 'The Council shall encourage: (a) effective enforcement by each Party of its environmental laws and regulations; (b) compliance with those laws and regulations; and (c) technical cooperation between Parties'. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), *North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, 1993*, Publications and Information Resources, [online] available: http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/naaec/naaec04.cfm?varlan=english (22/10/02).

Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank' (the BECC/NADB Agreement). The idea guiding both institutions was that environmental sustainability had to be the objective of projects approved by the bank, to ensure self-sufficiency in the border region, and that these projects had to operate under the principles of 'public participation', 'ecology', and 'economic viability'.[1006]

BECC's functions have been to provide technical assistance to communities for developing environmental infrastructure projects in the border area, and to certify those projects for financing consideration by the NADB.[1007] It is important to note that the latter has been a lending institution that was formed using paid-in capital from the U.S. and Mexican governments. The infrastructure projects have been limited to three categories: water supply and treatment; wastewater treatment; and disposal of solid municipal waste. However, after both U.S. and Mexican authorities recognised the limited ability of small border locations to afford their infrastructure needs, they decided to provide construction grants in addition to contributions for BECC operations and NADB capitalisation. The resources needed specifically for construction projects were estimated at $1.4 billion over a ten-year period, with half coming from each country. EPA became the U.S. agency responsible for managing financial resources by means of both BECC and NADB.[1008] This has been an important reason why communities in both countries have sought project certification by BECC.[1009]

[1006] M. J. Spalding, *NAFTA Plus 5. On the Right Track? An Assessment of the BECC/NADBank Institutions*. 2nd Edition. January 1999. Document provided by the author attached to an e-mail interview in September 2001, p.13.

[1007] The NADB's authorised capital under its Charter totaled $3 billion with equal commitments from each country. Payments of capital by the two countries started in 1994, and scheduled installments were to be completed by September 30, 2006. While 15% of NADB's authorised capital ($450 million) was in the form of paid-in capital, 85% ($2.55 billion) was in the form of callable capital. By 2002, the NADB had received from the two countries a combined total of $348.750 million in paid-in capital and $1.976 billion in callable capital, representing 77.5% of its total subscribed capital.

NADB Capital Structure.

Country	**Paid-In Capital**	**Callable Capital**	**Total**
United States	$225,000,000	$1,275,000,000	$1,500,000,000
Mexico	$225,000,000	$1,275,000,000	$1,500,000,000
Total	$450,000,000	$2,550,000,000	$3,000,000,000

See NADB, 'General Overview'.

[1008] Through the BIEF programme, EPA can make projects more viable by reducing the effective cost to communities, particularly small ones. For example, grant money can be used to buy down the cost of a project, and thus make the financing for the rest of an infrastructure development more affordable. See Spalding, *NAFTA Plus 5*, p.17.

[1009] From the beginning of BECC/NADB's operations to 2000, Congress appropriated $575 million to EPA for water-related border infrastructure grants to address health and environmental risks on both sides of the border. This came from a recognition that problems on Mexico's side of the border are U.S. problems as well (as well as a 'bang for the buck' understanding a dollar spent in Mexico, where infrastructure is scant and less expensive, buys more

One of the criticisms of NADB and BECC has been that political pragmatism has in general limited their scope to water treatment and supply. After almost seven years of operation, in September 2000, for instance, out of a total of 81 projects financed by NADB (44 on the U.S. side and 37 on the Mexican side of the border), 60% of them were related to water (approximately 38 in the United States and 11 in Mexico).[1010] One of the recommendations made to both institutions was that they should consider viable projects not necessarily related to their core areas, and to make sure the public, especially on the Mexican side of the border, participated in the decisions affecting their communities.[1011] Months before, NADB had actually prepared a white paper that was released in June 2000, which proposed a mandate expansion to allow the bank to finance additional environmental projects.[1012] This is how the issue was resolved:

> In November 2000 the [NADB] Board approved a resolution allowing the Bank to finance new types of BECC-certified environmental infrastructure projects within the current charter. While water, wastewater and solid waste will continue to be priorities, this new flexibility to consider additional sectors and financing mechanisms will greatly enhance the Bank's positive impact along the border. The Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) are working together to identify which new environmental infrastructure sectors to pursue in the near term.[1013]

In this context, in early 2001 BECC and NADB agreed to open for certification and financing additional projects such as recycling and waste reduction and, on a pilot basis, projects related to air quality.[1014]

Another important issue was the recognition that NADB's loan portfolio was modest, and that its lending capacity was under-utilised. To illustrate, between the start of the bank operation

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environmental protection than it would if spent on the U.S. side). See Hecht, Whelan and Sowell, *Sustainable Development*, p.13.

[1010] See North American Development Bank (NADB), 'Institutional Development Cooperation Program', *Quarterly Report*, September, 30, 2000, Quarterly Report, [online] available: http://www.nadb.org/english/search/search.htm (12/01/03), pp.1-8. Those more than 40 BECC-certified projects received, or had the commitment of receiving, funds for over $1 billion. Moreover, BECC assigned around $20 million for technical assistance to communities in order to develop and certify new projects. See G. Kourous, 'The Great NADBank Debate', *Borderlines*, Vol. 8, No.9, October 2000, p.12. This argument contrasts sharply with the criticism previously made to the IBEP, pointing out at its insufficient attention to water-related projects.

[1011] Mumme, 'NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement', p.3.

[1012] M. J. Spalding, 'BECC/NADB Assessment', Unpublished Draft, provided by the author attached to an e-mail interview in September 2001, p.4.

[1013] North American Development Bank (NADB), 'Mandate Documents', Publications and Reports, [online] available: http://www.nadbank.org/reports/mandate/eng/mandate%5Fmain.htm

[1014] Spalding, 'BECC/NADB', p.4.

and 1997, out of the $265 million in loans and grants approved by the bank, more than $253 million were grants and only $11 million were loans.[1015] This problem resulted from the fact that NADB's interest rates were established at the same level as market rates, and therefore applying for a loan had been costly for poor border communities. The application of market rates can be explained by the fact that while NADB has lent to anyone whose project has been certified by BECC, the bank has not been a tax-exempt institution and therefore its funding has come only from the market (i.e. no subsidised loans). This is the reason why the bank has been unable to loan at a level lower than the market rate.[1016] According to Fege, EPA Assistant Director at the San Diego Office, this situation led communities on the U.S. side of the border either to use grants in order to pay interests on NADB loans, or to 'finance tax exempt bonds' also as a way of keeping the interest rate lower (because 'the bond holder does not pay tax on earnings').[1017] To address this problem, in 2001 NADB formally established a 'Value Lending Program' to lend $50 million of its paid-in capital through low-interest loans for the three core infrastructure areas.[1018]

Although both organisations have also been the target of criticisms about institutional weakness, it seems that insufficient public participation in their decision-making mechanisms has not been at issue, at least not regarding BECC.[1019] According to Sayoc, the BECC has been an outstanding example of an institution supported by both governments that has fostered local participation in the solution of environmental problems. This has been evident in the fact that 'all projects that are working towards BECC certification must show local support before it [sic] moves forward'.[1020]

[1015] Kourous, 'Great NADBank Debate', p.12. It is important to note that although both institutions were created in January 1994, they received initial funding until early 1995 and hired staff and set policy during that same year. Thus, they began to function in early 1996.
[1016] Spalding, *NAFTA Plus 5*, p.17.
[1017] Interview with Fege.
[1018] Spalding, 'BECC/NADB', p.5.
[1019] The criticism about 'institutional weakness' comes from the impression that both institutions depend on the political mood in Washington, DC. For example, in FY2001 the U.S. Congress did not approve EPA's budget request for BIEF's operations. Instead of the $100 million requested, Congress authorised only $75 million with $9.5 million already assigned to specific projects. See N. Carter, 'State of Binational Cooperation Today, Prospects for the Future', *Borderlines*, Vol.9, No.1, January 2001, p.2.
[1020] E-mail interview with Marico Sayoc. The criticism referent to both institutions lacking public participation might be directed more to NADB than to BECC, because public participation in the commission has been facilitated by its Board of Directors through an Advisory Council that consists of up to 18 members. Up to six members represent U.S. border states, another six represent Mexican border states and municipalities, three members represent the U.S. public and three members represent the Mexican public. See Spalding, 'BECC/NADB', p.1. BECC also actively disseminates information as part of the electronic listserve *BECCnet* established and maintained

Finally, within the U.S. government structure, the GNEB, created by the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative Act (EAI) in 1992, has worked as an independent federal advisory committee. GNEB has not carried out any specific programme. Its mission has been to advise both the U.S. Executive and Legislative branches of government on the well-being and sustainability of communities along the common border. After focusing on issues such as institutional and infrastructure development, information needs, and participating in the design of a Border XXI Plan, in its fourth annual report issued in 2000, for instance, it recommended the adoption of a watershed approach to better managing outstanding water issues at the common border, and to present solutions incorporating the views of all levels of government.[1021]

It is important to note that by 2000 there were a number of border projects already completed or in the engineering stage as never seen before, which was significant given the region's deficit in infrastructure investment. As will be discussed below, however, these efforts were not sufficient to satisfy existing needs, and it was uncertain whether the level of investment at the time was going to be able to keep pace with future economic and demographic growth in the area. In general, expectations about the ability of BECC and NADB to address the border's long-standing environmental problems in a short period of time were exaggerated. According to Spalding, some of the blame for such expectations must be attributed to NAFTA's advocates, 'because in the politics surrounding NAFTA's passage, unrealistic promises made by its supporters placed an unreasonable burden upon the shoulders of the two young organizations'.[1022]

6.4.2.2. 'Border XXI Program'

While the new Clinton administration that was inaugurated in January 1993 supported the concept of a border plan as well as the previous request of resources made by President Bush to implement that plan, the incoming administration was critical of IBEP's narrow scope and its

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by the University of Arizona's Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy. Additionally, BECC carries out quarterly meetings for local involvement and comment on projects. See Spalding, *NAFTA Plus 5*, p.15.

[1021] The Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB), *Fourth Report of the Good Neighbor Environmental Board to the President and Congress of the United States*, September 2000, p.3. The most recent document of the organisation is: The Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB), *A Blueprint for Action on the U.S.-Mexico Border*, Thirteenth Report of the Good Neighbor Environmental Board to the President and Congress of the United States, June 2010, [online] available: http://www.epa.gov/ocempage/gneb/gneb13threport/eng_gneb_13th_report_final.pdf (12/05/11).

[1022] Spalding, *NAFTA Plus 5*, p.28.

'top-down' approach.[1023] Therefore, U.S. officials wanted to draft a new plan as soon as the 1994 elections in Mexico were concluded. In this context, EPA announced a new initiative as a follow-up to IBEP, the 'Border XXI Program' (B21). Signed by the United States and Mexico on 7 October 1996, B21 was an 'umbrella program' for the co-ordination of environmental activities of federal, state, local and tribal governments on both sides of the border. In particular, it expanded the scope of bilateral co-operation through the establishment of nine border-wide groups that covered issues related to natural resources, environmental health and data management.[1024] It is important to mention that B21 was not a treaty but a 5-year non-binding agreement that built on mechanisms already in place, such as the La Paz Agreement. In this sense, the programme was only a framework for co-operation and as such it did not receive appropriated funds nor had a funded staff. B21, however, represented a step forward in contrast to earlier efforts by satisfying demands for decentralisation and public participation, and also by promoting co-operation with the private sector.

Working through its nine groups, B21 yielded some concrete results on the border in terms of strengthening institutional and bi-national capabilities to deal with long-term environmental and development issues.[1025] One of the key objectives of its 'Framework Document' was that each of the workgroups would develop indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of border environmental policy. Descriptions of each environmental indicator were published in 1997 but these were not accompanied by concrete data showing the impact of B21.[1026] According to EPA sources, while the proportion of localities on the Mexican side of the border with access to water for human consumption grew between 1995 and 2000 from 88% to 93%, those with access to drainage and residual water services grew from 34% to 75% and from 60% to 75% in the same period, respectively, although other indicators appear to have

[1023] Hecht, Whelan and Sowell, *Sustainable Development*, p.8.
[1024] The six workgroups initiated under the La Paz Agreement were: 1) Water; 2) Air; 3) Hazardous and Solid Waste; 4) Pollution Prevention; 5) Contingency Planning and Emergency Response; and 6) Co-operative Enforcement and Compliance. The three workgroups integrated by B21 were: 7) Environmental Information Resources; 8) Natural Resources; and 9) Environmental Health. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 'Executive Summary', Framework Document, *Border XXI Program*, [online] available: http://epa.gov/usmexicoborder/2001/ef.htm (29/10/02), pp.2-4.
[1025] Besides improving co-ordination among all levels of government on both sides of the boundary and developing environmental indicators, additional relevant achievements of B21 included amending Annex III of the La Paz Agreement in 1999 in order to allow joint cross-border responses to hazardous substances incidents, as well as concluding 'Six Sister City Joint Contingency Plans' to respond to chemical emergencies at the border. See Hecht, Whelan and Sowell, *Sustainable Development*, pp.13-14.
[1026] EPA, *United States-Mexico*.

worsened.[1027] As will be discussed below, these figures seem to exaggerate the pace of improvement because other sources from EPA itself recognise that a variety of water-related needs in the border region have not yet been met.

Nevertheless, in terms of other achievements, from the point of view of Whelan, an EPA official in Washington, DC, one very important workgroup that had not received enough attention from the public was the workgroup on 'Contingency Planning and Emergency Response'. Its relevance resided in the need to be prepared to handle emergencies such as chemical spills that could occur as a result of accidents along high-traffic corridors. Such accidents could have a serious impact on border communities' health.[1028] This workgroup has been concerned with creating the necessary infrastructure to deal with dangerous spill-over contingencies at the community-level, as well as with creating a bi-national pool of assets to confront such type of situations. A relevant concern voiced in public forums, however, was that sizeable geographic areas had been left out of the project despite the fact that these locations were important in terms of potential trans-border risks.[1029]

B21 was also criticised for being dominated by federal agencies and yet unable to address the limited local capacity to deal with environmental problems. Detractors of B21 further pointed to the unreliable access to financial resources and the absence of a clear vision for the future on the part of the two governments.[1030] The workgroups, which were the core of the programme, were criticised for implementing projects in a unilateral way in the absence of a framework for bilateral solutions. Co-ordination and planning among federal agencies also seemed to have been complicated by the fact that budget cycles are different in the United States and Mexico. In the end, the initiative was characterised as a list of programmes that would have been present independently of B21.[1031]

As already discussed, the U.S. and Mexican governments have established a comprehensive set of institutional arrangements to deal with environmental problems along the common border. These institutions and collaboration mechanisms have demonstrated a willingness on the part of the two countries to co-operate on environmental matters, even though

[1027] EPA, *Protecting the Environment*, p.11.
[1028] Interview with Patrick Whelan, U.S.-Mexico Program, Office of International Activities, U.S. EPA, carried out in Washington, DC, on 22 May 2001.
[1029] EPA, 'Executive Summary', pp.7-8.
[1030] Mumme, 'NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement', p.4.
[1031] Kourous, 'Border XXI', p.2.

they have faced a variety of operational problems which have prevented them from achieving optimal results. In spite of institutional shortcomings and the variety of issues that remain unsolved, it is important to note that the bilateral environmental institutional infrastructure has allowed the two federal governments the possibility of addressing environmental challenges without them turning into security issues. The existence of these institutions, and continuous bilateral dialogue on these issues, explains in part the reason why the potential for risk has not materialised, and also why those issues have remained in the political rather than moving into the security arena.

6.5. Threat Assessment

Population growth in the border area has been a feature of particular concern for its long-term prospects. Past demographic trends have not only placed stress on scarce natural resources, but have also generated environmental degradation in the context of insufficient infrastructure, in particular that related to water. As mentioned above, this section focuses on potential public health problems such as the spread of waterborne disease. This issue is addressed below.

6.5.1. *Environmental Health*

This section argues that, from the variety of environmental challenges at the U.S.-Mexico border, the most serious concern is the potential for an epidemic deriving from water pollution. This possibility, however, has not translated into water becoming an actual security concern because the two federal governments have addressed this issue through dialogue and co-operation, and because of the use of the bilateral institutional infrastructure already in place. Moreover, the potential for an epidemic at the common border seems to fit the pattern explained by the Buzan et.al. analytical framework that establishes that governments are more likely to securitise the consequences rather than the causes of environmental problems, notwithstanding the efforts of securitising actors to place urgent issues within the security arena.

Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, without the parallel development of required infrastructure, have had the potential to create serious public health risks on both sides of the boundary. Among the factors that have upset the integrated region's health conditions stand out the variety of contamination challenges involving both air and water resources, inadequate treatment of hazardous waste, and mismanagement of pesticides.

On both sides of the border, agricultural production has relied on significant quantities of chemicals in the cultivation of crops, and exposure to pesticides has become a relevant problem in the area. For instance, according to a 2000 report of the Texas Department of Health (TDH), '50% of colonia households [were] located within 1/4 of a mile from an agricultural field'; '66% of these households reported that pesticides were used on these fields'; and '75% said the pesticides were applied using aerial application'.[1032] People with history of contact with chemicals for agricultural production have often developed brain and skin disease, as well as potential prenatal and fecundity problems. According to activists, toxins are clearly linked to an increased risk of different types of cancer in the region.[1033] Nevertheless, scientists have been unable to determine conclusively whether there is a link given the complex cause-effect dynamic between chemicals and specific illnesses.[1034]

To illustrate this point, beginning in 1992 there was a series of efforts to find out whether copper smelting in Douglas, Arizona, contributed to the high incidence of systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) in the community. These efforts, however, failed among other reasons because there was not a reliable record of diseases in the area; because of insufficient research on 'the genetic predisposition' of Mexican-Americans to such an illness; and because of inadequate medical treatment in the region.[1035] According to some analyses, people with occupations involving contact with toxic substances have been prone to have offspring with pre-birth afflictions.[1036] The main environmental health challenge, however, has not come from potential chemical exposure.

6.5.1.1. Public Health Risks

Without dismissing the seriousness of the health problems described above, the most pressing public health challenges along the U.S.-Mexican border have been those related to waterborne diseases and their potential to turn into an epidemic affecting a large proportion of the region's population. Environmental conditions and public health in the U.S.-Mexico border area have been influenced by the quality of available water resources. There are two important factors that

[1032] Texas Department of Health (TDH), *Survey of Health and Environmental Conditions in Texas Border Counties and Colonias*, June 2000, [online] available: http://tdh.state.tx.us/border/pubs/exsumrev.pdf (22/10/02), p.20.
[1033] Author (s) not available, 'Two Countries', *Borderlines*, p.4.
[1034] *Ibid*., p.3.
[1035] A. C. Hoatling, 'Grassroots Groups in Douglas Seek Answers, Solutions. Tracking Environmental Health Problems on the U.S.-Mexico Border', *Borderlines*, Vol. 7, No.3, March 1999, pp.-1-4.
[1036] Author (s) not available, 'Two Countries', *Borderlines*, p.3.

have connected water and public health across the border. Firstly, all the communities on both sides of the boundary have been equally affected by the quality of water they share. Secondly, public health problems along the border could be exacerbated by the impact of intense cross-border travel and commerce. In FY1996, for instance, there were some 280 million land crossings from Mexico through the U.S. Southwest border, which accounted for approximately 70% of all land crossings in the United States that year. At the San Ysidro point of entry alone (between San Diego and Tijuana), there were 40 million crossings in the same period.[1037] For a long time, it has been recognised that the movement of people and the exchange of goods are factors that increase the potential for health risks.[1038] According to David Graham and Nana Poku,

> Population movement is one of these globalizing processes, and one that has increased as the power and influence of the nation-state has weakened. The increased movement of goods and capital can, and does, threaten the security of state economies. The increased movement of people has the potential to threaten the health and security of the whole human population.[1039]

Even though the environmental health situation at the U.S.-Mexico border has been far from representing a global health risk, there are nevertheless several challenges that could affect U.S. security (and Mexican security by implication) in the foreseeable future.

Although on the U.S. side of the border there has been more water supply and wastewater infrastructure than on the Mexican side, there have been some U.S. communities, especially *colonias*, which have not had access to sanitary services. For instance, according to a 2000 TDH survey, 41% of households on the Texas border obtained water for human consumption from sources other than the faucet, in spite of the fact they had access to water services at home; in this context, a survey of 64% of households that accumulated water in containers, found an acceptable level of 'chlorine residual' only in 10% of the cases; it also found that only 54% of

[1037] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, *Migration between Mexico & the United States*, p.10. Just to provide an idea of volume of cross-border traffic in the last years, the most recent figures found for this study (only for comparative purposes), point out that in 2003 the United States recorded 88,068,391 personal vehicle, 2,600,019 loaded truck containers, 266,496 incoming train, and 48,633,773 pedestrian crossing from Mexico. U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 'Border Crossing Data U.S.-Mexico', *Research and Innovative Technology Administration* (RITA), Several Tables, [online] available: http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/border_crossing_entry_data/us_mexico/ (08/05/11).
[1038] Graham and Poku, 'Population Movements', pp.205-206.
[1039] *Ibid*., p.227.

the *colonia* inhabitants had access to the drainage system.[1040] These figures were significant if it is considered that *colonia* residents represented 20% of the total border population in 2000.[1041] In comparison, as shown in Table 6-3, while, in general, people on the northern side of the U.S.-Mexico border has been better poised to obtain water for human consumption, more pressing infrastructure conditions in Mexico have made even more difficult for people there to procure potable water. The same has been true of sewer and wastewater treatment services.[1042]

Table 6-3. **Water Services for Selected Mexican Border Cities (1997)**

City	Drinking Water per capita Lts./Day	% Population/ Drinking Water	% Population/ Sewer Service	%Wastewater Collected and Treated	% Water Disinfected before Delivery
Mexicali	500*	93	80	72	100
Nogales	183*	64	81**	100***	100***
Ciudad Acuña	372	89	39	0	100
Piedras Negras	419	95	80	0	100
Matamoros	262	72	47	0	100
Reynosa	294	92	57	100	100

* 1995, **1992, ***1997.

Source, EPA, *United States-Mexico*, pp.34-36.

One comprehensive study on water and wastewater infrastructure on the U.S.-Mexico border published by the EPA afterwards in 2001, established a link between water quality and public health conditions. This study gathered and analysed data on surface water quality for each of the seven boundary area water bodies (i.e. Pacific Coastal Basin, New River Basin, Gulf of California Coastal Basin, Colorado River Basin, Northwest Chihuahua Basin, Rio Grande Basin, and the Gulf of Mexico Coastal Basin). Firstly, the sample data indicated that in the majority of the sampling locations water did not meet the minimum purity required, frequently as consequence of inefficient water recycling processes.[1043] Secondly, the study found that along the border, the rate of incidence of waterborne diseases was higher than the median in the United States, as shown in Table 6-4.

[1040] TDH, *Survey of Health and Environmental Conditions*, p.21.
[1041] *Ibid*., p.23.
[1042] EPA, *United States-Mexico*, p.35.
[1043] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), *Status Report on the Water-Wastewater Infrastructure Program for the US-Mexico Borderlands*, Office of Water (4204-M), EPA-832-R-00-001, January 2001, p.1.

Table 6-4. **Comparison between U.S.-Mexico Border and U.S.-Nationwide Waterborne Disease Rates (1998). Incidents per 100,000 people**

Disease	U.S. Border Rates	Mexican Border Rates	U.S. Nationwide Rates
Amebiasis	1.4	798.8	1.4
Hepatitis A	37.1	50.1	12.6
Shigellosis	35.3	n.a.	10.9
Typhoid Fever	0.4	36.1	0.2

Source: EPA, *Status Report*, p.9.

Unsanitary conditions and a paucity of treatment facilities have contributed to the diffusion of these diseases. In general terms, the rate of incidence has been usually higher on the Mexican side of the border.[1044] One extreme case was that of the New River, considered the most polluted watercourse in the United States. It contained an average of almost 461,665 colonies/100 ml. of faecal coli form, when the minimum accepted for human contact is 200 colonies/100 ml.[1045] Thirdly, according to the survey, only some of the U.S. cities and very few of the Mexican cities have had adequate water and wastewater treatment facilities. A significant number of cities on both sides of the border have obtained water from wells and most Mexican communities have treated water through unsophisticated filtration methods or have had no water treatment capacity at all.[1046] The fact that most of the border communities have obtained drinking water from aquifers does not mean their water supply has been safer for consumption, because of the possibility that contaminated surface water could have been filtering into these underground water sources as in the case of Bisbee, Arizona, discussed above.

In this context, one of the most significant requirements to confront the challenge of public health along the border has been to address water and wastewater infrastructure needs. Infrastructure in the border area, as already mentioned, has varied from community to community, and although investment and construction have been underway under NADB and BECC, it seems that much still needs to be done. In the opinion of Pamela Doughman, 'the BECC and NADBank were created to respond to the view that there is a health-threatening wastewater infrastructure deficit in the border region'.[1047] While some areas required upgrading

[1044] *Ibid*., pp.13-56.
[1045] *Ibid*., p.23.
[1046] *Ibid*., pp.13-56.
[1047] P. M. Doughman, 'Discourses and Water in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region', in J. Blatter and H. Ingram (eds.), *Reflections on Water. New Approaches to Transboundary Conflicts and Cooperation*, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), p.196.

or rehabilitation, others need new construction. According to an official 2001 U.S. report, 9% of the border population lacked access to water services, and 23% and 40% required sewers and wastewater treatment capacity, respectively.[1048] Across all the seven water basins, as shown in Table 6-5, the estimated capital needs for water supply and wastewater treatment infrastructure through the year 2020 amounted to $1.3 billion for the U.S. side of the border, and $2.4 billion for the Mexican side.

Table 6-5. **Water Infrastructure Needs in the U.S.-Mexico Border Area for the Year 2020**

	Population		**Near-term needs ($ millions)**			**Long-term needs ($ millions)**		
Basin	00	20	U.S.	Mexico	Total	U.S.	Mexico	Total
Pacific	4.3	6.6	95	26	121	232	593	825
New River	1.0	1.6	37	4	41	123	85	208
Gulf of Cal.	0.2	0.3	0	26	26	0	162	162
Colorado	1.5	2.2	133	51	184	216	222	438
N. Chihuahua	0.2	0.3	1	4	5	19	122	141
Rio Grande	4.6	8.7	42	222	264	517	1065	1644
Gulf of Mex.	0.8	1.4	34	16	50	229	219	386
Total	**10.4**	**21.1**	**342**	**349**	**691**	**1336**	**2468**	**3804**

Source: EPA, *Status Report*, pp.11 and 74.

It is important to note that another factor contributing to the border's poor health record has been poverty. As was established at the beginning of this chapter, U.S. border communities have had the lowest economic indicators in the country. In 2000 in Texas, for instance, 40% of four-member border families qualified as poor, in contrast to 17% of families with the same number of members for the entire state.[1049] Because healthcare in the United States has been very costly, it has been unavailable to many residents of that country's low-income border region. Each day a sizeable number of U.S. border residents travel to the southern side of the border looking for less expensive medicine and treatment, given the fact that the cost of health goods and services in the United States is sometimes threefold than in Mexico.[1050] In the 2000 TDH study, 40% of people interviewed reported that someone in their family unit bought medications in Mexico in the past year.[1051] Nevertheless, there have been several problems with U.S. residents seeking treatment and medications in Mexico. Firstly, Mexican physicians have not been utilised for long-term treatment but only for medical contingencies. Secondly, all efforts to

[1048] EPA, *Status Report*, p.73.
[1049] TDH, *Survey of Health and Environmental Conditions*, p.15.
[1050] Author (s) not available, 'Two Countries', *Borderlines*, p.2.
[1051] TDH, *Survey of Health and Environmental Conditions*, p.16.

create an epidemiological picture of the border region have been impaired by the fact that the exchange of information on these matters between the two sides has been insufficient. Thirdly, the majority of economically disadvantaged people has resorted to inexpensive, traditional, cures. Because they have usually not completed or abided by a treatment programme, this practice has often resulted in immunisation against the effect of certain medicines on specific diseases.[1052]

Despite employment generated by the *maquiladora* industry and the existence of poverty rates lower than the national average, the Mexican border region has lacked access to basic services, more so even than its U.S. counterpart. Furthermore, the economic disparity between the United States and Mexico has made trans-boundary co-operation difficult. In particular, differences between the two health systems along the border have represented an obstacle to a common diagnosis and response to health challenges.[1053] However, diseases or pandemics do not stop at the border. For this reason, it is important for Mexico and the United States to strengthen bi-national mechanisms in order to avoid an epidemic that could endanger the well being of U.S. and all border residents.

6.6. Environmental Degradation from the Copenhagen School and Risk Society Theory Perspectives

In general terms, in the United States the environment has been a politicised issue -as in other countries-, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. security rhetoric has increasingly reflected concern for environmental matters. For instance, even though the U.S. government supports the development of clean technologies and renewable energy,[1054] there are several cases in point where the United States has not shown a firm political commitment with the protection of the environment, as evident in its reluctance to ratify the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climatic Change.[1055]

[1052] Author (s) not available, 'Two Countries', *Borderlines*, p.2.
[1053] *Ibid*., p.4.
[1054] A. C. Mulkern, 'Stimulus, policy shifts seen spurring U.S. renewable energy boom – someday', *The New York Times*, March 6, 2009, [online] available: http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/03/06/06greenwire-stimulus-policy-shifts-seen-spurring-us-boom---10023.html (11/06/11).
[1055] United Nations Convention on Climate Change, 'Convention Parties and Observers', [online] available: http://unfccc.int/resources/country/country.html?226 (14/01/03). The United States signed the Convention on 12 November 1998 but did not ratified accession to the protocol. Later on, the Bush administration withdrew the United

U.S. environmental policy was not different in the 1990s in reference to the U.S. Southwest border. As discussed above, the U.S. side of the border with Mexico has consistently recorded a lower standard of living compared to other areas in the interior of the country, even though they have been higher than in communities south of the border. The dynamic between population growth and economic activity in the border region, as a whole, has contributed to create environmental challenges that have not been properly addressed so far because of lack of adequate and sufficient infrastructure, as discussed in the sections above.

Among the variety of environmental challenges confronting the U.S.-Mexico border in the 1990s, this thesis found that the possibility of an epidemic deriving from water pollution was a significant U.S. issue (with consequences for Mexico as well), based on the analysis of demographic, geographical, and infrastructure factors at the time.

The Buzan et.al analytical framework establishes that it is not the task of the security analyst to take the place of the securitising actor by pointing to something as a security issue.[1056] In this context, it is important to emphasise that the ultimate purpose of this chapter has not been to identify a threat, but to 'problematize' the 'absence of securitization' for an issue such as water pollution at the U.S.-Mexico border, based on the fact that the literature on the subject has recognised it as a pressing concern.[1057]

Water pollution and its potential impact on the border population (i.e. object of security) has not been securitised in the United States because its securitisation process has not been successfully completed, notwithstanding the efforts of the securitising actors to present it as an extremely urgent matter. That is, it has not been recognised as a matter of survival.

The analytical framework establishes a securitisation process that basically describes a sequence through which a 'securitising actor' identifies an 'existential threat' to a 'referent object of security', in order to propose the securitisation of the issue ('securitising move') before

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States from the Protocol on March 29, 2001. The reasons provided for this decision were the following: 'The Kyoto Protocol does not provide the long-term solution the world seeks to the problem of global warming. The goals of the Kyoto Protocol were established not by science, but by political negotiation, and are therefore arbitrary and ineffective in nature. In addition, many countries of the world are completely exempted from the Protocol, such as China and India, who are two of the top five emitters of greenhouse gasses in the world. Further, the Protocol could have potentially significant repercussions for the global economy'. See United States Embassy, Vienna, Austria, 'Fact Sheet: United States Policy in the Kyoto Protocol', *Public Affairs Section*, [online] available: http://www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/kyoto.pdf (11/06/11), p.1.

[1056] Buzan et.al., *Security*, p.34.

[1057] *Ibid*., p.40.

an 'audience', with the purpose of obtaining its approval to 'legitimize' the use of 'extraordinary measures' to deal with the threat before is too late.

Typically, within the environmental sector, securitising actors are those for whom environmental matters represent a priority and, therefore, are interested in taking the issue to the top of the governmental agenda. The sense of urgency attached to these issues can be interpreted as an effort to securitise them, even though presenting them in this fashion is often the only way to elevate them (i.e. to politicise them) within the agenda. This does not mean those interested in securitising the environment are not satisfied with its politicisation, especially if politicisation is in fact their most realistic target.

Based on the evidence provided above, it can be argued that the main securitising actors in relation to water pollution along the U.S.-Mexican border were, first, government agencies such as EPA presenting reports on the pressing needs and lack of adequate infrastructure to deal with the challenge; and second, concerned scholars and NGOs trying to call attention to border environmental problems. These two groups include the variety of U.S. federal and state agencies dealing with border environmental and health matters, and those scholars and NGOs whose reports were quoted in this thesis. In general terms, environmental NGOs have been better organised north of the border, and they have included, among other groups, the Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), in addition to 'community-based NGOs', such as 'Arizona's Border Ecology Project, California's Environmental Health Coalition, New Mexico's Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC), and the Texas Center for Policy Studies', among others.[1058] The IRC, for instance, was in charge of publishing *Borderlines* -the series of reports on environmental matters used in this research-, which was IRC's main 'information dissemination' tool.[1059]

It is important to note, according to the Buzan et.al analytical framework, that those actors attempting the securitisation of certain issues 'do not necessarily say "security", nor does their use of the term *security* necessarily always constitute a security act'.[1060] This point is important because, as matter of fact, none of the actors calling attention to water pollution

[1058] D. M. Liverman, R. G. Varady, O. Chavez and R. Sanchez, 'Environmental Issues Along the United States-Mexico Border: Drivers of Change and Responses of Citizens and Institutions', *Annual Review of Energy and the Environment*, No. 24, 1999, p.628.
[1059] *Idem*.
[1060] *Ibid*., p.33.

explicitly portrayed the challenge in terms of security. By arguing about the urgency of dealing with water pollution, nevertheless, it is possible to argue they were contributing to the process of securitisation of the issue, even though they only managed to increase its level of politicisation, which is a more common outcome when attempting to securitise environmental concerns.

In terms of the analytical framework, successful securitisation requires the 'audience' to approve and legitimise the use of extraordinary measures to deal with the existential threat, and nowhere there is evidence of the U.S. or local governments dealing with water pollution in a matter of 'survival' mode. The audience for securitising moves regarding the environment includes the government and the public, in general. Nevertheless, the level of acceptance is different for each of them. Regarding environmental matters, for instance, for the government it is often more difficult to accept the securitising move because bureaucracies are better prepared to securitise the consequences rather than the causes of environmental concerns, as discussed above. In reference to the general public, if it is true that it is more open to be concerned about these matters, it is important to consider that only a small fraction of the population is in fact receptive to environmental problems and for this reason its influence is marginal at best. Additional difficulties in reference to the securitisation of environmental issues, according to the analytical framework, is the fact that notwithstanding that environmental challenges have gradually become part of the political debate, these matters are very complex and not easy to understand. There is no evidence, in the case of U.S.-border environmental issues, that either government agencies or the public accepted (sanctioned) the urgency to deal with this matter.

One relevant characteristic of the Buzan et.al analytical framework in this context, nevertheless, is the fact that not all securitisation processes must be approved by the government in its role of audience, because if this were the case, then the analytical framework would be only reaffirming the traditional centrality of the state.[1061] In the case of environmental issues along the U.S.-Mexico border, in particular in reference to water pollution and its potential to generate an epidemic in the region, it is possible to argue that the process of securitisation of this issue has been incomplete because the audience (i.e. the U.S. and local governments and the public, in general) have not been convinced so far that an epidemic represents a threat to the survival of the U.S. border population –the object of security-, because of the reasons discussed above. Moreover, in the specific case of U.S.-Mexico environmental affairs, it is important to take into

[1061] Buzan et.al., *Security*, p.24.

consideration that both countries have had a long tradition of collaboration on these matters (they have shown the highest level of co-operation not seen in reference to other issues within the bilateral agenda), which is reflected in the existence of both bilateral mechanisms and institutions that albeit insufficient, have represented a forum for continued dialogue on issues of mutual interest. This is a fundamental empirical factor contributing to keep water pollution along the common border away from the security realm, maintaining thus the issue within the risk management context.

The United States and Mexico have gradually worked together through bilateral co-operation mechanisms (i.e. IBEP and B21) and environmental institutions (i.e. NADB and BECC) –discussed at length in the sections above- to address the lack of water infrastructure at the common border, keeping therefore the risk posed by water pollution to the population at the border within the political rather than within the security realm. This is a remarkable case because it shows that not all challenges at the U.S.-Mexico border become security concerns, especially considering that the common border is the key security aspect in U.S.-Mexican relations, as demonstrated by prominent issues such as drug trafficking. To sum up, in the period of study covered by this thesis, the United States securitised neither scarcity nor pollution problems related to water at the border with Mexico, basically because they were not considered a matter of survival and because of the existence of a bilateral institutional infrastructure to deal with these matters.

In terms of issue-sectors contained in the Buzan et.al analytical framework, environmental issues are more politicised by the scientific agenda than actually securitised, as discussed above. It can be argued that environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexico border has been related to the economic security sector to the extent that degradation of the border environment has derived from global economic forces, as expressed in industrial activity in the area in the context of intense intra-firm trade between both sides of the boundary. This is what the analytical framework refers to as 'the dark side of capitalism'.[1062] In this sector, the depletion and contamination of vital resources could ultimately undermine efforts to promote growth and prosperity in the region. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this has happened yet or that it will happen soon. However, an argument can be made that pollution entails costs not only in terms of resources rendered unusable, but also in terms of financial resources devoted by the

[1062] *Ibid*., p.98.

government to environmental infrastructure, even though this latter aspect could also be considered an investment in a strict sense.

The United States has not been threatened in the military sector by environmental problems on the border with Mexico. The sole exception could be an environmental catastrophe on the Mexican side of the border that could spur a northward exodus of emigrants, and in this context require the presence of the U.S. military on the border to stop that exodus. As noted in the previous chapter, massive immigration could also have ramifications in the political sector if the U.S. government were seen by the U.S. population as incapable of containing that influx. Likewise, in the societal sector this phenomenon could stir fears over the erosion of national identity precisely because of that 'invasion'.

In the environmental sector, pollution and depletion of natural resources provoked by human activity has the potential to affect human lives to the point of threatening their survival, even though this has not occurred yet. Northern Mexico has shared the same environment and the same challenges. The consequences of the operation of the liberal economy along the U.S.-Mexico border (e.g. the activities of *maquiladora* plants), has resulted in environmental degradation, just as it has also fuelled the trade in illegal narcotics.[1063] This research found that the most pressing environmental concern with potential implications for U.S. security was related to water even though this issue has not become an actual security concern. Regarding this resource, the risk was not the possibility of a 'water conflict' between the United States and Mexico because of scarcity. Rather, the central issue was the lack of adequate water infrastructure on both sides of the border, which increased the probability that water supplies would be contaminated. This was a concern of paramount importance because exposure to polluted or improperly treated water could lead to the spread of disease in epidemic proportions due to the border's own dynamic. The United States and Mexico, nevertheless, have created a comprehensive bilateral legal and institutional framework to deal with water-related controversies. Moreover, within the bilateral framework, the United States and Mexico established a workgroup to deal with health problems (i.e. Workgroup 9 under B21) should they ever occur, even though it is important to mention that the deficit in water infrastructure has lingered as an issue for the well being of U.S. communities without becoming securitised.

[1063] B. Buzan and O. Waever, 'Liberalism and Security: The Contradictions of the Liberal Leviathan', Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, April 1998, in *Columbia International Affairs Online*, (CIAO), Working Papers, [online] available: http://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/bub02 (01/29/00), p.13.

An epidemic on the border could also have consequences beyond the realm of environmental health and into the societal security sector, if an exodus from Mexico creates concerns about identity in the United States. Nevertheless, environmental concerns in the U.S.-Mexican border have been so far mainly politicised and both countries collaborate to resolve common problems. The threat most likely to be securitised in this sector could be water pollution, and in fact it would fit precisely the definition of environmental threat advanced by the framework. That is, a challenge that is the product of human activity –not nature- which allows therefore for the identification of those responsible for it. This matter has not become securitised, as discussed above, in part because of the high level of bilateral collaboration between the two countries, which has taken the 'urgency' and 'survival' factor out of the issue.

According to the Risk Society perspective, border environmental degradation, in general, represents a manufactured risk that is function of global processes manifested in demographic change and industrialisation. Border environmental concerns have been approached in U.S.-Mexican relations from a risk management perspective, which is evident in the existence of a long-standing bilateral institutional framework to deal with possible environmental scenarios along the common border, which has prevented potential issues from becoming actual security concerns. This is the fundamental difference when comparing environmental issues with drug trafficking and undocumented immigration that are both located within the security realm. In contrast to these two actual security concerns, risk management in the environmental context deals with causes more than with both causes/consequences as in the case of the two issues above. The boomerang effect in this case is related to the fact that addressing potential environmental security issues in the present, only fosters more economic activity in the future creating thus the possibility for preventive measures to be insufficient at one point to deal with environmental challenges. Nevertheless, the focus of Risk Society on the future provides a more complete understanding of environmental concerns than the Buzan et.al perspective that is unable to conclusively distinguish between issues that are extremely politicised and those that are actually securitised

6.7. Conclusions

Since the decade of the 1960s and up to the 1990s -this latter decade the focus of this research-, intense industrialisation and population growth, occurring mainly on the Mexican side, has

affected the environment of the U.S.-Mexico border. These two processes by themselves, however, do not fully explain the degradation of environmental conditions. Neglect of the border's environmental infrastructure by both the U.S. and Mexican governments has compounded the region's environmental woes.

For the United States, the area has been of marginal economic importance compared to the rest of the country and, therefore, the focus has been mainly in containing 'undesirable flows' from the south such as drugs and undocumented immigrants, although there have also been sporadic efforts to promote economic development. For Mexico, in contrast, the border has been an important platform for economic growth, and this has meant that growth has been promoted even at the expense of social and environmental considerations.

It was the trans-boundary character of environmental problems that led the governments of the United States and Mexico to take the first steps to address these matters in the 1980s, even before NAFTA's entry into force and the creation of its bilateral environmental institutions.

This chapter found that environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexican border has had the potential to affect the well being and, therefore, the security of the U.S. population (as well as of the Mexican population) in the area. This analysis has demonstrated that even though Mexico has not represented a security threat to the United States in the classical, military, sense, trans-boundary environmental challenges related to Mexico, especially water pollution, have had the potential to affect the U.S. border population. Insufficient capacity to deal with industrial and demographic growth, especially on the Mexican side of the border, has been an outstanding aspect of the problem.

This chapter argued that notwithstanding other environmental concerns such as air pollution and contamination produced by solid and hazardous waste, water pollution has been the most important environmental risk along the U.S.-Mexico border, based on the evidence found during the course of this research. In terms of the Buzan et.al analytical framework, U.S.-Mexico border environmental challenges, however, have been basically politicised rather than securitised, not only because of the analytical reasons discussed above, but because of the presence of a long-standing bilateral institutional framework to deal with environmental matters in a mutually convenient way. The potential for an epidemic deriving from water pollution along the common border has been an issue that has not been securitised so far by the United States, basically because securitising actors have not been successful in presenting this challenge in

terms of survival. The environment, in general, has remained an issue to be addressed within the bilateral political arena, and up to now it cannot be identified as a U.S. security issue, notwithstanding that U.S. security rhetoric has been increasingly incorporating the environment as a matter to be considered under the security logic.

In terms of the Risk Society theory, environmental degradation at the U.S.-Mexico border is a transnational issue that is the expression global economic forces. This concern has been focused by both countries from a risk management perspective that is evident in the existence of an institutional framework to deal with environmental issues along the common border, which has prevented these issues from becoming actual security concerns. In contrast to drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, risk management regarding the environment deals with causes rather than with consequences, notwithstanding the fact that addressing potential environmental issues in the present only delays the emergence of contingencies if the dual process of demographic change and industrialisation is not accompanied by investment in sufficient environmental infrastructure. Even though both the Buzan et.al and the Risk Society perspectives provide useful elements to understand why the environment has not become a security concern, the latter provides a more useful explanation than the former because of its focus on preventive measures, *vis-à-vis* the confusion of the former in terms of distinguishing between issues that are intensely politicised and those that are securitised.

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS

Since the end of the 'Mexican War' in the first half of the 1800s, and except for a brief period during WWII when co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries increased, it can be argued that military factors have not played a central role in the U.S.-Mexico security relationship.

From the U.S. point of view, the Mexican state itself has not represented a traditional (i.e. military) threat. Not only are military issues a low priority in the bilateral relationship, but Mexico actually contributed to U.S. security during the Cold War, for instance, by remaining a stable neighbour. In so far as Mexico presents a security threat to the United States, from the U.S. point of view, this threat emanates from non-state actors operating along the common border, taking advantage of a *de facto* existence of an integrated illegal drug and labour market. The paradox of U.S.-Mexican relations, nevertheless, is that at the same time that NAFTA intensified the linkages between the two countries, it also increased U.S. concerns about the need to protect its Southwest border from 'undesirable flows' from Mexico. In this context, the imperative of facilitating legitimate, and guarding against illegitimate, exchanges has characterised the U.S. security perspective in reference to Mexico in the context of NAFTA. Understanding why Mexico represents a threat to the United States in the context of intensified economic integration explains the focus of this thesis on the 1990s.

A broader conception of security from the 'non-traditional' literature of security resulted useful to analyse the threat Mexico indirectly poses to the United States. From the several strands of the post-positivist literature on security, this thesis opted for the Buzan et.al analytical framework because it is the one that offers a more comprehensive explanation of the issues under consideration in terms of the scope of security, in contrast to other perspectives that only emphasise the constructivist aspect of security. For instance, the Buzan et.al perspective includes both a process (securitisation) that explains why an issue becomes securitised, by who, and under what circumstances, as well as a structure (security issue-sectors) that explain the impact of security challenges in one area on others, providing thus a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics characterising a security issue in a context where the state remains a dominant rather than a central actor. This perspective, nevertheless, was complemented with insights from

Risk Society theory that provide an in-depth perspective of security by explaining the logic behind the designation of security concerns.

The identification of the issues under consideration in this thesis was based on a methodology that included reviewing first the U.S. military strategy in order to identify Mexico's military relevance for the United States from the own U.S. perspective. Since the Mexican state itself did not pose a military threat to the United States in the 1990s, very little was found by looking at U.S. defence strategy. Based on the guidelines established by the 1997 QDR, Mexico did not appear to be a priority for the United States in strict military terms. The most important finding in this regard was that the U.S. armed forces were directed to support the activities of LEAs along the common border by providing them infrastructure and intelligence to forestall trans-border security concerns, mainly drug trafficking. Mexico was nowhere addressed in a direct way in the whole QDR.

When examination turned to the broader 1997 *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, however, it was then possible to appreciate the full dimension of Mexico's relevance for U.S. national security not only in terms of challenges but also in relation to opportunities in the areas of trade, energy and promotion of democracy. Regarding drug trafficking, Mexico was an explicit U.S. concern because of the need to stem the flow of drugs through the Western Hemisphere transit zone of which Mexico is part. No mention was made, nevertheless, of Mexico as a producer country. Even though undocumented immigration was singled out as a major trans-national issue within the hemisphere, Mexico was not explicitly addressed in relation of this issue, notwithstanding the fact that the country is a major source of both legal and undocumented immigration to the United States, and this is the reason why, from the point of view of this thesis, it was relevant to analyse it as a security issue by default. It is important to note that Mexico was not mentioned at all in terms of environmental degradation. This thesis analysed U.S.-Mexico border environmental issues, nevertheless, because of two important reasons: first, in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of security at the border by analysing issues that are both actual and potential security concerns; and second, to demonstrate that non-traditional security perspectives are equally useful to analyse the two types of issues.

Firstly, regarding the illicit trade in drugs -which is not a new phenomenon-, it is important to mention that drug issues became prominent in the bilateral relationship after WWII when drug use increased in the United States. Drugs have remained one of the most important

items of the bilateral relationship, and it actually was a major source of tension during the 1980s and the 1990s. Yet, while Mexico has been a key country for U.S. anti-drug efforts, the bilateral management of the issue has been asymmetrical by being defined mainly in U.S. terms (i.e. by stressing the supply-side of the problem). While attacking the supply side of the problem has been the least politically costly alternative for Washington, it has failed to address the problem and thus has not contributed to further U.S. security. Not only has U.S. drug policy failed to make progress towards its stated goal of protecting the well being of U.S. citizens; it has also put Mexico's stability at risk by externalising the costs of fighting drugs. The consequence for Mexico has been the need to confront stronger drug organisations and greater corruption within its security agencies.

The combination of persistent demand in the United States and failed Mexican control efforts has had serious security implications for both countries. In the United States, drug use not only impairs the health and well being of U.S. citizens but also saps its economic strength, burdens its criminal justice system, and degrades its social values. In Mexico, drug trafficking has generated violence and induced the concentration of law enforcement resources in anti-drug activities in a society whose main demand, in the last decades, has been for more public safety. One of the most serious threats to Mexico, however, has been increasing corruption among its law and order institutions and, in recent years, the high level of drug-related violence in the country. Moreover, the use of the military for anti-drug operations has exposed it to drug money, thus jeopardising its prestige, its cohesion, and its historic role as one of the guarantors of the country's stability.

Drug trafficking and consumption have been successfully securitised in the United States because the audience, the public and the U.S. government itself, have legitimised the 'breaking of rules' to use 'extreme measures' to deal with an 'existential threat' conceived in terms of 'survival', because of its negative social, economic and political consequences in the country. The acceptance of drugs as a security issue has been facilitated not only because of a genuine concern for its impact on the society's health, but also because it has been a convenient justification to keep considerable law enforcement structures and budgets, as well as U.S. influence abroad on producer and transit countries. This emphasis on coercive rather than on treatment measures, however, has demonstrated that the U.S. securitisation of drugs has not been

an effective measure because of the evident failure of the U.S. sponsored so-called 'war on drugs'.

The central securitising actor that has traditionally used the 'speech act' to securitise drugs in the United States has been the federal government, mainly by framing the issue as a law enforcement/national security rather than as a health matter. This perspective has justified the coercive approach to the problem, in particular the supply- in detriment of the demand-side of the issue. The U.S. response to drugs has not only been forceful, but it has also been oriented towards transferring the cost of combating drugs abroad. This one-sided and asymmetric perspective, in turn, has been endorsed by state and local governments that have defined drugs also as a security issue and, therefore, as a law enforcement matter more in general. The securitisation has been successful to the extent that this perception has easily translated into accepting and legitimising the government discourse on drugs as a security matter, which is reflected in considerable law enforcement budgets and coercive anti-drug aid abroad. In this context, the discourse about 'secure our borders' has justified not only the need to protect against terrorist threats (especially after 9/11 which is a period beyond the scope of this thesis), but also the continuation of the coercive approach to drugs and undocumented immigration from Mexico.

The audience that accepts and legitimises the designation of drugs as a security issue in the United States is made up of the same stake-holders that propose it, especially the government through the law enforcement agencies for whom combating drugs represents the continuity, growth and permanence of their institutions. The interests and the intentions of those who securitise drugs are related, first, to the genuine concern over preventing social erosion and the impact consumption has on new generations. Moreover, the politicisation of the issue is reflected in the fact that governments at every level cannot afford to be perceived by the population as being 'soft on drugs', because this posture is not in accordance with the generally accepted, and politically convenient, 'war on drugs' rhetoric. In more specific and practical terms, there is an interest in maintaining drugs as a security matter because the acceptance of this threat is essential for justifying the significant budgets that keep the 'law enforcement industry' working, because drugs not only imply substance trafficking and consumption, but also a variety of associated crimes such as robberies, rapes, extortion, street violence, gang activity and public corruption, that in turn require responses in terms of police personnel, equipment, courts, and prisons.

It could be argued that drug trafficking is, in principle, an economic challenge emerging from the forces of demand and supply in the context of an integrated market for drugs. In the United States, drug trafficking originates from the economic security sector because of the existence of an integrated illegal drug market with Mexico, but it is also related to the societal security sector inasmuch as it threatens the population itself. Additionally, it affects the political security sector because of the potential for corruption within institutions, and because it contributes to increase crime rates. Potential large-scale violence resulting from drug control in Mexico also raises the possibility for Mexicans to migrate to the United States in search of a safer environment. In this context, the United States could face a challenge in the societal security sector as a result of a potential significant inflow of people from the south. To sum up, a challenge of an economic nature has important effects on the societal and political sectors in the United States.

In terms of Risk Society theory, drug trafficking is a trans-national concern related to the existence of an integrated drug market between Mexico and the United States, which is the product of an illicit global process and therefore a manufactured risk. In the United States, drug trafficking has been designated an actual security concern that has affected the social fabric of the country, and in the context of possible scenarios, it is considered not only to worsen social conditions but also negatively affect future generations. The United States has responded to this challenge through a risk management perspective that deals through law enforcement measures with both its actual and potential manifestation. So far, the coercive approach has only resulted in more incentives for DTOs to carry on with their lucrative activities, and this is a situation that will continue in the foreseeable future as long as drug demand remains unadressed.

Secondly, in addition to drugs, undocumented immigration is one of the most complex and sensitive items in the bilateral agenda. There are several factors that explain the sustained movement of Mexicans, legal and undocumented, to the United States. They are the so-called ‘demand-pull’ factors in the United States and ‘supply-push’ factors in Mexico, as well as the existence of ‘social networks’ across the U.S.-Mexican border. Even though immigration matters were not addressed within NAFTA negotiations, it was argued that the agreement would stimulate investment in Mexico and that it would generate more jobs that would prevent the need to emigrate in search of work. While Mexico expected that the agreement would facilitate dialogue on reducing barriers to immigration, the United States only intensified its efforts to

stem undesirable flows, including unauthorised migrants across the border, through enhanced law enforcement and border infrastructure. As a matter of fact, in the United States a clear link was established between immigration and terrorism after the 9/11 events.

In the debates about undocumented immigration in the United States, emphasis has often been placed on its negative effects and the country has responded accordingly by increasing its law enforcement measures. Changes in U.S. immigration policy have responded to the perception of immigration either as an asset or a liability, which often depends on the economic and political context of the nation. There is considerable debate over whether undocumented immigration tends to suppress the wages of native-born workers or whether it imposes a net burden on the public treasury. Regarding the last question, it can be argued that while undocumented immigrants do impose a fiscal burden in some individual states, they actually contribute more to the federal government in taxes than they receive in services.

What causes Mexican immigration to be perceived as a security concern, more than its economic or political impact, is the perception in the United States that Mexican immigration, especially undocumented, could undermine the identity of the country. A U.S. concern is the fear that an influx of Mexican immigrants could weaken the cultural identity of the country should they take advantage of their large numbers and geographical concentration to collectively resist pressure to assimilate. Though the evidence pointing to such a scenario is weak, it is difficult to dispel anxieties over immigrant assimilation, perhaps due to latent and unstated concerns over the dilution of dominant racial and ethnic, rather than merely cultural, identities.

The main securitising actors in the field of immigration are the anti-immigrant groups that include nativists, right-wing radicals and conservative organisations, more in general, who are worried first and foremost about the erosion of identity. There are some unions and Hispanic groups as well that perceive competition from newcomers. These sectors are supported by individual politicians and by each of the political parties, for different economic or ideological reasons. Some of the important actors securitising immigration, nevertheless, are state governments with a sizeable presence of undocumented immigrants. They bear the brunt of the social and economic costs associated with this presence, on the one hand, and are those which also press the federal government to deal with the problem as its own responsibility, on the other hand. Official actors such as the Border Patrol, for instance, also securitise the subject because of the need to maintain the vitality of the ‘law enforcement industry’ referred to above.

The designation of immigration as a security issue has been successful to the extent that it has been accepted by the audience, including those who promote it as such. In this context, governments have the obligation to respond to public demands to put in place measures to stop what is seen as an 'invasion'. The government is an important part of the audience accepting immigration as a security issue, and the evidence has been the creation of a DHS not only at the federal level but also within the bureaucratic structures of states on the Northern and the Southwest borders.

In Buzan et.al's terms, undocumented immigration is first of all a threat to identity within the societal sector. It is a threat because the presence of a large racially and linguistically distinct population in the United States is presumed to weaken the assimilation process. Undocumented immigration from Mexico could become a threat to U.S. security in the military sector if a serious deterioration of Mexican stability resulted in a mass movement of people to the United States, which might, in turn, compel the U.S. armed forces to seal the Southwest border. Even though this challenge emerges in the societal sector, it is of an economic nature due to the existence of a *de facto* integrated labour market between Mexico and the United States. This is another example of the challenges created by the growing interdependence between the two countries.

In the United States, the securitisation process of undocumented immigration has been successful, as mentioned above, to the extent that the audience has legitimised the 'breaking of rules' and the use of 'extraordinary measures' to confront the challenge, which has been evident not only in the series of restrictive immigration legislation approved by the U.S. Congress and local legislatures, but also in the sizeable budgets appropriated for LEAs dealing with border security.

The U.S. law enforcement approach to the issue, however, was not up to the task of effectively dealing with problem, which has been evident in its negative effects reflected in the strengthening of the human smuggling business, the use of false documents at U.S. POEs, increasing corruption and undocumented immigrant deaths at the common border. These coercive measures have not prevented the continuation of the illegal flows, basically because they have not addressed the root of the problem, which has been the U.S. economy's continued demand for foreign labour due to structural factors that have been beyond the control of both the U.S. and the Mexican governments, this latter because of its inability to stabilise its labour market.

Undocumented immigration might be a self inflicted predicament created by the United States resulting from the process of globalisation U.S. foreign policy has vigorously pursued around the world.

From the Risk society perspective, undocumented immigration is a trans-national security concern that is the product of an integrated illegal labour market between the United States and Mexico, and as such an effect of global economic forces. It is an actual security concern for the United States because of its perceived negative effect on the identity of the country and because, in a possible future scenario, the intensification of the flow might negatively affect social integration in the country. The United States has adopted a risk management approach regarding this concern that includes legislative and law enforcement measures to contain the flow. As in the case of drug trafficking, this approach does not have the purpose of dealing definitively with the problem but only to prevent this risk from growing, even though this course of action has had the unintended effect not only of blocking 'circular migration' but also increasing both the profits of criminal organisations and deaths at the common border.

Thirdly, decades of intense economic activity and a rapidly increasing population have transformed the U.S.-Mexico border region's environment. Growth has outpaced the capacity of the local resource base and exceeded the ability of border area governments, especially on the Mexican side, to establish new infrastructure to keep up with greater demands. Degradation of air and water quality standards, as well as pollution generated by hazardous waste, pose health risks to residents on both sides of the boundary.

The U.S.-Mexico border is one of the longest and busiest international boundaries in the world. Because communities on both sides of the boundary share the same natural resources, scarcity, but especially contamination, could become a problematic issue. The sizeable flow of people moving back and forth across the dividing line reminds that an outbreak of contagious disease on one side of the border would also require the attention of both nations. This study establishes that, although air quality degradation and inadequate disposal of hazardous waste do have an impact on environmental conditions along the border, water issues represent the greatest potential for directly affecting the U.S. population in the area.

Problems related to water pollution represent the most serious environmental challenge to U.S. security in the region, because of the potential for waterborne diseases to spread on both sides of the boundary. Because of common access to water sources and the intense two-way flow

of people across the border, the boundary line would pose no barrier to the transmission of disease. Such an epidemic would have broader consequences than the health problems caused either by air pollution or hazardous waste due to its mode of transmission and the higher risk of contagion. Moreover, even though water infrastructure in the region has improved in recent years, there are important needs yet to be met that represent potential vulnerabilities to the outbreak of disease. Such a scenario constitutes a hazard to the U.S. population and, as such, a potential challenge to U.S. security. There are, of course, other potential consequences of pollution besides epidemic diseases. Collectively, however, an epidemic is the most important concern.

In general terms, in the United States the environment is a subject more politicised than securitised, even though there is a concern for the environmental matters that is present in the discussion about security. Notwithstanding that the U.S. government reflects preoccupation regarding the development of clean technologies and renewable energy, there are several international instances where the United States has not shown a decided commitment in reference to the protection of the environment.

The main securitising actors that attempt the securitising move regarding the environment are the NGOs and the segments of the scientific community, for whom environmental matters represent a priority and, therefore, are interested in placing the issue at the top of the governmental agenda. In fact, trying to securitise the subject (portraying it as an extreme concern) is often the only way to elevate it (i.e. to politicise it) within the agenda.

The audience in relation to this matter includes the government and the public in general. Nevertheless, the level of acceptance is different for each of them. For the government, for instance, it is more difficult to accept the securitising move because of bureaucracies, in general, are better placed to securitise the effects rather than the causes of environmental degradation. In reference to the general public, if it is true that it is more open to be concerned about the environment, it is important to consider that only a small fraction is in fact receptive of environmental problems, and for this reason its influence is limited, at best. In the case of water pollution along the U.S.-Mexican border, the pattern of the issue is similar to what the Buzan et.al perspective describes in its analytical framework; that is, in the majority of cases, the securitising move in relation to environmental issues results in politicisation rather than in securitisation. At the end, the issues with the greatest potential to become securitised are the

consequences of man-made disasters. It is possible to argue, therefore, that because environmental issues are not readily accepted as urgent matters by the audience, they often do not become security issues. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the fact that they are not accepted as such, does not necessarily mean they do not have the potential to become an actual security challenge. This study argues that water pollution along the border can be a security matter independently of the actors and the interests. The consequence of accepting this reality, nevertheless, would be the need for both governments to aggressively invest in water infrastructure in the region. It will take more to construct water pollution along the border as a security matter. In the 1990s, both governments were satisfied with doing what they could, and were ready to securitise the environment had they ever needed to respond to a major border contingency.

This study found that environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexican border has had the potential to affect the well being and, therefore, the security of the U.S. population (as well as of the Mexican population) in the area. This analysis has demonstrated that even though Mexico has not represented a security concern to the United States in the classical, military, sense, trans-boundary environmental challenges related to Mexico, especially water pollution, have had the potential to affect the U.S. border population. Insufficient capacity to deal with industrial and demographic growth, especially on the Mexican side of the border, has been an outstanding aspect of the problem.

It was argued that notwithstanding other environmental concerns such as air pollution and contamination produced by solid and hazardous waste, water pollution was the most important environmental risk along the U.S.-Mexico border in the period of study. Environmental issues in the region were politicised rather than securitised, not only because of the analytical reasons discussed above, but because of the presence of a long-standing bilateral institutional infrastructure to deal with environmental matters in a mutually convenient way. The potential for an epidemic deriving from water pollution along the common border was not securitised by the United States, because securitising actors were not successful in presenting this challenge in terms of survival. The environment, in general, has remained an issue to be addressed within the bilateral political arena, and it cannot be identified as a U.S. security issue, notwithstanding that U.S. official rhetoric has been increasingly incorporating the environment as a matter to be considered under the security logic.

According to Risk Society theory, environmental degradation at the U.S.-Mexico border is a transnational issue that is the result of global economic forces. Potential environmental concerns have given way to a risk management perspective that is based on a bilateral institutional framework to deal with the causes rather than with the consequences of environmental issues along the common border. Addressing potential environmental issues in the present, nevertheless, only delays the emergence of contingencies if the dual process of demographic change and industrialisation in the region is not accompanied by investment in environmental infrastructure. By focusing on prevention, Risk Society theory provides a useful explanation as to why the environment has not so far become a border security concern either for the United States or Mexico.

This thesis concludes, therefore, that the paradox at the basis of this study is explained by the intensification of trans-border challenges as a result of a higher level of interdependence between the United States and Mexico in the 1990s in the context of NAFTA.

In terms of the non-traditional security perspectives, drug trafficking is an explicit U.S. security concern because it has been successfully securitised by the U.S. government by affecting the societal and political issue sectors. From a Risk Society approach, it is an issue focused from a risk management perspective that requires to be contained in the absence of meaningful demand-reduction policies.

Undocumented immigration is an implicit U.S. security concern successfully securitised by state governments and public opinion because of its impact on the societal security sector, in particular its deleterious effect on U.S. identity. It is also an issue addressed through a risk management orientation because of the existence of structural factors both in Mexico and in the United States that are likely to encourage the continuation of the flow in the foreseeable future.

Environmental degradation, in particular water pollution, represents a potential U.S. security concern that has remained outside the security realm because of efforts at securitisation have only produced its politicisation, and because of the existence of an institutional framework that, albeit insufficient, has so far prevented it from becoming a security issue. The emphasis on preventive measures to deal with potential environmental contingencies, nevertheless, explains why this issue has remained outside the security realm, notwithstanding that managing efforts at one point might become insufficient in absence of more long-terms solutions to environmental problems.

APPENDIX

Schedule of Interviews

Date	Name	Organisation	Position	Location
April 18, 2001	**David C. Fege**	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	Assistant Director, San Diego Border Liaison Office	San Diego, CA
May 22, 2001	**David E. Randolph**	U.S. Department of State	Coordinator, U.S.-Mexico Border Affairs	Washington, DC
May 22, 2001	**Patrick Whelan**	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	U.S.-Mexico Program Office of International Activities	Washington, DC
May 29, 2001	**Juan Pablo Cárdenas**	Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Executive Office of the President, The White House	Policy Analyst Mexico, Central America & Caribbean	Washington, DC
June 21, 2001	**Michael J. Pérez**	Office of the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice	Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General (former)	San Diego, CA
June 22, 2001	**Errol J. Chávez**	Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Department of Justice	Special Agent in Charge, San Diego Field Division	San Diego, CA
June 26, 2001	**Marico Sayoc**	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)	U.S.-Mexico Program Coordinator	E-mail
August 6, 2001	**Edward W. Logan**	U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury	Special Agent in Charge, Office of Investigations	San Diego, CA
August 7, 2001	**Thomas J. Umberg**	Former Deputy Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Executive Office of the President, The White House (September 1997-February 2000)	Attorney at Law Morrison & Foerster LLP	Irvine, CA
August 9, 2001	**Manuel Figueroa**	U.S. Border Patrol, El Centro Sector Headquarters	Supervisory Border Patrol Agent, Public Information Officer	El Centro, CA
September 2001	**Mark J. Spalding**	University of California, San Diego (UCSD)	Professor of the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS)	E-mail
June 21, 2002	**Ana María Salazar**	U.S. Department of Defense	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support	Mexico City

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Interviews

The Appendix contains the list and schedule of interviews for this thesis.